

## SENSATIONAL MEMOIRS

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Design by artist S. Kurbatov

Beria L.P.

"Stalin does not believe in tears." Personal diary 1937-1941 / Lavrenty Beria. - M. : Yauza-press, 2011. - 320 p. — (Spetskhran. Sensational memoirs).

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THE MAIN HISTORICAL SENSATION OF THE XXI CENTURY! Publication of the personal diary of L.P. Beria, which was supposed to be destroyed on the orders of Khrushchev, but, in full accordance with Bulgakov's famous aphorism: "Manuscripts do not burn", this priceless document was saved, kept in secret archives for more than half a century - and only now, when the muddy foam of "perestroika" subsides revelations, slander and anti-Soviet hysteria, was handed over for publication to Sergei Kremlev, author of the bestseller "Beria. The best manager of the 20th century.

This diary is a unique opportunity to look into the personal world of Stalin's closest associate and hear his own voice. These are extremely candid testimonies of the main witness of the era, shedding light on the most forbidden pages of Soviet history: the Great Terror, the catastrophic start of the Great Patriotic War, the Atomic Project, the death of I.V. Stalin... Records of 1938-1941 are published in the first volume. — from the appointment of Beria to the post of People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR to the defeat of the Nazi invaders near Moscow.

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### Publisher's Preface

The story of this book began in an unusual way - like in a movie. Three years ago, in 2007, the Yauza publishing house published my book Beria. The best manager of the 20th century". And, of course, I was glad that she was met with interest, although not always friendly.

And in the fall of 2008, a bell rang in my apartment, and after its owner found out that he was talking to Sergei Kremlev, a muffled voice asked if I was interested in new materials about Lavrenty Pavlovich?

Of course, I answered that they were interested, but it depends on which ones. My unknown interlocutor said that he knew that I did not live in Moscow, and then asked if I was going to the capital in the near future?

I replied that I was going, and we agreed to meet on the appointed day in Alexander Garden. I was informed that my interlocutor would be dressed in a brown leather cloak of "not the first, as it was said, youth", that his head "is decorated with an even older, but completely preserved, absolutely gray hair", and that he would wait for me at the artificial grotto.

"However," he added, "if you do not recognize me, then I will recognize you, because I have seen you several times in television programs."

Soon I got out to Moscow and found myself in the usual maelstrom of Moscow affairs. And when it's time

I got to the Alexander Garden and almost immediately saw a gray-haired and very old man at the grotto. He was dressed in an autumn leather coat of good leather, but shabby, which was understandable: the cut of the coat was fashionable either in the fifties, or in general in the thirties.

The white head was uncovered, the gray eyes looked inquisitively, not at all in an old man's way. Appearance - Slavic, mouth strong-willed, on the chin - a hole. My new acquaintance (more precisely, a mysterious stranger) was taller than average, he held himself very straight, almost athletic. In his left hand he held a leather briefcase, also of an old look. I don't know much, but it looks like the briefcase was real crocodile skin.

The stranger's hand was dry and cool. And the point was, as I guessed, not only that that memorable Moscow day for me turned out to be sunny, but not warm. The stranger confirmed my guess, saying that he was in his 90s, Well, at that age, the blood warms badly.

"I know that your name is Sergei Tarasovich, but you can call me," my interlocutor smiled sparingly, "for example, Pavel Lavrentievich."

I replied that I was glad to meet you and fell silent, realizing that "Pavel Lavrentievich" himself would tell me everything essential.

And so it happened. Without much conversation, "Pavel Lavrentievich" (I had no doubt that these were not his real name and patronymic) said that Beria's diaries were in his briefcase.

— Original? I asked, not believing beforehand that this was true.

"No, photocopies," my interlocutor replied.

I thought about who I was dealing with, and whether it was not in vain that I was driving here through half of Moscow. The manners and appearance of "Pavel Lavrentievich" were conducive to him, but

what he said was so unexpected for me, and even implausible, that, willy-nilly, I had to suspect him, alas, of a swindler.

"Pavel" "Lavrentievich" looked at me cheerfully and inquired:

- Do you want to make sure?

What was left for me? Of course, I said that I wanted to, and asked for how long and under what conditions "Pavel Lavrentievich" could leave these papers to me.

"I can't leave them to you," I heard the answer. - I can't even tell you in detail how they are turned out to be me.

Here I had a natural desire to take my leave immediately. However, I restrained myself and asked in my turn: how then will we cooperate with him, how does he explain the presence of such sensational material in the old portfolio, who is he, after all, and how can he confirm the authenticity of the document?

"Pavel Lavrentievich" listened to me calmly and said:

— Dear Sergey Tarasovich! Your doubts are entirely legitimate. I will explain to you everything that I can explain and want to explain, I will explain. And there decide for yourself whether to believe me or not, and cooperate with me

or not. Moreover, our cooperation, I will warn you right away, will be short. Now I will show you the diaries themselves, or rather, part of them. The fact is that the original was a very thick stack of individual sheets. The full photocopy is naturally even thicker. Therefore, I did not bring you everything, but I think this is enough. I hope you are familiar enough with Lavrenty Pavlovich's handwriting to make sure that the handwriting of the author of the diaries is similar to Beria's. Of course, you are not a graphologist, but this is at least some additional guarantee for you. You will review these sheets, and then I will give you an electronic copy of the diaries.

- Scanned? I immediately asked.

No, just typed text.

- And who recruited him?

"That shouldn't matter to you. I can't tell you much, but I'll let you know that we – I immediately noted and noted "we" – are not in a position to give you either a photocopy, a photocopy, or a scan of a photocopy for good. You will see that there are notes, archival legends and other signs that may become essential for overly curious subjects. And this is of no use to us.

- So you, as I understand it, have or had access to very closed archives? I suggested.

"We did," "Pavel Lavrentievich" replied dryly.

And here for some reason I thought that he might not be lying. There could well be people who were loyal to Beria, had access to the papers confiscated from him and took steps to copy them in case of destruction by the Khrushchevites or other scoundrels.

Are the originals available anywhere? I asked.

"I can't tell you that either. By the way, I cannot guarantee you that you will receive complete diaries. There are large gaps there for whole months. Perhaps he simply abandoned the diary for this time, perhaps some of the sheets were destroyed. And some things we just didn't have time to reshoot.

My interlocutor was old, and I asked a natural question:

— Did you personally know Lavrenty Pavlovich?

— Well, I can't talk about acquaintance, but I knew him a little personally, and I knew some of those who knew him well.

Having said this, "Pavel Lavrentievich" looked at me attentively and added:

- Beria was not just a bright and talented person

a smart man, but he was a multi-talented person. And at the same time, a good person.

"Pavel Lavrentievich" was silent for a while, then asked:

Do you remember who said this and about whom? — and he recited: — "He was kind to his comrades with human kindness, he stood up harder than iron to enemies"?

- I remember ... Mayakovsky about Lenin.

"Well, I wouldn't say that Lavrenty Pavlovich was kind to people. But he was attentive to them and was sincerely interested in making people who honestly do their job feel good.

"Pavel Lavrentievich" sighed.

Then he opened his briefcase and handed me the first stack of not new photographic paper. I started looking through it and saw a familiar hand. At first glance, it was really Beria who wrote this.

"I don't understand," I asked, "are you transferring this, well, let it not be this, but an electronic version, to me?" Why don't you publish them yourself? And why did they turn to me?

— Because after reading your "Beria" I realized that finally there was a book that allows you to put everything in its place. I like your position, Sergei Tarasovich, you wrote deeply and boldly about Beria. I would say that you wrote about Beria in the style of Beria, who did not tolerate wagging around the bush. I also watched a film about Beria, where you participated. I also liked your way of speaking and thinking. And I decided that I would not find a better option than you. We want you not only to publish these diaries, but to thoughtfully prepare them for publication and comment on them.

The offer was tempting, and I internally already agreed, but questions remained. In particular, it was necessary to understand - what "Pavel Lavrentievich" asks for the manuscript, how you can make sure of its authenticity, without even getting a copy in your hands, you need to

Should the circumstances of the receipt of materials from "Pavel Lavrentievich" be kept secret?.. However, many questions quickly disappeared. It turned out that "Pavel Lavrentievich" was ready to give me the electronic version of the diaries free of charge and without any written receipts and guarantees on my part. "I trust you," he explained, but stated that the examination of authenticity by photocopies was excluded.

"I understand that this question worries you in the first place," "Pavel Lavrentievich" said, "but, sorry, it doesn't bother me. Take what I give you, if you wish, and compare the chronology, psychology, factology, and whatever you like, in the manuscript with known historical facts. And decide for yourself whether it is authentic or not. You may publish this manuscript with any reservation you may have about its authenticity. You can publish it as your own literary work, or treat it as someone else's literary hoax, as you wish. There will be no disclosure of incognito, because you see me, dear Sergei Tarasovich, for the first and last time. I have one condition: study it carefully, prepare it for publication and try to publish it ...

"Pavel Lavrentievich" smiled and added:

— By the way, regarding copyright, if you publish it... So, consider that we transfer all copyright to you. However, it cannot be otherwise if you are the publisher of the diaries.

"But why is that, Pavel Lavrentievich?" I was surprised. - Are you afraid of something? What, these diaries contain some kind of explosive compromising material, some sensational revelations and all that sort of thing? Why such mystery?

"Pavel Lavrentievich" shook his head.

- No mystery, Sergei Tarasovich!

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What about sensations? There are no "fried" sensations there. That is why we finally settled on you, because your book very accurately restores many circumstances. You are not right in everything, but in general you are on the right track. And you will see that the diaries of Lavrenty Pavlovich confirm your correctness with all the persuasiveness of a document of the era.

I started to lose my temper.

- Especially! Is it really not important for you that the authenticity is also established with the persuasiveness of the document? Your photocopies must be submitted for state expertise! Don't you understand what it is - true diaries of Beria?! If they are genuine, of course.

- They are genuine. But I do not intend to convince anyone of this.

- That is? I didn't understand. - This is our history, "Pavel Lavrentievich"! You have no right!

And then "Pavel Lavrentievich" pulled himself up, as if a spring had straightened. I couldn't believe my eyes! In front of me sat not a ninety-year-old man, but almost a young man with sparkling young eyes.

- Young man! he almost cried. - I have the right to everything! This present time has no rights! You said that the contents of my portfolio should be submitted for state expertise... But state expertise can only exist if there is a state.

But is what we have now - in Moscow, in Kyiv, and anywhere, with the exception of Minsk - this is a state? It was Lenin, Stalin and Beria who created a mighty state and glorified it! And Khrushch and all the rest zasr..tsy fucked him up...whether. There is no state now, and I will not give anything for its "examination"!

"Pavel Lavrentievich" suddenly calmed down, but still remarked angrily:

- Yes, and no one would confirm their authenticity

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today's examination, calm down! If there were descriptions of orgies, descriptions of the intimate features of raped girls and other rubbish, then everything would have been confirmed in the best possible way. But there is nothing of this in the diaries - Lavrenty Pavlovich was a rather ascetic person, in some ways even a puritan, although he liked to dress well and loved good interiors. But what is surprising here - he was an architect, his dacha was built according to his own project. And good project!

I was sorting through the sheets, and "Pavel Lavrentievich" suddenly slapped me on the knee and said:

- You know, Sergei Tarasovich! Is it really about the diaries of Lavrenty Pavlovich? After people like him, power remained! Open the archives, bring up the minutes of the meetings, transcripts, resolutions, conduct an examination of all the false evidence of his alleged butchery and sadism - that's where an examination would not hurt. And if you are objective, then everything will fall into place once and for all. And instead of a monster in front of us will be a man. Very, by the way, worthy of respect.

It's time to part. In my case was a laser disc with an electronic version of what was presented to me as Beria's diaries.

We, having already risen from the bench, were standing when my interlocutor asked:

- I hope you will not try to find out who I am and what I am? Please don't do this.

"Pavel Lavrentievich" seemed to want to say something else, but he simply waved his hand, then held it out to me, and I shook it again, cool, but dry and strong.

On that we parted.

He left and I thought. And there was really something to think about. The way some records arose from the historical (that's just - is it historical?)

non-existence, allowed us to assume a carefully designed joke, which spared no time and effort, and a literary hoax, and - oddly enough, the authenticity of Beria's diaries.

The first cursory acquaintance with the text intrigued even more. The style, the details, and many other things told me that I was reading Lavrenty Pavlovich's diary entries.

But...

But common worldly wisdom recommends being afraid of the first impression - it is, they say, deceptive. Well, if you are inexperienced, then it is better not to rely on the first impression and to postpone the final conclusions. But if you are well-versed in something, then you can rely on the first impression. No wonder they say that information is the mother of intuition. After all, developed intuition is, as a rule, the ability to instantly assess a situation or information, taking into account all the array of knowledge and experience that a person has. And a person with a developed intuition assesses the situation correctly at a glance. In that case, of course, if in his head he had already accumulated a real array of information, and not a pitiful pile of disparate and primitive knowledge. I knew quite a bit about Lavrenty Pavlovich. And my first impression, not without reason, inclined me to believe in the authenticity of the text.

What about the second impression?

And the third?

Yes, I knew quite a bit. However, I still knew much less than what I should have known about Beria in order to make this or that verdict like this, right away. Reliable information about Lavrenty Pavlovich is too scarce. Only information contained in archival documents that bear one or another imprint of Beria's activities can be considered completely reliable, but wide access to archives "according to

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Beria" has no one to this day. If, however, someone received at least partial access, as, for example, prosecutor Sukhomlinov, who studied the "investigative file" of Beria (obviously shot by the time "his" "case" was concocted), then it is unlikely that the author of the book "Who are you, Lavrenty Beria?" was interested in recreating the true appearance of Lavrenty Pavlovich.

But the fact that this is not the appearance of a monster (as General Volkogonov, who is now licking frying pans in hell, called him), not a sadist and not a petty tyrant, is clear both from the documents and from the fact that there are no documents. Indeed, to this day, none of the slanderers of Beria has presented any archival documents that would reliably denounce Beria as a "beast" and show him as a "bloody executioner". I think if such documents were at the disposal of the "democrats" and liberals, they would shake them at all corners.

But here - do not shake.

Former Leningrad, and now St. Petersburg "historian" Lev Lurie promised me to send mountains of evidence of Beria's alleged "butchery", allegedly found by him and the film crew of the film "Defendant Beria" in the archives of the KGB of the Georgian SSR. However, I did not wait for the "incriminating documents". They were not presented on the screen either.

There is no such evidence in the published documents of that era (fakes like "Katyn" documents, of course, cannot be considered).

But there are published documents proving the opposite. And they show Beria as a sometimes tough, but humane manager, whose concern for people was expressed not in patting them on the back, but in providing normal ones - how much it depends on the leader

— conditions for the manifestation of business qualities by people, as well as reasonable care for the life of those whose fates are entrusted to you.

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However, what we have so far is clearly not enough to compile a detailed biochronicle of Lavrenty Pavlovich, that is, a chronicle of the life and work of a historical person by day, and sometimes by hour. If it were, one could compare with it the text that "Pavel Lavrentievich" offered me as Beria's diaries. Alas, we do not have a biochronicle of Beria, so even a superficial identification of the text was a problem.

I've been thinking...

There were no rough, immediately distinguishable overlays in the diary text. But in itself this did not prove anything, although everything that I knew for certain about Beria made it possible to interpret the printout in front of me as a genuine document of the era.

An interesting question was how to evaluate the fact that the original, as follows from the photocopies, was written in Russian. To what extent did this fact prove the authenticity of the text or, on the contrary, its falsification?

Beria was a Mingrelian and his native language was, of course, Georgian. However, he knew the Russian language since childhood. And the fact that the diary was written in Russian was, for me personally, another proof of its authenticity, at least from the psychological point of view. Let me elaborate on this...

I do not know how well Beria mastered Georgian writing. The fact that he owned it is beyond doubt, because he studied at an Abkhazian school in the Caucasus. But it is also beyond doubt that he switched early in writing to Russian. And this is understandable from any point of view. Beria well understood the importance of the Russian language for success in life. And for that; that he was early oriented—by himself—to achieve such a goal, all his subsequent biography says. Lavrenty Pavlovich always had a pronounced enormous capacity for work and such an outstanding nature,

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that would be doomed to success even in the conditions of tsarist Russia. After all, he had clear engineering and organizational skills and inclinations.

However, his active nature in the conditions of growing destabilization in the Russian Empire could lead him to the camp of professional revolutionaries. Beria was disinterested, in personal requests he was quite modest and emotionally mobile. In fact, in the terrible storms approaching Russia, he chose the fate not of a witness, but of a participant in the era, surrendering to the struggle on the "red" side of the barricades.

In any case, both for an engineering career and for revolutionary work, a good knowledge of the Russian language was necessary. Moreover, the skill of writing was even more important than conversational skills. Let's remember Stalin. His first works were published in the Tiflis social-democratic newspaper "Vrdzola" ("Struggle") in Georgian, but Stalin quickly switched to Russian, without which his opportunities as an all-Russian theoretician and the practice of revolution could not be expanded and strengthened.

With Beria, the situation was — at his level — similar, so he absolutely needed Russian as a written language already in his youth. All his subsequent life only improved and deepened the skill of expressing thoughts on paper in Russian. At the same time, Beria wrote very competently. The numerous mistakes and often clumsy expressions that he made in his "letters from the bunker" after his arrest in June 1953 are explained, as I understand it, by great mental stress, as well as by the fact that he lost his pince-nez.

If we talk about the language of the diary, then it cannot be called literary smooth, but this is understandable - the diary was kept by an extremely busy person, irregularly, and these were, as they say, hasty draft entries "for the soul". This explains, presumably, not

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numerous spelling and more frequent syntax errors.

But it is difficult to compare the diary with texts authentically penned by Beria, because, as far as I know, there are only five authentically written by Beria personally and published documents.

This is, firstly, an autobiography, written by him on October 22, 1923. The second document deserves special mention, it is a letter dictated by Beria in 1953 to KB-11 about the accident with a research reactor that took place there. Both documents characterize Beria's business-like literary style, but the level of literacy can only be judged from the first document, and this level is quite acceptable for a young Mingrelian Georgian. There is no doubt that over the years the level of Beria's written literacy only increased, and this is quite understandable: Stalin himself was an absolutely literate person and was very intolerant of the illiteracy of his employees. Therefore, for this reason, Beria could not but work on his level of written literacy, as well as on his business literary style.

However, in the other three authentic documents – I mean three letters from Beria, written by him on June 28, July 1 and 2, 1953, to the Central Committee after his arrest, the level of literacy and style, as they say, are "lame". A number of very intelligent researchers, and most of all Yu.I. Mukhin deny the authenticity of these letters; but in my opinion, it was L.P. who wrote these three letters. Beria, but wrote them in a state of a very complex psycho-physiological structure, when in his soul and mind in the most bizarre way, complete confusion and saved reserves of energy, unwillingness to believe that long-term comrades and colleagues can so unexpectedly, undeservedly and vilely betray him, and with

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a stored ability for sober analysis, a simple human fear of an uncertain future and thoughts about its already complete predestination, combined with inevitable thoughts about how much more needs and could be done in life for that mighty state, one of the creators of which he was. Being in this state, one can forget about the rules of grammar, style, and syntax. A diary is not kept in a state of shock, but the style of the diary given to me was something between a literary and grammatical norm and its violation. And this is also understandable. Beria was, of course, a very emotionally mobile person, but at the same time he knew how to restrain himself when the situation required it. Moreover, every day he had to restrain himself, "going out" sometimes "out of himself" rather for educational purposes, so to speak. There was no need to hold back or adhere to grammatical rules alone, but in the subconscious mind there was a feeling of a permanent lack of time. Hence, as I understand it, either the absence or the presence of, for example, colons before direct speech, then quoted, then not quoted or not completely quoted direct speech, etc. However, more important was the question on the merits - could Beria, an experienced Chekist, keep a diary at all? Well, why not? Especially since 1938. By that time, Lavrenty Pavlovich, of course, was internally very tired. So why couldn't he create an extra little moral outlet for himself? An outlet in that damned daily whirlwind in which all the top leadership of the USSR, and especially Stalin and Beria, revolved year after year of hard work. Especially since June 22, 1941. Moreover, the psychological stress of Beria was then, perhaps, in some ways even more difficult than that of Stalin. Stalin answered only to history and the country. It was

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a very heavy load, but still a somewhat abstract load. Beria, on the other hand, answered specifically to Comrade Stalin, although the scope of Beria's activity and responsibility was also historical and stately.

One way or another, keeping a diary was completely out of the question for Stalin from any point of view. Although Stalin, by the way, was not so completely encased in armor. He even took a great interest in collecting — he collected watches. He even collected autographs, although not in the way that exalted girls do who lose their minds from rock stars.

But a diary?

No, Stalin's diary, if it were ever "found", cannot be authentic. Stalin's "diary" was Poskrebyshev. It's not for nothing that this also slips through Beria ("My diary is secretaries").

So what about the assumption that Beria could keep some kind of diary? Well, it is, I repeat, in my opinion, psychologically reliable. The question of a possible diary of Beria, of course, arose more than once. And, for example, the well-known researcher of modern history Arsen Benikovich Martirosyan in his book "100 Myths about Beria" ridiculed the very idea that Beria could keep a diary. Like, Chekists do not keep diaries.

No, it happens, they lead. And not only security officers. Without going into this delicate issue in detail, let me remind you that a personal and very frank diary was kept by such a cunning fox and intelligence ace as Admiral Canaris. He "burned out" on it.

And here is another example... The well-deserved Soviet writer Georgy Bryantsev, the author of a number of fascinating books (including the classic "The End of the Wasp's Nest"), was himself a good Chekist, during the war he performed special tasks behind the front line.

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she, of course, knew the KGB environment well. At the same time, his novel about Chekists "On Thin Ice" begins with the title "Diary of Lieutenant Trapeznikov". And the main character of the book, the deceased Chekist Dmitry Bragin, kept notes in a notebook behind enemy lines.

By the way, the legendary, but still real, Nikolai Kuznetsov was detained by Bandera, having with him a written report on his work - also a kind of diary. Keeping it with you, behind enemy lines, was not the most prudent decision, but what to do - Chekists are people too.

Like Stalin's Chekist No. 1 Beria.

As it is reliably known today, some very important state figures in the USSR kept diaries, for example, V.A. Malyshev. In general, he kept a very detailed diary, where he immediately wrote down, for example, his conversations with Stalin, including by telephone. It was a kind of personal office diary, but it was still a diary!

All of the above, although indirectly, but confirmed the possibility of the existence of the diary of Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria and spoke in favor of "Pavel Lavrentievich".

Yes, everything in the materials of Pavel Lavrentievich looked plausible.

However, I thought about it.

False "diaries" of certain historical figures are a phenomenon that has taken root in literature not yesterday. Suffice it to recall the famous "memoirs of d'Artagnan" by Sandra de Courtil. They gave the initial impetus for the creation of the brilliant Musketeer trilogy by Dumas, but they were,

alas, fake. However, although these "memoirs" did not come from the pen of the one who was formally designated by their author, they belonged to the era. Reading memoirs

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d'Artagnan, even in quotation marks, is not only fascinating, but also useful for understanding the essence of those days and knowing the real history of France and Europe.

In our century, the "diaries of Vyrubova", the famous friend and maid of honor of the last Russian Empress, turned out to be the same clever literary hoax of the Pushkin scholar Shchegolev.

After the Second World War, "Bormann's diaries" of dubious authenticity appeared in the West, and even more dubious "diaries of Muller" — the chief of the Gestapo, who allegedly took refuge in the United States under the wing of overseas special services.

However, Beria's obviously false "memoirs" also saw the light. In 1992, a book was published in Russian with a print run of 100,000, which was called "Beria's Diaries". The publisher's annotation of the Ekaterinburg MP "Konver" said:

"The sensational bestseller by the American writer (Alan Williams. — Note S.K.) is based on the personal diaries of Beria, the famous chief of the Stalinist secret police, which became a sensational exposure of the barbaric methods of Soviet politics and contain new facts from the history of the post-war Soviet Union. Veteran Union. The detective plot of the book includes the history of these diaries, which are being sold to an American publisher for three million dollars. The two most secret services in the world, the KGB and the CIA, are ordered to reveal the origin of Beria's personal papers.

I don't know if the American writer Alan Williams existed in nature, but the "Beria diaries" featured in his (?) bestseller were absent in real life, even according to Williams. Williams' book describes the history of the creation of these diaries by two clever swindlers, former employees of Radio Free Europe, Russian defector Boris Drobnov and Anglo-Saxon Thomas Malory.

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With the help of Tatana, a Georgian non-returner, Tatyana Bernshtein, after her Israeli husband, the "diaries" are translated into Mingrelian (?) and typed on a typewriter in Georgian script. Then they are offered to publishers, but it all ends with the fact that the CIA agents remove Malory and Tatana so that the fact of the forgery of "compromising evidence" does not become known to anyone, and the KGB agents steal Drobnov, who, in order not to return to the "Sovdepiya", is thrown out of the moth.

It must be said that the story of how the "diaries of Beria" were cooked up is itself hastily slapped and only for a very unpretentious taste can seem like a bestseller.

Beria's father, a peasant, becomes Alan Williams' "local official under the liberal tsarist regime", Beria himself becomes "Yagoda's chief agent in Geneva and Paris in 1928-1929", a recruiter of the "Cambridge" Burgess, McLean and Philby, as well as the first secretary of the never-existing "Transcaucasian Communist Party" (Beria was the first secretary of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia).

About the most active and intelligent member of the State Defense Committee, who in 1944 became Deputy Chairman of the State Defense Committee I.V. Stalin, Williams' book says that "his activity in the committee was deplorable."

Well, such "little things" as the title of Hero of the Soviet Union in 1943 instead of the title of Hero of Socialist Labor actually received by Lavrenty Pavlovich and the 15 million "Beria" Gulag during the war can no longer be counted.

However, one cannot but admit that the creator of Beria's "diaries" was not bad - for the beginning of the 90s - aware of many real delicate or unfortunate things.

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obvious details of the historical situation in Stalin's USSR. But a number of accurate information and assessments do not change the general low quality of the forgery and its unambiguous anti-historical character.

From the "diaries of Beria" by Alan Williams, Lavrenty Pavlovich appears before the reader as a voluptuous, cynic and intriguer. At the same time, Beria by Williams-Malory-Drobnov naturally turns out to be a good writer with his own literary style.

In general, he turns out to be a fool.

A fool because if Napoleon did not trust his plans even to a pillow, then Beria - according to Williams - trusted paper, for example, this is what:

"I take care of the staff. Rafik presented a full report on our capabilities. A special force of 300,000 men with experienced commanders whom I can rely on, because they know that if they sweep me away, they will be swept away ... "

This was allegedly written by Beria in Barvikha in November 1952 and allegedly proves that he was preparing a coup d'etat and the assassination of Stalin.

The first alleged diary entry in Williams' book begins like this:

"Gagra, June 1949.

Woke up at sunrise with a feeling of cheerfulness in the body and a strong carnal desire. The Black Sea, as usual, had a wonderful effect on my body. (Even after yesterday's drink, my head was completely clear.) ... "

Next, allegedly Beria describes the boat ride, often mentioned in anti-Beria literature: "I burst out laughing and asked him how he likes my toy (boat. — S.K.)? After all, the truth is a good thing,

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right for a Western playboy (well, well, the word is clearly from Beria's dictionary. - S.K.) with girls.

Then a "girl" appears, allegedly "hooked up" in the sea by a certain "famous Soviet champion in long-distance swimming" Lyudmila.

Allegedly, Beria writes about her in "his" alleged diary:

"I slowed down, grabbed the binoculars and pointed at her. Wow! Well, just a figurine, all golden-brown in a dazzling white bathing suit; when the men pulled her on board, her buttocks stuck out like two ripe plums ... "

"Lyudmila" stayed, of course, for the night and "we had a good time, I did whatever I wanted with her, but she turned out to be a good student."

All this could, perhaps, convince someone. But here's the bad luck - the study of the now fully published (indicated circulation, however, 350 copies) Journal of Records of Persons Accepted by I.V. Stalin in 1924-1953, shows that L.P. Beria was present at meetings with Stalin on 1, 4, 10, 11, 18, 20, 25, 29 June 1949.

That is, Beria was at all the June meetings of 1949 in Stalin's office.

He was there at all the July meetings of 1949: July 2, 6, 9, 13, 16, 18, 23, 25, 29, 30 ...

And on all August - too. They took place at Stalin on August 1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12, 15, 18, 19, 20, 22 with the participation of Beria, until August 24, 1949. A day later, Beria left for Kazakhstan at the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site, for the forthcoming August 29, 1949, the first test of the Soviet atomic bomb.

On June 2, 9, 16, 23 and 30, July 7, 14 and 21, August 10, 18, 16, 25, 1949, Beria took part in meetings of the Bureau of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and on June 16, July 7,

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On August 10, 13, 16, 1949, he chaired these meetings.

On June 4, 1949, Beria signed the list of draft resolutions and orders of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the atomic problem presented to Stalin.

On June 17, 1949, Beria took part in a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

On June 23, 1949, Beria imposed a visa on a note from the First Deputy Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR Sokolovsky and Chief of the General Staff Shtemenko on the desirability of transferring 105, 106, 107 and 108 military road units to the USSR Ministry of State Security.

The schedule, as we see, is diverse, rich and completely Moscow. So Lavrenty Pavlovich could not have fun with the champion "Lyudmila" in Gagra in June 1949.

Analyzing Williamea's Diaries in detail is a waste of time. Suffice it to say that the overall low — even in today's times of triumphant incompetence — level of the "bestseller" ruled out the possibility of its reprints in the future - after the first publication in 1992. It must be assumed that a circulation of one hundred thousand has completely saturated the emerging "Russian" market for such waste paper once and for all.

What "Pavel Lavrentievich" gave me was fundamentally different and looked like the truth. That is why I agreed to undertake the work of preparing the manuscript for publication with a number of necessary references, comments and notes.

As I worked — and in two years I had to work a lot, checking dates and facts, rummaging through archival documents available to me and all sorts of memoirs and "memoirs" — my sense of the text and the era naturally grew. And now, at the end of

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bots, I would like to share with the reader a number of my observations and guesses.

Here, for example, is an interesting, in my opinion, moment. There is not a single entry in the diary concerning the work of Bureau No. 2 under the Chairman of the Special Committee, through which the main flow of intelligence information on atomic issues went. In the now declassified documents of the Soviet Atomic Project, this side of the issue is well covered, and one can find many requests from various leaders to inform a number of their subordinates with sensitive information. Thus, Academician Khlopin twice addressed personally to Beria with a similar request, and Kurchatov repeatedly asked the same about it.

Contrary to popular misconception, from a certain point on, the circle of those who, one way or another, was allowed to get acquainted with the materials of Bureau No. 2 was very large. By January 4, 1949, the list of acquaintances included 35 names, including academicians Kurchatov, Semyonov, Khlopin, Ioffe, Vavilov, and other scientists involved in the atomic problem, including Khariton, Zeldovich, Frank-Kamenetsky, and others.

Judging by the lack of records, Beria himself did not care much about this issue, he was on the periphery of his interests. And from this detail alone, one can understand how high was the general level of problems that occupied L.P. Beria as a statesman, if the fact of receiving valuable information on nuclear issues from abroad was, presumably, insignificant for him from the standpoint of keeping a personal diary.

It is also interesting how Beria refers to Stalin in private with himself - either "Comrade Stalin", or simply "Koba". Moreover, the official, so to speak, version in some cases looks like it is imbued with bitter irony or annoyance, and in some cases almost mockingly. Psychologically, this is understandable. There is not stupid

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saying: "The older we get, the more peers we have." That's right. Stalin was exactly twenty years older than Beria. In 1919, the twenty-year-old Beria, even in his thoughts, could not put himself close to Stalin and somehow compare himself with him.

But what about in 1949, when Beria was fifty and Stalin was seventy?

Characteristic in this regard is the detail with the signatures of Stalin and Beria.

Stalin for a long time signed in full "Stalin", and put the visa in the upper left corner. Over the years, the abbreviated signature "I St." becomes the norm, while Stalin imposes his signature directly on the text. Beria used the full signature "L Beria" to the end, but his most recent published autograph - the signature on the unregistered Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR "On the tasks and test program at the test site No. 2" in 1953 looks like this: "L B" . After all, this also, perhaps, speaks of a psychologically different, higher level of self-awareness.

Beria, of course, respected Stalin to the end, but since the beginning of at least the 50s he could no longer look at him only from the bottom up. As effective managers, by that time they were already worth, perhaps, each other.

At the same time, both of them, both Stalin and Beria, were very tired in 1953 - tired of everything! From the burden of state problems, from the inevitable flattery of those around us, from the diverse, so to speak, monotony of everyday life.

But Stalin was twenty years older, Beria had a head start of two decades and understood that during these years he and the country could accomplish a lot. And Stalin's stubborn unwillingness to formally make Beria his successor could not offend Lavrenty Pavlovich.

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to reap, and sometimes to anger. And here the student was right, not the teacher.

It is necessary, perhaps, to say a few words about the shift of dates in the diaries of the war years. Sometimes an entry for a particular date is dated by one day; but it could have been done only the next day, judging by the now published journal of visits to the Kremlin office of I.V. Stalin.

This is quite understandable - Stalin's meetings were held, as a rule, in the second half of the day until midnight and later, with a transition to the night of the next day. In other words, for Stalin's closest collaborators, to whom, of course, Beria also belonged, night turned into day, day into night, and personal records were dated taking into account this peculiarity of life.

During the first period of my work, when I was only mastering the text, I was embarrassed by both long, sometimes interruptions in notes, and their small number in some years, especially in the second half of 1941, in 1942, 1950 and 1951. But then I - at least for myself - found an explanation for this.

The paucity of entries for the first year and a half of the war is quite understandable. As objective memoirists testify, then Beria could be found in his office "alive" or on the phone at almost any moment of the day.

However, as "Pavel Lavrentievich" admitted, perhaps part of the text was removed before he and his comrades could photocopy the diaries. I will dwell on this piquant moment in more detail in the commentary to the diary entry dated June 10, 1941. Immediately I recommend the reader to read this comment carefully.

By the spring of 1943, the situation had acquired features of stability and confidence in the outcome of the war, which would be favorable for the USSR. Beria had more free time. On the other hand, the need for a trusted

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The "interlocutor" increased because Beria had a split in the family - he had a woman, which he then told his wife Nino about. The result was, of course, the alienation of the spouses, which Beria endured hard (more on this will be discussed in the afterword).

I explain the meager volume of the diary for 1950 by the high tone of its author at that time, and also the meager volume of entries for 1951, on the contrary, by the fact that in 1951 Lavrenty Pavlovich, judging by the diary, was more often visited by minor thoughts and moods.

And there are reasons for that. Too many problems had accumulated in the USSR by 1951. Beria could not fail to see all their complexity and multidimensionality. He was aware that these problems could be solved, but at the same time he could not but realize how much effort had to be made for this, including him. But he was no longer a youth with burning eyes.

However, the relative paucity of the volume of the diary for a number of post-war years may have another explanation (see, in particular, the commentary to the diary entry dated June 10, 1941).

I must say that the work on preparing the diary of L.P. Beria for publication only strengthened my conclusions that I made earlier regarding Beria and his era. These conclusions have already been stated by me in a number of my books.

As for Beria's diaries, they did not contain any "dirty linen" in the sense that this expression is usually attached to. Yes, there could not be anything like this in Beria's diaries: no one bribed Stalin's associates with blocks of shares, they did not have secret sadistic inclinations and did not engage in kickbacks.

Another thing is the coverage of certain periods in the history of the USSR. Here you can talk about a sensation (as an unexpected revelation). For example, as it should

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from diaries; It was Beria who, in contrast to the established clichés, with his objective information about the threat of war in a timely manner, a few days before June 22, 1941, broke Stalin's conviction that the war in 1941 could be avoided. Such a fact of course, sensational.

And yet, Beria's notes do not reveal any "dirty" "secrets of the Kremlin court." Therefore, we can say that the sensationalism of Beria's diary also lies in the fact that there is no sensation (like some "fried" facts) in them! What they confirm: at the highest level of the Stalinist leadership there were no particularly juicy secrets.

I repeat: none of the, so to speak, benign, that is, Stalin's "team" that went with him until the end of his life, was either a secret pedophile or a homosexual, or a secret

provocateur of the Okhrana or a drunken alcoholic, neither a miser-accumulator, nor a corrupt official, nor a forerunner of all sorts of "watergates" and "courchevels" ...

The truth of that era is that normal people, far from angels, but not devils with horns, were then engaged in a big and important state business. They built a state, defended it, restored what was destroyed, developed it.

And they led - albeit not always perfectly - this process.

In the collection of documents "The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of Ministers of the USSR. 1945-1953", published in 2002, on p. 154-157 three notes by L.P. Beria in the Bureau of the Council of Ministers of the USSR: on the state of timber rafting dated February 26, 1948, on the mechanization of logging dated March 14, 1948, and according to the report of the Minister of Forestry and Paper Industry of the USSR dated September 28, 1948.

Only three serious papers on the same topic! But year after year the number of them passing through

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Beria during the year, reached at least two or three thousand! And - but a good ten topics!

What perseverance and hard work one had to have to at least read all this! But it was necessary to assimilate, comprehend what was read, and not just like that, but to make decisions. And not just decisions, but correct, competent decisions in very different spheres of life and activity of the state, economy, and society.

There is no doubt, as a rule, Beria personally did not prepare the "fish" of his notes, letters, etc. on specialized issues. Draft documents were prepared by his assistants, experts in specific issues. But all the same, the flow of outgoing and incoming documents passed through Beria and Beria was effectively and competently controlled!

What intrigues, tricks, "secrets of the Kremlin court" and "Kremlin cuisine" are here! It would be good to get to bed and sip some soup. One consolation is to escape to your native places on vacation, since these native places are just a piece of paradise.

Yes, except to snatch - when five minutes, and when half an hour - for a secret "buddy" - diary.

It remains for me to say the following.

The original electronic version did not have a breakdown by year. Recordings go together year after year. I, for the convenience of the reader and my own, have given the entries of each year an appropriate heading.

Further... Checking punctuation shows that punctuation marks are most often present (but often not present) where they are supposed to be, that is, the author of the text had a good syntactic culture. There are practically no grammatical errors in the manuscript, except for obvious slips of the pen. But Beria was generally very literate and well educated, had a taste for reading.

The further I advanced in the analysis of the transmitted

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materials, the more I had possible questions to "Pavel Lavrentievich" and his unknown assistants. Alas, I was deprived of it. I would be grateful if "Pavel Lavrentievich", God bless him, found it possible to respond and clarify at least for me a number of unclear points.

One way or another, my tedious, I confess, work is finally finished. And I present its results to the judgment of readers, without hiding from them the circumstances that preceded the publication.  
books.

I don't know if "Pavel Lavrentievich" is alive now. Even the strongest-looking old people over the age of ninety can leave unexpectedly, at any moment, but I hope that "Pavel Lavrentievich" is still alive and well and will read this book.

Sergei Kremlev (Brezkun)

Beria: the way from the Caucasus to Moscow Introductory essay

The biography of Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria is still not widely known today, so I considered it appropriate to remind the reader of something, starting with a biographical note about him published in the mass reference calendar for 1941, published by the State Socio-Economic publishing house (Sotsekgiz):

Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria was born on March 29, 1899 in the village of Merkheuli (Georgian SSR) into a poor peasant family. Comrade Beria joined the Bolshevik Party in March 1917 in Baku. In 1918-1920, during the reign of the Mussavatists and Mensheviks in Transcaucasia, Comrade Beria conducted active underground work in Baku and Georgia. In 1920 Comrade Beria was arrested by the Menshevik government of Georgia. At the insistence of S.M. Kirov, who at that time worked as the plenipotentiary representative of Soviet Russia in Georgia, Comrade Beria was expelled from Georgia to Soviet Azerbaijan. Since 1921, Comrade Beria has been in leadership work in the Soviet intelligence agencies. Since November 1931 - the first secretary of the Central Committee of the CP (b) of Georgia, in 1932 and the first secretary of the Transcaucasian regional committee of the CPSU (b) ...

Since the end of 1938, Comrade Beria has been People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR. From the KhUP congress - a member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, since March 1939 - a candidate member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Tov. Beria is one of the most prominent leaders of the CPSU (b) and the closest students and associates of Comrade Stalin ... "

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So it was, basically. At first, work in the bodies of the Cheka and the OGPU, then, after Beria had established himself as an active worker, able to quickly understand diverse problems and solve them, he was transferred to major party work. Since 1932, Beria has been the formal and informal leader of the entire Transcaucasus.

Could it be otherwise? Could - in the sense that Beria could step to the leading party heights not from the organs of the OGPU, but, for example, after working in the national economy. The fact is that Beria really wanted to become a civil engineer, but rather an architect. Even before the revolution, he entered the Baku Mechanical Construction School and graduated from it in 1918. After the establishment of Soviet power in Azerbaijan, the school was transformed into the Polytechnic Institute in the fall of 1920, and Beria immediately entered it.

He wants to be a student, but he did not have to finish his studies - the party said that he should become a Chekist. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan appoints 22-year-old Lavrenty Beria to the Azerbaijan Cheka as deputy head of the secret operations department (SPO), and soon as head of the SPO and deputy chairman of the AZChK.

In November 1922, by order of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee, Beria was recalled from the AzCHEK to the disposal of the Central Committee of the CP (b) of Georgia. In Tiflis, he was appointed head of the secret operational unit and deputy chairman of the Cheka of Georgia.

By the time Stalin decided to transfer L.P. Beria to leading party work, he already headed the entire OGPU of Transcaucasia. I must say that Beria, as the head of the Chekists of Transcaucasia, had to work in especially difficult conditions, but he worked not only efficiently, but also - on-



as far as it was possible - bloodless. There is a well-known story of the Menshevik emissary Dzhugeli, who was arrested by the GruzChK and appealed from prison to his comrades with an appeal to stop the struggle because of its senselessness. It was Beria who convinced Dzhugeli to do so. And that was his style.

Becoming the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia in 1931, Beria led the republic until the end of the summer of 1938. From 1932 until the division in 1936 of the Transcaucasian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (TSFSR) into the Azerbaijan, Armenian and Georgian SSRs, Beria led, as the first secretary of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the entire Transcaucasus.

When "advanced" "democratic" "historians" talk about the Caucasian period of Beria's activity, they only remember the repressions of 1937-1938, which he allegedly inflated to enormous proportions. However, in reality, L.P. Beria went down in history (even if it is hushed up now) as the most outstanding and effective reformer of the Caucasus and, above all, Georgia.

By 1940, the Georgian SSR held an absolute record among all other union republics, including the RSFSR, in terms of economic development. If we take 1913 as a unit, then by 1940 the volume of industrial production in Georgia increased by 10 times, and agricultural production by 2.5 times, with a fundamental change in the structure of agriculture towards highly profitable crops of the subtropical zone.

As for the "bloody repressions", by the end of the Chekist operation of 1937-1938, about one out of 277 residents of Georgia was imprisoned in various prisons and camps of the NKVD. For comparison, let me remind you; that in the current "Rossiania" "sits" with

approximately one in 150, that is, in Beria's time in Georgia, the number of prisoners per 1,000 people was approximately two times less than in Yeltsinoid "Rossiyania" in the current "democratic" times.

Even according to very suspicious estimates of the end of 1953, in Georgia in 1937-1938, 8 thousand people were sentenced to capital punishment. Is this a lot or a little for turbulent times, when a sharp social struggle between the new and the old turned out to be a real feature of life, and vice versa?

Now the "accountants" of the unfortunate "reformer" Saakadze are increasing the number of those repressed in Georgia in the 1st category (that is, those sentenced to capital punishment) to 15,000 people, which is even more doubtful. But if we accept such a figure as reliable, what then? With a population of Georgia of 3.5 million people, this gives four shots per thousand inhabitants. Is it a lot or a little?

Back in 1920, Georgia was Menshevik. In fact, the government party of the Mensheviks then numbered up to 80,000 members, of which at least 10 percent were active, including functionaries. There were no more than two thousand Georgian Bolsheviks at that time.

Anti-Soviet and anti-Russian sentiments were encouraged and fed not only by the Mensheviks, but also by their Western patrons. In Georgia, as well as in Transcaucasia in general, the Americans with the British, the French with the Turks, and even the Poles (the latter, by the way, very actively) actively planted their agents. The Georgian proletariat was still weak, but there was a large stratum of merchants, nobles, various kinds of princes, merchants, semi-criminal lumpen, etc.

So the question is - what, in a Georgian town with a population of, say, five thousand in the late 30s years

were there not two dozen active enemies of Soviet power?

Yes, there were more! Apart from the traditional for the Caucasus corrupt officials.

However, despite the slander against him, Beria did not have executioner inclinations (he did not even like hunting, preferring fishing to it) and took the inevitable repressive measures in that situation so that, if possible, minimize them. Nevertheless, his repressive policy turned out to be very effective in the sense that the Germans did not have an active "fifth column" in Georgia and in the Transcaucasus in general, despite all their strategic importance, even during their greatest success in the Caucasus.

A possible German occupation of Georgia would take at least 50,000-60,000 lives of Georgians alone (not to mention Georgian Jews). That is, at any angle of view — unless, of course, black glasses are worn — the objective "arithmetic" of repressions in Georgia does not blame, but justifies Beria. He and his security officers managed to improve the internal situation in the republic with the minimum possible bloodshed.

It was impossible to do without bloodshed at all, because the presence of a powerful "fifth column" on the eve of a possible big war would lead to much more bloodshed in the event of a war.

As already mentioned, Georgia under the leadership of Beria developed extremely dynamically and, at the same time, harmoniously. Beria in Georgia is the first flourishing of the Georgian economy, science, education, culture (including physical) ... This is the period of reconstruction of Tbilisi, mass urban and industrial construction, transformation of Georgia into an all-Union resort area. However, at the end of the summer of 1938, Beria left Georgia for Moscow forever at the call of Stalin.

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Stalin again needed the Chekist Beria, and not the socialist manager Beria. Looking ahead, I will say that in the NKVD, Beria proved himself first of all as an effective reformer, and then rather quickly grew into an outstanding figure on a nationwide scale.

At the same time, the appointment of L.P. Beria in the NKVD was logical not only because Stalin was fed up with various kinds of politicians at the head of the NKVD, who now and then strove to get themselves and others into one or another anti-Stalinist, but in fact into anti-Soviet conspiracies. With regard to Beria, there could be no doubt in advance that he would sensibly, selflessly and honestly engage in direct work, strengthening, and not undermining the state.

However, the essence was not only in this, as well as not only in the fact that Beria had a huge purely KGB experience. It is little known, but Beria was a member of that narrow commission that was formed by the Politburo on March 20, 1934 to develop the draft Regulations on the NKVD of the USSR and the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR.

Here is the composition of the commission: Kaganovich (chairman), Kuibyshev, Yagoda, Art. Kosior, Beria, Chubar, Gr. Leplevsky, Akulov, Vyshinsky, Prokofiev, Bulatov, Agranov, Balitsky, Redens, Belsky and Krylenko.

Of this composition, Yagoda, Leplevsky, Prokofiev, Bulatov, Agranov, Balitsky, Redens and Belsky were "pure" Chekists and were part of the leadership of the OGPU of the USSR, which was to be transformed into the NKVD of the USSR.

Kaganovich then was at least the left hand of Stalin, if we assume that Molotov was the right hand. However, it will not be a mistake to assume and vice versa.

Kuibyshev by March 1934 served as Chairman of the Commission of Soviet Control under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR

(in May 1934 he was appointed 1st Deputy Chairman of the SNK and STO of the USSR).

Kosior was then the 1st secretary of the Central Committee of the CP(b) of Ukraine, Akulov and Vyshinsky represented the USSR Prosecutor's Office, Krylenko was the People's Commissar of Justice of the USSR, and Bulatov was the head of the Department of Leading Party Bodies (ORPO) of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

Beria also served as 1st Secretary of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee of the CPSU(b) and 1st Secretary of the Central Committee, CP(b) of Georgia. In terms of the scale of the country, this is not the highest level, but when he was appointed to the commission, not only his business qualities were clearly taken into account, but precisely his KGB experience.

By the summer of 1938, of the entire composition of the commission, only Kaganovich, Vyshinsky and Beria remained in the ranks. Kuibyshev died, the rest were repressed. And now, when Beria was appointed to the NKVD, Stalin and his closest associates could not help but remember that Beria stood at the beginning of the NKVD and took a direct and active part in the first reform of the OGPU in the NKVD.

Here is a brief summary of the path of Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria from the Caucasus to Moscow.

1938

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I never thought I'd be writing a diary. I have secretaries instead of a diary. And then it pulled. At least I need to consult with someone, I can't even tell Nino. You can only take it with you. And this is called a diary. I'll try, it might help. You won't be able to write every day, but you don't have to. And you need to speak up.

Received a personal letter from Comrade Stalin. A serious letter and one must think hard. Offers to return to the KGB work, in Moscow, Yezhov's first deputy.

Nicholas! complex person. I messed up with the repression, and the hardest thing in intelligence. Betrayed by Nikolsky?, betrayed by Krivitsky?, betrayed by Lyushkov\*.

1 Ezhov Nikolai Ivanovich (1895 - 02/04/1940), party and statesman. The foundryman's son, a participant in the First World War, was wounded. In May 1917 he joined the Bolshevik Party. Since February 1, 1935 - Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, since October 12, 1937 - candidate member of the Politburo of the Central Committee, General Commissar of State Security of the USSR. On September 26, 1936, he was appointed People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR to replace the removed Genrikh Yagoda. From April 1938 to April 1939 he was also People's Commissar for Water Transport of the USSR. He carried out a purge of the NKVD and led the main stages of the KGB operation for the mass repression of anti-Soviet elements, made serious excesses, and became involved in political adventures. On November 25, 1938, he was replaced at the post of the NKVD of the USSR by the LP. Beria, on March 10, 1939 he was deprived of all party posts, on April 10, 1939 he was arrested, on February 4, 1940 he was

2 Nikolsky Lev Lazarevich (Orlov Alexander Mikhailovich, real name Feldbing Leiba Lazarevich) (1895-1973), high-ranking officer of the Cheka-OGPU-NKVD, major of state security (1935), from 1933 to 1937 an illegal resident of the INO OGPU-NKVD in

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These are big failures. Koba writes that he does not know who to believe. Artuzov!, Slutsky?, Uritsky? and other bl..di. There are abilities, but adventurers, I always thought so. And raised adventurers. It was never clear where they would turn, they often milked me .. they used to work for the OGPU.

France, in 1937-1938. Resident of the NKVD in Spain and adviser to the Spanish Republican government. In 1938, he defected to the United States, taking an operational reserve from the residency

currency (more than 50 thousand dollars). Lived in the USA.

3Krivitsky Walter Germanovich (Ginzberg Samuil Gershevich) (1899-1941), member of the RCP (b) from 1919, from 1918 to 1921 in illegal work in Austria and Poland, since 1921 an employee of the 4th (intelligence) department of the Headquarters of the Red Army, since 1931 in the INO OGPU, since October 1935 an illegal resident of the INO in Holland, in the fall of 1937 he asked for political asylum in France. In 1941 he committed suicide (probably eliminated). He handed over more than 100 illegal Soviet spies in Western Europe to employees of the Western intelligence services, almost "lit up" the "Cambridge Five", including Kim Philby.

\* Lyushkov Genrikh Samoylovich (1900, Odessa - 08/19/1945, Dairen, Manchuria), one of the leaders of the state security agencies, the highest-ranking defector from the NKVD to the enemy. In the bodies of the Cheka since June 1920, commissar of the State Security Service of the 3rd rank (1935), protege of Heinrich Yagoda, deputy head of the SPO of the NKVD of the USSR. Moved by N.I. Yezhov from the central apparatus to the periphery, from June 1937 the head of the NKVD Directorate in the Far Eastern Territory, on June 13, 1938, fled to the Japanese, collaborated with the intelligence of the Kwantung Army, after the defeat of Japan, he was liquidated by the head of the Dairen military mission of Japan.

'Artuzov (Frauchi) Arthur Khristianovich (1891-1937), one of the heads of the state security and intelligence agencies, a talented counterintelligence officer, one of the leaders of the Trust operation, from July 1931 head of the Foreign Department (INO) of the OGPU of the USSR, then in the GRU General Staff of the Red Army. Arrested on May 13, 1937, on August 28, 1937, sentenced to CMN.

2 Slutsky Abram Aronovich (1898-17.02.1938), one of the heads of the foreign intelligence of the OGPU-NKVD, a protégé of Heinrich Yagoda, from May 1935 replaced A. Artuzov as head of the INO. It is alleged that he was poisoned, but the more likely option is suicide because of the fear of exposing connections in the conspiracy of Yagoda, who was arrested on April 4, 1937.

- Uritsky Semyon Petrovich (1895-1.08.1938), one of the heads of military intelligence, from 1927 to April 1935 in various positions in the Red Army, from April 1935 the head of the 4th (intelligence) department of the General Staff of the Red Army, On November 1, 1937 he was arrested, on August 1, 1938 he was shot.

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The NKVD and military intelligence are littered with cadres of Yagoda and Trotsky. Koba writes that I am one of the entire party leadership, I know Chekist work well and only I can straighten things out. Presses on consciousness, "Koba" signed. He writes that you will put things in order in the Cheka and then, if you want, you will return home.

It's easy to say you'll be back. Even if you return, you will lose the pace (So in the text, but this is an obvious typo, as in a number of other cases. - S.K.1). And we took a good pace. The highest in the Union?.

I don't want to leave the Caucasus. Here it is easy to breathe and your own head. And there's a lot to do. All my life I lived in the Caucasus, worked in the Caucasus, they were not transferred anywhere. And I don't want to.

When mud..ki refueled, it was rotten. What is Lavrentiy?, what is Mamiya\*. And when Koba believed me, gave me power, I moved Georgia in such a way that let someone else try it. You won't know in six years. This is clearly visible!

1 Obvious grammatical errors are each time specified by the publisher in parentheses in italics marked "S.K.". However, it should be noted that these clauses in parentheses (So in the text) were already in the original electronic copy transmitted by "Pavel Lavrent'yich".

Beria, as we know, did not boast. It was under his leadership that the Georgian SSR gained a genuine all-round flourishing (see introductory essay).

5 Lavrenty Iosifovich Kartvelishvili (1890–22.8.1938), party leader, member of the RSDLP(b) since 1910, in 1931 secretary of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, then in the West Siberian and Far Eastern Territories, from December 1936 First Secretary of the Crimean Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. In June 1937 he was expelled from the party, in July he was arrested, in August 1938 he was shot.

\* Orakhelashvili Ivan (Mamiya) Dmitrievich (1881-1937) party and statesman, from the nobility, graduated from the Military Medical Academy (1908), member of the RSDLP (b) since 1903. After the establishment of Soviet power in Georgia, he held a number of senior posts in the republic and the TSFSR, in May 1920 - Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia. In 1926-1929 and 1931 to 1932. — First Secretary of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, since 1932 Deputy Director of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute. In April 1937 he was exiled to Astrakhan, on July 26, 1937 he was arrested and transferred to Tbilisi. On December 11, 1937, he was shot by Troika under the NKVD of Georgia.

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And as soon as everything got better, and then act in film, Lavrenty, roll to Moscow. Catch spies. I have them in the Cheka on caught all my life.

They survived the most difficult time, how much they cleaned out, crushed the underground, developed the industry, raised science, reconstructed Tiflis. You can see what has been done, you can see what needs to be done. And to clean up after these Jews the GUGB (Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR. — S.K.) is not much fun. But Koba asks. So he writes, I ask as an old Chekist. Work, and then you will return or we will pick up something bigger for you at the chore. But I feel that I will have to replace Nikolai.

Do not want. I'm used to the fact that a year has passed, the result is immediately visible. Everything is changing before our eyes, but it is I who is pushing forward. People are picked up, weed cleaned out, just work. Another five-year plan, you won't recognize Georgia. And in Moscow, papers, agents, ciphers, interrogations, protocols. Fuss a lot, enjoy few.

But intelligence sucks. And in the People's Commissariat it is not clean, things have been confused. And if Nikolai failed, I'll have to take on the People's Commissariat. That's the end of me, I won't get out, I'll be stuck. And I'm more interested here.

But I think I'll have to go. Koba asks, but it is clear that this is an order. He just doesn't want to offend, he understands that he has offended me anyway, he is tearing me away from the living thing. I asked to go to school, but they didn't let me. Well, I stayed in Che, raised the case there. Then they gave me the opportunity, they said the system. Well, the whole republic was built. It is more interesting to build, and now the Cheka is coming out again.

There are two main directions. Exploration may fail, may not fail. Who knows who these bastards surrendered, who they did not surrender. We need to figure it out. Koba is especially worried about Lyushkov. So, it will be necessary to thoroughly check everyone. Distrust is a hard thing, but if

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if you are your own, then you will be offended inside, but you will never go against your own. No offense, if you are your own, does not make you a traitor. So here I will act accordingly (So in the text. — S.K.). He openly expressed distrust and we need to see how he behaves. Afraid or offended. Why is he afraid? It also needs to be sorted out. But if you're offended, that's fine.

The second is frames. We must take the guys with us, Vse-Voloda! Necessarily. We worked with him, no words needed. Koba believes me, I believe Vsevolod. There is no need to ask him, he will go with me even to Tashkent, and even more so to Moscow. Of course, he will not have sugar there either.

And if Nikolai is replaced, then the main thing will be to deal with the results of the repressive operation on the scale of the Union. This is the second main direction. Even here, under my control, there were some excesses. The Menshevik bastard has done harm, the hidden Trotskyists. Until they brought it to

clean water, a number of people lost, even before being shot. Our percentage of inflection was small, while others need to be dealt with. But for now, I'll have enough intelligence.

Intelligence and internal sabotage are directly related. So work on k.-r. (To the counter-revolutionary. - S.K.) the underground will also immediately be large. And then we take a trifle, but we need to go deeper.

. Merkulov Vsevolod Nikolaevich (1895-1953), one of Beria's longtime associates, including in the Caucasus. The son of an officer, studied at the Faculty of Physics and Mathematics of St. Petersburg University, was drafted into the army in 1916, participant in the First World War, ensign, from March 1918 lived in Tiflis, from September 1921 - in the bodies of the GruzChK, party member since 1925, member of the Central Committee from 1939 to 1952, in 1952-1953. candidate member of the Central Committee. In 1937-1938. head of the industrial and transport department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia, from August 1938 in the NKVD of the USSR (from November 1938 - head of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR), in February-July 1941 and from April 1943 to May 1946 - people's commissar State Security of the USSR. From October 1950 - Minister of State Control of the USSR. Arrested in September 1953, shot in December 1953.

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Ba! I have already returned to the Cheka, I think about things not in Tbilisi, but in Moscow. That's it, Lavrenty. Koba did not take pity on you, does not allow you to live in peace at home. You won't get enough sleep there, Koba won't let you. So now I'm going to sleep while I can.

I was rooting for Dynamo Tbilisi, and if I move, I will have to root for Dynamo Moscow.

And maybe it will cost, maybe I'll stay.

But hardly.

5/USh-38

I'm leaving for Moscow for a session! The head is already working on two sides. The current work is here, and the thoughts are there. Koba called, did not say anything on the phone, only asked: "Do you think?"

I say: "I think."

"Well, think, come to the session, we'll talk."

And that's it.

I sit and think. It will be difficult in the Center. Relationship with Nicholas? they were never good, with Mikhail3 too. Mikhail is a risky and adventurous man. ugle

On August 1-10, 1938, a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was held in Moscow.

2 N.I. Yezhov.

Z Frinovsky Mikhail Petrovich (1898-4.2.1940), one of the leaders of the state security and intelligence agencies, commander of the 1st rank. The son of a teacher from the Penza province, graduated from a religious school in 1914, in January 1916 he entered the cavalry as a volunteer, received the rank of non-commissioned officer, was associated with anarchists, deserted in August 1916, participated in a terrorist act against General M. A. Bema. In September 1917, he joined the Moscow Red Guard, took part in the storming of the Kremlin, and was seriously wounded. In July 1918 - squadron commander, then head of the Special Department of the 1st Cavalry Army S.M. Budyonny. In 1919 he was transferred to the bodies of the Cheka. In 1928-1930. commander and commissar of the Special Purpose Division. F.E. Dzerzhinsky, since 1934 the head of the Main Directorate of the Border and Internal Guards of the NKVD of the USSR, since April 15, 1937 - the 1st Deputy People's Commissar and Head of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR. Since September 8, 1938, the People's Commissar of the Navy of the USSR, on April 6, 1939, was arrested on charges of conspiracy in the NKVD, and was shot in February 1940.

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he repents, he can fall under the influence and he himself can influence another. Who influences whom, Yezhov on Frinovsky or Frinovsky on Yezhov? They were there under Yagoda like spiders. It looks like Nikolai is also in trouble. I didn't think much about this, but now I'm thinking and thinking. It will be hard for me.

So far, I have not told anyone about the move, why ahead of time. Only with Vsevolod! I must talk carefully, I must immediately take him with me if I leave.

It will be hard. During these two years, a lot of blood has been shed in the country. You can't get anywhere here (So in the text. - S.K.), we don't need the fifth column, but it was and no matter how you clean it, you can (So in the text. - S.K.). But there are too many arrests and executions on the ground.

This will need to be dealt with. In Georgia, we tried to take only those who were already registered, and besides them, which was revealed during the investigation, they were taken. But they took the most active. If we take everyone in Georgia, we need to take about 50,000, but then there will be 200,000 or more dissatisfied people.

Here you need to choose a measure. And how to choose it. We shot clean bandits, and then not all of them. Trotskyists and active Mensheviks were also shot. Also incarnates. And how much was hidden. But all the same, Nikolai gave big numbers for the Union. Maybe he is to blame, maybe the apparatus in the field and in the allied People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. Or maybe both.

My apparatus is not clogged, we clean it all the time

`V. Merkulov (see note 12 to the entry of July 29, 1938)

2 Anti-Soviet and anti-socialist forces in Georgia were traditionally strong. As I have already noted, in 1920 in Menshevik Georgia the government party had up to 80,000 members, while the Georgian Bolshevik Party had about 2,000 members. The Georgian proletariat was then weak, but there was a large stratum of merchants, various kinds of princes, merchants, semi-criminal lumpen, etc. Plus - numerous agents of foreign special services in the Caucasus. Therefore, L.P. Beria was not mistaken in his quantitative estimates of the late 1930s.

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Tim, we are expelling, but you will not expel everyone. Here is Mdivani! Mud..k, he messed up and messed up, but anyway, we didn't come to him, but Moscow.

It will be hard for me. And you won't refuse (So in the text. — S.K.).

29/USh-38

I returned from Moscow, my head swells. Everything, the matter is settled. The Politburo adopted a Decree on the approval of Comrade Beria as the First Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR. Frinovsky is transferred by the People's Commissar of the Navy. The appointment is strange, Mikhail was connected with the sea only by the border guard, which of him was a sailor. So this appointment is temporary. But I don't need Frinovsky. I need Vsevolod at GUGB, I'm taking him with me, I've already agreed. Glad.

I spoke with Koba, but not much. He said: "You have all the cards in your hands. When you arrive, take a closer look, behave carefully with Yezhov, do not pull in different directions, but immediately lead your own line. Allow people to pick up.

I am instructed to submit a candidate for the approval of the Central Committee for the first secretary. Would I recommend Candida?. But here the last word belongs to Koba. Let him choose. Now he has to work with the Georgians. And I'm leaving soon. Nino and Sergo will stay here for a while, but

1 Mdivani (Budu) Polikarp Gurgenevich {1877-1937}, party and statesman, member of the RSDLP since 1903, in 1921 chairman of the Revolutionary Committee of Georgia, known for the 1922 conflict with G.K. Ordzhonikidze, who reached the point of mutual assault. In 1931-1936 - Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council of the Georgian SSR. The last post before the arrest was First Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Georgian SSR. Active separatist, Georgian nationalist. Unlike the line of L.P. Beria opposed the integration of the Georgian economy into the all-Union. In 1937, in the case of a Trotskyist spy and wrecking center, he was sentenced to death by firing squad.

a The First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP(b) of Georgia from 1938 to 1952 was Kandid Nestorovich Charkviani (1907-1994), before that the third secretary of the Central Committee of the CP(b) of Georgia.

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I don't want to break the school year for a guy. He will be more interested in Moscow, and maybe he will also yearn for the mountain air.

But what to do, you need to pack up and go. I'll hand over the cases, and again Lavrenty put on your uniform.

Spoke with Nicholas!. The conversation was long and drawn out. It seems that he was firmly crap, I don't know how we will work. And it is clear that he drinks, and this is the last thing. If a person goes on this business, he will not end well. Or maybe out of fear, that's what happens.

All the time I'm spinning, I want to finally do more. I can't believe that everything will be here now without me. We are handing over the new Government Palace, but I will not be there. Will they also hand over the road to Staliniri without me? The Academy of Sciences did not have time to organize and is no longer successful. It's a pity. The Beria Stadium, the Beria Club, the Beria Institute, and the Beria Square will remain. So the memory will remain, thanks to people, they will not forget. We have already made a good construction base, both brick and tile, we will build a lot. A new telescope for Abastumani \* I did not have time. Maybe I can help later. No, it won't be before, it's unlikely.

I will soon leave for Moscow. Shall we hold a Plenum?, and off we go. Koba is in a hurry. Then it will not be up to the diary. But I will not leave this matter. There will especially need such an adviser that he will not blurt out and will not let you down.

1 During his stay in Moscow at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, L.P. Beria was received by Yezhov on the evening of August 22, 1938.

2 The railway from Gori to Staliniri (until 1934 Tskhinvali, the center of the South Ossetian Autonomous Region within the Georgian SSR) was commissioned in 1940.

In 1935, the Georgian Branch of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR was formed, in 1941 it was transformed into the Academy of Sciences of the Georgian SSR. The role of L.N. Beria in the development of Georgian science was undoubtedly great.

4 In 1932, the first high-mountain astronomical observatory in the USSR was founded near the Georgian resort village of Abastumani. Since 1937 he has been publishing his Bulletin.

On August 531, 1938, the last Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia was held, which L.P. Beria spent as the first secretary of the Georgian Central Committee.

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4/1X-38

Just got back from Yezhov. We sat until late in the evening. Immediately reached for a glass, began to treat, had to refuse. At first I was offended, then I realized that it was not smart to get fooled, and began to speak to the point. He is a smart and knowledgeable man, but it is already clear that he is confused. I told him



directly, that we will work without offense, I now have the main thing in my bush, and the rest I will be in the know. We agreed that we would not put a spoke in Vsevolod's wheels, I would immediately transfer the GUGB to him, all the operational work and the personnel issue!

Have we agreed that we will transfer the State Security to the position of Glavka, as before? We agreed, but I see that Nikolai is dissatisfied here too. And the structure of the People's Commissariat is worthless, should it be changed?

But I see that it is very unclear. I was approved on the 22nd, and at the end of August a group was shot at the Lubyanka. Zakovsky\* was also shot. And before that they shot

In September 1938, V.N. Merkulov was appointed deputy head of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR.

On March 228, 1938, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decided to abolish the Main Directorate of State Security within the NKVD of the USSR and transform it simply into the first directorate of the NKVD. Beria, having come to the NKVD and replacing M.P. Frinovsky as the 1st Deputy People's Commissar and Head of the UGB, insisted on returning the status of the Main Directorate to this most important division of the NKVD. Vsevolod Merkulov became Beria's deputy for the GUGB, and after Beria's appointment as People's Commissar, he headed the GUGB.

On September 13, 1938, the Politburo approved the new organizational structure of the NKVD presented by Yezhov, consisting of three main departments: State Security, Economic and Transport. This was the result of Stalin's first joint conference with Yezhov and Beria. However, already on September 23, Stalin accepted Beria's proposal to radically change the structure of the NKVD with the formation of 10 Main Directorates, including the Main Directorate of State Security, the Main Directorate of the Workers' and Peasants' Militia, the Main Directorate of the Border Troops, etc.

\* Zakovsky Leonid Mikhailovich (Shtubis Heinrich Ernestovich) (1894-1938), commissar of the State Security Service of the 1st rank, since 1913 a member of the RSDLP (b). A rich biography from a young age (from the age of 18 he sailed as a cabin boy and a stoker on the Libava-New York line). In the bodies of the Cheka since December 1917, he worked in various positions in a number of regions, after the murder

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a group of former executives. It looks like they are covering their tracks. And what is behind this? Rubbish, squabbling, or worse? Suspicious. Nikolay gives the impression of a deeply confused person. And if you get confused, then you can mess yourself up in whatever you want, from recruitment to adventure. Tukhachevsky, Uborevich and Yakir showed us this.

Berry also showed.

Yagoda with Yenukidze! they decomposed the apparatus even under the OGPU, everyone played politics. And in the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, Yagoda continued. Conspiracies were played for real. Nikolai himself said that he cleaned them well. But the hasty executions before my arrival is a suspicious fact already for Nikolai. Why hurry? You'll have to figure it out yourself.

10/1X-38

I am drawn into Moscow life. When you constantly live, not the mood when you arrived for a while. I live for a short time, but the mood is different. Nicholas

CM. Kirov was appointed head of the Directorate of the NEVD for the Leningrad region, from January 19, 1938, deputy people's commissar of internal affairs and head of the Moscow UNKVD. In the spring of 1938, he was removed, appointed head of the construction of the Kuibyshev hydroelectric complex, arrested on April 30, 1938, and shot on August 29, 1938.

| Yagoda Genrikh Grigoryevich (Enokh Gershenovich) (1891 - 03/15/1938), General Commissar of the State Security Service, long-term 1st Deputy Chairman of the OGPU V.R. Menzhinsky, actually subjugated the OGPU apparatus and sated it with his proteges. After the death of Menzhinsky (May 1934), Yagoda from July 1934, after the transformation of the OGPU of the USSR into the NKVD of the USSR, became the first people's commissar of internal affairs. In September 1936, he was replaced at the post of the NKVD by Yezhov. On April 4, 1937, he was arrested, went through the process of the Anti-Soviet Right-Trotsky Center, and in March 1938 was shot. He had far-reaching political ambitions and plans, was associated with the anti-Stalinist conspiracy of Avel Yenukidze (1877 - 10/30/1937).

The last, old Bolshevik, from 1922 to 1935, secretary of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee (CEC) of the USSR, envious of Stalin, politically and morally corrupted, saw himself as a replacement for Stalin. On February 11, 1937, Yenukidze was arrested, on October 29, 1937 he was sentenced to death and the next day he was shot for his active participation in the Anti-Soviet Right-Trotsky Center.

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keeps more distance. It looks like he is wondering whether the People's Commissariat will charge me or not. I said that I was not happy with the appointment, I didn't ask for it myself, it was better for me to work in Georgia. But an Order is an Order. Still squints.

I got a new title! Nikolay congratulated, Koba too. I accept business. Koba calls me and Nikolai to a serious conversation.

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev.

The reader, I hope, has already noticed that the publisher of the diaries L.P. Beria, that is, I, prefers to give notes to entries in the diary for a given date, not at the end of the book, but immediately after the entry itself. This option of placing notes seems to me the most convenient for the reader.

Moreover, I would like to emphasize that the NOTES ARE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THIS PUBLICATION, without careful reading of which the understanding of the text of the diaries themselves (and, accordingly, the understanding of the personality of the author of the diaries) cannot be complete.

In addition, I have found it appropriate, expedient and useful to include more than just footnotes in the text. From time to time I will introduce into the text, in addition to operational notes, also a more general commentary and a number of references. In my opinion, this will help to more fully illuminate the various periods of life and work of L.P. Beria and the era in which he lived, acted and led his diary.

So, already the first entries in the diary of L.P. Beria, begun in Tbilisi and continued in Moscow, allow us to take a fresh look at the history of the appointment of L.P. Beria in the NKVD of the USSR for the post of first deputy Yezhov.

Beria's ill-wishers are already on a real scale

On September 19, 1938, the Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was adopted on conferring the title of Commissar of State Security of the 1st rank to the First Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Comrade Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria.

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time it was claimed that he aspired to Moscow out of careerist considerations, and his appointment to the NKVD was the result of a clever intrigue. So, by the way, thought Yezhov himself.

In our time, the initiative in the appointment of Beria to the NKVD is sometimes attributed to Malenkov, etc.

In fact, in the appointment of Beria as the first deputy people's commissar of internal affairs of the USSR, the main role was played by ... Yezhov himself.

By the middle of the summer of 1938, Stalin, who had had reason to worry before about the state of affairs in the NKVD, became completely clear that things were not going well with the NKVD. In particular, on July 13, Lyushkov fled to the Japanese, and the next day, July 14, Nikolsky (Orlov-Feldbing) defected to the enemy.

Of course, the list of high-ranking "defectors" was not opened by them. By that time, the names of, for example, Ivan Tovstukha, Georgy Agabekov, Grigory Besedovsky (Ivan Karpov, Kirill Kalinov), Fyodor Raskolnikov (Ilyin), Walter Krivitsky (Ginzberg), Alexander Barmin (Graff), Ignatius (Nathan) Reiss (Poretsky). And almost all of them, before escaping, at various times were connected in one way or another with the Soviet special services. However, Lyushkov and Nikolsky were figures, firstly, especially informed, and secondly, their runs coincided in time so tightly that Stalin could not help thinking. And having thought and turned part of his attention to the work of the NKVD to a greater extent than before, Stalin could not help but see the very obvious failures in this work both outside the country, and especially inside it.

Therefore, Stalin needed a person who could turn the tide. The fact that he offered the post of People's Commissar of the NKVD (moreover, immediately People's Commissar, not first deputy!) to Chkalov is beyond doubt for me personally, and not because much has been written about it in recent years. On this account there is, although indirect, but very convincing evidence. In the old, simple-hearted 70s, when no one thought about the current dirty "historical sensations" in the USSR, former test pilot Igor Ivanovich Shelest

documentary book "I'm flying for a dream." without any ulterior motives, of course, he cited his conversation with the old tester Alexander Petrovich Chernavsky.

Chernavsky was a friend of Valery Chkalov and another outstanding test aerobatic pilot Alexander Anisimov. And then, "in the mood," Chernavsky told how Chkalov, also in the mood, confessed to him and Anisimov that Stalin had just offered Chkalov a "very responsible position"...

Then Chernavsky made a long pause and Shelest could not stand it:

- Did Takine tell you Valery what they wanted to entrust him with?

- Said.

- What?

"You know what..." Chernavsky smiled, "if I tell you this now, you won't believe it anyway; so let me say no more.

There is no doubt that Chkalov told his friends about Stalin's proposal to switch from pilots to Chekists.

But why did Stalin make him this offer? I think that the answer lies precisely in the proposal to immediately replace Yezhov as people's commissar.

As deputy commissar, Chkalov could not change anything in the NKVD problem, because he was a complete ignoramus here. But Chkalov could, in modern terms, immediately change the image of the NKVD, which acquired an odious connotation after two years of something very overgrown repressions. At the same time, Stalin did not write off Yezhov "in circulation" - he would remain People's Commissar for Water Transport, Secretary of the Central Committee and Chairman of the CPC under the Central Committee. There were posts for three!

Chkalov, fortunately for everyone, refused. Fortunately, because today we can confidently say: any other candidate for the People's Commissariat of the NKVD, except for Beria, would not be able to do all that.

positive that Lavrenty Pavlovich managed to do during the three pre-war years. In the then Soviet leadership, he was a unique figure in the exact meaning of the last word! A brilliant professional Chekist with an outstanding track record of successful leadership.

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as a major republic—Stalin had no other such collaborator.

Only Beria could understand the internal intrigues and conspiracy within the NKVD, stop them, correct the excesses of repression, reform the NKVD in accordance with new tasks, create new intelligence, new border troops and effectively integrate the NKVD into the general system of the national economy (which at that time was objectively necessary).

But precisely because Beria, having come to the NKVD, could not become a real "workhorse" at the same time, changing not the image of the people's commissariat, but its essence, Stalin could not immediately make him a people's commissar. Beria's growth into the NKVD was supposed to be, albeit rapid, but gradual. At the same time, depending on the degree of Ezhov's personal guilt in the failures of the NKVD, it was possible either to keep the NKVD in his place, or to replace him with Beria.

As can be seen from the diary, Beria was not happy with his appointment to the NKVD, and this is quite understandable. He just got a taste of creative work in Georgia, and here again "catch spies"...

But Beria was a man of duty. In addition, having come to the NKVD, immediately after the collapse of the old NKVD, he immediately created a new, in fact, structure, retaining everything alive and necessary in the People's Commissariat and discarding the harmful and disastrous.

After all, Beria was a builder, an architect (in other words, a creator, creator) both by education and natural inclinations! It is also understandable why he had to start with solving the problem of the activity of the operational-Chekist structures of the NKVD directly, that is, with the GUGB.

In the GUGB (then, by the way, the UGB) and, in particular, in the intelligence of the NKVD, the situation then developed, which was no better than in the intelligence of the GRU of the General Staff of the Red Army. A number of betrayals, primarily Nikolsky-Orlov-Feldbing, Walter Krivitsky, Genrikh Lyushkov, led someone to the fact that in 1938 it was impossible to be sure of almost any of the external employees of Soviet intelligence - almost all of them could be deciphered by traitors, turn out to be under the covert control of the enemy intelligence services. Someone could be re-recruited under pressure.

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Under these conditions, perhaps only Beria could really turn the tide and overcome the crisis - this is the ability to understand people, energy, pressure and, which is very important - this considerable experience of a professional intelligence officer and even more - the experience of a highly professional counterintelligence officer.

Judging by the first entry in the diary dated July 29, 1938, Stalin intended to assign to Beria, first of all, the task of sorting out the rubble in foreign intelligence. However, this summer the situation in the NKVD changed very quickly, dynamically and developed in an unfavorable direction. Repressive measures, necessary in themselves, for some reason assumed a landslide character. Beria had a direct relationship with the repressive operation within, mainly, Georgia, however, he also caught the general scale of the phenomenon. But no more than caught! While Beria was busy leading the republic, he did not have the opportunity to deeply analyze the general state of affairs with repressions in the country. From September 1938 this became one of his direct tasks. Tuti went and

let's go...

The chronology of Yezhov and Beria's visits to Stalin's office, starting from the moment of Beria's new appointment, is interesting.

August 20, 1938 - the day before the appointment of L.P. Beria in the NKVD of the USSR - Yezhov was with Stalin together with Molotov - from 19.40 to 23.30. Undoubtedly, Stalin then explained to Yezhov that the NKVD needed a new hand, and that hand would be Beria. But at that moment, Stalin still did not put an end to Yezhov as a people's commissar of the NKVD! This indisputably follows from the fact that in September and early October 1938 Yezhov appeared at Stalin's often, for a long time and, as a rule, without Beria.

On September 4, 1938, Beria, who arrived in Moscow, had a private conversation with Yezhov at the Lubyanka. And on September 5, 1938, Stalin received only three in his Kremlin, starting at 18.50 just with Yezhov. An hour later, at 19.55, Molotov joined them, and at 20.35 - Malenkov. At 21.50 all three left Stalin's together.

On the night of September 12-13, Stalin conferred from 1 a.m. to 3 a.m. with Yezhov and Beria in the presence of Molotov and Zhdanov. It was most likely a "setup" conversation through

about half a month after the start of Beria's work in the central apparatus of the NKVD of the USSR.

Then only Yezhov - without Beria - takes part in meetings with Stalin on the evening of September 13, 18, 20, 21, 22, 25, 28 September, 2, 5, 7, 8 October 1938 - eleven times in less than a month! This bears little resemblance to disgrace, mistrust and suspicion.

Only on October 15 did Beria appear in Stalin's office, without Yezhov. Moreover, the conversation was clearly confidential and important. After holding a meeting with leading Moscow Soviet and party workers, Stalin kept Molotov, Zhdanov, Voroshilov, Mikoyan and Khrushchev from 23.40. Kaganovich approached, and for almost half an hour Stalin informed only members of the Politburo about something, and at 0.05 Beria appeared in the office and reported for almost an hour and a half - until half past one on October 16. Then Beria left, and the members of the Politburo stayed for another 20 minutes.

All day on October 16, Stalin did not receive anyone, and in the evening at 22 o'clock Beria came to him alone. Five minutes later Malenkov came up and the three of them talked until half past eleven at night. Then Malenkov left, and Stalin detained Beria for another half an hour.

On October 19, Yezhov and Beria took part together in a completely ordinary meeting with Stalin, but October 21 must be considered a turning point!

On October 21, 1938, after nine o'clock in the evening, Voroshilov, Molotov and Kaganovich appeared at Stalin's, then Yezhov arrived at about ten o'clock, and Malenkov an hour later. Exactly At 23.00 Beria was invited to the office. After an hour and a half, at 0.30, he and Malenkov leave, and the former area remains in the office, just as Yezhov remains there. Only at 1.45 am Yezhov leaves - along with everyone else, but this is not yet a curtain, an alisantrakt! On a cloudy night, Stalin's office resembles a passage yard: Molotov, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Malenkov come in and out. Even at one in the morning, under Yezhov, Stalin summoned Lev Belsky (Abram Levin) (1889-1941), an old Chekist, until 1907 a member of the Bund, from June 1917 a Bolshevik, who at that time was the first deputy people's commissar of railways, and until 28 May 1938 - for

avenger Yezhov. At the end of June 1939, two and a half months after Yezhov's arrest, Belsky was also arrested and, after a long investigation, shot after the outbreak of the war, on July 5, 1941. But then, in 1938, Stalin still trusted him, although this trust was melting, just as the trust in Yezhov was also melting.

A day later, on October 23, Yezhov was again with Stalin. The writer Mikhail Sholokhov came to Stalin from the village of Vyoshenskaya from the Quiet Don, including with complaints about Yezhov's department, and now Stalin arranges for the two of them something like a confrontation. At 19.20 Sholokhov leaves, and Stalin and his "iron commissar" are left alone for more than an hour.

The conversation was, of course, mutually difficult.

But Stalin had not yet completely lost faith in Yezhov. He appears in the leader's office on October 25 (together with Beria, but the latter leaves Stalin much earlier than Yezhov), then on October 26, 28 (without Beria).

On October 31, 1938, Yezhov was again with Stalin, together with Sholokhov, the secretary of the Vyoshensky district committee of the party, Lugovoi, and the leaders of the Rostov NKVD.

By the way, in 1998, a certain Vitaly Shentalinsky, referring to the Literaturnaya Gazeta correspondent Vadim Sokolov, told some amazing things in the Novy Mir magazine! Allegedly, Sokolov, shortly after Stalin's death, interviewed Sholokhov in Vyoshenskaya and only in 1994 was able to "publish" the writer's story about his stay in Stalin's office in 1938.

Like, allegedly in the spring (!) of 1938, Sholokhov, fearing arrest, left for Moscow, wrote to Stalin, got exhausted from waiting and went on a spree (they say, finally) in the restaurant of the Sovetskaya Hotel with Alexander Fadeev. And right from the table he was taken to the Kremlin, where at first Poskrebyshv put Sholokhov almost under boiling water to sober up, and then, having provided the writer with a "new tunic", he "shoved" him into the office, which Sholokhov "before that only in saw the movie." In parentheses, I note that at that time the Stalinist office was not shown in the cinema, and Sholokhov visited it until 1938, no less, but nine times!

At the table, Sholokhov (according to Sokolov-Shentalinsky) saw a number of "all military men", absolutely unfamiliar

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his "generals", with the exception of one with a "fox face" - Yezhov. Opposite the "general's row", with their backs to Sholokhov, were two civilians, in which Sholokhov "recognized by the back of the head" fellow countrymen. At the head of the table is the Politburo in full force.

The "mustachioed" himself allegedly "paced" behind the "unfortunate" back. The generals allegedly reported on maps and "colored cardboards" about the "counter-revolutionary conspiracy of the White Cossacks on the Don". Like, they were preparing a coup and expected to make "the future president of an independent Cossack republic" "Comrade. Sholokhov "...

This whole "picturesque", but, alas, completely false story is broken on the weighty book "brick" of the now published Journal of visits to Stalin's Kremlin office. It follows from it that not in the spring, but in the autumn of 1938, Sholokhov first appeared at Stalin's on October 23, at first alone - at 18.30, or only at 19.00 Yezhov joined them. After a general twenty-minute conversation between the three of us, Sholokhov left the office, and Yezhov remained in it for another seventy minutes alone with Stalin.

On October 31, 1938, Yezhov was summoned to Stalin by 4:05 pm, and for ten minutes only Stalin was in the office, Molotov and Malenkov, and Yezhov were already in jail.

At 4:15 p.m., Sholokhov, the head of the NKVD for the Rostov region, Grechukhin (the only NKVD "general" besides Yezhov himself), his deputy Kogan, the head of the Vyoshensky district department of the NKVD, Ludishchev, and the representative of the NKVD for the Vyoshensky district, Shchavalev (two Sholokhov, of course, knew the latter as flaky). And besides them - released, thanks to the intercession of Sholokhov, the former secretary of the Vyoshensky district committee of the party Lugovoy and party worker Popernov.

All of them were in the office until 18.35 and all, except Yezhov, Molotov and Malenkov, left the office at the same time. Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov and Yezhov remained. At 19.10 Malenkov came out, and for ten minutes Stalin and Molotov talked with Yezhov alone. Then Yezhov and Molotov left the office, and Stalin did not receive anyone else that evening.

I think he had something to think about alone with himself.

Nevertheless, on November 1 and 2, 1938, Yezhov again sat at meetings with Stalin. And on November 4, Yezhov was again at Stalin's with Beria, and only Zhdanov was present during their conversation.

On November 5, 1938, Yezhov was at a meeting with Stalin along with Molotov. Kaganovich, Voroshilov and Mikoyan - most likely as People's Commissar for Water Transport of the USSR. However, on November 9, 1938, the removal of Yezhov was almost completely a foregone conclusion.

On November 9, Yezhov, Beria, Malenkov and Andreev gather at Stalin's, that is, the still formally acting people's commissar, the people's commissar without three weeks and both members of the future commission for receiving and transferring cases to the NKVD of the USSR.

On November 10, Yezhov was again at a meeting with Stalin, and again most likely as People's Commissar for Water Transport.

But on November 12, Litvin, the head of the UNKVD in the Leningrad region, shot himself. Almost immediately after this, Uspensky, People's Commissar of the NKVD of Ukraine, disappears.

And on November 14, 1938, Beria sent a message to Stalin about the statement of the head of the UNKVD for the Ivanovo region V.P. Zhuravlev about serious problems (to say the least) in the NKVD. This is already a direct accusation of Yezhov in political tricks. It is often claimed that Zhuravlev's statement was allegedly inspired by Beria himself in order to "fall down" Yezhov, but this is just nonsense.

Firstly, the fall of Yezhov was prepared by Yezhov himself, entangled in his own life and destiny and entangled by an unscrupulous and adventurous environment.

Secondly, by mid-November 1938, the replacement of Yezhov by Beria was on the agenda by itself - the course of things and events.

On November 14, Stalin had one Beria, on November 19 he was Stalin together with Yezhov, but he comes later than his people's commissar and leaves before him.

On November 16, 17 and 21, Beria is personally present at the meetings with Stalin, but this is not surprising - in fact, everyone looks at Beria as a new people's commissar. His appointment was finally decided after a stormy debate at Stalin's on the night of November 19-20, where Beria was with Yezhov and Frinovsky.

But I will talk about this later.

131X-38

Today, Comrade Stalin summoned Nikolai and me. There were only Molotov and Zhdanov, they talked until three. The conversation was difficult, Nikolai could see that he was lying. Zhdanov just shook his head. Then Zhdanov said that with Litvin! this is unclear. Nikolai also began to justify himself. And it's dark. Litvin's connections are not the best. It also needs to be sorted out.

I have already forgotten what normal sleep is. And I see that even worse lies ahead.

21/1X-38

Comrade Stalin often calls Nikolai, and I sit in the Lubyanka, turning over folders, getting in on the action. And the thing x .. voe. Now it is clear to me that Nikolai needs to be replaced. He did a lot of things in the People's Commissariat, but he screwed up a lot. The good thing is that he removed Yagoda's people, but not all of them, but he imposed his g..vna and missed Lyushkov. Thank you for recruiting a young recruit of guys with higher education from the industry. This backbone is young, healthy, it will be useful to us, there is a reserve. The main thing is that this is mostly personnel in the field, and I will deal with the Central Office. If only not a new major conspiracy would come to light, as Yagoda was wrapping up. But maybe there is a conspiracy. The question is who and why. We have to arrest someone in the head of the Apparatus.

The structure of the People's Commissariat is loose, Nikolai it's time

1 Ezhov's protégé, head of the UNKVD of the USSR for the Leningrad region Mikhail Iosifovich Litvin (1892-1938), commissioner of the State Security Service of the 3rd rank. In 1920 he fought in the Far East, was in contact with Blucher and Postyshev. Demobilized from the Cheka in 1921 due to injury, he switched to trade union work. In 1929, in Central Asia, he met Yezhov and since then enjoyed his support, switched to party work, worked in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, in 1936 he was the 2nd secretary of the Kharkov regional party committee. After Yezhov joined the NKVD, Litvin, from October 1936, headed the Personnel Department of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR, and then the Personnel Department of the NKVD of the USSR. He was engaged in cleaning the apparatus from Yagoda's cadres and promoted Yezhov's cadres.

November 12, 1938 Litvin; summoned to Moscow, shot himself.

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botted weakly. Then it is necessary to understand the investigative cases, send them for additional investigation, or shove them through the courts, and if the investigation does not confirm guilt, then release them from custody. This matter will have to be put on a broad scale, and for this a special subdivision is needed.

The contingent of prisoners is now large, and in remote areas we are starting a large construction. Now there are many risky, desperate prisoners, leaving camps in populated areas is dangerous for the people. Contracting for free employment in Siberia and in the DVK (Far Eastern Territory. - S.K.) is going badly, and more convicts should be sent there. This means that separate industrial administrations are needed.

It is necessary to put the Border Guard on a new one. Fully. I will do this myself, and I will select people. And political work on the border should be done. The name needs to be changed. Security is like a watchman. Convoy troops, hence the border troops.

There has been a mess with the protection of the Government for a long time, as soon as conspiracies go out to the commandants of the Kremlin. We must have a separate Directorate of the Commandant and select people by person.

I see that Koba believes Nikolai in vain. He is twisting something, and this is dangerous. Yagoda has already twisted it once.

Commentary by Sergei Kremlen.

The entry dated September 21, 1938 can be considered the final draft of Beria's program for the reorganization of the NKVD. Soon it was accepted officially. On September 23, 1938, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, in a change to the Decree of September 13, approved the structure of the NKVD of the USSR with the formation of 10 Main Directorates, including the GUGB, the Main Economic Directorate, the Main Directorates of the Workers' and Peasants' Militia, Border and Internal Troops, Fire Protection and others, including the Main Archival Administration.

Unlike many of Beria's political leaders,

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he did not want to destroy, but to preserve the archives, realizing their importance for ensuring a stable future of the state.

The new structure of the NKVD of the USSR assumed a large-scale increase in the economic and industrial activities of the NKVD. It is significant that, having become the initiator of such a turn of affairs in 1938, Beria himself, after the death of Stalin, decisively removed all the national economic activities of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs from under its jurisdiction and transferred all industrial enterprises and organizations of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs to the sectoral ministries. . And the GULAG, by the way, was under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice of the USSR And there were no contradictions here - Beria was able to clearly see the tasks of the moment and the best ways to solve them. For the end of the 30s (and then wartime), the economic activity of the NKVD was justified, but by the beginning of the 50s



became uncharacteristic for a structure now designed to ensure exclusively state security and control over the activities of local authorities.

On the initiative of L.P. Beria, since 1939, the Administration for Construction in the Far East - Dalstroy - has received new opportunities. Beria understood its growing importance for the extraction of gold in the country, as well as tin and a number of other valuable metals.

Separately, it should be noted how Beria realized his idea that a mass review of many cases is necessary, followed by the mass release of those who were convicted or arrested without guilt. The resolution of the Politburo of September 23 provided for the creation of a special Bureau in the NKVD of the USSR for receiving and considering complaints. There was no such unit before Beria in the NKVD. This Bureau functioned throughout 1939.

L.P. Beria also became a true reformer of the Border Troops, starting with the organization of the service and communication system on the border and ending with combat and political training and equipping the border guards with modern weapons, including machine guns and heavy small arms. Beria's border troops in combat and organizational

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They were so well prepared that at the beginning of the war they actually played a strategic role in holding back the first onslaught of the Wehrmacht and waging a border battle. Conscious of the importance of the moral factor, L.P. Beria, by the way, became the initiator of the issue of the magazine of the border troops "Pogranichnik".

Under Beria, secure high-frequency communications ("HF") began to be increasingly introduced into the practice of public administration.

Objectively considered activity of Beria more and more convinced both Stalin and the other members of the Politburo that Yezhov must be replaced by Beria as soon as possible. At the same time, the work of the NKVD revealed an increasing number of not even shortcomings, but vices and crimes committed, among other things, by hidden enemies in the NKVD system.

Beria did not need to create "phony", exaggerated cases - the situation was unsightly and so. Sores in the NKVD accumulated even during the existence of the OGPU, especially when you consider that the organs of the Cheka - OGPU - NKVD have always been a tempting place for the opponents of the system to penetrate the entire political spectrum - from direct anti-Soviet White Guards and foreign agents to Trotskyists and right. |

At the same time, the difference in approaches to repressive measures between Yezhov and Beria is clearly visible from the analysis of their joint special message to Stalin dated October 15, 1938 on the arrests of the wives of traitors to the Motherland.

With reference to the operational order of the NKVD of the USSR No. 00486 dated 15.08.1937, it was reported that the order provided for "the arrest of the wives of traitors to the motherland, members of right-Trotskyist spy sabotage organizations convicted by the military collegium and military tribunals in the first and second categories, starting with August 1, 1936, so that in the future, along with the arrest of husbands, arrests of wives would also be made, followed by their imprisonment in camps or expulsion for a period of 5 to 8 years.

It was Yezhov's approach - one size fits all.

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However, later in the special message it was said:

"In the future, we consider it expedient to repress not all the wives of convicts ... but only those of them:

- a) who were aware of or assisted in the counter-revolutionary work of their husbands;
- 6) in relation to whom the NKVD authorities have data on their anti-Soviet sentiments...", etc.

And this was, of course, Beria's new approach—differentiated, not indiscriminate. He demanded a different, higher culture of investigation, but he was, of course, humane.

I think the reader will be interested to know about one figure given in this top secret report of the NKVD of the USSR No. 109173. It clearly follows from it that in two years of active repressions, from only 18 thousand people were condemned in the USSR by the Military Collegium and military tribunals in the first and second categories (that is, not only the red arrow, but the deprivation of liberty), and not the mythical 350 thousand allegedly only executed party and Soviet workers, who, as appeared in Khrushchev's times, and so, to this day, they walk in the brains of "notebook" "democrats".

1/X-38

I didn't think that the state of affairs in Moscow, in the People's Commissariat and in general in the country is so bad. In Georgia, we no longer have a strong internal opposition, but here the head swells. Enemies are very active. One of these days Bogdan! reported data on Koltsov, journalists

? Kobulov Bogdan Zakharovich (1904-1953), since 1922, an employee of Beria in the GruzChK, then in senior positions in the OGPU-NKVD of the ZSFSR and the NKVD of Georgia, in 1935 he was on intelligence work in Persia, from mid-September 1938 head of the 4th (secret political) department of the 1st Directorate of the NKVD. He held various posts in the central apparatus of the NKVD of the USSR and then in Georgia. After Stalin's death, he was appointed 1st Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR. Arrested in the "Beria case" and shot on December 23, 1953.

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stu!. One brother? draws Yezhov with a tightrope, and another has assembled a Trotskyist salon of writers. Mud..ki. These brethren are worse than terrorists.

I've already plunged head over heels into the usual KGB swamp, I've lost the habit, now I'm getting used to it. There are enough enemies and fools in the country, and our KGB business is not to collect flowers, but to clean up the dirt. Now it flows through me. In the Yaroslavl region, the regional dolbos ... would have decided to double the collection of bell bronze, and the regional dolbos ... would have decided to close the church in the village under this brand, and the bells into scrap metal. Churchmen revolted?. I sent someone there to sort it out. Reported to Kobe and Molotov. We will deal with Malenkov.

1Koltsov (Fridland) Mikhail Efimovich (1898 - February 2, 1940), a publicist with a bias in the "world revolution", the author of the "Spanish Diary", praised Yezhov and showed Stalin a fig in his pocket. On December 14, 1938, he was arrested; on December 1, 1940, he was sentenced to VMN and shot.

. Efimov (Fridlyand) Boris Efimovich (1900-2008), famous cartoonist, newspaper artist, brother of Mikhail "Koltsov". He published caricatures of embezzlers of socialist property, Western imperialists, and so on. in all leading Soviet newspapers and magazines until the Gorbachev era. He lived until the Yeltsin-Putin era, but he no longer drew caricatures of them.

3 The record is confirmed by the archives of the NKVD. The incident occurred in September 1938 in the village of Chernaya Zavod, Nekrasovsky district, Yaroslavl region. When the district workers came to close the church, the clergy, who had been notified in advance by someone (?), gathered a crowd of up to 600 people on the square, ready to use axes and pitchforks. There were provocative cries from the crowd: "Drunken bandits have arrived! Beat them!"

The secretary of the district committee of the party, the chairman of the district executive committee, the chairman of the regional financial department and the team of Tsvetmetal scrap were confused and began to make excuses that they were not drunk, they called a doctor for an examination. Nothing helped and the representatives of the district left with hooting villages.

It all ended with the fact that on October 27, 1938, the Yaroslavl regional party committee canceled the decision of the Yaroslavl regional executive committee to increase the collection of bell bronze, and the church in the village was preserved. Mezenev, chairman of the Nekrasov District Executive Committee, was put on trial "for a provocative decision to close the church."

This story well shows how even at the end of the repressive operation of 1937-1938. the ordinary man in the street and the provocateurs who incited him to violence were "intimidated" by the authorities.

We have to unwind and unwind the head of the People's Commissariat. And I see that the main arrests are still ahead!

9/X-38

The Politburo instructed the commission to develop within 10 days a draft resolution of the Central Committee, the Council of People's Commissars and the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs on the issue of arrests, prosecutorial supervision and investigation?. Ezhov chairman, members myself, Georgyz, Vyshinsky\* and Rychkov. We raised this issue with George, it is possible to work with him. Sluggish, but solid and knows how to dig. Paper works well.

Agreed, Georgy, Vyshinsky and Rychkov boo

1 During the period from September to December 1938, 332 leading employees of the NKVD were arrested, 140 of them in the central apparatus and 192 in the periphery, including 18 people's commissars of internal affairs of the union and autonomous republics. However, these figures are not surprising after reading the testimonies of those arrested - they reveal a picture of horrific neglect, moral deformation and degeneration of the leading cadres of the OGPU-NKVD. Accordingly, Beria's purge of the NKVD leadership was not only overdue, but was vital for the country.

The Politburo formed a commission and decided to develop a new approach to arrests, etc. October 8, 1938. However, the deadline for the implementation of the decision was delayed instead of ten days until November 17, when the Decree of the Central Committee and the SNK was adopted, which can be considered a turning point for the cause of correcting all the excesses and provocations and outright crimes committed during the repressive operation of 1937-1938 gg.

Perhaps the reason was that Yezhov was in no hurry to prepare the project, and Beria was busy with the investigation that had opened in the case of the arrested high-ranking officials of the Lubyanka. As it happens, especially with a good investigator (and Beria was one), one exposure led to another, facts and events grew like a snowball. Beria was very busy, especially since did not wait.

3 G. M. Malenkov.

Vyshinsky Andrei Yanuarievich (1883-1954), an outstanding statesman, in 1935-1940. Prosecutor of the USSR One of the most slandered figures of Soviet history in Khrushchev-Medvedev times.

Rychkov Nikolai Mikhailovich (1897-1959), in 1938-1948. People's Commissar (Minister) of Justice of the USSR.

They are going to prepare the main draft, Yezhov and I will review it separately, then they make amendments. It is clear to me that a guarantee must be given against abuses by the apparatus of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, especially in the localities. If you do not immediately shake hands, this will all continue.

Here you need two lines. Clean out the old apparatus, and immediately give direction to the new one, observe the law and do not look at the party and Soviet bodies as an enemy, they also cleaned it up well there. And so that the prosecutors feel themselves masters of the rule of law. I can already see now that they screwed up the footage of Yagoda and Yezhov, you can't rake it. Once .. buy.

How tired of it already. And the work is only on the KGB line for a couple of years. How much I would have done over the years in Tiflis. But what, Lavrenty, pull the strap of the Cheka. Someone (So in the text. - S.K.) is necessary.

16/X-38

Just from Comrade Stalin. There was an important conversation. Only he, I and Georgy Malenkov. There were no disagreements, then Koba detained me alone. When I arrived, he was alone, he said: "Now Malenkov will come, you need to get to know each other better, you will often cross paths. He is also a half-educated engineer, just like you.

I jumped up, he says, do not boil, I understand you, I did not study myself. He dragged on, then said: "What to do, not everyone goes to the academicians."

I say we already cross paths.

He asks: Are you working out?

I say: We work together.

OK then.

Then Georgy came, Koba began to talk about how he now sees the tasks of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. He said that Yezhov

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firmly let down and it is not clear how it will end for him. Instead of being offended by himself, he is offended by others, he is offended by Beria, they say, Lavrenty survives.

He said it, nonsense. We will probably replace Yezhov, and with Frinovsky we will see how he will work. He said that he was afraid that there was a conspiracy in the People's Commissariat, or they were very tired. He asked how the arrested people show. I reported that the threads are unraveling while it is just beginning. But the picture sucks.

We talked about intelligence. I said that so far the hands do not reach, but intelligence will have to be set up in a new way. And it is necessary to train scouts according to the plan, and not in the same way as amateur performances. Agreed, said, support.

They talked a lot about what kind of People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs should have. Koba said that the Cheka was conceived as an organ of dictatorship, then Yagoda took it into the hands and turned out to be a collective hodgepodge, and honest Chekists, and enemies, and various conspiracies, both right and left, and simply decomposed self-seekers. And so all the time, in the NKVD there were always enough Napoleons. Yezhov could not put an end to them, and he began to produce them himself. We dealt with these Napoleons in the army in 1937, but we need to deal with the Napoleons in the Cheka now.

He said that enough of this Comintern and Bonapartism. Anyone who wants to play politics to clean, interrogate and slap. He said that the Cheka was, is, and will be a special case. But all the same, we need a normal People's Commissariat, a normal State Institution that should solve the tasks that the State has set.

Politics in the People's Commissariat should no longer smell. Politics in the People's Commissariat should be dealt with only by the People's Commissar, and no one else. And then, since Yezhov was studying, thanks (So in the text. - S.K.), it's better not to.

When Georgy left, Koba asked about the investigation, I said Berman! and others give very important indications. He said send it quickly. Then he asked: Is Yezhov heavily soiled? I said it looks strong. He said, probably we will replace you, get ready. Let's leave the Water People's Commissariat to Nikolai, if he pulls, let him pull.

That's where things went. But Yezhov seems to be not just dirty. He acts like he's on a hook. Or someone with their own, or maybe beyond the cordon. Let's see.

2/X]-38

Yezhov often invites Koba, but it seems more like a blazer or as a water commissar. Called me for a report two days ago. There were only Molotov, Kaganovich and Georgy (Malenkov. - S.K.). He listened carefully, then got angry, began to swear. He says you need to shoot to annoy mother, but before that it is good to unwind, because it's enough to tear the ends, they all need to be pulled out. It's about war, and we have a traitor on a traitor. Enough. When these people only translate

Berman Boris Davydovich (1901-1939), one of the heads of the state security agencies, joined the Cheka in February 1921, in 1931 he was sent as a legal resident of the INO OGPU to Germany, on March 4, 1937 he was appointed People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Belo - Russian SSR and head of the Special Department of the Byelorussian Military District, from May 1938 head of the 3rd (transport and communications) department of the NKVD of the USSR. Arrested on September 24, 1938 on charges of organizing right-wingers and spying for Germany, he gave extensive and unconditionally reliable testimony. On February 23, 1939 he was shot.

On October 23<sup>1</sup>, 1938, from about two in the afternoon until seven in the evening, Molotov, Malenkov, and also Kaganovich sat at Stalin's without leaving. Before Beria, they heard the people's commissar of the Navy Frinovsky and his first deputy, a natural sailor Isakov on naval affairs. And from 15.10 to 16.00 Beria reported to Stalin. Immediately after Beria left, Yezhov appeared in the office, and soon, as noted earlier, the trial of the accusations of the writer Sholokhov against Yezhov and the NKVD workers began in the presence of the leadership of the NKVD in the Rostov region and a party worker from Don Lugovoy, who was released at the request of Sholokhov. From 18.35 to 19.20 only Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov (left at 19.10), Kaganovich and Yezhov remained in the office. The essence of the conversation hardly pleased the latter.

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pout!. He says: "Oh, Nikolai, Nikolai, asshole...net. He let himself down and let us down."

October holiday is coming soon. I'll be on the podium. Still nice. Not once (So in the text. - S.K.) was not.

8/X]-38

No one knows that we have experienced the most difficult moment. There could well have been a terrorist attack at the demonstration. The time is convenient, everyone is on the podium. Dugin? and his guys could take the risk. Koba understood, but you can't leave Mausoleum. I took control of everything myself. Now it will be easier. I think we took the most dangerous head.

<sup>1</sup> As an illustration of the entry, I will cite a fragment of the extensive protocol of interrogation of Boris Berman dated October 13-14, 1938, sent by Beria to Stalin on October 21, 1938: albums - from many regions and regions. Foreign intelligence agents who had made their way into the NKVD were diligently recklessly helped by "career Chekists"... The intelligence officer (Abwehr liaison officer. — S.K.) bluntly said that foreign intelligence services knew this, and they would do it. all through their people, so that it will continue to be so. In Moscow, even earlier, I heard what kind of affairs the hardened scoundrel Dmitriev (former head of the UNKVD for the Sverdlovsk region. - S.K.) heaped up in the Urals ... "

Dagin Izrail Yakovlevich (1895 - 01/22/1940), from a worker, lower education, member of the RCP(b) since 1919, worked in the militia in the North Caucasus Territory (NCK), in 1934-1937. head of the UNKVD for the SKK-Ordzhonikidze region, for the Gorky region, then - head of the 1st department (government security) of the UGB NKVD of the USSR. He was arrested by Beria right in Yezhov's office on November 5, 1938. Dagin was closely associated with a member of the anti-Stalinist opposition E.G. Evdokimov (1891-1940). Evdokimov was one of the leaders of the Cheka-OGPU, from 1934 he switched to leading party work, from May 1938 he became Yezhov's deputy for the People's Commissariat of Water Transport. He was arrested on November 9, 1938, on February 2, 1940 he was sentenced to VMN.

3 Already in ancient times it was understood: "Who will guard the watchmen?" For example, Indira Gandhi was shot by her own bodyguards. As for Israel Dagin, who was responsible for the security of the country's top leadership, his participation in the anti-state conspiracy within the NKVD, like this conspiracy itself, was not a hoax by Beria and Stalin, but a reality. And that guard of the rostrum of the Mausoleum, which Dagin picked up, could well go on a terrorist act against Stalin and other members of the Politburo, if Dagin had not been arrested in a timely manner, but led the guards on November 7, 1938.

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14/X1-38

Everything is hotter and hotter. Just got back from Comrade Stalin. Reported on Zhuravlev!. There were only Molotov, Zhdanov and Georgy (G.M. Malenkov. - S.K.). It turns out a bad picture.

Litvin? shot himself. This is already a sign. The second sign, reported that Uspensky? drowned in the Dnieper. Maybe drowned, maybe not drowned. It is necessary to understand \*. Dagin worked with Evdokimov, Litvin worked with Blyukher and covered for Postyshev, Uspensky worked with Eikhe5, a thread may be drawn from here.

8 Zhuravlev Viktor Pavlovich (1902-1946), in 1938 head of the UNKVD of the USSR for the Ivanovo region, from December 1938 - head of the UNKVD for the Moscow region, from June 1939 to March 1944 head of the Karaganda labor camp. On the tenth of November 1938, Zhuravlev first informed Beria by telephone about the important testimony of former NKVD officers Changuli and Kamensky. Beria summoned Zhuravlev to Moscow and on November 14 sent his memorandum to Stalin. On November 19, this note and other materials compromising Yezhov were considered at a meeting with Stalin.

2 Sy. note 1 to the entry of September 13, 1938

3 Alexander Ivanovich Uspensky (1902-1940), one of the heads of the State Security bodies, commissar of the State Security Service of the 3rd rank. The son of a forester, in the bodies of the Cheka since August 1920. In 1934, head of the NKVD department for the Moscow region. On February 28, 1936 he was sent to the West Siberian Territory, and in January 1938 N.S. Khrushchev, leaving for Ukraine, took him with him - the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR. Both actively pursued a repressive policy, and both had a good "practice" in unwinding repressions - Uspensky in Western Siberia under the leadership of Eikhe, and Khrushchev - as the first secretary of the Moscow city and regional committee of the CPSU (b).

\* Ouspensky staged suicide by fleeing to the Urals. On April 15, 1939, he was arrested in the Chelyabinsk region (in Miass) and transferred to Moscow. On January 28, 1940 he was shot.

% Eikhe Robert Indrikovich (1890-1940), party and statesman. The son of a farm laborer, he was educated at a primary school, and in 1905 he joined the Social Democracy of the Latvian Territory. From 1924 he was the chairman of the Siberian Revolutionary Committee, from 1930 he was the first secretary of the West Siberian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, from 1935 he was a candidate member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

(alternative elections to the first Supreme Soviet of the USSR in December 1937), became one of the initiators of a broad KGB operation against the anti-soviet

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Uspensky was brought to Moscow by Yagoda. Ouspensky left for Ukraine with Mykyta!, well, he won't break off here. Mykyta is reliable. In the Ukraine, the excesses were great, and the Trotskyists are firmly seated there even now, but Ouspensky was not noticed in this. But still suspicious. Also a conspiracy? And what about Yezhov?

Yezhov is more and more removed, says that it is necessary to work on water transport and in the Central Committee? And I see myself drinking more and more.

Anastasz is cold, jealous, or something. What is there to envy? Did he want to go to the NKVD himself? Please, even tomorrow. We have never been friends with him, but we know each other for a long time, I could at least pat on the shoulder.

Oh well, to hell with it.

The decision on prosecutorial supervision is almost ready. They delayed it, but there are so many things at once that you don't have time. It's good that Koba himself did this. But we did a great job."

elements, trying to aggravate the internal political situation. Since October 29, 1937, the People's Commissar of Agriculture of the USSR. Arrested on April 29, 1938, shot on February 2, 1940.

Khrushchev Nikita Sergeevich (1894-1971), since January 1938, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the CP (b) of Ukraine.

\* Yezhov at that moment retained the posts of People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, People's Commissar of Water Transport of the USSR, Secretary of the Central Committee and Chairman of the Party Control Committee.

\$ Mikoyan Anastas Ivanovich (1895-1978), a major party and statesman, member of the RSDLP (b) since 1915, one of the leaders of the Baku commune, was acquainted with L.P. Beria on party and underground work since 1918.

\* On November 15, 1938, the Politburo considered the issue of the USSR Prosecutor's Office, and on November 17, 1938, Molotov, as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, and Stalin, as Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, signed the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "On Arrests, prosecutor's supervision and conduct of the investigation. The last paragraph of this Decree looked like this:

"The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks warn all employees of the NKVD and the Prosecutor's Office that for the slightest violation of Soviet laws and directives of the Party and the Government, every employee of the NKVD and the Prosecutor's Office, regardless of the person, will be subject to severe judicial responsibility. veins."

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20/X1-38

Well, I got the night. I will remember for the rest of my life. We spent the whole night at Koba's, dealing with Yezhov! All one to one. If Yezhov himself is not an enemy, then there were enough enemies around him. And we have not opened all of them yet. I'm tired, but I want to write.

I know what power is for a long time, I was a boy, but already there was power. What was power for me? Responsibility (So in the text. - S.K.). You have been trusted, work. You can't learn. If you don't want to, I can't, but do it! You were trusted. Then, when you have power, it's interesting. Myself

came up with it, did it yourself, you see that a smart person is nearby, you can lift him up, help him, he will help you too, it will be easier for you to work.

The more power, the more interesting. And if you are your own boss, then work and work here. When I received the Zak-krai committee, how I flew. Before that, my hands itched, there's a mess, there's a fucking ... would be, there you can do it, but they don't. And now everything depends on you! He said it's being done. Not done, punished. Doesn't help, kicked out. You can do everything. As I worked in Georgia, my soul rejoiced. You see a swamp, drain it. If you want children to be healthy and literate, build a stadium, build an institute. Learn, run, enjoy.

And how does it happen? He thinks he got power, you can eat to your heart's content. And they start to cheat, play tricks, then they skimp (They neglect their duties. - S.K.), then they got caught on something, and most often on broads, that's all, pi..dets, you are on the hook. I myself did not notice how the enemy had become.

And then our zasr..ntsy Chekists. You have great power, you use it for business and carefully. Here you don't want to, but you will make mistakes (So in the text. - S.K.), because go figure out where the truth is. Maybe he is

1 See comment below.

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split, or maybe just from evil or desperation, he slanders someone. So no, they start making themselves into, as Koba said today, Napoleons. We are special, we will do whatever we want. They begin to think that they are the smartest, and Koba is a fool, and Lavrenty is a fool, they do not know the situation. Evdokimov almost built himself out of Karl Marx, he knows politics, he knows the village, but Koba sits in the Kremlin and knows life only from our reports.

And then conversations begin, then they discuss, they figure it out. Then comes the conspiracy. But even here they are afraid, they will hesitate there, they will hesitate here. And I want and prickly. If you don't kill Koba, it won't work. And killing Koba is not a joke. And unknown; what will come out. And I want power. Not to do business, but to have power.

And someone thinks that it will be better than Koba. Now Trotskyists, now right. We have seen such smart people over the years, wow! Wept! We will destroy the fist, and there will be no bread, no calico, and we are building planes, where can we go to Europe without bare f..sing. And let's go, we saw!

They don't have much to do. Things up to the throat. It has long been seen that if you want to do a job, do it with Koba. If he makes a mistake, he will recover, only he rarely makes mistakes, and in the main line he has never made a mistake.

It's a pity that I left Georgia, I lived there for a month, everything I did before my eyes. There was a dirty beach, make an embankment. Today the foundation, a month later the walls are up.

And then you slurp this swamp, and it's all swamp and swamp, but you have to sip. Okay, I'll take a bite. Because if you don't, it won't work. Hurry to deal with this bastard, and then you can work. Intelligence, Border Guard and production affairs sort it out. Here is such a colossus, you can also work hard.

Koba can now call at any moment, it must be borne in mind.

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Commentary by Sergei Kremlev.

On the night of November 19-20, 1938, from 11:10 p.m. to 4:20 a.m., a very stormy conference was held at Stalin's, in which Molotov, Mikoyan, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, and the secretaries of the Central Committee took part.



Andreev and Zhdanov, Shkiryatov, secretary of the CPC Party Collegium under the Central Committee, as well as Yezhov, Beria and Frinovsky. The work of the NKVD and Yezhov was discussed, including in the light of Zhuravlev's statement.

The reader has already read enough to understand even without my lengthy descriptions that for Yezhov, and even for Frinovsky, that night became, perhaps, the blackest in their lives, which from that night more and more rapidly rolled towards the end.

Let me tell you just one detail that characterizes that moment. On the night of November 19-20, a new appointment of Nikolai Vlasik took place. Stalin's personal bodyguard since the late 1920s, since 1936 the head of the operational group and the head of the department of the 1st department of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR, he was appointed to the place of the arrested Dagin by the head of the 1st department of the GUGB, taking over the entirety of the immediate responsibility for the safety of Stalin and the top party and state leadership of the country. Vlasik entered Stalin's office at 2.40, and five minutes later he left it as the head of the 1st department of the GUGB.

However, the entry in the diary of L.P. Beria dated November 20, 1938 is of interest primarily to others. It gives a lot for understanding the life and work of Lavrenty Pavlovich. This is, albeit a little confused and hastily stated, but Sgedo, these are his views on how and by what a person who receives great power should live.

Then, on the night when the further fate of not only Yezhov, but also Beria himself was actually decided, on the night that became the "moment of truth" for the entire "team" of Stalin, emotional stress was experienced, of course, not only by Yezhov and Frinovsky. Everyone else experienced it too, and Beria more than anyone else, with the possible exception of Yezhov and Frinovsky. And this, just experienced, excitement, a surge of feelings was well manifested in a confused diary entry, where, as is generally characteristic

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for Beria's diary, punctuation and other grammatical norms are sometimes observed, sometimes not.

For Beria, as for Stalin, great power means great opportunity to do great things. But

not everyone thought so.

During my work on the history of that era, I read many of its most interesting declassified documents. But over and over again I am convinced that one of the key evidence, important and necessary for understanding the situation at that time, should be considered the statement of M.P. Frinovsky dated April 11, 1939. It gives a lot for understanding such a phenomenon as the degeneration of a part of the Soviet elite by the mid-30s, as well as for understanding the reasons for the repressive process in the upper echelons of power in the USSR,

On April 6, 1939, Frinovsky was arrested, and five days later he wrote (rather, however, he finished, because it was huge, on many sheets) a statement addressed to the "People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - Commissar of State Security 1st rank Beria L.P. "

On April 13, 1939, Beria sent it to Stalin. In a small-circulation collection of documents "Lubyanka. Stalin and the NKVD - NKGB - GUKR "Smersh". 1939-March 1946" this statement occupies 16 pages of the format 70x100/1, and is striking in its frankness and concreteness. Moreover, there can be no talk of any "literary creativity" of investigators from the Lubyanka Tughne, especially since this is not an interrogation protocol with questions and answers, but a statement. I cannot, of course, give it in full, but I will give the beginning:

"According to the investigation, I was charged with anti-Soviet conspiratorial work. For a long time the idea of the need to confess to my criminal activity in the period when I was at large struggled in me, but the miserable state of a coward got the better! Having the opportunity to honestly talk about everything

1 These words are especially psychologically authentic, because the former cavalryman of the First Cavalry of Budyonny, Mikhail Frinovsky, was far from a coward, if we bear in mind his behavior in dangerous combat situations. Suffice it to say that in the Special Department of the Moscow Cheka in November 1919, he was assistant chief of the active (that is, operational

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to tell you and the leaders of the party, "of which I have been unworthy of the last years, deceiving the party - I did not do this. Only after my arrest, after the indictment and conversation with you personally, I took the path of repentance and promise to tell the investigation the whole truth to the end, both their own criminal-enemy work, and about the persons who are accomplices and leaders of this criminal enemy work.

I became a criminal because of blind trust in the authorities of my leaders YAGODA, YEVDOKIMOV and EZHOV, and having become a criminal, together with them I created a vile counter-revolutionary deed against the party.

In 1928, shortly after my appointment as commander and military commissar of the Special Purpose Division under the OGPU Collegium, at the regional party conference that took place, I was elected to the plenum, and by the plenum to the bureau of the party organization of the Sokolnichesky district.

Even at the conference, I established contact with a former employee of the OGPU (committed suicide in 1937 in connection with the arrest of YAGODA), Pogrebinsky, who informed me of the presence of a group struggle among the members of the district committee. Subsequently..." etc. etc. — sheet after sheet, year after year: surnames, situations...

Stalin received this statement on April 13, 1939. And on April 28, 1939, Yezhov was arrested. And now it was time for him to admit and confess.

Alas, it was something to admit ...

But here it was not the fault of either Stalin or Beria. Having received power, they bore its burden with dignity from beginning to end. And for Yezhov, Frinovsky, Yagoda, Evdokimov and the like, the burden of power eventually gave way to the temptations of power.

Noah) part, and in 1920 he was the head of the active part of the Special Department of the South-Western Front and later, in 1921-1922, the deputy head of the operational detachment of the All-Ukrainian Cheka, took part in the liquidation of anarchists, Makhnovists, etc. .

ÿ At least on the same night from November 19 to November 20, 1938, as well as during meetings with Stalin on January 10, 17, 19 and February 8, 1939, not to mention daily communication with L.P. Bery within the walls of the NKVD.

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They say that power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. But this is nothing more than a biting phrase. If a person looks at the power given to him as a duty, as a responsibility, then the power does not corrupt him, but constantly develops him as a person, as a leader and as a manager.

Power corrupts only those who look at it as a means of satisfying their passions, it does not matter - high or low.

21/ÿ1-38

Today I reported to Comrade Stalin, only Molotov was there. Yezhov's wife committed suicide in the hospital, the circumstances of death are suspicious. Maybe she herself, but someone helped. We need to figure it out.

Koba said that he had received a letter from her the other day, showed it. She writes there that she is not guilty of anything, swears by her old mother and daughter, but these are all nerves, she is a psychopath, and it can be sexually motivated. I had to read everything. He swears by the health of his parents, and then it turns out that he is lying. The important thing is that she wrote that she has no right to die. And then she took herself. How to understand?

I told Kobe, and he says: Or maybe not herself? I say, but the devil knows. Koba says: "The devil is not the devil, but the Cheka must know." I say let's find out.

But it's all x..ynya. We need to unwind something important. Koba is angry at Ouspensky!. He is sure that Ouspensky is alive and escaped. I myself think so, there is data. But it's not a jerk. Uspensky is an experienced operative, he knows everything. You just can't get it.)

1 See note 3 to the entry of November 14, 1938.

On November 22, 1938, Stalin wrote a note to Beria, where he demanded "the bastard - Uspensky, who went underground in front of everyone" to catch "by all means". Stalin wrote that "the honor of the Chekists has been hurt and disgraced" and that "this cannot be tolerated."

See also note 4 of the November 14, 1938 entry.

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25/X1-38

Everything, Lawrence. Goodbye dreams of Georgia. Now I will sit in Moscow, maybe forever. From this day on, the People's Commissar. Immediately after the 19th, Yezhov wrote to Comrade Stalin a statement asking him to release him.

Today, Comrade Stalin called and said, accept Lavrentiy People's Commissariat. Yezhov wrote a statement, repents and asks to be released. We freed him, we leave him the People's Commissariat of Water Transport and Party Control.

Let me read the statement. He said that a commission for the transfer of cases would be formed, and then they spoke specifically. He approved all my proposals, most importantly he said that we would strengthen the personnel of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, let's give lists and Malenkov will also select people. Just don't be arrogant, he says, otherwise we are already tired of replacing people's commissars in the Cheka.

Besides me, there was only Molotov.

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev.

On November 23, 1938, Yezhov wrote a statement to the Politburo addressed to Stalin with a request to release him from the work of People's Commissar of Internal Affairs. It should be noted that he listed all his omissions and shortcomings in his work in great detail and completely, so that acquaintance with this statement for the same Beria was of some benefit. Yezhov did not just repent, but analyzed the situation in the NKVD, and his statement could be considered at the same time as a brief analytical note.

"Advanced" "historians" have already worn out one phrase from this statement, but I will also quote it. In the end, Yezhov wrote: "Despite all these big shortcomings and blunders in my work, I must say that under the daily leadership of the Central Committee - the NKVD crushed the enemies great." There is nothing to argue here. Even Yezhov, with all his vices and sins, did to cleanse the leading strata of the country from various kinds of enemies (from the White Guards and a whole set of

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ra conspirators to simple degenerates and self-seekers) are many.

On November 23, 1938, Yezhov appeared in Stalin's office for the last time in his life, entering it at 9:35 p.m. on November 23 and leaving it at one in the morning on November 24. In the last conversation between Stalin and Yezhov, at first only Voroshilov participated, and by ten in the evening Molotov also came up. So far, Stalin saw in Yezhov only a very confused person, who had sinned a lot, but was still capable of straightening himself out. He has already deprived Yezhov of his trust, about which he directly said. However, if Stalin saw Yezhov as an enemy at the end of 1938 or simply put an end to him, then he would not have spent three and a half hours talking with Yezhov only on November 23, not to mention the five-hour "debriefing" in night from 19 to 20 November!

Accordingly, Stalin would not have taken a decision on November 24, passed as a Politburo Resolution, to satisfy Yezhov's request to release him from the duties of the People's Commissar of the NKVD while retaining for him the posts of "Secretary of the Central Committee, Chairman of the Party Control Commission and People's Commissar of Water transport".

Therefore, only as vile, unhistorical and irresponsible chatter should be assessed the "memorial" stories of the "democrats" that Stalin needed Yezhov only as an "instrument of bloody total terror", and when the deed was done, "the country was intimidated", the "tool" was thrown away as unnecessary. Stalin was generally tolerant and every time he tried to the last to believe in a person and broke with him only when he was convinced that he was no longer a comrade and ally, but a traitor and enemy,

So it happened with Yezhov. This happened with Frinovsky, although this former deputy Yezhov and his future accomplice were at meetings with Stalin after November 19, 1938, four times already in 1939 (the last time on February 8, 1939, two months before his arrest). And for Stalin it was not a game - he did not play political thrillers. If a person was in his office at a business meeting, then there was one reason: this person was considered as necessary for the business. That is, Frinovsky only by the end of winter

1939 began to be regarded by Stalin as a dubious figure...

However, I got ahead of myself. On November 25, 1938, a cipher signed by Stalin went to the places "to the first secretaries of the Central Committee of the National Communist Parties, regional committees and regional committees" about the unfavorable situation in the NKVD, about satisfying Yezhov's request for his release from the NKVD, about keeping his posts "for NKVD and through work in the bodies of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. The same cipher reported on the appointment of the People's Commissar of the NKVD of the USSR "on the unanimous proposal of the members of the Central Committee, including it. Yezhov, - the current first deputy of the NKVD comrade. Beria L.P.". The addressees were asked to "immediately acquaint the people's commissars of the NKVD and the heads of the UNKVD with this message".

Yezhov was, of course, depressed. In addition, he became entangled not only in business in the NKVD, but also in conspiracies, in relations with foreign special services, in his personal life - in everything at once. Yezhov was not an ideological opponent of Stalin and Soviet power, he even loved them and was devoted to them in his own way, but he turned out to be a weak man without a strong inner core. I repeat: Yezhov was not a monster, a sadist, etc., he was not an enemy either, he was just a weak person and therefore slipped into the betrayal of Stalin and Russia. They betray always and only their own. An open enemy cannot betray by definition, because he is immediately recognized by you as an enemy. A hidden enemy cannot betray either, because you are immediately recognized by him as an enemy, even if he does not show it. And the traitor, until his betrayal is revealed, was once a friend in deed and therefore is perceived as a friend, as his own, even after he embarked on the path of betrayal, but has not yet been exposed.

Yezhov was his own.

But he betrayed.

Frinovsky was also his own.

And he betrayed.

It can be said that they turned out to be almost Shakespearean figures, but personally I have never been seriously interested in the psychology and genesis of betrayal. And they are not interested. Therefore, I will not continue further psychological exercises, but will inform you that after the appointment of Be

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rii Yezhov wrote a personal letter to Stalin, which reached the addressee through Poskrebyshev (Stalin's secretary) on November 27, 1938.

It was no longer an analytical note, but a confession. Moreover, the surname "Frinovsky" ran like a refrain throughout the letter - like the evil genius of Yezhov and the NKVD. The last third of the long and very sincere letter was devoted almost exclusively to relations with Beria. Yezhov, in particular, confessed to a prejudice against him, encouraged by Frinovsky.

The essence of Frinovsky's slander, according to Yezhov, boiled down to the following: "... 1) I will not work well with Beria; 2) there will be two directorates; 3) the Central Committee and comrade Stalin will be informed biased; 4) deficiencies will be built into the system; will not shy away from any means to achieve the intended goal.

Referring to the fact that Beria has an "imperious character" and that he "will not tolerate subordination," Frinovsky, as Yezhov admitted in a letter, advised: "...keep the reins firmly in your hands. Don't let it sit on your head. Do not mope, but take hold of the apparatus firmly so that it does not double between. Beria and me. Do not allow people Beria to the apparatus.

The end of the letter deserves to be quoted in full:

"I listened to all this scum with sympathy ...

Concerning the affairs of Georgia, he (Frinovsky. - S.K.) said the following: it was a mistake that I did not listen to him in time and did not control Georgia. He took many liberties for Georgia. It is suspicious that Comrade Beria wants to destroy all Chekists who have ever worked in Georgia. He said that Comrade Beria had shot all of his closest associates. He must be responsible for this environment ... ".

Here I will interrupt the quotation to remind the reader that after being transferred to Moscow, Beria almost immediately achieved the transfer with him to Moscow from Tbilisi to responsible positions in the NKVD of the USSR of his long-time employees for Chekist work in Georgia: Merkulov, Bogdan and Zakhara Kobulovs, Dekanozov, Mamulov, Sharia, S.R. Milshtein, Goglidze, Tsanavu (to be appointed People's Commissar of the NKVD to Belorussia), Sumbatov-Topuridze, Gvishiani, Sharapov,

Shalva Tsereteli. Since 1939, Beria transferred Ivan Maslennikov, a future hero of the Great Patriotic War, to Moscow from Belarus to the post of deputy people's commissar of his long-time comrade-in-arms in Georgia.

And all these were people from Beria's inner circle! Moreover, in the NKVD of Georgia, after all, there were quite a few Chekists who had long worked with Beria in the Cheka, and then in the OGPU of Transcaucasia (the same Rapava remained in Tbilisi as People's Commissar of the NKVD of the Georgian SSR).

Many of the old security officers Beria, becoming the 1st secretary of the Zakkraykom of the CPSU (b) and the 1st secretary of the Central Committee of the CP (b) of Georgia, nominated for party and economic work in Georgia. Let us also not forget about the "pure", so to speak, party and state workers of Georgia, nominated by Beria and quietly working there both before 1937 and after 1937.

That is, Frinovsky, from the beginning of the 1930s, gradually mired in games of right-wing conspiracies and intrigues, simply slandered Beria. Frinovsky did not get along with him in kind, since 1930, when Frinovsky was appointed chairman of the GPU of Azerbaijan, and Beria was the chairman of the entire Transcaucasian GPU and the plenipotentiary representative of the OGPU of the USSR in the Transcaucasian SFSR,

After his resignation, Yezhov also understood this, because he wrote to Stalin:

"In a word, he pumped hard. I, in turn, not only listened, but in many respects agreed and told him [about] Comrade Beria's bad attitude towards Frinovsky.

As a result of all this bastard behavior, I did a lot of completely unforgivable stupidities. They were expressed in the following: a) any just criticism of Comrade Beria in the work of the apparatus, I considered biased; b) it seemed to me that comrade Beria did not take into account the situation in which I had to work and did not take into account that a lot of work had nevertheless been done; c) it seemed to me that Comrade Beria was wiping me out of my work at the GUGB; d) it seemed to me that Comrade Beria was not objective enough in the information of the Central Committee; and finally, e) that all this is personally directed against me."

The plot, as they say, is outlined very clearly.

21/ŷ1-38

Today I was alone with Koba for almost an hour! We talked, as they say, heart to heart. Showed Yezhov's letter. Yes, Nikolai got confused, confused. But it's his own fault. And Mikhail, as he was a bastard .. nets, remained. A healthy bull, he knows how to shove forward like a tank, and he influenced Nikolai, but he himself is also amenable to influence. Adventurer. But that's for Koba to decide. I told him everything about Mikhail that I think.

Koba said, take matters from Nikolai as soon as possible and shuruy?. And what a joke. And so we shoot to the full stoker. I agreed with Georgiy that they would start preparing people for the replenishment of the Central Apparatus and for the periphery.

15/CHI-38 'Tough day. You can't see for everything, and then you deeply regret it. Chkalov crashed?. And they warned

On November 127, 1938, Stalin began the reception with the fact that from 18.00 to 18.45 he talked with Beria face to face. From that moment on, Lavrenty Navlovich became an almost indispensable participant in working meetings in Stalin's Kremlin office. Of the twenty-one meetings that Stalin held at his place from November 28 to the end of 1938, Beria was present at twelve.

On December 25, 1938, the Nolitburo adopted a Resolution on the surrender of Ezhov's cases on the NKVD to Beria, while "the delivery and acceptance of cases should be carried out with the participation of the Secretary of the Central Committee, the CPSU (b) Comrade Andreev and the head. ORPO (Department of Leading Party Organs) of the Central Committee of Comrade Malenkov. The delivery and acceptance of cases was prescribed to begin on December 7 and be completed within a week. In reality, the act of acceptance and delivery of cases for the NKVD of the USSR was presented to the Central Committee to Stalin by Beria, Andreev and Malenkov only on January 29, 1939, since in the process of the work of the commission with the participation of Yezhov himself, more and more sins of Yezhov and his leadership were revealed.

Valery Chkalov crashed in the first test flight of the new fighter N.N. Polikarpov I-180-1 December 15, 1938 at 13.10. The flight scheduled for December 12 was postponed at the insistence of the representative of the NKVD and at the direction of L.P. Beria (in preparation for the flight on December 12, 48 defects were detected). By December 14, the breakdowns were fixed, and on December 15, Chkalov took off at 12.58, and ten minutes later he died during an emergency landing.

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him and Polikarpov!, sent people himself, and wrote to Comrade Stalin. On December 12, the flight was postponed, he traveled around the Earth and on Earth his thrust burst. It seems to have been fixed, but it still crashed. He reported to Comrade Stalin, angry, gloomy. He said understand.

Kaganovich<sup>3</sup> justifies himself, but to no avail. I will sort this out".

18/HP-38

There is a Russian proverb "Simplicity is worse than theft". You can come up with a new proverb "A mess is worse than sabotage". I deal with the death of Chkalov. Everything could be, a terrorist attack could be, wrecking on the plane. The plane was new, needed, they could do two things at once.

But it turns out that it's just stupid .. and assholes ... ntsy. Aviation workers have already told me that where aviation begins, order ends there. And then you sort it out (So in the text. - S.K.) and you can see that there is no order at all. Worse than in the People's Commissariat. We'll have to plant someone, but what's the point. Here it is necessary to change the whole system, but this is not for me. I'd like to deal with mine, I'll clean the People's Commissariat and get down to business.

1 Polikarpov Nikolai Nikolaevich (1892-1944), famous aircraft designer, Hero of Socialist Labor.

LP. Beria was with a report to Stalin from 21.00 to 21.55 on December 15, 1938. The next time he appeared at Stalin's was December 19, 1938.

3 This refers to brother L.M. Kaganovich Mikhail Moiseevich Kaganovich (1888-1941), then People's Commissar of the Defense Industry of the USSR (in 1939-1940 People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry).

\* Some now accuse Stalin and Beria of deliberately organizing the death of Chkalov. Like, Chkalov was getting out of control, and he had to be removed. Not only the character of Stalin and Beria, but also an objective analysis of the specific situation convinces of the complete groundlessness of such accusations.

5 As a result of the investigation, Deputy Chief Designer N.N. Polikarpova N.V. Tomashevich (released ahead of schedule in June 1941 for good work in TsKB-29 of the NKVD with the removal of a criminal record) and director of the pilot plant M.A. Usachev (released ahead of schedule in August 1943 with the removal of a criminal record).

It's none of my business, I don't understand this, but I told Polikarpov that you, Nikolai Nikolayevich, won't fly so high, everything is a blunder, but you need to approach the matter responsibly. Of course, he is worried, Chkalov is on him. But you need to think about how to work further!,

Tomorrow I will report to Comrade Stalin that there is no sabotage, but it is necessary to judge.

George? continues to select people in accordance (So in the text. - S.K.) with the November Decrees of. He said that he was giving me a good reliable worker Kruglov. Said you won't regret it, guy with perspective. Let's see\*. Georgy said that soon the staff will come to you in a stream, we will select the best people. This is good.

1 The I-180 aircraft and its development of the I-185 is one of the examples of the unrealized potential of our aviation. Nikolai Nikolaevich Polikarpov was a talented designer, but his views on the process of developing aircraft design were very peculiar. He could well have launched a "raw" aircraft into flight, risking the pilot and believing that all the flaws would be revealed during flight tests. Chkalov died on the I-180-1, and on September 5, 1939, the talented test pilot Thomas Suzi crashed on the fifty-third flight of the I-180-2 variant. In 1943, another talented tester, Vasily Stepanchonok, died on the cannon version of the I-186 fighter (development of the I-185). At the same time, according to the Air Force Research Institute at the end of 1942, the I-186 surpassed all fighters in the world and had a good development prospect. Alas, the prospects were limited.

GM. Malenkov, then head of the Department of Leading Party Workers (ORPO) of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, that is, the main "personnel officer" of the party and the state in general.

On November 326 and 27, 1938, two resolutions of the Politburo on workers for the NKVD of the USSR were adopted, according to which Beria and Malenkov were instructed to select 100 people for training courses for workers for the NKVD "from among the leading district and regional party and Komsomol

workers." In addition, 25 people were sent to work in the central office of the NKVD personally.

4 This is the first entry in the diary of L.P. Beria about Sergei Nikiforovich Kruglov (1907-1977), Beria's future deputy, and later his successor as People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR since 1946 (and as Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR since June 26 1953). Kruglov was personally sent to the NKVD by a decision of the Politburo of December 20, 1938, from the position of responsible organizer of the Department of Leading Party Workers (ORPO) of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Until February 1939, he was a special commissioner of the NKVD, and from February 1939 he became deputy people's commissar and head of the Personnel Department of the NKVD of the USSR.

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev.

A serious and positive personnel renewal of the NKVD bodies in the central apparatus and in the localities has already begun, I must say, N.I. Yezhov. In this, as in many other things, the duality of Yezhov's nature and his fate, and the ambiguity of the situation within the NKVD, affected.

Here one can, perhaps, draw an analogy with the provocateur Malinovsky, who was at the same time an agent of the Okhrana, and one of the major figures in the Bolshevik Party, and even a deputy of the tsarist State Duma from the workers' curia. Malinovsky played a dual role. On the one hand, as a secret agent of the tsarist government, he had to counteract the development of the revolutionary movement in Russia. But he could not have advanced to the leading core of the RSDLP(b) if he had not had the talent of a political organizer of the masses and had not shown it in his daily work. He showed it: speaking brilliantly in the Duma and before the workers, attracting new members to the party, and so on. On the example of both Malinovsky and Yezhov, it is clear that this is the lot of any large figure that has a "double bottom". Even by secretly opposing and corrupting the cause to which he is obliged to serve openly.

That is, on the one hand, Yezhov corrupted the NKVD (at the level of the highest leadership), but, on the other hand, he strengthened the NKVD at the mass grassroots level, attracting young and developed guys who were completely devoted to Soviet power, including - from the periphery and for work on the periphery.

On March 11, 1937, Yezhov made a report to young communists and Komsomol members mobilized to work in the NKVD, and these were mostly well-educated (many with higher, including higher technical education) workers. At the same time, for the period from October 1, 1936 to January 1, 1938, 5229 people left the State Security agencies (of which 1220 were arrested), and 5359 people arrived.

L.P. Beria expanded the process of attracting specialists from the national economy and party and state bodies to the NKVD bodies. Including in December 1938

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The NKVD of the USSR ORPO of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Moscow Civil Code of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks selected 1,500 people for study and subsequent work in the NKVD among politically proven and advanced manufacturers of the city of Moscow.

So the image of the semi-literate Chekist-sadist from the NKVD Beria, created by the liberal "intelligentsia", is no more historical than the image of Baba Yaga as a real figure in ancient Russian history. In support of the above, I can cite, for example, interesting data from the State Archive of the Tomsk Region on the number of citizens repressed in the Tomsk Region under Article 58 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR over a number of years.

That is, if in the "Yezhov-Frinov" year of 1938 in the Tomsk region, under three thousand people were shot on political charges, then in the completely "Beria" year of 1939, three people were shot in the same region!



I am convinced that for many these figures will be unexpected, especially in the light of those ideas about Beria that are still in circulation in the minds.

Immediately, from the end of 1938, L.P. Beria also launched a large-scale, outstanding reform of Soviet intelligence. In fact, he created a qualitatively new political intelligence of the USSR, whose employees did not imagine themselves to be politicians, as it was before, but considered themselves as an instrument for ensuring the policy of the state leadership of the country. And this applied not only to new intelligence personnel

kov, but also the old ones, which Beria personally and carefully checked. I will refer here to the assessment of Vladimir Konstantinovich Vinogradov, the leading inspector of the Department of Registration and Archival Funds of the FSB of Russia, professor of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences. In an article on the reform of the state security bodies, published in II volume of the "Proceedings of the Society for the Study of the History of Domestic Special Services", he wrote:

"Under the new People's Commissar (L.P. Beria. - S.K.), they began to solve problems related to the defeat of experienced Chekist cadres who fell under a wave of mass repressions. Amnesty and rehabilitation were carried out for many victims, some former employees began to be returned to service, intelligence and counterintelligence work was established, and foreign residencies that had been defeated under Yezhov were recreated. At the same time, special recruitment and training in NKVD schools began to be actively carried out.

But to this day, many are sure that Beria allegedly almost destroyed Soviet intelligence. In fact, he creatively reformed it, putting the technical equipment of intelligence work on a new level.

26/HP-38

Today I managed to get some rest. The year ends. I think it was the hardest year of my life. Not the whole year, but four months. During this time, I got tired more than a year in Tbilisi. What did he do? Go .. but raked in the People's Commissariat, and even then not to the end. But now it will be easier, in the New Year it will be possible to work, there will be a lot of work.

It is already clear that they imprisoned en masse, and now they must be released en masse. You can't bring back the shot ones, and not everyone is to blame there either. But they shot a lot for the cause. Even if today they did not harm, if the war had begun, they would have harmed. And they burned, and killed, and poisoned, and blew up. An enemy is an enemy. While it's quiet, he sits quietly, and he smells of gunpowder, starts to act.

Received Anna Larina. Now Bukharin's widow. I remember her as a young girl. Such was the gypsy and all as shone. Nikolai Ivanovich was a womanizer, flattered, captivated the girl, charmed her, she would die for him now. Fool you are fool. She sat down because of her Nikolai Ivanovich, and you will sit. Nikolai Ivanovich is an enemy, but you can't prove it to her, she prays for him. He writes poetry. Nikolai Ivanovich is a white dove, and Stalin is a black crow and his brain pecks.

I wrote a letter to Yezhov, and they brought me to the office, and there was Beria. She was surprised, she thought that I was in Georgia, and I was in the Lubyanka. Daring, looks like a wolf cub. Fool fool. I guessed at first. Can release, do not spoil fate.

I talked, I see, it's impossible to release. If released, she will shout at every corner that Nikolai Ivanovich is innocent. And this is no longer a toy girl. You poke your head into politics, and this is no longer my personal business. I wanted to release it, but I can't. For real, she should be shot, because all the same, she will still use her tongue even in the camps, even in exile, but it's a pity. May he live and live long. Maybe he'll understand something.

It's a pity when such young people do not go there. You live and live, five more years, and we will establish such a life that you just live. If there is no war. Only war can interfere, but here we must try not to mess around for a long time. We can come quickly if we are READY.

Okay, the year is over, let's think about the New Year. In March I will be forty. Old man, katso.

1939

3/1-39

Today I spoke with Koba about measures of physical influence. After the Decree on Prosecutorial Oversight! back wave. Do not arrest anyone, do not touch anyone, etc. And how to conduct a consequence of conspiracies? I explained that there was no material evidence. They took him, he refuses. And there are testimonies of three people against him. Maybe a disclaimer? Maybe. Here it is necessary to compare, collect material. Got it, interrogation again. He refuses. How can you prove it? Only other indications. And time goes by. A confrontation does not always help. If they are friends, then they will understand each other without words, and the investigator, if inexperienced, will not understand that they immediately agreed in front of him.

No, if there are serious materials, and he pulls rubber, it's better to hit him in the face a couple of times or also with rubber. What to do! This is where it starts to show. And you write and then compare again.

An investigation is always a difficult matter, but if the investigation is based on a conspiracy or anti-Soviet work, then it is a hundred times more difficult. As for sabotage, it's easier, here the fact is obvious. You just need to figure out whether negligence or a pest

1 The resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "On arrests, prosecutorial supervision and investigation" was adopted on November 17, 1938, and was prepared with the active ideological participation of Beria and largely on his initiative after he dealt with the situation in the NKVD.

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stvo and organization. And according to a conspiracy, working by persuasion alone is a disastrous thing. Koba agreed, said he would give an explanation!2,

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev.

This is an interesting point, around which a lot of lies are piled up. The use of physical force as one of the methods of conducting an investigation in the NKVD was indeed allowed from 1937 with the permission of Stalin and the Central Committee, and in January 1939 Stalin only confirmed that, in principle, the approach to the issue had not changed. However, one must understand why this was decided in 1937 and confirmed in 1939.

Until 1937, before the disclosure of the Tukhachevsky-Yakir-Uborevich conspiracy, this method was not sanctioned, because the picture of secret activity in the USSR, with the organization of conspiracies against the "general line of the Central Committee", did not seem very large-scale and ramified. Conspiracies were exactly what they played, because the top of any conspiracy consisted of people who were inconsistent, vacillating, and internally weak. On the one hand, they - by themselves, without external support - did not seem very dangerous. On the other hand, after the arrest, they were quickly confessed, since, as a rule, all of them had past oppositional sins, which could not be denied. That is, there were threads that the investigation could seize on.

Since 1937 the situation has changed. At first, the disclosure of Tukhachevsky's conspiracy showed that the real danger to the country was great and remains great. Then, in the course of the investigation, a picture of conspiratorial activity on a nationwide scale was increasingly revealed. To this

On January 110, 1939, Stalin sent cipher telegram 26/sh "to the secretaries of the regional committees, regional committees, the Central Committee of the National Communist Parties, the people's commissars of internal affairs, the heads of the NKVD", which stated that "the use of physical force in the practice of the NKVD was allowed from 1937 with permission of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

2 See comment below.

In the middle of the summer of 1937, it became clear to Stalin that a powerful layer of degenerates had formed in the party and state leadership in the center and in the localities, which turned out to be intertwined with ties and sentiments with hidden Trotskyists, right-wing and direct internal and external enemies of socialism. Moreover, no practical actions have yet been taken, while everything remained at the level of conversations. But, as you know, "in the beginning was the Word." Aza with a word could follow and deeds.

However, the word, although it can become a material force, is in itself immaterial, and you cannot sew it into the protocol. And hidden tape recording then existed in its infancy even in the West. Therefore, even a long investigation using only logical methods was ineffective or ineffective and led to an unacceptable - according to the situation - delay in terms.

In addition, the investigators were confronted not by children or semi-defective criminals, but by developed people, accustomed to discussions, diplomacy, maneuvering, and so on. That is why, since 1937, it was necessary to sanction physical measures for the NKVD.

However, in a cipher dated January 10, 1939, Stalin recalled: "At the same time, it was indicated that physical impact is allowed as an exception, and, moreover, only in relation to such obvious enemies of the people who, using the humane method of interrogation, brazenly refuse to give thieves, do not testify for months, try to slow down the exposure of the conspirators who remained at large - therefore, they continue the fight against the Soviet government even in prison ... "

In the same cipher, Stalin noted that this method greatly accelerated the work of exposing the enemies of the people, but at the same time he admitted that "later, in practice, the method of physical influence was polluted by scoundrels Zakovsky, Litvin, Uspensky and others, because they turned - whether it was from an exception to the rule and they began to apply it to honest people who were accidentally arrested, for which they suffered due punishment ... "

However, Stalin immediately warned the addressees that

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this does not in the least discredit the method itself, if it is correctly applied in practice, and explained:

"It is known that all bourgeois intelligence services use physical force against representatives of the socialist proletariat... The question is why socialist intelligence should be more humane in relation to inveterate agents of the bourgeoisie, sworn enemies of the working class and collective farmers."

In conclusion, Stalin again emphasized that this method should be applied as an exception, in relation to open and non-disarming enemies.

We must not forget that Beria turned to Stalin with a request to authorize the methods of physical influence in the future at a time when the NKVD of Beria had yet to reveal many aspects of the very real anti-state activities of the same Yezhov, Frinovsky, and many others. Trotskyists and rightists, etc.

And in his diary entry dated January 3, 1939, Beria described the situation quite clearly. In conspiracy investigations, sincere testimonies of the suspects or accused are the most important, and sometimes it is simply impossible to achieve them by logic alone. Moreover, in a short time frame. Eliminate the potential "fifth column" in the upper echelons of the country's leadership had to be very urgent. After all, already in 1939 the USSR faced a real threat of being drawn into a war with one or another enemy.

We are not done with the transfer of cases. Nicholas! the look is sometimes angry, sometimes pale, and more often it does not appear at all, but it should. You have to appear, not always sober, but sometimes worse. More and more skimping.

I need to check everything to the point, because I'll clean it out now, then it will be possible to work calmly. Georgy and Andreev swear, Nikolai immediately subsides. Here

1 NO. Yezhov.

You can no longer say that Beria finds fault. But the more we understand, the quieter it is.

What will he say. Brought to a mess, nothing. say. Almost any line has to straighten. Now I see that Nikolai had a lot of good ideas, we will definitely use something. So what? Fool, started for health, and finished for peace.

One thanks, Nikolai cleaned the Apparatus well from Yagoda's people. But he cleared it for his own, and now they need to be cleaned. We'll finish with the check, we'll send the Kobe Act, and then I'll take it firmly. We need to take care of the border guard. The border guard should not be a watchman at the border, but the master and guard of the front line. This is a big deal and it is now very badly staged. The Internal Troops are also a mess, but they have their own specifics. They just have to be a watchman, and what are they to the fucking mother of a watchman if 30,000 people fled in one year!. Damn..s.

21/1-39

Today with Nicholas? sat side by side on the podium at the Funeral Meeting on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of Ilyich's death. Kind of sad, and sat silently, did not say a word. And sorry for him, and himself to blame. How many I have already seen confused people and you still don't understand why. If you don't have discipline, then you're gone. When there is power, it is easy to decompose.

Nikolai, too, and worked like an ox all his life, he says so himself, but still he could not resist. And not everything is clean. I know Mikhailaz. It is now Nikolai Kobe who repents, but when he and Mikhail ran the People's Commissariat, they did not repent. Mikhail not without reason began with anarchism

: The figure is valid. In 1938, with the number of guards of the NKVD camps in 60 thousand people, the number of successful escapes reached 30 thousand.

2NI. Yezhov. Mi. Frinovsky.

nal, this audience, as it were adventurers, so it went on. How much I quarreled with Mikhail about the GPU. The threads stretch, but how do they unwind?

24/1-39

Today, Comrade Stalin tells me, when you are left alone, you are right about Intourist, always act like that. Although you are in the GPU now, you must always look broadly, on a national scale. Not from your bump, but like from a mountain. You're great, you can see everything at once. So screw it up. And keep in mind (So in the text. - S.K.), we need to promote Dalstroy, we need gold. And you need a tin! The war may already be this year.

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev.

The collision with Intourist deserves a separate discussion. This is an interesting moment! By a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the All-Union Joint-Stock Company Intourist was transferred in April 1938 to the jurisdiction of the NKVD of the USSR, and in August 1938, that is, under Yezhov, it finally became part of the NKVD.

On the one hand, Yezhov seemed to understand that this decision was unreasonable. However, things did not go further than Yezhov's understanding, who could have Intourist as his subordinate for Yezhov, given that Yezhov's wife was a lady of a cheerful and "secular" disposition, not alien to "exquisite" life. Accordingly, Intourist was a convenient channel for obtaining foreign goods, perfumes, underwear, etc.

However, by October 1938, Yezhov was no longer up to providing Evgenia Solomonovna Yezhova (Feygenberg) with Parisian spirits. And in October he, still in his capacity as People's Commissar, sent to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars

1 On the night of January 24, 1939, Stalin received L.P. Beria and employees of Dalstroy of the NKVD of the USSR, including the deputy head of Dalstroy, brigade commander Arkady Alexandrovich Khodyrev. At the same time, Stalin talked with Beria one on one for 45 minutes.

USSR V.M. Molotov's note on the inexpediency of transferring Intourist to the NKVD.

At the end of November 1938, Beria became People's Commissar, and in December 1938, a trial began in the United States against a representative of Intourist, convicted of intelligence activities.

Beria always thought about the benefits of the case, and therefore, without even officially accepting the people's commissariat, he approached Stalin with a proposal to remove Intourist from the jurisdiction of the NKVD. The rationale for such a step in Beria's letter was business-like, concrete, and revealed a good acquaintance with the essence of the problem. Most likely, the draft letter was not prepared by Beria himself (although the initiative came, no doubt, from him), but Lavrenty Pavlovich was just distinguished by his ability, firstly, not to silence, but to encourage subordinates to their own reasoned opinion, and secondly secondly, he knew how to select smart people and use them effectively.

One way or another, the final argument of Beria's letter of December 7, 1938 (it came to Stalin on January 9, 1939) was made in the style of Beria:

"...Z. The fact that INTOURIST has been taken over by the NKVD will certainly become known abroad. Capitalist travel companies and the press hostile to us will try to use this fact to spread harassment around the representative offices of "INTOURIST", will call them branches of the NKVD and thereby impede their normal work, and by their provocation will scare away people from the petty bourgeoisie and intelligentsia from traveling to THE USSR".

After reading Beria's letter, Stalin imposed a resolution: "Comrade, Molotov, Mikoyan. It seems that Comrade Beria is right, Intourist could be handed over to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade. I. Stalin. 01/10/39. On the same day, January 10, 1939, by the Decree of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Intourist was transferred to the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade of the USSR.

It would seem that a small fact (although, if you think about it, it's not so small even on the scale of Stalin), could not but strengthen Stalin's opinion about Beria as a worker who knows how to become not a narrowly departmental, but a state point of view and actively pursue it .

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29 /1-39

Finally signed the Act!. Conclusions for Nikolai x..evye. For Frinovsky too. Andreev believes that they should be expelled from the Party. I say exclude, so it's immediately on trial. Also a twist. We wrote what we have so that Comrade Stalin and the Politburo know an objective picture of what has been launched and what will need to be straightened out. And Nikolai is already severely punished. If he is a party man, he will draw conclusions. He has a job in the TsN up to his throat and in the people's commissariat navigation on the nose. Let it work if it pulls.

But they wrote down that there are doubts about the political honesty of comrade. Yezhov.

Let Comrade Stalin decide. We wrote down our findings.

6/P-39

Everyone, I'm starting to joke. The main program will be like this. Do we raise Dalstroy in the first place in Economics?. Koba is very interested. Then it is necessary to increase the construction along the canals and the railway. It will be necessary to expand the structure. You can't cover everything in one Office.

There are a lot of pest specialists, their work must be organized wisely. This also needs to be done quickly. He is politically a bastard or passive, but a good specialist. So use it to its fullest, it will work, the other person will. For him, work is like another

January 129, 1939 L.P. Beria, A.A. Andreev and G.M. Malenkov signed the act of acceptance and delivery of cases to the NKVD of the USSR and a cover letter to Stalin. The number of the cover letter was the People's Commissariat with the letter Beria - 447 /B, but the style of the act suggests that the main formulations belong to G.M. Malenkov.

2 Dalstroy - Main Directorate for the construction of the Far North "Dalstroy" of the NKVD of the USSR. The main tasks were to ensure the extraction of gold and tin in the Kolyma and the economic development of the northern regions of Eastern Siberia.

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a glass of vodka. He cannot live without a job. So give him a job.

Then check the device in detail. People come, so there is someone to replace. They will gain experience, we will pass it on. It's hard, but what can you do?

Intelligence, this is a special case, here I will check everything myself. The most subtle thing, but screwed up tightly. Maybe all the agents are exposed, but you need to work. It will be necessary to take a risk, in Intelligence it is impossible without risk. But everyone needs to be checked. I call, I take it for fear, I look at who is behaving. An honest person will be offended, but it is immediately clear whether he is offended or frightened. If you're scared, it's rubbish. And if you are offended, I'm sorry, friend, we'll check it and then we'll believe it. And believe me, work. We don't believe it either sorry.

Be sure to deploy a school for reconnaissance. Enough self-activity, we need professors in intelligence as well. Only without the Comintern. We'll find ours. There are smart guys. And let them look for their own agents behind the cordon.

The border guard must be set up in a new way. New schools are also needed, the selection is the most stringent. A politically illiterate person should not serve on the Border. They look at him from the other side, he should be a model both in appearance and in everything. So that all the girls dry on both sides of the Border.

Strong political preparation is needed. You will need to talk to George. And cook ourselves.

Operational communication at the border is needed everywhere. Radio of course. And most importantly wired. At the border, a wire line is possible, because the normal regime at the border is in peacetime, and in peacetime they will not massively break the connection. And if the connection is torn, this is already a war. Or on the nose.

Armament on the border is now x.. military, weak. It is necessary to rearm firmly. We need machines and mi

notes. If there is a war, the army will be an army, and we will also fight.

Single training should be like that of a saboteur. It is not a urka going against you, but a well-trained person. And you should. One must be able to act alone and in a small group. You have to shoot hard. At the border, we all need Voroshilov arrows. Snipers cook need to be massive.

Further, on the Border, you need your own intelligence. One agent can be uncovered and re-recruited. And you won't know who he works for, for you or for your uncle. And if massively, at the grassroots level, then there is already such an influx of information that you can't hide it. We will set up reconnaissance for the border troops separately. This helped us even in Transcaucasia. You learn more from the peasants than from the boss from the ministry.

We need to start reviewing cases. The decision on arrests was adopted, but you can't replace the entire apparatus in the field, you need to push it, review it. According to the passport regime, too. It is necessary to put the investigation in a new way, this is already being done.

Nikolai did things. It turns out that they did it on purpose to embitter. There are many enemies, but it is clear that there were many unjustified arrests. I think at least 100,000, and maybe more, they planted in vain. And there was an excess in the executions, but you can't fix it here.

It will be easier to protect the Government. Vlasik! will not let you down, we will add more people to him. It is necessary to add a strong staff to the operational-Chekist work.

I must ask Koba to give me time to better deal with the affairs of the People's Commissariat and then immediately report to him on the entire program. It is necessary to prepare draft resolutions, which are not yet ready.

1 Vlasik Nikolai Sidorovich (1896-1967), long-term head of security I.V. Stalin. After joining the NKVD, L.P. Beria was appointed head of the 1st department of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR.

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Commentary by Sergei Kremlev.

The entry dated February 6, 1939 speaks for itself. This is the program of immediate activities, refined after a more detailed acquaintance of L.P. Beria with the state of affairs in the very complex department entrusted to him with very diverse tasks.

It must be said right away that during the years 1939-1940 L.P. Beria basically fulfilled this program, and in some ways overfulfilled it, supplementing it and expanding it, because he always knew how to see the requirements of the day.

So, on December 12, 1938, Beria received Stalin's sanction to create the Investigative Unit of the NKVD, which ensured the separation of the functions of search and investigation in the interests of qualified investigation.

In early February 1939, Beria sent Stalin a draft Decree of the PVS of the USSR on the removal of a criminal record from those convicted by the former OGPU Collegium, the Special Meeting and the NKVD troikas. On April 5, 1939, the Politburo approved the draft of this Decree.

At the same time, a large-scale rehabilitation process began, with a sharp decrease in the number of new arrests. According to the International Foundation for Democracy, in 1939 the NKVD arrested 44 thousand people - 15 times less than in 1938. Moreover, the Foundation's historians admit that the bulk of the arrests were carried out only in the autumn of 1939, after Western Belarus and Western Ukraine joined the SSER, where there was a strong and active anti-Soviet nationalist movement (especially in Ukraine). At the same time (according to the International Fund for Democracy) in 1939, 110,000 people arrested in 1937-1938 were released. In 1940, mass liberations continued.

In parentheses, I note that there are other figures. Thus, the well-known anti-Soviet historian K. Zalesky reports that Beria "for propaganda (?? - S.K.) purposes, carried out in 1939 the liberation of 223.6 thousand people from the camps and 103.8 thousand people from the colonies. No matter how flattering these figures are for Lavrenty Pavlovich, I think that they are still too high. At the same time, K.Zalesky argues that at the same time in

In 1939, up to 200 thousand people were arrested, not counting those deported from the western regions of Belarus and Ukraine. But let the last statements remain on the conscience of K. Zalesky. To be precise, I will inform you that in April 1941, Beria reported to Stalin that in the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR and the BSSR in 1939-1940, 102,408 people were arrested. It was, of course, a large-scale, but in general, alas, a reasonable measure.

Let us return, however, to the first period of L.P. Beriiv NKVD USSR

In February 1939, a Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR was adopted on the separation from the Main Directorate of Border and Internal Troops of an independent Main Directorate of Border Troops. This marked the beginning of a radical reform of the border troops of the USSR. Accordingly, it was L.P. Beria must be considered a true reformer of the border service in the Soviet Union (as a reformer of Soviet intelligence, by the way).

During 1939-1940, the border troops were completely reorganized and received a single unit structure with the organization of communications and rear services in them. The personnel of the border troops increased by 50% in 1939-1940, and in 1941 it increased more.

In 1940, the GUPV of the NKVD of the USSR adopted new regulations: instructions for the border commandant's office, the border outpost and the border patrol, which summarized all the previous experience of service and combat activities of border guards.

The motorization of the transport units of the border troops was carried out. By the beginning of 1941, there were about 400 cars in the Belorussian border district, and about 500 cars in the Ukrainian border district. 15 motor transport rotis and 70 motor transport platoons were formed. 6 sapper companies and 70 sapper platoons were also formed.

By the end of 1940, a unified communication system had emerged along the entire western border between the departments of the border districts, border detachments, commandant's offices and outposts, for which 6525 kilometers of new lines were laid.

connection. At all 511 outposts, an operational signal link was built between the outpost and the border detachments carrying out direct protection of the border (the same telephone sockets "on every tree" that we know from films about the border).

The GUPV of the NKVD reorganized 7 service dog schools and a communications school. By the beginning of 1941, the GUPV had 11 military schools.

The protection of maritime borders developed. Instead of wooden ones, steel border ships were built with a speed of up to 34 knots (about 60 km/h). A training maritime border detachment was formed in Anapa, and the Naval Border School was opened in Leningrad (it was already closed by the Khrushchevites in 1960).

Intelligence agencies of units and formations of the border troops were created. By the summer of 1941, this "ant-like" reconnaissance ensured a very complete disclosure of Germany's military preparations on our western border and timely informing the top leadership of the USSR and Stalin personally about the imminent war. It was Beria who constantly supplied Stalin with relevant operational information, which allowed Stalin, about four days before the start of the war, to authorize the bringing of troops to combat readiness. Only the direct betrayal of a number of undisclosed accomplices of Tukhachevsky, Uborevich and Yakir and the criminal negligence of a number of leaders of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff of the Red Army led to the fact that the war began so tragically for the USSR. However, the border troops of the NKVD, who were obliged to retreat with the outbreak of the war in order to cede the task of repelling the enemy to the army, in fact, fought for days



border battles and in the initial period of the war played not even an operational, but a strategic role!

However, you can't win much with your bare hands in modern warfare, and Beria achieved the allocation of 81.1 thousand submachine guns (machine guns) for the border troops in 1940 alone. By the beginning of 1941, the border troops received 200 heavy machine guns, 400 light machine guns, up to 2000 machine guns in the Belarusian border district, 300 machine guns in the Ukrainian border district,

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more than 600 light machine guns, 6,500 self-loading rifles and 2,500 machine guns.

And this is with a constant increase in individual and collective combat training. Beria himself was an excellent shooter and was well aware of the importance of accurate shooting by personnel. Therefore, the sniper movement in the border troops of Beria immediately acquired the widest possibilities.

The political preparation was not forgotten either. The border guards immediately received the popular monthly magazine Border Guard. By 1941, the border troops consisted of 26% of the members of the CPSU (b) and 70% of the Komsomol. And then belonging to the Komsomol was far from formal.

Having finally accepted the People's Commissariat, Beria immediately set about reforming intelligence. As follows from the diary entry, he was well aware of the danger of resuming work with agents, which could be massively disclosed as a result of a number of former residents and intelligence officers going over to the side of the enemy: Lyushkov, Nikolsky-Orlov, Krivitsky, Alexandra Barmina, Reiss. In addition, it was already clear that foreign agents of the INO NKVD could also be betrayed by conspirators or agents of the enemy within the NKVD.

The current critics of Beria are hardly capable - due to complete business mediocrity - even to imagine how Beria risked going for an amnesty and rehabilitation of a number of foreign intelligence officers who were arrested after returning to the USSR and also restoring foreign residences that were destroyed under Yezhov. The new leaders of intelligence - Fitin, Sudoplatov turned to Beria with relevant proposals, but Beria bore full responsibility to Stalin for possible failures and disinformation. However, he took risks and returned to active intelligence work a number of both experienced and promising illegal immigrants who fell under suspicion - suffice it to recall the examples of Vasily Zarubin and Alexander Korotkov.

But an even greater merit of Beria to Soviet intelligence is that. that he gave the "green light" to a special set of

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frames and organization of NKVD schools for the training of intelligence personnel - both for legal residencies and illegal immigrants. This is what created a solid foundation for planned intelligence, which replaced the often talented, but amateurish intelligence of the 1920s and early 30s. Under Beria, analytical work at the Center also acquired serious significance, and serious scientific personnel were involved in it.

In fact, there is not a single aspect of the work of the Soviet special services that would not receive a good sustainable development prospect in the NKVD of Beria.

At the same time, Beria paid much attention to the expanding economic activity of the NKVD. Under Beria, many new production Main Directorates of the NKVD were created, but the explanation of why this happened is far from "memorial" insinuations. The point was not that Beria had allegedly "driven half of the country into the Gulag," but that Beria was able—as he always did when faced with a new problem—to approach the organization of work here as well.

new prisoners. And before him, convicted specialists did not, as a rule, grind rocks, but had the opportunity to work in their specialty.

If a person has committed a crime (and there were many) and is serving a sentence, he must work. But it must work in such a way as to bring maximum benefit. This is especially important when a specialist-saboteur or saboteur has been convicted (and there were, alas, not so few of them). However, the professional and qualification appearance of those who ended up in custody was accidental. Beria, on the other hand, understood that only a complex team could work effectively, and therefore he began to widely involve civilian specialists in the production activities of the NKVD - in addition to the contemplated specialists. In addition, he sharply raised the professional level of the heads of production departments. If we look at biographical information on the leadership of Glavgidrostroy, the Main Directorate of Railway Construction Camps, Dalstroy of the NKVD, etc., who came to the NKVD under Beria through party recruitment, then

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we will make sure that these are not drunken stooges with a revolver in an unbuttoned holster — as they are depicted by the “memorial” provocateurs — but full-fledged specialists with higher education.

Here are just a few examples from the top echelon of the NKVD leadership of Beria...

Bazanov N.A. (1904-1950), graduated from the Moscow Industrial Academy; Buyanov L.S. (1911-1950), graduated from LIIZhT; Gvozdevsky F.A. (1901-1962), graduated from MIIT; Egorov S.E. (1905-1959), graduated from the Moscow State Technical University; Kartashov K.I. (1904-1959), graduated from the Stalino-Donetsk Mining Institute; Kuznetsov S.V. (1909-1980), graduated from the MKhTI im. Mendeleev; Mitrakov I.V. (1905—?), graduated from the Moscow Mining Institute; Pavlov V.P. (1910-1962), graduated from the Leningrad Mining Institute; Petrenko I.G. (1904-1950), graduated from the Leningrad Academy of railways. transport them. Stalin; Pospelov M.L. (1906-?), graduated from the Military Transport Academy. Kaganovich; Rozhdestvensky V.I. (1900 -?), graduated from LIIZhT; Sarkisyants G.A. (1904-1964), graduated from MIIT; Topoline CAA. (1908-1983), graduated from KIIT; Khomchik M.I. (1902—?), graduated from MIIT...

I draw the reader's attention to the fact that most of those mentioned above died at a young age, in general, because they worked hard. Here are the true shots of People's Commissar L.P. Beria!

And above all, cooperation with specialists, and not with a stick, ensured under Beria the production victories of the industrial Directorates of the NKVD.

26/P-39

I've been in Moscow for half a year, but I haven't seen that Moscow. Before, when I came, I managed to see something, but now it's a complete parka. There is no end in sight and never will be. New Right-Trotskyist organizations are opening up, including in industry. They become active, they smell that the war smells, bastards.

We must not forget to propose to Koba and Molotov to restore the Mobilization Department. When the NKVD was made instead of the OGPU, since 1935 there was no Mobotdel. Poche

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mu? Koba himself says that this year we may have to fight, but we do not have an apparatus that would solve the issues of preparing for war. It doesn't matter, it needs to be fixed.

5/Sh-39

Did you get your hands on Dalstroy? We will prepare a 5-year development plan. Did you talk to Pavlov? and Professor Aleksandrov. Alexandrov is an intelligent uncle, he knows the business,

agrees to be chairman of the Dalstroy Commission. In two years we mined 110 tons of gold there, and we need to extract so much a year. Or at least tons 80 or 70 °. Separately, it is necessary to firmly grasp the tin. He told Pavlov that he had received the order, now let's work for the second one.'

April 19, 1939 Politburo at the request of L.P. Beria allowed the organization in the NKVD of the USSR of the Mobilization Department headed by I.S. She redeg.

4 Dalstroy - Main Directorate for the construction of the Far North "Dalstroy" of the NKVD of the USSR.

3 Pavlov Karp Aleksandrovich 1895-1957), from June 08, 1938 to October 11, 39, head of the Main Directorate for the Construction of the Far North "Dalstroy" of the NKVD of the USSR.

a Alexandrov Semyon Petrovich (1891-1962), mining engineer, candidate of technical sciences, engineer-colonel. Graduated from the Leningrad Mining Institute. Since 1925, the chief engineer of the Rare Metals Trust, in 1928-1929. on a scientific trip to the USA, since 1930 deputy director of Gintsvetmet for science, professor at the Moscow Institute of Nonferrous Metals and Gold, since 1938 in the NKVD system, since July 13, 1940 deputy head of the Mining and Metallurgical Industry Directorate of the Gulag of the NKVD of the USSR. In January 1945 he was involved by Beria in the work on the Atomic Project, in April 1946 he was the head of the Saxon ore prospecting party of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs for the exploration of uranium ores in Germany. In October 1949 he was awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor for his participation in the Atomic Project.

5 In 1939, Dalstroy mined 66.3 tons of gold, in 1940 - 80 tons. In 1941, it was planned to mine 85 tons of gold.

6 In 1940, 1917 tons of tin were mined, against 507 tons in 1939, 202 tons in 1938 and 40 tons in 1937.

7 Decree of the PVS of the USSR of February 1, 1939 K.A. Pavlov was awarded the Order of Lenin for exceeding the production plan for Dalstroy. In total, according to this Decree, 252 employees of Dalstroy were awarded, including the Order of Lenin - 6 people.

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I think things will work out there. So he said, let's do it, comrade Stalin, don't worry.

Commentator help.

From March 10 to March 21, 1939, the 18th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was held in Moscow. The Congress approved the Third Five-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy of the USSR for 1938-1942. The congress approved the new Charter of the CPSU(b).

At this congress, Stalin made a big speech in which he talked a lot about the international situation and the foreign policy of the USSR. In the West, his speech is known as "chestnut", and here's why. Stalin said that we need to "be careful not to let our country be drawn into conflicts by military provocateurs who are accustomed to rake in the heat with the wrong hands."

"To rake in the heat with the wrong hands" is a Russian idiomatic (that is, not exactly translatable) expression. It roughly corresponds to the Western European idiomatic expression "to force others to carry chestnuts from the fire for themselves." Both expressions are similar in meaning, but not completely. To rake in the heat means to extinguish the "heat", that is, to rake in hot coals so that they go out. Stalin meant here the Anglo-Saxons, who wanted to push the USSR against Germany in a war in order to eliminate the German danger with Russian hands. The idiom "carrying chestnuts" has a narrower meaning as a synonym for selfish gain associated with pleasure.

Keeping in mind the internal situation, Stalin said in his speech at the congress that the punitive organs, the intelligence service, "with their sharp edge are no longer turned inside the country, but outside it, against external enemies."

N.I. Yezhov attended the congress as a still active member of the Central Committee. At a meeting on March 13, Yezhov handed a note to Stalin:

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"Tov Stalin!

I beg you, talk to me for one minute.

Give me that opportunity."

On that day, Yezhov did not have such an opportunity. However, he received it on March 20, when the last meeting of the current composition of the Central Committee took place on the eve of the election of a new composition on March 21. The conversation was, of course, public, but Yezhov could not say anything intelligible.

He did not get into the new composition of the Central Committee. On March 29, 1939, the Politburo instructed the commission "composed of Comrades. Malenkov, Poskrebyshv and Krupin within 5 days to accept all cases on the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks) of the former Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade N. I. Yezhov.

He was a delegate to the congress and Ml. Frinovsky, as a military committee of the Navy, however, it was not he who was elected to the presidium of the congress, but the commander of the Pacific Fleet N.G. Vuznetsov, who immediately after the congress was appointed at first the 1st deputy Frinovsky, and soon the people's commissar instead of him.

On April 6, 1939, Frinovsky was arrested.

Yezhov was arrested on April 10, 1939.

22/Sh-39

At the Plenum he was elected as a Candidate Member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee. Koba said, for Comrade. Beria is a big advance, but during his time in Moscow he has shown himself to be a mature worker on a large scale and will be needed in the work of the Politburo.

Nicholas! was also a Candidate, but did not rise above.

1 NO. Yezhov was introduced to the list of candidates for membership in the Politburo on October 12, 1937.

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31/Sh-39

Today, Comrade Stalin invited me early, I came, he was alone. He congratulated me on his birthday, he says, he lived for forty years, live to be a hundred years Lavrenty. I say thank you, I will try to live under your guidance.

He sighed, said, I will not live. You will live in your own head. Then he sighed and said that we are cleaning it, but we won't clean everything. You can't shoot enemies. The war may already be in the summer. I say, but what about the preparation. We are not ready yet. He says, as we are ready, we will fight, they are also not very ready. Then he added that Yezhov and Frinovsky should be arrested. Yezhov does not repent, but is angry. We need to take it seriously here.

While the congress was going on, the situation in Europe changed drastically. Hungarians have become more active!, the Germans have entered the Czech Republic? and Memel?, are now openly demanding the return of Danzig.

It's over in Spain."

A meeting of German and English industrialists was held in Düsseldorf (So in the text. — S.K.). Is this dangerous? If they agree at our expense, it will be x..evo. And Litvinovv courts them and doggies with the Germans. Birobidzhan himself was bred in the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. "How to stop this business. From a German

On March 14, 1939, Hungary occupied Transcarpathian Ukraine. On the same day Slovakia declared its independence from the Czech Republic.

On March 215, 1939, German troops entered Prague, after President Hacha, elected by the Czechs themselves, "handed the fate of the Czech people into the hands of the Fuhrer of the German nation."

Y What Lithuanians call today "Klaipeda" has long been the German Memel in the Memel region, which was given after the First World War by the Entente to "remake" Lithuania and in which, before its return to Germany in March 1939, up to 90% of the population was German.

\* In the period from March 28 to April 1, 1939, the entire territory of Spain was occupied by the troops of General Franco. On March 28, Madrid was occupied, and the Spanish Civil War ended with the victory of the Francoists, who were supported by Germany and Italy.

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we can negotiate, but with the British - x..y. Here you have to think. I think Koba is beginning to think so too. At the Congress, he spoke more in favor of the Germans!. Hitler is not a fool, he will understand.

10/1U-39

Frinovsky promised to tell the whole truth, he said, I will write everything with my own hand, and there is no need to interrogate. I'll write myself.

Let's see. Mikhail and I talked for a long time, I see that I understood. Too late, Michael. We fought like comrades, and now excuse me, you yourself brought yourself to the point that

On March 15 and 16, 1939, a conference of the Federation of British Industry and the Union of German Industry (Imperial Industrial Group) was held in Düsseldorf, as a result of which a Joint Declaration (Düsseldorf Agreement) was signed. The London-based The Economist called the Düsseldorf talks "unprecedented in history in terms of scale." However, the US and the Golden International needed a European war, not peace, and Dusseldorf's potential was not realized.

6 Litvinov Maxim Maksimovich (Meer-Enoch Movshevich Wallach) (1876-1951), Soviet statesman, member of the RSDLP since 1898, Bolshevik, agent of Lenin's Iskra, party nickname "Papasha". He lived in exile, was married to Ivy Lowe, the daughter of an English journalist of Jewish origin (until the end of her life she retained English citizenship). In 1930 he replaced G.V. Chicherin as People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, a supporter of the Anglo-French orientation, put spokes in the wheels of Soviet-German cooperation back in the days of Weimar Germany, but especially after 1933. The author of the stillborn idea of "collective security".

7 The capital of the Jewish Autonomous Region.

8 The role of the LP. Beria in a reasonable change in the course of the foreign policy of the USSR in the spring and summer of 1939 remains unclear, although it can be assumed that it was implicitly great. That is why the phrase "How to stop this business" is very interesting and intriguing, especially in light of the fact that Anna Larina-Bukharina recalled that during a conversation with her in December 1938, Beria was especially interested in N.I. Bukharin and M.M. Litvinov and in general asked her about Litvinov.

1 At the congress, Stalin spoke harshly about the Western countries as "warmongers between Russia and Germany", that capital was preparing and bringing a world war closer and was not averse to "raising the fury of the Soviet Union against Germany and provoking a conflict with Germany for no apparent reason (bold is mine. — S.K.)."

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enemy. Eh, fools! Now he himself says: "There was a man, he became a g..no." For what?

Nicholas! also arrested. Until Frinovsky writes his testimony, I will not talk to Nikolai. Dagin revealed a lot and others too, but let's see how Nikolai behaves. Bogdan will interrogate.

Decided to judge the exposed Trotskyists, the Rights and the wreckers? These were opened. And how many more of them in the corners?

18 TU-39 Khrenovo. It is finally clear that Nikolai is an enemy.

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev.

Although since the beginning of 1939 the volume of repressions had sharply decreased and a return rehabilitation process had begun, this, of course, did not mean that there was no longer an objective need to suppress the unmasked enemies of the state. There was a need insofar as there were enemies.

Let's go back a little - to 1937 and briefly dwell on the causes of mass repressions.

The country's enemies were at the top, because a significant part of the Soviet elite could not stand the test of the situation "from rags to riches" and over the years mired instead of deeds in politicking and conspiracies.

The enemies of the new system were also among the lower classes, among the masses. These were AND "former", including those from the middle class, etc., and

1 NO. Yezhov.

2653. Kobulov, then head of the Investigative Department of the NKVD of the USSR.

On April 38, 1939, the Politburo adopted a Resolution on the transfer to the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR of cases "on active participants in counter-revolutionary, right-wing Trotskyist, conspiratorial and espionage organizations" for consideration in accordance with the law of December 1, 1934 "in the amount of 931 people". It was decided that 198 leading members of these organizations should be subjected to CMN, and the remaining 733 defendants should be sentenced to imprisonment for at least 15 years each.

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ordinary people who did not understand that the main changes in the country are being made in the name of, if not their immediate welfare, then certainly in the name of the welfare of their children.

That is, repression was necessary. At the same time, the most active anti-social part of both the top and the bottom had to be physically eliminated from the life of society.

Firstly, the anti-Stalinist leadership, even in that part of them that came from the "old Bolsheviks", were not so old. For example, Avel Yenukidze (in the party since 1898) was 60 years old in the year of execution, Postyshev (in the party since 1904) - 52 years old, Chubar (in the party since 1907) - 48 years old. What can we say about party members since 1917! Many of them, who had grown to high positions and were reborn in these positions, were not even forty years old in 1937.

Simply removed from their posts, simply deprived of power, the former "tops" would immediately begin to fight for it by any means. There was some experience.

The "grassroots" active anti-Sovietists were also not old, but it was no longer possible to re-educate them with conviction, in a word.

The scale of the executions in 1937-1938 is now seriously exaggerated, but it is unlikely that they amount to less than 200...250 thousand people, including both the bottom layer of the repressed and the top.

Imagine what would happen if several tens of thousands of repressed former leaders were not shot, but sent to camps? And if a hundred or two hundred had not been shot

thousands of grassroots anti-advisers ...

Let's take the former leaders... After all, it was a very dangerous company with experience in underground work, the Civil War, local conflicts, as well as experience in organizational and propaganda work. Having united with the most active part of the anti-Soviet mass, not shot, but simply sent to the camps, numbering a hundred or two thousand people, these former leaders, in combination with prisoners from the lower classes, would produce such an explosive mixture that the very the existence of the USSR

In real time, this was understood by the

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pressed, and, of course, Stalin and Stalin's Politburo. Stalin, of course, could not allow the possibility of destabilizing the situation in the country, and even in the conditions of quite real external aggression, perhaps Polish, possibly Polish-German, possibly Japanese, possibly pan-European at the hands of the Entente. .

Then we would count the victims in big millions!

That is why in 1937-1938 there were so many "execution" sentences - this was required by the harsh historical reality of those days.

Complete sets of minutes of interrogations of high-ranking figures of the CPSU (b), NKVD, Red Army and industry, arrested in 1937, 1938 and 1939, including, for example, the testimony of Evdokimov, Dagin, Frinovsky, not to mention Yezhov, Yagoda, have not been made public. to this day. There is no complete picture of the investigative cases of those years in the "lower classes".

The crumbs are declassified.

But, just as one can judge the salinity of the entire sea by a drop of sea water, so crumbs of truth about those years allow us to present their picture, if not in its entirety, then quite objectively. And it becomes clear that those arrested and shot were really guilty of what they were accused of. Even, for the most part, at the bottom.

It is also clearly seen that the historical and moral correctness is unquestionably in the hands of Stalin and Beria.

After all, whom Beria had to arrest and whom Stalin had to condemn to death, for a long time were their comrades in the common state cause. And these former comrades, who had descended to intrigues and outright betrayal, in their time did not so little for the success of the struggle for the new Power, in which Stalin and Beria were participants.

But if Stalin and Beria still had years of great labors and victories ahead, then for Yezhov, Frinovsky and their accomplices everything was behind them. And they prepared such a fate for themselves. For example, on August 4, 1939, Yezhov said interesting things during interrogation, namely:

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"The first results of the operation for us, the conspirators, were completely unexpected. Not only did they not create dissatisfaction with the punitive policy of the Soviet government among the population, but, on the contrary, caused a great political upsurge, especially in the countryside. Mass cases were observed when the collective farmers themselves came to the UNKVD and the district departments of the UNKVD demanding the arrest of one or another fugitive, White Guard, merchant, and so on.

In the cities, theft, stabbing, and hooliganism, from which the working-class districts especially suffered, were sharply reduced.

It was quite obvious that the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks correctly and timely decided to hold this event ... "

That is, it all started intelligently. Indeed, there were quite a few antisocial elements in the country capable of active action in the event of an aggravation of the situation or external intervention. Approximately 17% of voters voted for the parties of big capital in the elections to the Constituent Assembly. This figure cannot be accepted as representative because not everyone was able to take part in the elections in October 1917 (by the way, they took place after the October Revolution and with the support of the new government), especially in rural areas. In addition, twenty years later, many anti-Soviet citizens either died of natural causes (age) or emigrated. Nevertheless, if we assume that only 3-4% of the population was actively anti-Soviet, then with the adult population of the USSR by 1937 of about 120 million people, the size of the potential "fifth column" could reach 4-5 million people. But, even according to the inflated data of the Khrushchevites and all subsequent falsifiers of history, in 1937-1938. no more than 2 million people were repressed.

How many of them suffered innocently? Without being able to go into the analysis of this side of the matter in detail, I will nevertheless note, firstly, that the total number of those repressed in 1937-1938 is lower, perhaps twice and even more than it is usually stated. Secondly, the really innocent victims of 1937-1938 are hardly

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more than a third of the total number of repressed. This is also a lot, but there are reasons for this. Some of them were revealed during the investigation of the Yezhov case, but more on that later.

The repressive operation itself, in the face of possible close external aggression against the USSR, was necessary. At the same time, the most active socially dangerous elements (kulaks, former White Guards and White Bandits, members of punitive detachments, policemen, repeat offenders, etc.) were operationally registered with the local bodies of the OGPU-NKVD. So the first repressive blow fell almost entirely on the unconditionally guilty - within the initially defined "limits", the figures of which were not taken from the ceiling, but according to, I repeat, operational records.

Further... Contrary to the established opinion, in many regions the arrested were convicted not "on the conveyor", but after an investigation that sometimes lasted for months. During the investigation, no doubt, additional defendants were uncovered, so a significant number of the repressed were convicted in the second wave, including CMN, not without reason.

However, the objective process of "cleansing" the country was superimposed by conscious provocative actions of that part of the NKVD leadership that was related to conspiracies and pursued the goal of discrediting the Soviet government and Stalin. The "technology" of such actions is clearly visible from the following part of Yezhov's testimony dated August 4, 1939:

"..Answer: When the so-called "limits" set for them in the regions for the repression of former kulaks, White Guards, K.-R. clergy and criminals, we are



the conspirators and I... again put before the government the question of prolonging the mass operations...

As proof of the expediency of continuing mass operations, we cited the extreme infestation of this kind of elements of collective farms in the countryside, factories and factories in cities, emphasizing the interest and sympathy for this measure of the working people of the city and countryside.

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<...>

Question: Have you deceived the government?

Answer: It was absolutely necessary to continue the mass operation and increase the contingent of the repressed.

This measure, however, had to be stretched out in time and real and correct accounting should be established so that, having prepared, to strike at the organizing, most dangerous top of the counter-revolutionary elements ...

"In this sense, we, of course, deceived the government in the most brazen way ..."

Yezhov further explained his words more specifically, saying this:

"According to Frinovsky (who traveled to the Far East Territory. - S.K.), the mass operation we continued came in handy. Having created the impression of a broad rout of the anti-Soviet elements in the DVK, he actually managed to successfully use the mass operation in order to retain the more leading and active counter-revolutionary cadres and conspirators. By concentrating his entire blow ... on the passive declassified elements, Frinovsky, on the one hand, aroused legitimate discontent among the population of many districts of the Far East and, on the other hand, preserved the counter-revolutionary cadres organized and active. He especially boasted that from the formal point of view, one could not find fault with the operation he had carried out. He smashed Kolchakovtsy, Kappellevtsy and Semyonovtsy (that is, those who served in the troops of Kolchak, Kappel and Ataman Semyonov. - S.K.), who, however, were mostly old men ... Frinovsky jokingly called operation in DVK - starikovsky .. "

This was not invented by Senior Lieutenant Esaulov, who was interrogating Yezhov that day (later, in 1944-1947, he was Deputy People's Commissar of the NKGB of the USSR), but was written down by him from the words of Yezhov himself. Actually, Esaulov, due to the smallness of his then official position, could not have invented anything similar to the protocol of interrogation of Yezhov on August 4, 1939, even if wanted.

Why did the people who previously quite honestly served the Soviet government, from some point on, committed treason? Answer oche

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visible - not because of the initial hatred of this government, as was the case with the "former", but solely because of the weakness of the civic spirit and the defectiveness of moral qualities. They say: "The claw is stuck, the whole bird is gone." Look, they all started with a "claw".

During the interrogation on April 26, 1939 (his protocol has now been declassified), Yezhov explained one of the immediate reasons why he was inclined to take decisive action in November 1938: believes and the moment of my exposure is approaching." After the plans for the November 7 putsch failed, Yezhov decided to personally prepare a suicide bomber, and this is how he talked about it:

"Answer: Now I have decided to personally prepare a person capable of carrying out a terrorist act.

Question: Whom did you attract for these purposes?

Answer: LAZEBNY (B. 1902, arrested on April 29, 1939, shot on January 22, 1940 — S.K.), former security officer, head of the port department of the People's Commissariat for Water Transport.

I knew that there were testimonies against Lazebny about his involvement in anti-Soviet work, and I decided to use this circumstance to recruit Lazebny.

In one of the meetings in my office in the People's Commissariat of Transportation, I told LAZEBNY: "You have no choice, you still die, but by sacrificing yourself, you can save a large group of people." In response to appropriate questions from LAZEBNY, I informed him that the assassination of STALIN would save the situation in the country. Lazebny gave his consent.

Question: What reason did you have to have such a frank conversation with Lazebny?

Answer: In general, Lazebny has recently been walking around as if he had been lowered into the water, was in a state of hopelessness and more than once expressed the idea of suicide. Therefore, he accepted my proposal without hesitation. Lazebny even agreed to commit suicide at the scene of the crime after a terrorist act..."

Can't believe it? But Kobulov and Shvartsman, who conducted the interrogation, although they are now presented as the "bloody butchers of Beria", in any case, the talents of Fyodor Dosto

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Evsky and Leo Tolstoy were not possessed, as was the senior investigator Sergienko, who kept the record of the interrogation.

However, this was already the final stage of the fall of Yezhov. Yezhov's nephew Anatoly Babulin spoke about one of the intermediate ones during interrogation on April 18, 1939. I will quote just one passage from the protocol:

"At the end of November, Ezhov ... finally sank - he began to drink heavily and debauchery ... Ezhov was very embittered by his removal from work in the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs and in my presence repeatedly scolded and vilified I.V. STALIN and V.M. MOLOTOV obscene street abuse ...

I remember another fact. When in January 1939 Ezhov was reprimanded by the decision of the Council of People's Commissars ... - he answered this with selective abuse at MOLOTOV,

In December 1938, when a commission was set up to hand over the cases of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, Ezhov systematically avoided participating in the work of the commission, telephoned the Central Committee and L.P. BERIA, declaring that he was ill ... every time he had to go to a meeting of the commission, he was nervous, cursed with obscene abuse, delayed the departure and, in the end, remained at home, devoting all his free time to drinking and debauchery with various women of easy virtue (Babulin named three specifically. - S.K.) ...

Ezhov .. walked around the rooms, drank and cursed obscenely at I.V. STALIN, V.M. MOLOTOV and the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks ... "

It would be natural if an innocent person, offended by suspicions and injustice, in a critical situation would wander for hours in the forest, sit on the shore with a fishing rod, walk with his daughter, or simply sleep off after many years of lack of sleep. And Yezhov fornicated, although, as they say, you won't breathe before death.

Beria was not inclined to alcohol, but he loved literature, painting, music, fishing, fish soup, good company, although all this fell to Beria very rarely, and during the war years he simply could not afford it. At the dacha, he could play volleyball for hours on weekends. Yezhov, even at the heights of power, was prone to drinking and "women." Yes, he has worked hard over the years. But at the same time he

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loved himself in the State, not the State in himself. With Stalin and Beria, everything was "exactly the opposite" with this - their most important sincere passion was the construction of a new powerful and free State.

By the way, if Babulin's testimony had been falsified "in the dungeons of Beria", then the captain of the Vlodimir State Security Service, who interrogated Yezhov's nephew (another, according to "memorial" assurances, "the butcher of Beria", who was shot in the "Beria case" on December 23, 1953), would certainly include in the text of the protocol a statement that Yezhov-de and comrade. Beria was covered with obscene abuse. An, no. And this once again proves the authenticity of Babulin's testimony.

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Finally they took Uspensky! Koba is happy. He asked about rewarding the guys, he said, let's show, will we reward?,

Good to reward. Worse when you have to razdalbyvat. And it has to.

3/U-39

Finally, Koba decided to restore order in the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. Our line worked. Litvinova takes off to f..any mother. Vyacheslav puts on NKID\*, I give

1 Al. Uspensky, the former People's Commissar of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR, from mid-November 1938 went into hiding. Recently, before his arrest, he was hiding in Miass in the Chelyabinsk region under the name of Shmashkovsky.

2 For participation in the search and arrest of Uspensky, three NKVD officers received the Order of the Red Banner, three - the Red Star, four - the Order of the Badge of Honor. Twenty-five people for participating in the search for Uspensky were awarded badges "Honorary Chekist", an extraordinary assignment of a special rank, military weapons and a cash prize.

3 See comment below.

On May 25, 1939, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs "Maxim" (Meer) "Maximovich" (Movshevich) Litvinov (Wallach) was replaced by Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, who also retained the post of Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. Former Prime Minister of France and personal friend of Litvinov

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there Dekanozov!. It's a pity, I need Vladimir in the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs. But Molotov also needs him. And now I have my boyfriend in the Narkomindel. Come in handy.

Litvinov completely outlived himself (So in the text. - S.K.). Or worse, but he is a cunning Jew, cautious. Half of the plenipotentiaries were in conspiracies, but there was no evidence against Litvinov. Koba appreciates him, calls him Papa, and now Papa is gone. Papa is not ours.

Now we need to activate the German line. And along the line of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, also activate. Koba is right, Merekalov? not that figure. Should everything be done through Astakhov?

The rest of the lines should be activated too, because now it is important to know how things are really going everywhere. Litvinov was friendly with England and France, he spoiled the Germans. Now there will be a change of course, it is necessary to improve relations with the Germans. You can do business with them. If we come to an agreement with them, then we won't have to fight with them, and the Poles themselves won't turn up.

You can deal with the Germans, I remember them from Baku. They tear up the nose, but the case is conducted more or less honestly. The British, those are another matter. Looking like a gentleman (So in

Edouard Herriot then publicly declared: "The last great friend of collective security has left." Well, with this "carrot" hanging in front of Litvinov's nose, the "democratic" West for several years, not without success, directed the USSR People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in the direction necessary for this West.

1 Dekanozov Vladimir Georgievich (1898-1953), a longtime colleague of L.P. Beria, who knew him from underground work in 1918 in Baku. He held leading positions in party bodies and state security bodies, after the appointment of L.P. Beria was summoned to Moscow by the People's Commissar of the NKVD of the USSR, from December 2, 1938, the commissioner of the State Security Service of the 2nd rank, took an active part in the reform of the NKVD of the USSR. May 4, 1939 was appointed Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR. In 1953 he was arrested in the "Beria case" and on December 23, 1953 he was shot.

2 Aleksey Fedorovich Merekalov, Plenipotentiary Representative (Ambassador) of the USSR in Germany (see comment below).

3 Georgy Aleksandrovich Astakhov, Charge d'Affaires of the USSR in Germany (see comment below).

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text. - S.K.) but in fact, asshole, don't put your finger in your mouth. The Germans are more honest. Then we have firmly established relations with the Germans in the field of Economics, the turnover is large. We get cars, they need grain and oil, they need it. And we need.

The Germans are pursuing an independent policy, while England looks back at America. France doesn't count at all. Koba correctly decided that he should try to negotiate with the Germans. It's too early for us to fight. It's better not to fight at all.

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev.

The entry of May 3, 1939, as well as the entry of March 31, 1939, are very interesting. They suggest that the role of Beria in the removal of Litvinov and in the turn of the USSR towards a reasonable German policy is greater than it seems today. Extremely intriguing is the mention by Beria of the name of Georgy Astakhov, our Charge d'Affaires ad interim in Germany during the preparation of the Pact from August 23, 1939, until the end of 1939.

But first, briefly about the situation at that time... In the early days after the Nazis came to power, Lev Khinchuk was the plenipotentiary in Germany. Then in 1934 he was replaced by Yakov Surits - a Jew, of the Unemtsy, however, did not cause allergies due to intelligence and tact. In 1937, Surits was transferred to Paris, and in Berlin, until the spring of 1938, the duties of charge d'affaires were performed by adviser Astakhov. Only in April 1938, a full-fledged plenipotentiary was appointed to Germany - Alexei Fedorovich Merekalov, a figure in our history that has not been clarified, what is the figure of Georgy Aleksandrovich Astakhov himself.

Our relations with Germany by 1939 were characterized by a very large amount of economic cooperation and extremely bad political relations. In order to complicate these relations as much as possible, Max Litvinov-Wallakh did his best.

The new Plenipotentiary Merekalov was not a diplomat, but Mikoyan's Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Trade. That is

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he was not Litvinov's "cadre", but he was Mikoyan's man, who always had good relations with the Germans.

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Molotov informed Merekalov about his appointment on the direct instructions of Stalin, calling him to his dacha on Sunday, April 12, 1938.

Merekalov refused, saying that I don't know the language, I don't know the situation in Germany, an experienced diplomat is needed here. However, on Monday he was summoned to a meeting of the Politburo, and Stalin personally told Merekalov that he believed in the successful fulfillment of his tasks in Germany. However, it is curious that Merekalov had no tasks for a long time - he rarely left the embassy, limiting his contacts to a minimum.

In my book *The Fuhrer's Kremlin Visit*, I already wrote that, in my opinion, Stalin set three tasks for the almost inactive plenipotentiary. First, to be present in Berlin, being in "duty" mode. Secondly, to be worthy of Stalin's personal trust. Thirdly, by the very fact of his "foreign trade" origin, to show the Germans that the USSR is interested in economic relations with the Reich, on the one hand, and on the other hand, that Merekalov is not a "Litvinov" figure.

Merekalov was sitting in Berlin, and the European situation developed in such a way that the stupidity of Litvinov's policy was more and more revealed. And only when Stalin - apparently not without Beria's information about the actual state of affairs in the secret European policy and the mentality of the Germans - decided to start Berlin soundings, the time of Merekalov came.

On April 17, 1939, he met with Weizsäcker, State Secretary of the Reich Foreign Ministry. In fact, this was only their second meeting (the first one took place in ausamt on July 6, 1938, before the presentation of credentials to Merekalov). Formally, the main topic of the conversation concerned a secondary issue - settling the problem of deliveries to the USSR of anti-aircraft guns, ordered by us at the Skoda factories when Czechoslovakia still existed. However, this was, as I believe, a cover for another, main task, assigned to the plenipotentiary not by Litvinov, but by Stalin.

One way or another, the plenipotentiary, with whom at the diplomatic

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At the reception on January 12, 1939, Hitler spoke defiantly and kindly for several minutes, now in the ausamt he asked Weizsäcker directly: "What do you really think about German-Russian relations?"

Most likely, in order to ask this question at the right time, Merekalov was sent to Germany.

In fact, anyone could ask a question. But Stalin could not instruct anyone to ask such a question without fear that it would become known to those who did not need it.

The next day, April 18, 1939, Merekalov sent a coded message to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, but this was also, as I understand it, a cover measure. Why did he have to send to Moscow on April 18 a cipher with a report on the meeting on April 17, if already on April 18 Merekalov left for Moscow with the military attache? No, Merekalov sent the cipher to the NKID CLEARLY "for reporting", and he left for Moscow on a call not from Litvinov, but from the one who sent him to Berlin, that is, Stalin.

On April 19, Maisky, our plenipotentiary in London, was summoned to Moscow as well. The plenipotentiaries were on their way to a meeting at the Politburo to discuss the reality of the tripartite Anglo-French-Soviet "mutual assistance" pact. This conference, which took place in the Kremlin on April 21, 1939, put something in its place for Stalin, and at the same time actually put an end to Litvinov and his policy - on May 5, Litvinov was removed,

Two days before, on May 3, 1939, the following Politburo Resolution was adopted:

"Instruct TT. Beria (chairman), Malenkov, Dekanozov and Chechulin to put things in order in the apparatus of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, find out defects in its structure, especially in its secret part, and report daily on the results of their work to Comrades. Molotov and Stalin.

Most likely, this was not the beginning, but the final stage of the showdown with the "Litvinov" NKID. In two days (from May 3 to May 5), it was impossible to take those cardinal decisions that were already made in the coming days. This means that before that a lot of work had been carried out, and it was carried out precisely by Beria and Dekanozov (Malenkov should

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was not so much to deal with the "Litvinov" cadres as to provide Molotov with new cadres).

However, Beria and Dekanozov did not decide out of the blue. Not being diplomats, for some time they could well assess the level of this or that employee of the NKID and the quality of the work of Litvinov himself, because both were well aware of the real positions of various countries of the world in relation to each other and the USSR. The fact is that the intelligence of the NKVD had excellent informants among the white emigration. The leadership of the organized white emigration knew a lot about the secret details of current world politics and the actions of diplomats from different countries, just because almost all former high-ranking tsarist diplomats in exile retained good lively ties with their colleagues from the diplomatic departments of Europe. Agent messages from Paris, London, Sofia, Prague and other European capitals were regularly put on the table for both Beria and Dekanozov. Although it was a correspondence school, it was a good school of practical diplomacy, as a result, Beria and Dekanozov were aware of the essence of what was happening even, perhaps, better than the "full-time" Soviet diplomats, since, unlike diplomats, they used accurate, not diplomatically camouflaged, information. from the camp of the enemy.

The appointment of Molotov did not mean an automatic turn towards Germany, but it fully assumed it. Merekalov did not return to Berlin after the meeting at the end of April, and Astakhov replaced him as charge d'affaires for the hottest (both meteorologically and politically) months of 1939. For that "free flight" that the Soviet representative in Berlin now had to make, Astakhov fit very well.

Georgy Alexandrovich Astakhov, from the Cossacks-nobles, an acquaintance of Mikhail Sholokhov, was born in 1897 in Kyiv, aumer in custody in 1942 in the Ust-Vymsky labor camp. This figure, on the one hand, is rather transparent, but on the other hand, as I have already said, it is not clear. It is transparent in the sense that it was

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an avowed idealist—this can be seen even from his photographs. Already after his arrest in 1940, his wife Natalya wrote to the NKVD: "He belongs to the breed of eccentrics that are sometimes found among people of science: he would probably have been an outstanding scholar on Eastern issues if everything had turned out differently. . He has a clear, bright mind, great internal discipline and, along with this, some kind of awkwardness, awkwardness in everyday affairs ... Astakhov ... exceptionally honest, organically incapable of deceiving the trust that he was given ..."

The wife saved her husband and, perhaps, somewhat exaggerated his worldly "absurdity." In any case, Astakhov's letters to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and the entries in his official diary reveal a very sober mind. However, Astakhov was indeed contradictory. The future famous "refugee" Grigory Besedovsky, who worked in the 1920s together with Astakhov in the embassy in

Japan, in his book published after his flight to the West, reports interesting facts about Astakhov intelligence:

“... he was an extremely nervous person, at times on the verge of normality. He was very interested in Japan, studied the Japanese language... In his views on the Soviet Far Eastern policy, Astakhov... fully shared the line of Kopp (Viktor Leontievich Kopp (1880-1930), a well-known revolutionary, in 1925-1927, plenipotentiary in Japan . - S.K.) and did not hesitate to criticize Karakhan (Lev Mikhailovich Karakhan (1889-1937), a well-known revolutionary, in 1923-1927 the plenipotentiary in China. - S.K.) and the Politburo.

Here one can see nature, which, perhaps, is not capable of deceiving, but it can be deceived and confused...

However, more on that later.

After graduating from the gymnasium in Novocherkassk in 1915, Astakhov studied at the Romano-Germanic faculty of Moscow University, in 1917 he became a Bolshevik, and took part in the Civil War in the Caucasus. He was the editor of the Vladikavkaz newspaper Kommunist, then -

behind

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leading press department in the Soviet embassy in Tiflis in Menshevik Georgia. It was then, “under the roof” of the plenipotentiary Kirov, Astakhov could for the first time meet (and most likely met) the young Beria, who was only two years younger than Astakhov.

Then Astakhov worked in Turkey, in Japan, in England. In 1928, on behalf of the USSR, he signed in Sana'a the Soviet-Yemeni treaty of friendship and trade, our first treaty with an Arab country. The USSR recognized the independence of Yemen in the same days when England widely practiced the bombing of Yemeni cities and villages.

In 1936-1936 Astakhov was authorized by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR in the Transcaucasian Federation. And here he was with the first secretary of the Transcaucasian regional committee of the party L.P. There was no way he could not get to know Beria. In 1936-1937, Astakhov was in charge of the Press Department of the People's Commissariat of the Soviet Socialist Republic and then left for Berlin as an adviser to the embassy.

So, in the summer of 1939, it was he who carried out in Berlin the delicate preparatory work for the mutual deployment of the USSR and Germany from oncoming and potentially combat courses to a parallel course of cooperation. Moreover, the published correspondence of Astakhov with Moscow and Moscow with Astakhov leaves the impression of incompleteness, but it creates the feeling that, in addition to instructions from the NKID, Astakhov had other instructions that did not contradict the NKID instructions of Molotov (in fact, Stalin), but complementing them. Only one department, the NKVD of Beria, could supplement the instructions and information of the NKID. Of course, these additional instructions also came from Stalin, but they were transmitted through Beria.

On July 26, 1939, a famous dinner was held at the “exclusive” restaurant “Evest” by Astakhov and the new deputy trade representative of the USSR, Yevgeny Babarin, with the head of the Eastern European referent office of the Department of Economic Policy of the Ausamt (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) of Germany, Karl Schnurre (a figure, by the way, a very outstanding ).

From that moment on, events began to speed up and speed up.

On August 2, 1939, the Politburo considered the issue of

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as part of the USSR delegation to participate in negotiations with the military missions of England and France in Moscow (K.E. Voroshilov was appointed head of the delegation).

On August 12, 1939, these negotiations, doomed in advance by the position of the West to failure, began, and on August 21 they were interrupted.

And just from August 2 to 12, 1939, the mutual exchange of telegrams between Molotov and Astakhov reached its peak of intensity. Only 11 such telegrams have been published!

The exchange of opinions between Molotov (in fact, Stalin) and the Moscow ambassador of the Reich, Schulenburg, went on just as intensively these days. Schulenburg was hurried by Ribbentrop, and Ribbentrop was hurried by Hitler. The Führer wanted to ensure Russian neutrality in his already decided war with Poland, which had to be carried out before the autumn rains and the thaw.

By August 19, the parties came to a common opinion: a decisive mutual political turn towards each other is necessary, but it must be preceded by a contractual provision of broad economic cooperation.

On August 19, Astakhov was recalled to Moscow. On the same day, Babarin and Schnurre signed a Soviet-German trade and credit agreement in Berlin, and the Reich ambassador in Moscow, Schulenburg, handed over to Molotov the German draft of a Soviet-German political non-aggression pact.

Stalin did not allow the West to rake in the heat of European problems with Russian hands. On August 22, 1939, Reich Foreign Minister Ribbentrop flew to Moscow, and on the night of August 22-23, Molotov and Ribbentrop signed the famous Pact in the presence of Stalin.

Astakhov was a talented man, but in all his nature he would not have been able to play the role that was now assigned to the Soviet representative in Berlin. And this role after August 23 was simple - to go strictly along the line prescribed by Stalin. Astakhov, on the other hand, was an intellectual with a free flight of thoughts and feelings, and therefore was not very predictable. Moreover, Astakhov could now even mess up - unwittingly. Therefore, he no longer appeared in Berlin, and on September 1, 1939, again, an inexpressive non-professional was appointed plenipotentiary there.

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sional - Alexander Shkvartsev, who was replaced by Dekanozov himself in the fall of 1940.

We will return to the fate of Astakhov and its interweaving with the theme of Beria.

23/UP-39

Time in Moscow does not fly like in Tbilisi. The level is different. There, only the case pushed me in the neck, and then Koba pushes me, spinning and spinning. You have to do everything at once. I wonder myself until I get tired. Everything is interesting, and I myself see how everything moves. I studied a lot in aviation, there are good improvements in engines. But still a lot of chaos. I think Kaganovich! not cha- no, but Lazarus? covers. Brother. We say nepotism, but it's hard to leave if there is weakness. Is that Nino? I have a good guy. There is wisdom and there is modesty. He does not climb on people and does not build a lady out of himself. I was lucky with Nino, it's calm with her.

In Europe, it is still calm, but in Mongolia we are at war. And the Border Guards are fighting along the entire border both in Europe and in Asia. We do not have peacetime, everything is combat. It was reported that the Japanese were preparing a major provocation in the Posyet direction. Off the coast of Kamchatka and Northern Sakhalin, an accumulation of Japanese ships begins, including up to five cruisers.

Reported to Kobe.

H..evo on the Turkish border. Everything can be expected from the Turks. Today neutrality, tomorrow they can cross the border. The British gave the Turks 60 million credits, the Turks brought the army to almost 1 million. There are poor people in the country, I know this well without reports,



1MM. Kaganovich, people's commissar of the aviation industry, brother of L.M. Kaganovich.

LM. Kaganovich, an outstanding party and statesman, member of the Politburo since 1930.

3 Nino Teimurazovna Beria-Gegechkori, wife of L.P. Beria.

4 Military operations in Mongolia, which gradually developed into a serious armed conflict in the area of the Khalkhin Gol River, began on May 11, 1939.

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I can report myself. And they have a million askers. Against who? If they climb, we will give them in the teeth. And if under the general noise, when others will climb? The Turks have to work.

The Poles arrange provocations on the border, the Romanians too. And I didn't want to fight. We are spinning big things on new construction. It is more interesting in Moscow, here you work on the scale of the entire USSR, the results are already visible.

And the whole s.an is activated along all lines! Direct agents, Trotskyists, rightists, White Guards and in general. Nikolai (N.I. Ezhov. - S.K.) brought a lot of harm, but there was also benefit. He boasted that he crushed the enemies great. Yes, whom he covered, and whom he smashed. I didn't touch the head, now we chop off the head. It helps that they have to become more active, and once you lean out, it's easier to identify you.

It's getting better with the Germans. But it's still unclear.

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev.

As an illustration of the situation on the internal anti-Soviet secret front, I will cite extracts from two special reports by L.P. Beria I.V. Stalin, relating to 1939.

1) From the special message of the NKVD No. 1973 / B of June 7, 1939:

"...8. In February 1939 in the mountains. Summary of the Poltava region of the Ukrainian SSR liquidated an anti-Soviet group of senior students of the local secondary school: Knysh N.F. - born in 1922, expelled from the Komsomol for anti-Soviet manifestations; Savchuk, who mechanically left the Komsomol (Obviously, due to non-payment of dues. - S.K.) and Abakumov D.M. — born in 1918, the son of a repressed enemy of the people.

The group called itself a "secret society", adopted a program and

1 See comment below.

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The charter of the Narodnaya Volya party, through the military, intended to acquire weapons for terrorist purposes and discussed the issue of organizing an underground printing house ...

As a result of the investigation, it was established that the inspirers of the group were: the former head of the library of the Sumy Chemical Technical School, the Ukrainian nationalist Kulish (convicted) and the former. Narodnaya Volya, Social Revolutionary Serdyuk N.N. (arrested). (The group members themselves were not repressed. — S.K.)

9. In December 1938, an anti-Soviet terrorist group was arrested in the Tulchinskaya secondary school in the Vinnitsa region ... from among the children of repressed parents ...

According to the plan of this group, its most strong-willed and resolute members were to establish contact in Moscow with the Kremlin guards, infiltrate the Kremlin and commit terrorist acts.

against members of the Politburo.

10. In the Nemirovsky orphanage in the Vinnitsa region of the Ukrainian SSR... members of the group (Five 16-17-year-old children of repressed parents. - S.K.) ... terrorized Komsomol members, mocked children of Jewish and Ukrainian nationality, destroyed portraits of leaders of the CPSU (b), painted fascist swastikas on the walls ... "

It was, so to speak, a youthful "test of the pen" in the anti-Soviet ranks of Soviet society. Although ... 17-18 years old - the age is not very childish. If one of THESE "kids" turned up in time, not a retired Socialist-Revolutionary, but one of the adult "uncles" from among the conspirators in the NKVD leadership, and, perhaps, one of the "young fighters" could get the laurels of a Serbian student Gavrilo Princip, whose shot in Sarajevo at the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne gave impetus to the First World War.

The second example comes from adult anti-state work.

1) From the special report of the NKVD No. 3456/B dated August 10, 1939 on the production of low-quality products at the manufacturing plants of KT fuses for artillery shells:

"..One of the grossest violations of the technological process of manufacturing fuses was the use of etching claw fuses with a mixture of nitrogen

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sulfuric and sulfuric acids in order to select the required resistance, which caused the mass destruction of these parts discovered in the middle of 1938. The destruction of the claw safety device makes the KT-type fuses dangerous for storage in warehouses, during transportation, and when the projectile is sent into the gun channel.

In view of this, at present, in order to replace the destroyed fuses, all the KT-type fuses available in the Red Army in the amount of 5 million pieces are being sorted ...

Such work to replace and check fuses and fuses of the KT and KTM type requires more than 45 million rubles and deprives the Red Army of a complete shot.

As far back as 1934, industry workers and the Artillery Directorate of the Red Army, in particular Khasin! and Ivanov3.

According to the materials received in 1934 from the Lysvensky plant (Lysva) about cracking of the claw fuses .. no measures were taken, and the etching of parts KT-1,2,3 continued until 1936, and in KTM before 1939..."

Here's how it was done in practice. And the "memorial" figures keep talking to us about the "innocent victims of the Stalin-Beria terror"!

29/UN-39

Kholzunov crashed\*. Mud..ki! There is such a mess in aviation that you can't understand (So in the text. - S.K.) when it's negligence, and when it's sabotage. Koba ordered an investigation. In aviation, we count hundreds of accidents; over the past three years, three hundred pilots have been beaten to death. They say that experience is not enough. So learn better

ÿ Khasin Fridman Ruvimovich, military engineer of the 2nd rank, in 1939 the head of the technical department of the 6th head office of Nkmunitions.

2 Zapolsky Sergey Alekseevich, military man, former head of the 10th sector of the UBAA AU RKKA, former cadet of the Mikhailovsky Artillery School, from 1917 to January 1918

ensign on the Romanian front

3 Ivanov Georgy Alekseevich, military engineer of the 1st rank, in 1939 the senior military representative of the Zlatoust plant.

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dolbo..would be x..eva. Then you punish yourself. A hero, but he died like a fool.

Khoshro (So in the text. — S.K.) things went on with the Germans. Astakhov is a good guy. The job is just right for him. Koba is happy!

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev.

The record dated July 29, 1939 finally confirms that Astakhov was involved in a very subtle "Berlin" operation jointly by Stalin, Molotov and Beria (most likely, Stalin's "operational headquarters" on the German question was then Mikoyan).

Actually, today we find direct confirmation of what Beria mentioned in the letters of G.A. Astakhov, which he sent to Beria, already ... sitting in prison.

After the signing of the Pact, Astakhov was not only completely withdrawn from Berlin affairs, but sent on a long-term leave, and on December 1, 1939, he was generally dismissed from the NKID with employment as the head of the Caucasus sector at the Museum of the Peoples of the USSR. On February 27, 1940, Astakhov was arrested for accusations of a conspiracy of "rightists" in the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and espionage in favor of Poland. An investigation has begun.

I already wrote that Astakhov, most likely, could not deceive

+ At the end of July 1939, Hero of the Soviet Union V.S. died in a plane crash. Kholzunov, commander of the air AON-1 (Special Purpose Army), and several other people. Preparations for the departure of the DB-3 aircraft were carried out hastily and had all the signs of criminal negligence, and even conscious sabotage. In particular, after takeoff, three FAB-50 bombs exploded in the bomb bays due to incorrect fuse assembly.

Kholzunov, like many other then aviation commanders, was not distinguished by exactingness either to himself or to his subordinates. Voroshilov, People's Commissar for Defense, was indignant at his lax behavior in the Far East already in July 1938 at a meeting of the Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. At the same time, Voroshilov mentioned an ugly air disaster in the Far East during a mid-air collision between a TB-3 and a Douglas (15 people died, including major aviation commanders Sorokin and Bryandinskiy).

1 See comment below.

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vat, but could be deceived. He was an addictive and nervous nature, sometimes not of this world, and he could be easily provoked and, as they say, circled around the finger - if it was not about serious state issues, but about his personal affairs and feelings. On the other hand, Astakhov could interfere - not with Stalin and Beria, but with those real hidden "rightists" and Trotskyists who still existed in the NKID and the NKVD. Therefore, Astakhov could, as they say, be slandered before Stalin and Beria.

One way or another, in February 1940, Astakhov was arrested and placed in prison. He denied his guilt at the investigation and then in court. At the same time, there is reason to believe that the regime of his detention was not "executionary", although in his letters to Beria and statements to the Central Committee there are references to severe psychological pressure and even one beating with a rubber stick

on the night of May 14-15, 1940. But investigations into conspiracy cases are always scant for "material" evidence, and Astakhov did not give any evidence even almost three months after his arrest.

There was some serious evidence against Astakhov. On April 1, 1940, he himself wrote that investigators were telling him that his criminality was considered proven, that "the world would soon turn upside down before this confidence was shaken," and on May 29, 1940, that he was told that the question of his guilt was "unconditionally resolved even before the arrest...". However, the measures of physical influence did not become the norm in the investigation of the Astakhov case. The tone of his letters to Beria is very free, these are not the humiliated requests of a broken man, but calm reflections on topic.

On May 29, 1940, he wrote to Beria: "Let me address you not only as the People's Commissar, but also as ... a person under whose supervision ... I had to work for a short period of time. Nevertheless, you have some kind of visual idea about me, drawn not only from materials that have not been known to me until now ... "

This is hardly a hint of Astakhov's work in Transcaucasia under Beriev in 1935-1936. Two, or at least one and a half years is not such a short period of time. So most likely

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This refers specifically to the Berlin period from mid-June to mid-August 1939.

However, even purely speculatively, without documentary evidence, it could be assumed that Beria played a significant role in the preparation of the new course of the USSR towards Germany in 1939. It was through him that reliable intelligence information came from abroad for Stalin and Molotov. It was through Beria that it was most reliable to take delicate operational actions in Berlin.

At the same time, it would be incredible if Beria or his trusted emissaries did not have one or another direct contact with Astakhov, with whom Beria had known at least since the mid-1930s, if he was from 1920. But, as we see, Beria really supervised Astakhov's Berlin work in the summer of 1939.

On May 29, 1940, Astakhov wrote: "... As proven by events, I ensured the complete secrecy of the negotiations with Germany in 1939, which decided the fate of those countries for which I am accused of spying. Please don't overlook this..."

Astakhov, of course, had in mind Poland and, most likely without realizing it, pointed out one of the possible reasons for his arrest. The Poles themselves could deftly "set it up" in revenge for the important role that Astakhov played in the preparation of the Pact of August 23, 1939, which decided the fate of Poland.

For example, the same 2nd department of the Polish General Staff, knowing that Astakhov had been recalled, could concoct essentially falsified, but authentic "compromising" materials on Astakhov in the hope that they could be planted on the Russians. At the same time, materials prepared even before the outbreak of the German-Polish war could have come to us after the defeat of Poland as trophies, which would only increase their "reliability" in the eyes of the NKVD.

One way or another, the fate of G.A. Astakhov turned out to be not only tragic, but also poorly explained - if you do not accept the version from that, I repeat that he was skillfully "set up" by certain forces hostile to the USSR inside or outside the country.

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3/USh-39

Yesterday at Koba they decided by negotiations! He kept Koba, Molotov and Voroshilov informed on all matters.

He said everything important. Are the Germans holding secret negotiations with the British in London? The initiative comes from the British. General Aronsides was inspecting the Polish army, the British are promising support. In fact, nothing serious will be given. They themselves promise and hint to Smigla\* that England will not fight for Poland. Apparently believe that we will. Here's x..y.

The British agreed with the Japanese. It seems to be against China, but in fact it is against us°.

The Poles are whispering with the Germans. The Germans promise Ukraine, but it's so, fu-fu. Hitler wants to decide everything about the Poles this year. Until the rains. Either the Poles will give in, or there will be war. So Hitler will be in a hurry. And we have nowhere to hurry. So we can expect that the Germans will go to meet us (So in the text. — S.K.).

The Poles will not be allowed into their territory under any circumstances. There are no troops in England, the French are about

On August 12, 1939, from 7:50 pm to 8:55 pm, Stalin conferred with Molotov, Voroshilov and Beria. Then Beria left, and members of the Soviet delegation were invited to Stalin's office for tripartite negotiations: Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, Army Commander 1st Rank B.M. Shaposhnikov, People's Commissar of the Navy, flagship of the fleet of the 2nd rank N.G. Kuznetsov and Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army Commander I.V. Smorodinov (the fifth member of the delegation, the head of the Red Army Air Force, commander of the 2nd rank A.D. Loktionov, was not invited).

2 In July 1939, an official at large, an employee of the agency for the implementation of the four-year plan of Germany, H. Wohlthat, negotiated in London with the chief adviser to the British government on industrial issues G. Wilson, the leader of the Conservatives J. Ball and the British Minister of Overseas Trade R. Hudson.

3 More precisely, W. Ironside, Inspector General of the British Overseas Armed Forces. On July 17-19, 1939, he was on an official visit to Poland.

\* The de facto dictator of Poland, Marshal Edward Rydz-Smigly, Inspector General of the Polish Armed Forces.

5 See comment below.

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rot. Conclusion: negotiations must be conducted so that everything becomes clear that England and France will not fight, but want to rake in the heat with our hands. But negotiations are needed to work the Germans. We do not need a war, especially a war with the Germans.

Conclusion: to conduct negotiations until the Germans are ready. Strengthen Astakhov's work, but conduct it carefully so that Hitler believes that they are leading the line. As soon as the Germans accept our economic conditions, go to negotiations with them, and send these old per..uns from England and France to the fucking mother.

Today Koba started with me, I told everything about Berlin affairs, then Vyacheslav and Voroshilov came in, talked together?,

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev.

By the beginning of August 1939, the situation for the USSR was outlined with transparent clarity.

In Europe, the British (apparently in agreement with the United States and with the full support of France) tried to provoke the USSR into a war against Germany in the event that Germany started military

actions against Poland (and it went to that). To this end, since the spring of 1939, England has been conducting political negotiations with the USSR, meeting the full support of the then People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR "Litvinov" Wallach, who was still rushing around with his initially stillborn, and therefore politically idiotic idea of "collective security". "

At the same time, as noted above, in the summer of 1939, the German representative H. Wohlthat held secret negotiations in London with the "gray eminence" of British politics Horace (Horace) Wilson, Tory leader J. Ball and Minister Hudson. It was the same Hudson

! This policy was brilliantly implemented in the next fortnight.

On August 23, 1939, Stalin received from 16.25 to 17.25 Beria and 17.00 to 17.25 also Molotov and Voroshilov. That is, for 35 minutes, Stalin talked with Beria in private. The conversation was obviously delicate and highly confidential.

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to whom Litvinov, in a note dated March 20, 1939, preached at length about the dangers of tobacco, the benefits of smoking, the need for "collective security", etc. At the end of the note, Litvinov stated: "In particular, we have always been and are now ready to cooperate with Great Britain (Against Germany. - S.K.)".

Hudson at this time was preparing for secret negotiations with Wohlthat. Moreover, the British attached much more importance to the negotiations with the Germans than to the ongoing negotiations on the political line with the USSR and the upcoming tripartite military negotiations in Moscow. That is why the London negotiations were secret. And on them the British, assuring the Russians that they were allegedly ready to come out with the USSR and France to defend Poland and, if necessary, Romania, provoked the Germans against the Russians.

In fact, Litvinov's policy failed, and he was replaced by Molotov. It was urgently necessary to find out the possibility of such an improvement in relations with the Germans, when a mutual military conflict would be excluded.

At the same time, it was necessary to bring our political consultations and military negotiations with the British and French to their logical end, that is, to the complete exposure of the provocative policy of the "democratic" West.

This is how things were in the summer of 1939 on the western flank of the USSR

On the eastern flank, in Siberia and the Far East, everything was similar. There were anti-Soviet provocations by the British, pushing Japan into a big war with the USSR. On July 22, 1939, the Arita-Craigie Agreement was signed in Tokyo. Japanese Foreign Minister Hachiro Arita and British Ambassador R. Craigie agreed that Britain recognizes the current situation in China and the "special needs" of the Japanese Armed Forces there and undertakes not to encourage any acts or actions, "interfering with the Japanese military forces in China in meeting these needs."

At that time, the Soviet-Japanese conflict at Khalkhin Gol was in full swing. And the Arita-Craigie agreement was nothing more than an assurance from England to Japan that the Britons were giving a free hand to the Japanese in their expansion towards the USSR.

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and guarantee Japan's security against British military action, despite Japan's previous anti-English actions.

The nature of the tripartite Anglo-French-Soviet military talks in Moscow scheduled for mid-August 1939 was determined in advance by the fact that on the part of the USSR the representative delegation was headed by the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and a member of the Politburo Voroshilov, and on the part of England and France by the semi-retired Admiral Drax and minor general Dumenk. Moreover, both, unlike Voroshilov, did not have any serious powers. This became clear already on the very first day of the negotiations - August 12, 1939.

Here is another political detail of that summer: even in the face of a real threat of a German attack, the Poles categorically refused to allow Soviet troops to enter their territory to defend Poland. The Poles refused even airfields!

Therefore, all the actions of the USSR to stop this political farce and normalize relations with Germany were not only justified, but also the only expedient.

The "democratic" West wanted to provoke Germany into a military conflict with Russia, and Japan into an expansion of the conflict that had already arisen, and, accordingly, put Russia before the fact of a war on two fronts.

However, Stalin decided otherwise.

18 / USh-39 I spin in all directions. What you need:

1) Continue on the People's Commissariat!. We must a) Strengthen the work of the Special Bureau. On all lines, especially on ammunition and aviation

1 Beria not only fully fulfilled his thesis current program of activities in the NKVD for the remaining months of 1939, in 1940 and the first half of 1941, but even expanded and exceeded it. So, for example, on August 17, 1939, he addressed Stalin with a letter No. 3517 / 6, reported on the work of civilian A.A. in the 2nd Special Department of the NKVD of the USSR. Vinokurov on the project of the original aviation gas turbine for

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6) to work on the perversions of Yezhov, especially on the revision of cases and expulsion

c) to intensify work along the Border. Time will be hot soon. It needs to be strengthened. Separately for the Japanese.

d) to strengthen in Intelligence, people basically passed the test, now you can work. It is especially necessary for England and America. Through them you can watch the Germans.

e) Do not weaken the line on the right and on the opening of enemies. Sits a lot in the corners

f) Work more widely on special communications. It's the right thing, it's necessary for the People's Commissariat and in general.

g) Strengthen industrial controls. It is necessary to expand the structure, bring it closer to the tasks. We will build a lot in the central regions and in Siberia, and beyond.

It seems that everything is important, otherwise you can go through the entire alphabet.

Still need to pick up shots. Cadres decide everything if you choose them well.

2) You need to figure it out yourself (So in the text. - S.K.) yourself (So in the text, twice. - S.K.) according to reports on political affairs in Europe and according to the situation in our industry! . There are a lot of bars

On August 14, 1939, Beria, in letter No. 3517 / 6, reported on the work of civilian A.A. in the 2nd Special Department of the NKVD of the USSR. Vinokurov on the project of the original aviation gas turbine for

30 thousand revolutions (the project was unrealizable at that time, but still!). As is typical for Beria, he informs Stalin that "comr. Vinokurov will be employed as a student at the Faculty of Thermal Engineering of the Moscow Power Engineering Institute. V.M. Molotov. It was Beria's style - to actively take care of the formation of a new shift. He promised his colleague Navl Sudoplatov to send him after the war to study at the military academy in 1942 (!) in Tbilisi, where the Germans were rushing! And I didn't forget my promise.

Examples can be continued. Beria, even before his appointment to the NKVD, was a "multi-station" manager. Work in Moscow quickly brought his ability to do many things at once to perfection.

1 Interesting and infrequent for a leader of this level of mind! Beria really knew how to study, because he was simply not allowed to get a full-fledged formal education. He could compensate for this shortcoming only by self-education, and he mastered this science well. In addition, the information materials of the NKVD were excellent "teaching aids".

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shit and badass. Pests of course, but a lot of just slob and dolbo ... bov. It is necessary to firmly take the NKVD under control.

3) It is necessary to personally check the composition of the protection of the Government and separately mine. Check how they shoot.

There is a lot to do. We can consider the work of the Germans done. It is now up to Koba and Vyacheslav (V.M. Molotov. - S.K.). He reminded Vyacheslav and Vladimir (V.G. Dekanozov. — S.K.) that they should be careful with Hilger! This zemstvo teacher is smarter than all their embassies and knows the Union better than we do.

24/USh-39

All data for the fact that the Germans will start soon. Koba has not yet decided when we will go. All the same, it is necessary to prepare, because the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs will now fight and fight. The anti-Polish movement in Ukraine is strong. Now they will act against us in those areas that will go to us. This means that it will be necessary to suppress and be sure to expel all suspicious anti-Soviet elements. We will send to Ukraine

EG charter Hilger (1886-1965), adviser to the German embassy in Moscow. The figure is almost unique. He was born in Moscow, his mother was Russian (Hilger himself was also married to a Russian). He graduated from a gymnasium in Moscow, was absolutely bilingual, actually belonged to two cultures. He received his higher technical education in Darmstadt, returned to Moscow in 1910, left for Germany in the summer of 1918, but returned already in 1920 and in 1923 officially entered the German diplomatic service. Until the war, Hilger worked at the Moscow embassy as the chief expert on all Russian issues.

Beria, having risen at the head of the NKVD and already from 1939 paid special attention to Germany, very quickly figured out the meaning of Hilger. Interesting detail! At one of the government receptions, Beria tried to personally get Hilger drunk, and in order not to lose control over himself, he had to appeal to Stalin. Most likely, Beria wanted to see for himself how malleable Khilger was for possible recruitment.

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Serov!. The guy is young, he has little operational experience, he will learn. The main thing will be able to immediately act on the bandits. And we'll see.

It will be necessary to reorganize the whole work. It's good that I managed to clean up the People's Commissariat for the most part, and on the ground too. Here we must not look back, but look ahead. And if the back is not covered, far from



you leave (So in the text. - S.K.), you will all look back.

Commentator help.

On September 1, 1939, the German armed forces crossed the Polish border. It has not yet begun a world war, but only a German-Polish war. Despite the fact that England and France provoked Poland into a war with the Germans instead of reaching a reasonable compromise with them, the conflict between Germany and Poland was potentially local. For example, by that time Japan was conducting active hostilities in China, a number of regional conflicts and acute situations were also fraught with a multilateral, that is, world war, but historians take September 1 as the starting point of World War II for some reason. 1939.

It is more correct to count from September 3, 1939, when England, France, Australia, New Zealand and India declared war on Germany (the Union of South Africa joined them on September 6, and Canada on September 10). That is, in fact, the conflict was globalized by Britain, dragging its

. Serov Ivan Alexandrovich (1905-1990), one of the heads of state security agencies, graduated from the Military Academy of the Red Army in 1938, from February 09, 1939, head of the Main Directorate of the Workers 'and Peasants' Militia of the NKVD of the USSR, from July 29, 1939, deputy head of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR and head of the 2nd department of the GUGB (fight against anti-Soviet elements). Since September 02, 39 People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR.

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dominions, as well as another colonial power - France,

The nature of the hostilities that they really acquired in the very first days of the war could not be imagined by anyone, and above all by the Germans themselves. By 1939, the Wehrmacht did not even have the combat experience that the Red Army had gained in the conflicts of 1929 on the CER, 1938 near Lake Khasan, and in 1939 in Mongolia at Khalkhin Gol. Both the Germans and we both had "Spanish" experience, but we additionally had, although specific and small, but real Chinese experience.

And now the unfired German army literally smashed the Poles. The fate of the war and Poland was decided in just over a week.

The Red Army acted "to protect the life and property of the population of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus" on September 17, 1939. The limits of the advance of our troops were agreed in advance in Moscow, when the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact was signed. However, the demarcation line itself actually corresponded to the long-standing Curzon line, which was proposed as the Russian-Polish border by the Supreme Council of the Entente at a conference in Spa (Belgium) in 1920 as ethnically based. That is, the USSR did not annex the Polish territories, but returned to its composition our primordially lands, torn away from Russia under the Riga Treaty of 1921.

At the end of September 1939, Ribbentrop arrived in Moscow for the second and, alas, last time to sign the German-Soviet treaty of friendship and border. On September 28, 1939, the agreement was signed, and on September 29 it was published in Pravda.

The new situation was both beneficial and dangerous for the USSR in the sense that now the Baltic republics, in the zone of borders of which Germany entered,

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could accept the protectorate of Germany and too strengthen Germany on the northwestern flank of the USSR. Therefore, the USSR consolidated its position by concluding mutual assistance treaties with Estonia (September 28, 1939), Latvia (October 5, 1939) and Lithuania (October 10, 1939).

Looking ahead, we can say that this was not a step towards the sovietization of the Baltics. The decisive actions of the USSR to return the Baltic States to the USSR in the summer of 1940 were due to openly pro-German (and at the same time pro-Western) moods of the highest circles in all three republics.

Indicative in this respect is the entry dated October 25, 1939, in the diary of Georgy Dimitrov, General Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, who recorded the following words of Stalin: "We think that in the mutual assistance pacts (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) we found the form which will allow us to place a number of countries in the orbit of influence of the Soviet Union.

But for this we need to endure, to strictly observe their internal regime and  
independence.

We will not seek their sovietization.

The time will come when they will do it themselves!"

On October 12, 1939, the Soviet government proposed to conclude an agreement on mutual assistance also to Finland, however, on the basis of an exchange of territories so that the border was significantly moved away from Leningrad (long-range artillery could fire at our second capital from the old Soviet-Finnish border) .

The Finns evaded, making the military way of resolving the conflict practically inevitable for the USSR. At the same time, Stalin understood that the war with the Finns and friendly relations with the Germans put the USSR in the position of an antagonist to the "democratic" West of the United States.

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23/X 39

Back from Koba! and remembered that he forgot about his friend?, it is necessary to consult. We did a lot in a month. It's time to figure out what's what.

So you don't write, you don't write, your hands don't reach, you turn and turn, you won't have time to sleep, come on Lavrenty. When to sleep!

Khorsho (So in the text. - S.K.) people have already been selected, strong help in all areas.

The war began can be considered a world war. Australia has already declared war on Germany. How it will proceed is still unclear.

With Poland it turned out as they thought. Koba dragged on, didn't want there to be a reason to call us aggressors. He told me, watch it so that in Warsaw they only think, and I already knew. As soon as the government fled to Romania?, so we went. There was a lot of mess, but it's good that it happened. If we were to fight seriously, it would be bad.

No one thought that Poland would collapse like this. All, Paul

On September 123, 1939, Stalin received only two in the Kremlin: Molotov from 17.35 to 19.50 and Beria from 18.20 to 19.20. The range of questions is quite imaginable. A conversation in such a composition could not help touching on the development of the European situation; Ribbentrop's upcoming visit to Moscow; the policies of the USSR in the returned territories, including their inevitable repressive aspect; as well as sentiment in the Baltics and Finland.

> Of course, I mean "friend" diary. As follows from the dating of the notes, Beria's workload increased, and he did not think about the diary for weeks, not feeling the need for it or having no time for it. A bit of chronology... From September 1 to September 30, Stalin held meetings at his place every day, missing only September 24 (obviously, on that day he

rested), as well as on September 28 and 29, when he was busy with Ribbentrop, who arrived in Moscow. So, despite the particularly intense work of the NKVD with the outbreak of the German-Polish war, Beria took part in meetings with Stalin on September 1-4, 6, 8, 12, 15-19, 21-23, 25 and 30 September.

On September 316, 1939, the Polish government fled to Romania and was interned there. Poland found itself without a government, and this created such a legal situation when the USSR could cross the Soviet-Polish border without a formal declaration of war on Poland (there was no one to declare war) and, accordingly, not commit an act of aggression.

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It does not exist and may never be the same as it was before the imperialist war. Let's see. And we note that it is better not to bring the Germans to war. There will be a lot of blood, but why. Now it is possible without war.

There will be a lot of work on the Baltic states. And we need to strengthen the northern borders. There you can expect all sorts of fuck .. from the British. And the Finns can. And the shell reaches Leningrad. Koba has already ordered an operation in Murmansk, but this is a defense!

We must think about an offensive along our line, People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. Need to talk to Vsevolod? The main thing now is Western Ukraine.

3/XI 39

Went through operations. I'm tired like a dog and I have to go again. The guys are also tired, but they are doing well. Reported to Koba. It is necessary to present this group to the Awards. And one more. Do not forget to say later Serovuz. And then he, as for himself, so give, but it is necessary for others.

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev.

The entry dated November 3, 1939 is intriguing not only for its brevity, but also for its obscure meaning. One can only speculate what is behind it. It is possible that precise knowledge

On September 16, 1939, the Politburo Resolution was adopted (with the stamp "Top Secret"), which, due to its brevity and expressiveness, is given in full:

"122 - About the city of Murmansk. 1) Transfer the city of Murmansk to a regime position. 2) Carry out this measure gradually, without noise and without unnecessarily intimidating people.

In any case, deport from Murmansk no more than 500-700 people who are definitely suspicious, especially Finns, Estonians and other foreigners. Issue passports to the rest of the unpassported and ensure that Murmansk is not littered with anti-Soviet elements in the future."

2 VN. Merkulov in 1939, First Deputy People's Commissar and Head of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR.

3 See note to entry dated August 27, 1939.

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a study of the NKVD archives could have given, but perhaps this would not have clarified the essence of the record, since many materials on Beria were destroyed or fabricated after his death.

Judging by the registration records in the journal of visits to Stalin's Kremlin office, Beria did not appear in this office from October 2 to November 3, 1939. Most likely, Beria was absent from Moscow at that time and was up to his neck in organizing special operations in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. Objectively, there were many tasks that required the attention of the People's Commissar personally, including:

— studying on the ground a new dynamically changing situation,

- liquidation and suppression of the armed nationalist underground, both Ukrainian-Belarusian and Polish,
- “cleansing” of new territories from undesirable elements,
- the creation of NKVD bodies there (from the police to state security) and the organization of counterintelligence,
- organization of reception, registration and filtration of Polish prisoners of war, refugees, etc.

A separate task was to study the situation with the so-called osadniks, former Polish servicemen. Since December 1920, the Polish government has been massively settling anti-Soviet osadniks along the border with the Ukrainian SSR and the BSSR, providing them with 25 hectares of land, agricultural implements and the opportunity to hire laborers from the local population.

The siegemen were not just Polish fists! These were active and well-prepared enemies of the Soviet power, capable of effectively waging an armed struggle against it. Therefore, it was necessary to relocate them as soon as possible from the new borders of the USSR and L.P. Beria dealt with this problem. In February 1940, he reported to Stalin on the results of the operation to evict siegemen and forest guards from the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR and the Byelorussian SSR.

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On November 3, Beria took part in a meeting with Stalin for an hour in a narrow format: Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Mikoyan, Zhdanov and Beria. Almost certainly, Beria spoke about the situation in the reunited territories, but not only - at the end of the meeting, People's Commissar of the Navy Kuznetsov and Commander of the Northern Fleet Drozd appeared in the office, and from that moment, most likely, the Finnish situation was discussed. Things were going well with the Finns, and the British could help them, so the issue of ensuring possible naval operations was important.

From November 4 to November 14, 1939, Beria did not appear again at Stalin's. Only on November 15 did he take part in a conference with Stalin, together with Zhdanov, Voroshilov and others, including Kuusinen, a member of the Finnish Communist Party, the Comintern and the CPSU(b). The latter speaks for itself: the preparations for the war with the Finns have entered the final phase, which explains the presence of Kuusinen.

Then Beria was Stalin on November 19, 21 and twice on November 22. On November 22, at first they met at night in a narrow format: Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Beria, Kuusinen, and in the evening a large meeting was held with 26 people.

Then there were meetings with Stalin with the participation of Beria on November 24, 25, 27, 28 and 29.

It should be especially noted that Beria is sometimes accused of organizing the shelling of Soviet territory by allegedly Finnish, in fact Soviet, artillery in the area of the town of Mainil. The Mainil incident actually became *sasis Bey* (Cause for war. - S.K.). But this shelling took place at 15.45 on November 25, 1939, and Beria from 20.50 to 24.00 on November 24 and from 17.35 to 20.00 on November 25, Stalin was imprisoned.

It is unlikely that Beria - if Stalin had decided to create a pretext for war in this way - entrusted the conduct of a delicate operation to someone else. But he physically could not be on the 25th at the border. And this once again indirectly confirms that the shelling was provoked by the Finns themselves. They behaved in the autumn of 1939 extremely recklessly and impudently. To be convinced of this, it is enough to get acquainted with the records and facts of the Moscow negotiations between Stalin and Paasikivian Tanner in October-November 1939.

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On November 30, 1939, hostilities began in Finland. And Beria again "disappears" from Stalin's eyes until December 10, appearing on December 10 at Stalin's in the middle of a night meeting for 5 (five!) minutes.

A day later, again on the night of December 11-12, Stalin receives Beria already face to face, but the conversation was short-lived - from 2.30 to 2.40. By that time, the Soviet troops were firmly bogged down in failures on the Finnish front. Only the border guards of Beria fought consistently well. And, as I understand it, Stalin had to urgently understand - what did we encounter this time, only with the eternal "racial" laxity, or with the eruption of certain conspiracies, above all, the conspiracy of Tukhachevsky? Only Beria's department and personally Beria himself, who was an experienced counterintelligence officer, could promptly clarify this issue. Possibly, during this period he also reached Murmansk.

Some long movements of L.P. Beria on the territory of the USSR is indirectly confirmed by an entry in his diary dated December 14, 1939.

From December 12 until the end of the year, Beria's presence at meetings with Stalin was restored. He takes part in them on December 14, 17, 19, 22, 25, 26, 28 and finally on December 31, 1939.

27 /X1 39

Koba held a meeting. He said we'll continue tomorrow. It is finally decided how to fight the Finns. My guys got good data on the Finnish fortifications, Sinitsyn! reported directly to the meeting. Koba was pleased, and so was I. Wiped the nose of military intelligence.

1 Elisei Tikhonovich Sinitsyn (1909-1995), from 1939 to 1941, a resident of the NKVD intelligence service, worked under legal diplomatic cover in the Soviet embassy in Helsinki under the surname Eliseev. Having arrived from Helsinki on November 27, 1939, he was present at the evening meeting with Stalin on November 27, 1939 from 19.35 to 20.40 (Beria - from 18.10 to the end of the meeting - 21.10).

A characteristic moment for Beria's managerial style: he took with him to the Kremlin the one who had the greatest completeness of operational information and could inform Stalin without "spoiled telephones". Beria did not try to stick out his merits, but he willingly emphasized the merits of his subordinates.

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14/HP 39

I rode the railroads. The right-of-way is more like (So in the text. — S.K.) the settlement zone. Solid shanghai and nahalovki!. A mess, it is necessary to demolish and relocate. Lazar (L.M. Kaganovich, People's Commissar of Railways. - S.K.) supports.

In Tbilisi, they petitioned to assign my name to the Transcaucasian Railway. The Politburo adopted a resolution, Koba congratulated?.

I say thank you, but the railways are a mess, urgent measures are needed. Koba says: "Emergency measures are needed everywhere." But they made a decision on my Note with Lazarems.

It's nice when the team asks for your name. They have more responsibility (So in the text. - S.K.), that they will not let down a comrade, and you have more responsibility, so that they do not let down trust. The city is not that. Here is Ni

1By the end of 1939, 318,260 people lived in temporary buildings (dugouts, huts, etc.) in the strip adjacent to the railways, there were 80,945 people. Entire settlements were formed with colorful names such as "Shanghai", "Kitayka", "Dig-Gorod", "Cockroach Hill", "Nakhalovka", etc.

On December 21, 1939, at the request of the railway workers of the Tbilisi railway junction, the Transcaucasian Railway was named after L.P. Beria.

3 Most likely, this refers to the joint memorandum of L.P. Beria and L.M. Kaganovich dated December 1, 1939 on the results of the work of the commissions of the NKVD and the NKPS on checking temporary residential buildings in areas adjacent to railways and built without the permission of the authorities. The initiative came, most likely, from Beria. The figures given in note 1 and the names of temporary settlements are taken by me from this note. The energetic and specific style of the note betrays Beria's active interest in a real solution to the problem, because in the note, among urgent measures, it was recommended "to propose to the heads of economic enterprises and railways to provide assistance with materials and technical assistance to workers and employees living in temporary residential buildings ..".

By the way, at the end of 1939, Beria secured the allocation of funds for the construction in 1940 of housing for workers of the UNKVD in the Leningrad region, a significant number of which, as acknowledged in a note by V.M. Molotov, "is in difficult living conditions."

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Kolya gave the city, and now removed!. The city is not specific. And if the Beria Collective Farm or the Beria Institute, then this is different. Now, dear comrades, if you please, work or study in such a way that my name is not dishonored, otherwise I will refuse.

In Kyiv, Dynamo was named after Yezhov. And what is your relationship with him? In Tbilisi, Dynamo named after Beria, so I built it, I walked around the construction site at night.

We are still fighting with the Finns x..evo. It is necessary to give mud..kov to the tribunal. Koba almonds.

I'm tired. A year as the People's Commissar, but how he lived his life.

19/HP-39

In a day, Kobe is 60 years old?. I wonder if I'll live to see these years. It seems that I should, I don't smoke, I don't drink much, I don't forget physical education as much as possible. I'm nervous a lot, but so far nothing, I'm not complaining.

Let's see.

1 In 1804, the village of Batalpashinskaya was founded in the basin of the Kuban River, renamed in 1936 in the city of Sulimov in honor of the then chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR D.E. Sulimov (1890-1937), who was repressed in 1937. On July 16, 1937, the capital of the Karachay-Cherkess Autonomous Region, the city of Sulimov, was renamed the city of Yezhov-Cherkessk. After Yezhov's arrest, the first part of the name was removed.

2 Official birthday of I.V. Stalin - December 21, 1879.

ZLP. Beria did not live to see his 60th birthday. He was born on March 29, 1899, and even according to official figures, he was shot on December 23, 1953, that is, at the age of fifty-four.

1940

1/1-40

The New Year has begun. The first time I met him in the Kremlin at Koba!. They cursed so much, even Koba, that they did not notice how they ended up in 1940. The army crap .. lazed and does not want to admit it. I am their facts, they balk. Then Koba could not stand it, he began to swear, he rarely happens. Klim turned pale, but Koba said Lavrenty was right. You must be judged. Where can you get others.

There is a mess in the war, but do you need to finish the work on the Nikolai case ?. And there it is necessary and there it is necessary. I think we cleaned the main ones. But how do you look at the mess at the front, do you think that everyone was cleaned up or still left? Zashchitsy. It sucks when a person doesn't know what he wants. Then he repents, and what do they repent (So in the text. - S.K.). Regret, he will continue anyway, you won't get away from yourself. Better right away.

1 On the last day of 1939, Stalin first hosted a conference on economic cooperation with Germany, which ended at about six in the evening. And at 10.20 p.m., People's Commissar of Defense Voroshilov appeared at Stalin's, and ten minutes later Shaposhnikov, Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, and Vasilevsky, Deputy Chief of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff, approached. At 11:25 p.m. on December 31, 1939, Beria entered the office and remained there until 010 hours on January 1, 1940. As can be seen from the entry in the diary, the conversation was heated. After Beria left, the military remained with Stalin for another 35 minutes.

On January 217, 1940, the Politburo Decree was adopted on bringing to trial the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR 457 people - "enemies of the CPSU (b) and Soviet power, active participants in the counter-revolutionary, right-Trotskyist conspiratorial and espionage organization". Of these, it was decided to sentence to death according to the law of December 1, 1934, 346 people, including Yezhov, Frinovsky, Yovdokimov.

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We are finishing the Regulations on the Archives. Also a big mess, it's time to put things in order. The archive is history. Then you can come up with whatever you want, but if you want the truth, you won't get it without an archive. And we have it like this: "Ah, a piece of paper." No, today a piece of paper, and in a hundred years a document. I take the archives for myself and put this matter firmly!

4/1-40

We are serious about railway construction in the People's Commissariat. I signed an order on the organization of the Main Directorate, we are uniting everything into one Directorate. And before that we built a lot, and now we will build even more. Let us build the Second Ways and equip them well. Stations by itself and it will be necessary to press on Kultbyt, on housing and medical institutions.

We will build new hydroelectric stations and expand them through canals and reservoirs. We must fundamentally rebuild the Gulag so that there is no hodgepodge. You are responsible for this, and answer. And you answer for that, too. No fools. Did a good job, reward from

\* An extremely interesting entry. Beria's words are known that without archives there is no history, and without history there is no future. Beria attached great importance to the organization of archives in the USSR, and, as it seems to me, he can be considered an outstanding reformer not only of Soviet intelligence and the border troops of the USSR, but also of archives in the USSR. In any case, the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of January 28, 1940, which approved the LP signed by the People's Commissar of the NKVD of the USSR. Beria The Regulations on the Main Archive Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR provided for a comprehensive and large-scale approach to business. I will cite only one point e) from the general list of GAU tasks, ending with point l):

"..f) organization of research issues related to the formulation of archives, archival production equipment and methods of storing archival materials; organization of measures for the hygiene of archival materials and the restoration of archival documents"

Comments are hardly necessary here, although it can be seen that Beria kept the archives, and his detractors - from Khrushchev to Gorbachev and the Yeltsinoids inclusive - destroy the archives, or even worse, falsify them.

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souls. I didn't, sorry, we have a prison. Or just went to the fucking mother. Don't get confused by no-gami.

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev.

On January 4, 1940, Beria signed the order of the NKVD of the USSR No. 0014 "On the reorganization of the management of the railway construction of the NKVD of the USSR", according to which the Main Directorate of Railway Construction of the NKVD of the USSR was created (later - the Main Directorate of Railway Construction Camps, GULZhDS). Corps engineer N.A. Frenkel.

But this was only the beginning of a major reform of the economic activity of the NKVD of the USSR On August 19, 1940, L.P. Beria signed order No. 001019 "On the reconstruction of the GULAG of the NKVD of the USSR." Within the framework of this reform, in September 1940, in particular, the Main Directorate of Hydraulic Engineering Construction of the NKVD of the USSR (Glavgidrostroy) headed by Ya.D. Rapoport. And in 1941, in the structure of the NKVD of the USSR, in addition to the GULAG, there were also GU-SHOSDOR GULZhDS, Glavgidrostroy, the Office of Special Construction (Osobstroy) and Dalstroy.

I will quote paragraph 2 of the order of the NKVD of the USSR No. 001159 dated September 13, 1940 on the organization of the Main Directorate of Hydraulic Construction of the NKVD of the USSR:

"2. To entrust Glavgidrostroy of the NKVD with the management of the following construction projects: Klyazma, Kotorosl, Kostroma and Msta, construction No. 200 (Construction of a naval base in the Luga Bay near Leningrad. - S.K.), 201 (Dredging in the lower reaches of the Amur River. - S.K.) and 213 (Construction of the port of Nakhodka in Primorsky Krai. - S.K.), completion of the Belomorsky port, as well as work related to the temporary conservation of the Kuibyshev and Solikamsk hydroelectric facilities.

As you can see, although the construction program of the Glavgidrostroy of the NKVD of the USSR was impressive, it covered only

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a small part of national hydrotechnical projects, and it could not be otherwise. Prisoners in the USSR really worked at construction sites, and did not glue envelopes, as, for example, the Soviet intelligence agent Conon the Young (Gordon Lonsdale) who was imprisoned there did in Her Majesty's prisons. However, the basis for the transformation of the country was provided by free labor, and not "slave", as "advanced" "historians" are now talking about it.

Also, contrary to the established opinion, many civilian specialists worked in the system of industrial departments of the NKVD, and in the link of specialists with higher and secondary technical education there were a majority of such specialists. It was due to their high qualifications, good (as a rule) organization of work and the high demands of the people's commissar, and not due to fear, that the economic activity of the NKVD of Beria was very successful.

By the way, a little about the death rate among prisoners in 1940. Thus, for the White Sea-Baltic ITL, it amounted to approximately 3.8%; in the Amur railway ITL - 2.23%; in Bureinsky ITL - 2.39%, in Southern ITL - 1.01%.

For comparison, let me tell you that even according to official estimates, mortality in the Russian Federation in 2007 was at the level of 1.4%.

Without any Gulag.

Again, for comparison, I will give mortality figures in some countries of the world at the beginning of the new century: the Czech Republic - 1.1%, Greece - 0.95%, Sweden - 0.9%, Japan - 0.75%, North Korea (supposedly dying out according to the assurances of the "democrats") - 0.55%.



9/1-40

Nikolai fell ill with lobar pneumonia, he must be transferred to a hospital in Butyrka! He must be brought to trial without fail, otherwise they will say that he was killed on purpose so that he would not talk his tongue in court. Do not sing

On January 11, 1940, Beria informed Stalin about Yezhov's illness ("pulse - 140 per minute, temperature kept within 39 (°). On January 13, Yezhov was transferred to the hospital of Butyrskaya prison.

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I'm Nicholas. You started well, worked hard. You've been noticed, you've been promoted. Then Poles picked you up, good. You either go and confess, and if you are afraid (So in the text. - S.K.), then slap yourself, also a way out, albeit a bad one. No, I'd rather start drinking. And then the Germans picked up a woman, and he thinks, but anyway, I already give information to the Poles, it's possible for the Germans too.

And so everyone we spin. Everyone was hooked, and they thought that it would cost. Thought they would be the owners. They thought, well, it's true. Stalin is leading the country to destruction, the kulak will be destroyed, but agriculture will not be raised, famine and strikes will begin. And we are right here! Kobe on the hat and become ourselves. Bastards! The most bastard people, if anyone starts to cheat. You think that he is yours, but he has long been an enemy.

Let's cure Nikolay and you can prepare the process!. Everything is already clear, but you still can't stretch all the ends. They sit firmly. Nothing, they sit, they sit, someday they will come out.

Nicholas sheds tears. It's too late to shed tears, dear friend. Comrade Stalin does not believe in tears. He believes only in what you have done.

On January 117, 1940, the Politburo adopted a resolution on the trial of a large group, including Yezhov and Frinovsky. On February 2, 1940, Beria talked with Yezhov, and on February 3, 1940, Yezhov was tried at a closed court session of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, chaired by the invariable Vasily Ulrich (1889-1951),

On February 3, Yezhov appeared before the court, and on February 4, Yezhov, Frinovsky and others were convicted under the law of December 1, 1934, which provided for a simplified procedure for legal proceedings, the absence of an appeal, and the immediate execution of the sentence.

February 6, 1940 Yezhov was shot. Frinovsky was shot on February 8, 1940.

Ezhov's disappearance from the political life of the country did not cause any particular resonance, and there is a simple explanation for this. Firstly, the scale of the repressions of 1937-1938 was not as great as it is presented today. Secondly, Yezhov, as People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, had some popularity among the people, but it was exaggerated - his figure was slyly inflated by various kinds of "PR people" such as journalist Mikhail "Koltsov" - Fridlyand and poster artist Boris "Efimov" - Friedland.

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Serov! and Tsanava? finish the operation on siegemen3. Soon it will be possible to report to Kobe. When the enemy is open, it's easier. He took it and where it is necessary. And when hidden, and you consider it yours, Badly.

It sucks at the front.

The "trials" were closed, no reports were published about them or about the execution of the convicts. And this is also understandable. On the one hand, the repressions carried out by Yezhov's NKVD were basically necessary. On the other hand, they really affected a lot

innocent, which was shown by the rehabilitation process of 1939-1940. Yezhov was guilty of treason and conspiracy, but politically publicizing his end was inappropriate.

13/1-40

At the front, the same mess as it was. What is above, what is below. The fighter is cold and hungry. Combat capability is low. There is not much organization. I've been receiving reports from the Special Sections. I immediately report to Kobe. He's black, don't come near. Klim sometimes cocks, and then keeps quiet. I warned him a long time ago, there was a lot of chatter around the preparations for the Finnish Operation. And so they chatted, both on the phone and in letters. In general, the army

1 Ivan Aleksandrovich Serov (1905-1990), one of the heads of the state security agencies, since September 02, 39 People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR. (See also note 1 to the entry of 27 August 1939)

. Tsanava (Dzhandzhava) Lavrenty Fomich (1900-1955), one of the leaders of the state security agencies, a member of the CPSU (b) since 1920, one of L.P. Beria, since the end of 1938, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Byelorussian SSR. In 1953 he was arrested and in 1955 he died during the investigation (probably committed suicide).

3 For the siegemen, see the commentary to the entry dated November 3, 1939. In total, 146,375 people (27,356 families) were subject to eviction, of which 95,065 people in the Ukrainian SSR and 51,310 people in the BSSR.

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the communication system is not (So in the text. - S.K.) in piz..u. There is no secrecy. They clapped their ears, now we are paying. Fools! Koba correctly says: "Victory without communication is half a victory." So far, we have neither half a victory, nor x..l victory.

But the victory will be where to go.

I'm spinning all the lines.

From London, the British send Poles to the Finns. Also the same army. Or maybe they will fight for strangers better than for themselves. It's always like this with a lackey!

With Kuusinen? nothing worked out and nothing will work out, even if we get better. The internal position of the Finns is strong. All agencies confirm. Also reported to Kobe. That Kuusinen did not leave him, and now does not appear at all. Also an activist. If you are sitting in Moscow, and not underground, then work without fools.

I rely more (So in the text. - S.K.) on my sabotage groups. The guys work well, the Spanish experience came in handy. Koba says, even though yours did not disappoint, thank you.

`In January 1940, the British and French sent the Poles, who served in the British and French armies after the defeat of Poland, as "cannon fodder" to help the Finns against the Soviet troops.

2 Kuusinen Otto Wilhelmovich (1881-1964), Soviet party and statesman, Hero of Socialist Labor (1961), figure is not clear and dark. Finn, graduated from the Helsingfors (Helsinki) University. In 1905-1917 he was an activist in the compromising P International, an ally of Bernstein and Kautsky, then a major figure in the Third Communist International, an ally of Lenin, and a founder of the Communist Party of Finland. At the beginning of the Soviet-Finnish war, he was proclaimed head and minister of foreign affairs of the government of the "Finnish Democratic Republic", on behalf of which he turned to the USSR "for help" and signed the "Mutual Assistance and Friendship Treaty". In fact, he "set up" Stalin, disorienting him regarding the possibility of a "leftist" internal explosion in Finland. Since 1957, after the final Khrushchev anti-party coup,

Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The educator and patron of another unexplained figure is Yu.V. Andropov, as well as many future "foremen of perestroika".

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26/P-40

Finally with the Finns went. The army broke through the first line of defense, now it will break through the second one! So far so good. But in Europe x..evo. They are unlikely to build a united front against us, but there are such thoughts. The White Guards are eager to help the Finns, but they are afraid to accept them, and Europe does not want to. Now he doesn't want to, tomorrow he will. We must hurry. Reported to Kobe that the Allies were preparing an expeditionary force for the Finns. So far, their business with this is going poorly, but the dashing misfortune has begun. It can be brewed (So in the text, perhaps it is necessary to "brew"? - S.K.) porridge. London is starting to think about bombarding Baku. That's where they're aiming. Well, it's them x..y. We won't. And they won't dare. If things go like this, this is a war, and they have a war with the Germans. It turns out that Hitler and I are allies. A this is the end for them.

It would be nice to negotiate with the Germans, but hardly. Koba is afraid, and Hitler is unlikely to want to. And then what? War? Wouldn't want to.

Gradually, my work is getting better. Picked people up for the most part. According to Exploration, it is necessary to keep several lines at once as the main ones.

The east line is also needed. The Kuomintang (correctly "Kuomintang" — S.K.) finally breaks with the Communists and there will also be mess. You need to know what's what.

The Poles have come to their senses and are beginning to organize work against us. This is in addition to Ukrainian nationalists. These are activated too.

: The breakthrough of the first lane of the Mannerheim line lasted from 1! February 23, and the second - from February 28 to February 29, 1940.

2 Here is an illustration for this entry. On February 26, 1940, while illegally crossing the border from Romania to the USSR, the brothers Jozef and Stanislav Zhymersky, emissaries of the Sikorsky government in exile (a pseudonym for illegal immigrants "Strazhnitsa"), were arrested in Narizh. (After the defeat of France, the "government" of Sikorsky moved to London). The brothers had encrypted correspondence with them, which was decrypted only by March 11, 1940 (with the cipher key

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In Europe, one must look after the British in the first place. And in America too. There must be activated.

For the Germans to strengthen intelligence across the border. The border guards will give more than from Berlin!. You have to cross-check. Koba does not believe that there will be no war, but he thinks that the Germans have settled in Europe, they will not be up to us. He says, let the capitalists beat each other in the face, and we will see and strengthen the army.

Now the main thing with the Finns is not to crap again .. to be, according to

turned out to be Adam Mickiewicz's poem "Dzyady"). Among the deciphered documents were, in particular, the Instruction of the "Union of Armed Struggle" No. 1 for authorized persons, orders of the Chief Commandant of the "Union of Armed Struggle" General Sosnovsky (pseudonym "Godzembra") to an illegal colonel Lenkovsky in Lviv and the commandant of the Bialystok district No. 2 of December 29, 1939, etc.

I will give two points from the Instruction of the "Union of Armed Struggle" No. 1 for proxies:

“a) Mandatory political and comradely boycott of the occupiers. Experience up to the present time shows that the Polish people indignantly reject any kind of contact with the occupiers, both German and Bolshevik. Polish families, women, even children, must fence themselves off from robbers with a stone wall of indifference, contempt and hatred...

c) It is not contrary to the interests of the new Poland that Poles will serve in schools, administrative, commercial, industrial, agricultural, forestry, railway, postal and sanitary institutions, insofar as such a situation will enable them to combine the fulfillment of the conditions of work with political obligations. ..”

In fact, paragraph c) of the Instructions sanctioned a broad subversive illegal activity of the Poles - Soviet citizens, on the territory of the USSR. This is despite the fact that if in the German “General Governorship” the Poles were officially citizens of the second, if not third class, then in the USSR they enjoyed all the rights of indigenous citizens of the USSR.

By the way, today's Lithuanians, for example, would do well to know that in their orders, Polish illegal immigrants regarded the transfer of Vilnius by the Soviet Union to Lithuania as a "Lithuanian occupation."

: Intelligence of the border troops, created in its new capacity by L.P. Beria, really provided the most reliable and real-time disclosure of Germany's military preparations against the USSR in 1941, which allowed Stalin to sanction bringing the troops of the border districts to combat readiness by June 18, 1941.

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volume will be easier. Koba sees that it is necessary to strengthen the Army and Industry. There is also wrecking and we have already talked with Koba, we need to think about it!.

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev.

Here, most likely, we have in mind the improvement and expansion of the activities of the Main Economic Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR (GEM). This was one of the outstanding ideas of Beria and Stalin, who made the new Main Directorate of the NKVD actually a control structure for obtaining objective information about the situation in the national economy of the USSR. Party and economic leaders could gloss over and embellish reality, and the GEM was obliged to give ( and gave!) a true picture. At the same time, the GEM was supposed to identify and neutralize deliberate sabotage in the economy and poor organization of work. Accordingly, the GEM had departments for industry, for the defense industry, for agriculture, for Goznak and refineries, for the aviation industry and for the fuel industry.

laziness.

Unlike the Gulag and the industrial directorates of the NKVD of the USSR, the GEM did not conduct economic activities, it only controlled it throughout the country. Of course, the state security agencies have always been doing this. As early as January 11, 1923, the Collegium of the GPU approved the regulation on the economic management of the GPU, whose tasks were, firstly, “the fight against economic counter-revolution, economic espionage and crimes – official and economic”, and secondly, “assistance to the economic People's Commissariats in identifying and eliminating defects in their work”.

However, in the OGPU and then the NKVD of Yagoda, this side of the activity was in the pen - Yagoda was more occupied with conspiracies of the Bonapartist persuasion. The economic department has shrunk to the Economic Department (ECO) of the GUGB,

1 See comment below.

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With Yezhov joining the NKVD, even the ECO GUGB was disbanded.

Beria, already during the first reform of the NKVD at the end of 1938, immediately introduced into the new structure of the People's Commissariat not just a department, but the Main Directorate - the GEM. And now the work of the GEM in the NKVD of Beria was reaching a new, more perfect level. To do this, the staff of the GEM was not staffed with "animal-like executioners with a revolver on their belts", as it is portrayed today, but, on the one hand, qualified and, on the other hand, quite politically reliable personnel. The GEM technical experts were now able not only to reveal sabotage, negligence, low professional qualifications or weak technological discipline in the economy, but also to issue competent recommendations for correcting and improving the situation.

Even before that, Beria, thanks to the experience of party and state work in the Transcaucasus and Georgia, had a broad economic outlook and was able to quickly master new subjects of his concern. I think, however, that L.P. Beria as a brilliant expert on the problems of the national economy and led to his rapid involvement by Stalin in the leadership of nationwide socialist construction as Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (SNK) of the USSR.

16 LI-40

Signed the order for Dalstroy!. There is a Decree of the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars and it is possible to decisively reorganize the work. Last year, my hands didn't reach, we didn't fulfill the plan for gold ?, but what about the end

1 February 16, 1940 L.P. Beria signed the order of the NKVD No. 069 "On ensuring the plan for gold and tin mining in Dalstroy for 1940" on the basis of the corresponding Decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of February 10, 1940. See also the entry of March 5, 1939, and notes to it.

2 The 1939 gold mining plan was fulfilled by 84% (66.3 tons). In 1940, 80 tons were mined  
gold.

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ratu (So in the text, but this is clearly a typo. - S.K.) tin was overfulfilled, it means little. The absolute volume is small!!.

A large flood interfered with gold, but the main thing is poorly organized work and low mechanization. And it is necessary to strengthen geological exploration. It all depends on how you organize. You also need to know how to ask. It is necessary not with an outstretched hand, but justify. Then you can give. Supply also needs to be organized.

8/Sh-40

We will end the war soon, it's okay, we've recovered. The Military Theater was difficult, so the study was good, let the military and Koba figure it out. Our business is to catch traitors, not to break through the lines of defense and restore order in the army. They pointed to the mess, and straighten it there.

But all the same, my border guards had to fight pretty much, I said that to Klim at Kobe ?. The business of the Border Troops was to guard the border, and they went on the attack for the infantry. That's not the point. Klim looked sour?. A Koba

1 The 1939 plan for tin mining was fulfilled by 102%. At the same time, 507 tons of tin were mined in 1939, and 1917 tons in 1940.

In the late evening of March 7, 1940, Beria reported to Stalin in the presence of only Molotov and Voroshilov (at the end of the conversation, Shaposhnikov and Vasilevsky came up to Stalin's office). Beria had every reason to be dissatisfied with the command line of the Red Army in relation to

border guards. The army command, under the operational subordination of which the border troops in the combat zone passed, instead of using border guards in reconnaissance, outposts, etc., often used them in the offensive as infantry due to their high fighting qualities. At the same time, the border guards, of course, suffered heavy losses.

In addition to Note 2, I will inform you that on September 14, 1939, that is, before the outbreak of hostilities, the joint directive of the People's Commissar of Defense Voroshilov and the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of Beria No. Red Army to the line of 30-50 km deep into the Finnish territory.

By mid-December, many units of the 9th Army reached this line, but the military commanders still demanded that they be allocated to support units of the border troops. AND ended up being

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agreed. I said that for the war it is necessary not only to reward the army. Narkomvnucl also fought. He said, prepare, we will reward!

I'm already an old man, already bald, but I don't understand. Why do people not want to work when there is so much work. Who prevented Nikolai from working, who prevented Bukharin from working.

And why were both remembered, he did not understand? And, they are both Nikolai Ivanovich? Bukharin Anna? he twisted his head, the old fuck ... r and was generally a womanizer. Didn't feel sorry for the girl, you bastard. Well, to hell with you, I didn't spare myself, but why the girl, she's good enough for your daughter. Well, okay, I could not resist, but why did you get into the conspiracy. Everyone thinks that they are smart, that where is Koba, I myself am no worse than Koba. And they also shoot down, so it's not children anymore, but older ones. How much the same Nikolai Ivanovich turned the brains of young workers. And then you have to shoot them." Did you find an academician too, collecting butterflies?

On December 17, 1939, Colonel Kiselev, Chief of Staff of the NKVD Border Troops of the Karelian District, sent a report to the headquarters of the 9th Army, in which he tactfully but firmly reminded the army generals that the business of the Border Troops is to protect the state border, and not to break through a heavily fortified defense.

On April 118, 1940, Beria sent a note to Stalin with a draft Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on awarding 382 orders and 375 medals to the most distinguished workers of the NKVD bodies and troops,

2 It is clear from the entry that Nikolay means N.I. Yezhov.

Bukharin's third (!) wife, Anna Larina-Bukharin (1913-1996), was 25 years younger than her first husband, Nikolai Ivanovich Bukharin (1888-1939).

"NI. Bukharin was considered (generally unreasonably) the leading theoretician of the party and was one of the founders of the Institute of Red Professors, where he taught. This institute became a genuine nursery for young "leftists" in the leadership of the CPSU (b), who were almost completely shot in 1937 - 1938 for very real anti-party and anti-state activities.

EV 1929 NI. Bukharin was elected a member of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Indeed, he collected butterflies all his life - quite a suitable occupation for a statesman of a great power emerging before his eyes (but not very much with his participation).

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And Trotsky. This one is still shaking my head. How many people went to execution because of him. And he writes that Stalin is a bloody executioner.

The war has shown that we are up to x..I'm a dumbass..and there are even more heroes and honest people. So if you have been given power, then you rely on people and be a person yourself. Everywhere things - just work and work. It was bad, it became good. Is it bad? No, he needs him to be in charge, Koba is not an order for him, we can do it ourselves. Evdokimov persuaded everything, they would destroy the kulak, but they would not raise agriculture. He said that it was necessary to overthrow Stalin.

And we threw you, mud..ka x..eva, and raised the village. And the country was raised. Well, why are they dangling underfoot.

Want power. They don't know how to work, they speak their language, but they don't want to give up power. And they don't want to work. And it is necessary from morning to evening, and take the night. Because there is a lot to do and not enough time. If everyone worked, then there would be no such embarrassment with the Finns. We had everything at once, we didn't have one, reliable leadership. We had to get ready, but they didn't even prepare the skis ahead of time.

Shoot those, so new ones will appear. So what to do? You can't live without new people. You can't change the old, you have to build on the new.

Something drew me to philosophy, that's enough.

15/Sh-40

Koba says that intelligence should be actively involved in political sounding operations. He says that now the era of imperialist conflicts has begun again and we must use all the contradictions in our favor. Here they are already fighting against each other, weakly so far, but let it drag on. And we will strengthen. And we'll see.

He says that it did not work out with the Finns, because the Finns lived under the Swedes for a long time and learned national unity. Therefore, the revolution is not half

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it was planned to Sovietize Finland, and now. Lenin agreed to recognize the independence of Finland, and the Germans ensured the independence of the Baltic States with a bayonet. Now there are puppets. They smile at us through their teeth, the Germans and the British are closer to them. Or the Americans.

Then he says, "We need to think about Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania. It's easier with them, our troops are already there. You don't have to touch it yet, but you have to keep your finger on the pulse. He says it's Lavrenty on your line. We must know what they breathe and where they look. We must not miss the moment when we need to act decisively."

He sighed and said: "Here Ilyich was a master. Accurately chose the moment and hit. We have science."

I reminded them that they were whispering to each other. Lithuanians went to Berlin, their military confer!. He says "I remember. That's why I'm telling you, watch out. So that we have an accurate picture."

I sit and think. Need to orientate Vsevolod?, Pavlaz and Fitin\*. Let them think and develop too. I need to talk to Vladimir.

The Germans are preparing an offensive in the spring, and what is left for them

Sy. commentary after entry dated June 15, 1940. 2 Head of the GUGB VN. Merkulov.

ÿ Most likely, this refers to Pavel Anatolyevich Sudoplatov (1907-1996), one of the leaders of the state security agencies and Soviet intelligence, lieutenant general (1945). On May 23, 1938, he liquidated the pro-German Ukrainian nationalist leader Konovalts in Rotterdam, and developed the operation to liquidate Trotsky. In 1939-1941 - Deputy Head of the Department of the GUGB of the USSR.

\*Fitin Pavel Mikhailovich (1907-1971), one of the heads of state security and Soviet intelligence agencies, lieutenant general (1945). In March 1938 he was transferred to the bodies of the NKVD of the USSR according to the party recruitment. Since the spring of 1939, he was the head of the 5th (intelligence) department of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR.

n Most likely, this refers to Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.G. Dekanozov, nominee L.P. Beria.

6 This refers to the future offensive of the Wehrmacht in the spring of 1940 in France.

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there is. They need to decide something. The British are going to mine the coastal strip along Norway, so Hitler needs to move. We must wait for events. We are still quiet, but we also have suspicions. A German plane flew in from Poland. It seems to be lost and malfunctions in the motor. Maybe so. Koba asks: "how, let go?"

I say let the crew go, and let the plane first be studied, maybe something will come in handy. Well, they said that there are problems, so we will repair it, and then we will give it back. So we decided.

Koba asks, "Accidental or not?" Vasilevsky! says it's a coincidence. And Koba says: "If an accident has a political connotation, it does not hurt to take a closer look at it." And looks at me.

Should it be taken into account?

18/101-40

Didn't have time to deal with one plane? A whole group flew in." Yesterday I reported to Koba alone. I summoned Klim and Molotov in my presence. The case is more serious, then the crew was returned, and now there is one corpse and probably there will be a second one. Koba is worried and I don't understand. Are they going to fight with us? What are they, fools? Hardly.

Vasilevsky Alexander Mikhailovich (1895-1977), Soviet military leader, Marshal of the Soviet Union (1943), in 1940, Deputy Chief of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army.

h The question of the fate of the crew and the aircraft that violated the state border of the USSR was considered by the Politburo on the night of March 14-15, 1940.

3 See previous entry, March 15, 1940.

On March 217, 1940, 32 German aircraft (bombers and reconnaissance aircraft) violated the border in the area of the Bialystok ledge in the Strenkovizna area. They flew to the city of Augustow (now in Poland), made a circle and went back. The border detachment in the area of the Shcherba trees opened rifle and machine-gun fire at the violators. One plane was shot down and crashed on our territory 50 meters from the border. One pilot was killed and the other seriously wounded. This was the twelfth case since December 1939 of an air violation of the border.

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20/-40

Everything, there is a second corpse! Maslennikov? reports that there were issues with the transfer of corpses and the signing of an act of violation. Then the border commissioner apologized and verbally stated that there would be no more such violations by Germany. And yesterday, again, 5 aircraft violated the Ukrainian section of the border. Some bullshit. And it's just that violators cross the border, both in the Belarusian sector and in the Ukrainian one. This needs to be thought about.



25/Sh-40

Just from Koba. We discussed the situation. The Germans are actively violating our border, and the most disturbing, they are constantly violating with aircraft. Unclear. According to our information, the Germans are not going to stop the war with the Allies and the Allies are not going to stop the war with the Germans. This means that in the spring or summer of 1940 we must expect active actions, on the one hand, or both. Then it is dangerous for Hitler to start a war with us. And they are acting hostile.

Unclear. Fight on two fronts only fools

s The co-pilot of the plane shot down on March 17, 1940, was taken to the Augustow hospital and died on March 18, 1940 at 2.15 Moscow time.

2 Maslennikov Ivan Ivanovich (1900-1954), one of the leaders of the border troops of the NKVD of the USSR and commander, general of the army, Hero of the Soviet Union. In 1932 he served as head of the combat training department of the Border Guard Department of the NKVD of Georgia. From January 21, 1939 - First Deputy People's Commissar of the NKVD of the USSR, with the outbreak of war - at the front, commanded armies, fronts, hero of the battles for Moscow and the Caucasus.

On March 19, 1940, 5 German planes violated the border near the city of Yaroslav at an altitude of 500 m. Volzarks Kobylnitsa and Bukovina. All pilots were non-commissioned officers, armed with revolvers. The landing was explained by the loss of orientation in the training flight and the complete consumption of fuel.

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are asking. And if they close the Western Front, will they come to an agreement? And the Finns will be connected. And then they will come at us. And if the British go to us. And the Turks. And the Japanese will add?

Koba breaks his head. I told Kobe that according to the border intelligence, there was no concentration of troops yet. Koba says that spring has just begun, they can be transferred by summer. So watch both. Keep an eye out and keep your eyes peeled. And on the Japanese border too.

I said that on the Japanese border, the usual incidents, as always, are trifles. He said that I think that the Germans still fly in unintentionally, the border is new and the terrain is new for them, you can't paint the border with white paint from above, that's why they fly in.

Koba, Klim, Molotov and I were sitting. We decided that we would not open fire on the violators further, we would protest to the border authorities. Koba said that if they violate so massively, then they are looking for provocations. And we don't need it!

Then the soldiers came. The military always pisses me off. They didn't have time to end the war, they make strategists out of themselves. And what to tear up the nose. They say we won the war. You missed it..li, and only then won. Previously, I had less to do, but in these four months I have seen and heard enough. They crawl on the cards, comrade Stalin, comrade Stalin, but they fought x..evo.

It will be necessary to firmly order Vsevolod and Pavel that no extra shur-murs be carried out with military intelligence. And it was like a passage yard, INO, Intelligence Agency, those there, those here.

On March 129, 1940, an order was issued by the NKVD of the USSR that in cases of violation of our border by German aircraft, do not open fire, limiting ourselves to drawing up an act on violation of the border and immediately protest to representatives of the German command through the border service.

2 See notes 1, 2 and 3 to the entry of March 15, 1940.

3 The description of the relationship between the INO OGPU-NKVD and the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army in the 20s and 30s is very accurate.

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And they couldn't even explore the fortifications, our guys did their best, and the Intelligence Agency caught the raven and cleaned boots.

4 /1U-40

We must prepare for the exchange of prisoners. We have about 800 Finns. According to the Special Departments, up to 5,000 people were taken prisoner! It's a lot. The wise men from the General Staff want to be placed in the barracks in Novgorod, without an escort. And there is little space. Where are they? And how to conduct filtering. The fact that the Finns processed them is clear. And it's good if the Finns. Everyone worked there, are they fools? Skip this case. Here even the Americans could settle down.

Filtration must be done properly. I will ask Koba to place our prisoners in the Yuzhsky camp of the NKVD near Vyazniki upon the return of our prisoners. For filtration. The camp is big enough for everyone. Let's check who is worthy, let us go, who got dirty, will we have to work in Kolyma?

1 Exact figure: 4,904 Red Army men and 378 commanding officers, of which 72 voluntarily surrendered and 166 were members of an anti-Soviet volunteer detachment. (By July 1940, the figure had changed somewhat, in the Yuzhsky camp there were 5175 Red Army soldiers and 293 commanding officers).

2 The statistics of repressions on prisoners turned out to be the following. Operational Chekist groups identified and arrested 665 people exposed in active treacherous work, recruited by Finnish intelligence to work in the USSR or suspected of espionage. Of this number, by the end of July 1940, the prosecutor of the Moscow Military District completed and transferred investigation cases for 344 people to the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, of which 232 people were sentenced to death (the sentence was carried out against 158 people) . 4354 former prisoners of war, suspicious for the circumstances of captivity and behavior in captivity, by the decision of the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR were sentenced to imprisonment in labor camps for a period of 5 to 8 years.

450 former prisoners of war, who were taken prisoner being wounded, sick or frostbitten, were released and transferred from the NKVD to the People's Commissariat of Defense.

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8/1U-40

We must secure new HF lines! to the western regions to the Ukraine and Belarus, and now we still need to go to Vyborg and to the north. We need a reliable connection to Petrozavodsk, to Sortvala. We will pull, new worries, but it's better this way. New worries because new territories. What's bad?

18 /TU-40

The military, as they were dolbo .. bami, remained. Maslennikov reported that they had not canceled the January order? and we were not informed. Here we try not to provoke the Germans, but they keep their order in force. And we don't know that.

Did they want to fight the Germans? Thank you, we have already fought with the Finns. If they were so brave, they would have taken it themselves to the Germans in response a couple of times. The border guards can't, but the army could.

The Japanese are conducting the usual provocations, planes also fly in, but these are not Germans. The Germans fly in constantly. Every time they say they are lost. Most think it's true. But intelligence too

lead, of course.

In general, there is alarm everywhere on the entire border: the Hungarians are throwing up troops, the Lithuanians are also fortifying the border. Even the Finns go to provocations.

1 See commentary on 26 July 1940 entry.

On January 220, 1940, the command of the Red Army issued an order to immediately open fire in case of violation of the state border by aircraft. This order was developed on the basis of an action plan sanctioned by the head of the Operational Department of the General Staff of the Red Army, brigade commander Vasilevsky.

3 A very unorthodox idea. I wonder if L.P. Beria to Stalin and the army team something like that?

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In Europe, too, moved. The Germans will not leave Norway!. The good thing is that they started a real fight with the British, now they won't go at us.

26 /TU-40

Koba congratulated on the Decree?, said that the Border Guards would continue to be awarded, well done. He asks, what, the Germans all fly in? I say fly. They are already swimming. Laughs: "I know"? 3.

He says it's okay when singles fly in or swim by mistake. If only divisions did not enter the ground. Then he asks Vyacheslav: "How long has Comrade Molotov complained to Comrade Ribbentrop about violations of the border? It's time to complain."

He asks how the border is along the entire length? He reported that with Japan, as always, on the Afghan border there are constant clashes with small gangs, the Turks are building fortifications and are also dependent on petty provocations, on the western border they are disturbing

On April 9, 1940, Germany entered Denmark and Norway. Denmark offered no resistance and actually retained all the attributes of independence, including diplomatic relations with other countries, including Germany itself and the USSR. Norway, counting on England, began military operations. On April 14, 1940, Anglo-French troops began landing in Norway. Even before the German invasion of Norway, the British began mining Norwegian territorial waters, which were used by the Germans to transport iron and nickel ore from Sweden. The German operation in Norway and Denmark was thus an operation in advance of the British, who also intended to send troops to Norway and, possibly, to Denmark and Holland.

On April 26, 1940, the Decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR were published on awarding the border units of the NKVD (the 4th, 5th, 6th regiments of the NKVD and the 73rd Rebofsky border detachment) with the Order of the Red Banner and on conferring the title of Hero of the Soviet Union to the commander and the rank and file of the border troops of the NKVD. According to the latest Decree, 13 people were awarded, including 4 Red Army soldiers, 7 lieutenants and senior lieutenants, one captain and one battalion commissar. As you can see, it was not customary in the NKVD for Beria to drag high officials into award decrees.

On April 321, 1940, German minesweepers violated the Soviet maritime border in the Murmansk Zoon District. They were fired upon by the frontier post, detained and escorted to Murmansk.

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rebel bands of the OUN!, the Lithuanians are behaving unfriendly. And as always, without much incident.

Said, "Good."

Then he added, we will soon add worries to you, we will cut the borders even more. He looked at Vyacheslav and asked: Shall we cut it? He nods.

Where will he cut? Do you understand where?

5/U 40

The stupid man Voznesensky Carries himself like a bag of shit..m. I rarely encountered him, but others do not like him either. Koba appreciates, but he did not seem to me. We were deciding on new airfields, Frenkel sensibly reported, Koba asks questions, the guys answer. And this one sits like a turkey. And when they asked how the State Planning Commission would react if we were ready to intensify construction, they immediately began to fuss. He says it needs to be worked on.

Well, work on it, and we'll work on it.

1 OUN - "Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists", created from

"Ukrainian military organization" (UVO) with a center in Berlin. The first leader was a former Austro-German soldier, colonel of the Petliura army Konovalts. After the liquidation of Konovalts in 1938, P. Sudoplatov became the head of the OUN, Colonel of the Petliur army Andrei Melnik (nickname in the Abwehr "Consul-1"). In 1940, the OUN split into "Melnikovites", led by Melnik, and "Banderaites", led by Stepan Bandera. The latter had a demonstrative surname - back in the early 60s, "Bandera" in Ukrainian villages was called the most inveterate hooligans and bandits.

2 Knowing the situation at that time as Beria knew it, it was not difficult to guess that this meant primarily the Lithuanian-German border, which had already been guarded by Soviet border guards since June 22, 1940.

3 Voznesensky Nikolai Alexandrovich (1903-1950), from January 1938 Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR. The figure is quite large, but very ambiguous. Shot in 1950.

See also the afterword of the publisher.

\* Frenkel Naftaliy Aronovich (1883-1960), head of the Main Directorate of Railway Construction of the NKVD of the USSR. GUZhDS in 1940 was also engaged in the construction of new airfields in the western regions of the USSR.

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14/U 40

One to one. Our generals became uniformed generals!, and the Germans hit?. They have already broken through the front, God forbid, they are advancing in winter. Of course, it's easy there, there are no Mannerheim lines (or rather, "Mannerheim" - S.K.), and they bypassed the Maginot line\*. That's right, why shed blood in vain.

Koba sits with marshals and generals. He doesn't call me yet, I'm already up to my neck. No one expected the French to collapse so quickly. According to intelligence data, it was clear that the situation there was rotten, the intelligentsia were ready to surrender without a war. Well, okay, this cf..n everywhere cf..n.

I respect those who are not lackeys. And the French have half the lackeys. And even more. But the army seemed to be well prepared there. Not Poles. And it turned out like the Poles. And it is not clear how it will end.

Wehrmacht rushing to La Manche and to Paris. In England, Churchill is now at the head of the government (So in the text. — S.K.). This is the strengthening of supporters of the long war. Until I understand, it's better or worse for us. If there is a war, it's easier for us. But if the war drags on, we might be drawn in. And this

Badly.

On May 7, 1940, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was issued on the establishment of general and admiral ranks for the highest commanding staff of the Red Army and the Red Army Fleet.

On May 10, 1940, the long-awaited German offensive began.

3 Already on May 13, the front was broken through in the area of the Meuse River, on May 14 Holland capitulated, on May 17 Brussels was occupied. The first stage of France's agony began, accompanied by sabotage of joint operations by the command of the British Expeditionary Force in France.

s The French Maginot Line stretched along the Franco-German border to Belgium. The Wehrmacht did not storm the Maginot Line, but simply bypassed it through the territory of Belgium. The decision is not only reasonable, but also expected in advance by the allies.

On May 10, 1940, the government of Neville Chamberlain resigned and a "war cabinet" was formed by Winston Churchill, a protege of the cosmopolitan elite and a creature of the United States.

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28/U 40

It smells like gunpowder. The Germans will finish off France, this is already clear. Now their zone of influence is all of Europe up to our border. Italy can hardly carry out an independent policy. The Turks are not clear.

The Balkans are considered pro-Russian, but in fact they are pro-English. Koba hopes for the Slavs, but in vain. In Belgrade they love Russians, but they will do what London says. I know English well. They know how to influence.

Sokolov! reported that since May 28, there has been a transfer of Hungarian troops to the border with forces of up to 8,000 per day with artillery and tanks. Reported to Koba, he said: "Watch until they reach them. The Hungarians will not turn up."

For two days on May 24 and 25, 12 cases of border violations by German aircraft were registered. They don't fly far, hardly reconnaissance. Although you can see far from above, and the weather is good.

The development of recruited prisoners shows interesting things. Finnish intelligence officers offered to go to study in America. So the Finns became insolent for a reason. America needs war. This means that the American intelligence line must be strengthened and strengthened.

In Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, the authorities are reinforced by fascist nationalist organizations. Especially in Lithuania, counting on the Germans. And they whisper with each other, I sent a report to Vyacheslav (V.M. Molotov. — S.K.), let him also think<sup>2</sup>.

ÿ1/ÿ 40 Visited Koba for new ore developments in the North. Then we talked about the general situation. By

1 Sokolov Grigory Grigoryevich (1904-1973), head of the Main Directorate of the Border Troops of the NKVD of the USSR. The figure is silent. After the start of the war, he was the head of the rear guard of the Western Front, from September to October 1941, the deputy chief of the General Staff, commanded the 26th Army, which he formed.

2 See comment after entry of 15 June 1940.

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asked for details. He reported it as it is, it is clear that the success of the Germans worries him greatly. He says they didn't think, didn't think.

He reported on Lithuania and asked: "Does Comrade Molotov know?" I say that I have known for a long time, Vyacheslav confirmed.

Zhdanov said that the situation in the Baltic states must be resolved while the Germans are busy in the west. He says that the Estonians have also revived, they are hoping for something (So in the text. - S.K.)

He said that he agreed with Zhdanov. All data for the fact that they all think that now the Germans will be a force in Europe and they are counting on them. And they begin to lead a common line with each other. Conduct consultations.

Koba said that we will discuss this issue!

4/U1 40

Did you speak with Koba according to Frenkel's report? Naftala wrote briefly and convincingly. Lists presented, I will report to Koba. It is good to submit lists for awards, and not for execution. Ah, to hell!

We built a lot. For 7 years, more than 5,000 kilometers of tracks, this is not a joke. I will ask Koba to reward him well.

1 See comment after entry of 15 June 1940.

On June 4, 1940, the head of the Main Directorate of Railway Construction of the NKVD of the USSR N.A. Frenkel presented the people's commissar with a note on the construction of new railways with an appendix compiled at the direction of the people's commissar of the lists of workers "deserving government awards."

On July 20, 1940, 668 workers of railway construction were awarded by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR "for the successful fulfillment of the tasks of the Government for the construction of second tracks and new railways in the Far East". The Order of Lenin was received by 9 people, the Red Banner of Labor - 33 people, the "Badge of Honor" - 108 people.

See also entry dated January 4, 1940. Beria not only knew how to organize the work, but also to encourage for it. Moreover, he put the question in such a way that the award is not only an expression of gratitude and merit, but also an expression of the hope of the management for even better work in the future.

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Frenkel must also be introduced!

Again there were conversations about Lithuania. We looked at the demarcation maps, if you go to a new border, you need to know where to go.

10/%1 40

Have you approved Paul's translation? in the GEM ", In the Investigative Unit, he was not in place. The operative is weak and the investigation is sluggish, there is no pressure. And in the GEM he will be in place. Reliable guy, that's already change.

15 / UI 40

Koba made the final decision on Lithuania and the Baltics. He said, like it or not, but you need to sovietize. He said that no one thought that the Germans were so strong. Poland was beaten, now France was beaten, the British were beaten, and immediately the situation changed. Co-

July 120, 1940 N.A. Frenkel, among others, received the Order of Lenin.

2 See comment after entry of 15 June 1940.

3 Comparison of the dates and the meaning of the entry shows what is meant by Pavel Yakovlevich Meshik (1910 - 23.12.53), the future colleague of L.P. Beria for work in the NKVD of the USSR and then in the Soviet Atomic Project. He studied at the Samara Energy Institute, in 1932 he was transferred to the bodies of the OGPU and graduated from the Higher School of the OGPU in 1933.

January 1, 1939 P.Ya. By order of the NKVD, Meshik was appointed assistant head of the Investigative Unit of the NKVD (its creation was one of the rational points of Beria's reform carried out in the NKVD). On June 10, 1940, by the Decree of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Meshik was approved as the head of the 1st department (industrial and food people's commissariats) of the Main Economic Department of the NKVD of the USSR.

5 See comment below.

\$ By mid-June 1940, the defeat of France and the British expeditionary corps on the continent had become a fact. On June 4, the evacuation of the British Expeditionary Forces from Dunkirk was completed, on June 10 - from Norway, on June 12, Paris was declared an "open city", and on June 14, 1940, the Germans entered the capital of France. The official surrender of France was signed on June 22, 1940.

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where they needed us, the Germans were limitrophes! gave way, and now they can incite them and we can lose the Baltic States. And now we have pacts, troops are there, we will get good support from the population, this is not Finland.

Vyacheslav (V.M. Molotov. - S.K.) did a lot of preparation, the Lithuanians scrambled and the rest too. So everything should go well. This will help us a lot.

I have a lot of work to do again, especially in Latvia and Estonia, many White Guards have settled and there are enough local bastards. You can't leave, you will also have to relocate. But here it is necessary to do it carefully, not immediately. There is no such strong underground as the OUN. The OUN also worked under the Poles, there is a lot of experience there. And here the nationalists sit in the government, they are not accustomed to the underground.

So first we will study, and then we will decide.

It is necessary to prepare for the reception of the Lithuanian border under protection.

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev.

In 1940, the situation in the Baltic states for the USSR - with all our apparent success here - complicated.

On the one hand, in the fall of 1939, alliance pacts were concluded with all three Baltic republics - treaties on mutual assistance. On the territory of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, Soviet military, naval and air bases were created and Soviet troops were stationed: up to 25,000 people in Estonia, up to 20,000 people in Lithuania, and up to 25,000 people in Latvia. That is, the Soviet influence in the Baltic States at the end of 1939 increased dramatically in a matter of weeks.

On the other hand, already in December 1939, a secret conference of Baltic foreign ministers was held.

ÿ Limitrophes (from the Latin ltiogous - "border") - the common name of the states of the so-called cordon sanitaire formed by the USA, England and France around the USSR, then

there are Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland and Finland.

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cases, and in March 1940 - the second. By 1940, the general staffs of the armies of the Baltic states had developed joint operational plans. At the same time, it was clear that the Balts could open military operations against the USSR only together with Germany, because the calculation on the Finns did not materialize.

The most active was Lithuania, which had a common border with Germany. At the end of February 1940, Director of the State Security Department of the Ministry of the Interior A. Povilaitis, an emissary of the Lithuanian dictator Smetona, left for Berlin. The Lithuanians asked Hitler for political support up to the establishment of a German protectorate over Lithuania.

We knew about all this, of course.

But the Lithuanians, by the way, even then did not remember that under the Soviet-Lithuanian pact of 1939, the USSR transferred the city of Vilna (Vilnius) and the Vilna region to Lithuania, which was annexed from Lithuania by Poland in the 20s. But the Germans in 1939 torn away (with NATO, however, grounds) from Lithuania Memel (Klaipeda) and the Memel region, transferred to Lithuania by the Anglo-French Entente.

In response to the requests of Povilaitis, the Germans were evasive and promised to think about supporting Lithuania in the autumn of 1940, after the end of the campaign in the West. However, in the winter of 1940, the Germans themselves did not count on that deafening and rapid defeat of France, which became a fact by mid-June 1940. Now the Germans could really try to turn the Baltic situation in their favor - while the limitrophe republics were still legally independent. Formally, the Limitrophs could terminate the pacts with the USSR and at the same time "hand over the fate of their peoples into the hands of the Führer of the German people" — as did the Czechoslovak President Gakha, legitimately elected by the Czechs and Slovaks, on behalf of the Czechs.

The likelihood of such a development of events was small, but it existed. Stalin and his "team", including Beria, understood all this very well. And the Baltic pro-Western and pro-German circles behaved more and more

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unbridled. In Lithuania, it came to the abduction and murder of Soviet servicemen. The bourgeois circles of the three republics went for broke. They understood perfectly well that there was only one option for them to save their privileges and capital - to pass under the arm of Germany. And this could happen only with the extreme aggravation of Soviet-German relations UP TO THE WAR.

The provocative policy of the Baltic elite and the huge successes of the Germans in Europe left the USSR no choice. The point of no return here was, perhaps, two events: the entry of the Germans into Paris on June 14, 1940, and the anti-Soviet and pro-German "Baltic Week" scheduled for June 15 in Latvia and Estonia.

June 14 People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V.M. Molotov sent a circular to the plenipotentiaries of the USSR in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Finland on the attitude of the Soviet government to the situation.

Part of it is given below:

"After Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania signed pacts of mutual assistance with the USSR, the Baltic Entente, whose members, Latvia and Estonia, had previously been bound by a military alliance against the USSR, not only did not liquidate, but intensified the hostile USSR ... activity, including to a military alliance and Lithuania ...



<...>

In general, starting from December 1939, the Entente developed an exceptional activity, never before observed in the past, and in all possible directions - military, political, economic, cultural, press, tourism, etc. All these activities, both in large and secondary areas, were and are in fact anti-Soviet in nature.

In the Baltic Entente, military measures secretly agreed upon from the USSR have intensified in recent months... Estonia has appointed a military attaché to Lithuania, and Lithuania to Estonia. In November-December 1939, reciprocal trips of the chiefs of staff of Lithuania and Latvia took place... Since February 1940, the press organ of the Baltic Entente, Review Baltic, began to appear in Tallinn in English, French and German...» etc. .

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On June 15, the Baltic authorities scheduled the holding of the "Baltic Week" with a clear anti-Soviet orientation. The police began arrests of citizens loyal to the USSR.

The day before, on June 14, 1940, Molotov talked with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania, Urbshis. The current inhabitants of the official Kremlin would do well to read the recording of this conversation, and the rest of their fellow citizens too - this is a good document on Russian geopolitics. Molotov demanded from Urbshis the creation of a new Lithuanian government friendly to the USSR. The "proud" Balt was bustling like a scalded man and agreed to everything.

The same line was occupied with respect to the other two limitrophes.

On June 15, 1940, Lithuania agreed to the Soviet demands.

June 16 - Latvia.

June 17 - Estonia.

And the process started.

To control the fulfillment of the new obligations of the Baltic governments, Molotov's deputy Vladimir Dekanozov went to Lithuania, Molotov's deputy Andrei Vyshinsky to Latvia, and Andrei Zhdanov, secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, to Estonia. In Vilnius, Riga and Tallinn, the Soviet version of the "Baltic week" began: demonstrations of working people demanding the resignation of bourgeois governments.

The demonstrations were immediately followed by the resignations of the old "governments" and the formation of new.

On June 17, 1940, a government agreed with Dekanozov headed by J. Paleckis was created in Lithuania.

On June 20, 1940, a government agreed with Vyshinsky was created in Latvia, headed by Professor A. Kirkhenshtein.

On June 21, 1940, a government agreed with Zhdanov was created in Estonia, headed by the poet I. Vares.

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On July 14 and 15, 1940, elections were held for the People's Seimas of Lithuania and Latvia and the State Duma of Estonia.

On July 21, the newly elected Baltic parliaments proclaimed Soviet power and appealed to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR with a request to admit the three republics into the USSR.

At the seventh session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, held from 3 to August 1940, the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian SSRs were admitted to the USSR.

By the way, this story can, in principle, be repeated - if the current Russian Federation decides to re-proclaim Soviet power. Atam - dashing trouble is the beginning.

The restoration of Soviet power in the Baltics immediately defused possible tensions. Of course, Berlin was not happy about this. But the temptation disappeared, which meant that the possibility of conflict disappeared as early as 1940.

22/71 40

Reported to Koba that the border was occupied!. Everything is going smoothly. And there you will see.

29/UT 40

Yesterday at Koba's, the Politburo discussed the Baltic affairs. Satisfied, he says, now it's up to new elections and we accept them into the Union.

On June 122, 1940, the border of Lithuania with Germany was taken under the protection of the border troops of the NKVD of the USSR. The temporary instructions for the protection of the new border dated June 22, 1940, signed by the Head of the Border Troops of the NKVD of the USSR, Lieutenant General Sokolov and the Head of the Political Directorate of the Border Troops of the NKVD of the USSR, Divisional Commissar Mironenko, said:

"..Organize a reliable defense of units and headquarters. Draw up defense plans and work them out with personnel...

Ensure high combat and political training of the border guards and be ready to repel a possible surprise attack by fascist Germany ... "

The last phrase proves, among other things, that L.P. Beria oriented his subordinate (that is, border) troops to a possible surprise attack by Germany already a year before the war.

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He said, Comrade Beria, it is necessary to work out with Comrade Molotov what concerns you.  
together.

With Bessarabia, too, went like clockwork!. But work is added.

10/UP 40

Koba constantly confers with the military. It is clear that there will be no war this year, but this does not mean anything, time can already be considered military. There are queues in Moscow, nothing helps, there are a lot of speculators. It is necessary to transfer cases to the Special Conference and send or to the camps.

Klim seems to be out of work, complaining that there is little work?. But Koba promises to give him a plot. He will not pull the economy, he now has more work to do as an inspector or agitator. The people love him, he will cheer him up there, scold him there, but it will be useful. But that's Koba's business.

I think things are getting better for us now. Narcos

On June 26, 1940, the Soviet Union sent a note to Romania demanding the return of Bessarabia and the transfer of Northern Bukovina to the USSR. On June 27, Romania agreed, and on June 28, Soviet troops began to enter the territory of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina.

2 in June-August 1940, People's Commissar of the NKVD of the USSR L.P. Beria, the central apparatus of the NKVD of the USSR and the organs of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR and the BSSR had to deal a lot with both already old problems,

associated with the annexation of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, as well as new problems associated with the formation of the three Baltic Soviet republics, as well as the return of Bessarabia to the USSR and the annexation of Northern Bukovina.

Counter flows formed - someone moved from the USSR to Romania, someone - from Romania to the USSR. At the same time, it even came to shooting at the border. It was necessary to organize checkpoints, provide operational-Chekist measures and Chekist support of resettlement processes, it was necessary to ensure the inevitable "cleansing" of new territories, create the infrastructure of the NKVD of the republics there, and in addition, intensify the fight against the nationalist underground, especially in Western Ukraine.

A separate problem was the mass repatriation of Germans from the Baltic states to Germany.

May 3, 5, 1940 K.E. Voroshilov was relieved of his post as People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and appointed Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.

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mat works steadily, people are matched. On all lines, if there are shortcomings, you can't get away from them. They will always be, if only not to drown.

What is the most important thing for me personally. We must constantly watch the Germans and orient people. You need to know whether the Germans will fight or not. It is necessary to strengthen border intelligence and regularly give reports to Kobe, Vyacheslav, Timoshenko!, to the General Staff and separately to the Intelligence Agency, for cross-analysis. Unreliable office, but it turns out it is necessary to interact.

The second thing is to know whether the Germans will agree with the British or not. The former king is in Madrid? and leads shura mura with Hitler. Maybe because there is nothing to do, or maybe a sounding goes through him. Or maybe they just distract us, while the real channels are different. It is necessary to open through those that are and through America. They still coordinate everything with America, so there is a lot of information there. It is necessary to orient Fitin.

17/UP 40

Milstein? prepared a summary of Germany according to foreign agents. The Germans are going to build fortifications along our entire border from Memel through Poland to Slovakia. It seems to be more powerful than the Siegfried line. It turns out that the Germans will not go to war with us, but will fence themselves off. They are from us. We are from

Ÿ Timoshenko Semyon Konstantinovich (1895-1970), Marshal of the Soviet Union, from May 5, 1941, People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR.

\* Former King Edward USh, who abdicated in connection with his marriage to the twice-divorced American Simpson, was at that time not in Madrid, but in Lisbon.

3 Milshtein Solomon Rafailovich (1899-1955), one of the leaders of the state security agencies and a close collaborator of L.P. Beria still on the GPU of Georgia and then on the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia. In 1940, he was the head of the Main Transport Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR, from March 1941 he was the deputy people's commissar of the forest industry of the USSR, with the outbreak of war he was again in the NKVD bodies.

See also the commentary on the April 10, 1941 entry.

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them. That's how you can be friends. But we need to understand better. While some data contradict others. Could be misinformation. Most of all I have confidence in the border guards. From there it is also different.

We need to think about a new Award Title and Badge. The Cheka and the GPU are long gone, and we are awarding them on their behalf. Stupidity needs to be corrected.

21/UC 40

Yesterday I had a conversation with Koba. Did he say that he had Shakhurin? and Yakovlev ?, he was interested in how things were going with Petlyakov \* and Myasishchev ?. The people's commissar and the deputy both praised them.

Then he asks: "What do you think, Comrade Beria?" I said I agree. He asks and How

1 The title of honorary Chekist was first established in 1922. Then the title "Honorary Worker of the Cheka-GPU" appeared. However, in 1934, the OGPU of the USSR was transformed into the NKVD of the USSR, and now the Chekists were awarded with a very valuable badge of honor on behalf of an already non-existent state body. This anachronism existed in the NKVD before L.P. Beria. He also did not immediately reach a change in the position of his hands, but it is understandable. But by the fall of 1940, the situation within the people's commissariat had already acquired a stable personnel character, and Beria, as we see, decided to correct the absurdity of the award.

See also entry of October 31, 1940 and note to it.

2 Shakhurin Aleksey Ivanovich (1904-1975), in 1940-1945 People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry of the USSR, Hero of Socialist Labor (1941).

Yakovlev Alexander Sergeevich (1906-1989), famous aircraft designer, six-time winner of the Stalin Prize (1941, 1942, 1943, 1946, 1947, 1948), twice Hero of Socialist Labor (1940, 1957), in 1940-1946. simultaneously with the leadership of his design bureau, he held the post of deputy people's commissar of the aviation industry of the USSR.

4 Petlyakov Vladimir Mikhailovich (1891-1942), Soviet aircraft designer, worked in the Tupolev Design Bureau. Chief designer of the outstanding Pe-2 and Pe-8 aircraft, laureate of the Stalin Prize, twice holder of the Order of Lenin. He died in 1942 in a plane crash. He was arrested in the Tupolev case.

5 Myasishchev Vladimir Mikhailovich (1902-1978), Soviet aircraft designer, worked at the Tupolev Design Bureau, then headed an independent design bureau, developer of a number of outstanding piston and jet aircraft, since 1956 General Designer of MAP. Arrested in the Tupolev case.

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can we encourage them? I say you can be released. Let them work in peace.

Koba says they have just been convicted and are already being released. I say, well, they won't mind.

He said, good, prepare a performance, and a draft resolution. Let's remove the conviction. Let them work. They will do many more good things.

24/UP 40

Formed Defense Committee?. Klim chairman, I'm like a member. Deputy Voznesensky? Everything seems to be correct, Voznesensky chief planner, so he is obtained from Industry. But how will it work. This will work if we are all in the same team. And Voznesensky's nose is tearing up, only he is smart. If you're smart, organize. Klim can't bring us down together. Diplomat

Let's see".

26/UP 40

Comrade Stalin set an urgent task. By the autumn it is necessary to provide all aircraft factories with Government HF communications. Just from him, they sat for two hours one on one, then Shakhurin came ?, all

1 See commentary on 26 July 1940 entry.

\* On July 24, 1940, the Defense Committee was formed consisting of: "TT. Voroshilov (Chairman), Voznesensky (Deputy Chairman), Stalin, Timoshenko, Beria, Kaganovich L.M., Kuznetsov, Shaposhnikov. It did not become an effective body.

3 Voznesensky Nikolai Alekseevich (1903-1950), in 1940 Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR and Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. Educated at the Communist University. Ya.M. Sverdlov (1926) and at the Bukharin Institute of Red Professors (1931). Between the two formations, there is a party apparatchik in the Donbass. Then - in the planning bodies.

See also the afterword of the publisher.

\* Doubts L.P. Beria proved to be justified. An effective working body of the Defense Council did not.

? People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry of the USSR.

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discussed together. Construction, if necessary, is for Shakhurin, and he promised to help strongly. I said, "You promise under Comrade Stalin, look."

He swears. I am glad that I will have such a connection with all the factories in the field.

Koba says "Appreciate, comrade Shakhurin. We have not yet established government communications in Ufa and Kazan. Regional committees are asking, but so far we are refusing. And your plants in Ufa and Kazan will be connected by autumn. There will be separate stations"

I say to Shakhurin: "Even with secrecy, you can speak openly." Doesn't even believe.

Talked to Ilyinsky!, shakes his head. A lot of work. Six Moscow factories and TsAGI, this is nonsense, we will do it quickly. We will also do Leningrad quickly. And in Gorky, Saratov, Novosibirsk, Irkutsk and Voronezh - it's hard. And it is necessary.

Koba says this is just the beginning. We need to have secret threads for all the big factories. And with encryption. I say that already half of the lines have encoders, Comrade Stalin. And we'll push again. Says: "Press"?.

We talked a lot. He asks, what about sabotage in the aviation industry? I say there are no serious materials. Here we have cleaned well. He asks how is Tupolev? I say it works well

1 Ilyinsky Mikhail Ilyich (1910-1941), a specialist in the development, installation and classification of government high-frequency communication lines, in 1940 the head of the 8th department of high-frequency (HF) government communications of the 2nd Special Department (operational - technical equipment) of the NKVD of the USSR, from October 2, 1941 - the first head of the Department of Government Communications of the NKVD of the USSR, died in 1941.

2 See comment below.

Z Tupolev Andrei Nikolaevich (1888-1972), famous Soviet aircraft designer, colonel-general engineer, academician (1953), three times Hero of Socialist Labor (1945, 1957, 1972),

four times winner of the Stalin Prize (1943, 1948, 1949, 1953).

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prison has been good. Was a pest, became a leader!

Koba says, well, let him improve. Here is Petlyakov? and Myasishchev work like animals. Tupolev dragged them in, otherwise they are honest people.

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev.

This entry requires commentary on two topics.

The first is the role of Beria in the introduction of long-distance high-frequency (HF) government communications into the public life of the USSR, reliably protected from eavesdropping and interception. Officially, this type of communication dates back to June 1, 1931, when a corresponding division was created in the OGPU of the USSR, however, the first Moscow-Kharkov high-frequency line was organized already in 1930.

However, only with the advent of L.P. Beria began the rapid development and introduction of high-frequency communications. Of course, his arrival coincided with a number of serious technical achievements in this area, but it was Beria's energy and his ability to understand the potential of high-frequency communications that gave her a new impetus for development. Immediately after his appointment as People's Commissar, he ordered a thorough check of the state of affairs, and already in the winter of 1939, V.N. Merkulov submitted a memorandum to him, where it was noted that "due to the unsystematic organization, there is a dispersion of technical forces, an irrational use of materials," etc.

Bessistemnost and Beria were things incompatible, and therefore by the end of 1939 the number of HF stations increased to 78, and the number of subscribers increased by one and a half times and amounted to 430 numbers. By July 1940, there were already 103 communication lines, by April 1, 1941 - 116 HF stations with 729 s

! See comment below.

2 V.M. Petlyakov. See also note 3 to the entry for 21 July 1940 and the comment below.

3 V.M. Myasishchev. See also note 4 of the 21 July 1940 entry and commentary below.

4 See comment below.

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Only stupid and lazy shoemakers go without boots, and Beria was neither stupid nor lazy. Therefore, the governmental high-frequency communications of the NKVD of the USSR also widely served the NKVD of the USSR itself.

Beria periodically returned to the topic of high-frequency communications and paid constant attention to it during the war. And those principles of approach to the organization of closed communication lines, which were introduced by L.P. Beria, have not been archived to this day.

As for the aviation theme, which was also touched upon in the entry of July 21, 1940, the following should be briefly said here.

On October 21, 1937 Andrey Nikolaevich Tupolev, Chief Engineer and Deputy Head of the Main Directorate of the Aviation Industry of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry of the USSR, was arrested.

I will not go into lengthy explanations, but simply say that Tupolev was at least a covert anti-Soviet, and at most a conscious pest. Being the main figure

in the Soviet aircraft industry, in the fall of 1937 he actually led him to a dead end. The enormous efforts of Stalin, the Politburo, employees of the People's Commissariat of Aviation Industry and ... a group of young designers, primarily Ilyushin, Yakovlev, Mikoyan, Gurevich, Lavochkin, Sukhoi and Ermolaev, brought our aviation out of the impasse ...

In addition, it is necessary to mention Petlyakov and Myasishchev, two former assistants of Tupolev, who received independent design bureaus after Tupolev's arrest, but also under conditions of imprisonment, like Tupolev.

The fact is that both were arrested in the Tupolev case (Petlyakov on October 27, 1937, and Myasishchev on January 12, 1938).

Today, "advanced" "historians" claim that Beria put them in a prison so that they would work better. Silly, of course! The same Ilyushin, Yakovlev, Mikoyan, Gurevich, Lavochkin, Sukhoi, Ermolaev, Polikarpov, deputy Tupolev-Arkhangelsky, engine builders Mikulin, Shvetsov, Klimov, no one planted anywhere, but they worked brilliantly. In addition, the "Tupolevites" were placed in prison

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Yezhov, and already in 1938, even under Yezhov, they were working on new designs, albeit in prison. Beria kept this state of affairs because Tupolev and his colleagues were guilty. In the spring of 1940, they were convicted, continuing to work in prison, but enjoying a sufficiently large freedom (it could not have been otherwise).

Petlyakov and Myasishchev were sentenced to 10 years each on May 29, 1940, and on July 25, 1940 they were released. As you can see, with the assistance of L.P. Beria, who was increasingly involved in aviation issues. However, he was related to them even when he was in Georgia, because in Tbilisi was deployed, not without the hassle of Lavrenty Pavlovich, a serial aviation factory.

1/US 40

Milstein Information! overlapped by reports from the Border Troops. The Germans are building firing points along the border, tearing off trenches and anti-tank ditches, and laying wire. In Belarus (So in the text. - S.K.) pillboxes are being installed, in Ukraine (So in the text. - S.K.) concrete structures are being erected at a depth of 40 km from the border in the Yaroslav region (opposite Lvov). I will report to Kobe.

6/US 40

There are almost always provocations in the Far East. At sea too. We detain Japanese schooners in our territorial waters. Japanese destroyers of the Kamikaze type enter the three-mile zone. They also provoke and interfere with our fishermen. Maslennikov? reports that for the week of August the losses of the Ozernovsky fish factory in Kamchatka amounted to more than a million rubles. I need to report to Kobe. He told Maslennikov to prepare a Generalized Report for Koba and the Politburo.

1 See entry of 17 July 1940 and note 1 to it.

2 Deputy People's Commissar of the NKVD of the USSR for the troops, lieutenant general.

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12/US 40

There is cross-information from the border and from foreign agents that the Germans are preparing a war with us. There are up to 40 divisions on the eastern border. It's not much, but the troops are coming. Eat

information, the arrival of 18 divisions is expected in the Terespol station area. It is unlikely that such a mass of troops will not enter one area. You still need to take control.

We launched such construction, the situation in the country is improving, and here it turns out we need to fight. Wouldn't want to. Koba says that the era of wars is inevitable. I don't know, you can't fight the Germans. They don't have socialism there, but they don't have pure capitalism either. state capitalism. And a lot is being done for the people. According to agents, the internal situation in Germany is not very strong. It is reported that if the war with England drags on, a revolutionary upsurge may occur. It is unlikely.

In the German part of Poland, the Germans take Ukrainians into the army, create good conditions and create the most nationalist moods. They say that they will go with the Great Reich to liberate the Ukraine from the Soviets. And the concentration of troops continues.

I don't think they will go this year anyway. There are few deployed troops, it's about to fall, and they won't climb in the rain. What about next year?

There is a lively movement of troops in East Prussia. For what? Maybe they're wiggling around for show? The boy shouted: "Wolves, wolves." Joking. And when the wolves came, no one came running to him. Thought he was joking. Maybe they are. They either activate or subside, but we don't understand what's what.

16/USh 40 Koba called me and Vyacheslav (V.M. Molotov. - S.K.). He showed an article in Pravda about Trotsky! Nachi

1 This is the only mention in the diary of the NKVD operation to liquidate Trotsky.

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it says: "The telegraph brought the news of Trotsky's death." Looks at me. I say: "That's right. According to reports, he was assassinated by his close follower. I don't remember the name!, difficult? He says, "Well, that's right. Judas Judas death"?.

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev.

As a rule, L.P. Beria kept entries in his diary very frankly, but it is significant that if the unimaginable happened and a potential enemy had a photocopy of his diary, he would not have extracted a lot of valuable specific information from Beria's diary.

It seems that a professional instinct worked here - it is best to keep specific information (names and pseudonyms of foreign agents and residents, methods of conducting intelligence, plans for specific operations, their results, etc.) in your head and not trust paper, and if you do, then — only stored in a service safe under multi-layer protection.

As you can see, even in his personal diary, even alone with him, Beria did not say a word about the involvement of the USSR leadership in the liquidation of Trotsky.

1 The article in Pravda mentioned the name of the assassin - Jacques Mortan Vandenreisch.

, Curiously, the second name of "Wandenreish" (Wandenrhein) - Mortan, is an almost exact anagram of the real name of the Soviet agent, Hero of the Soviet Union Ramon Mercader (1913-1978), who mortally wounded Trotsky. Mercader's real name is also phonetically similar to both of his cover aliases, Vandenrhein and Mornard (under the latter he was a member of Trotsky's house).

and The operation was carried out under the leadership of L.P. Beria and P.A. Sudo-platova. The direct developer and leader of the operation was the colleague and peer of Beria, the legendary Naum



Isaakovich Eitingon (1899-1981), major general. After Beria's arrest, he was arrested and spent 12 years in prison.

Ramon Mercader spent 20 years in prison, sentenced to that term by a Mexican court. He served his term in full, on May 6, 1960 he was released and transported through Cuba to the USSR. In the mid-1970s he moved to Cuba, where he died. He was buried at the Moscow Kuntsevo cemetery.

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Just as the reader will be convinced of this as he becomes more familiar with the diary, Beria does not write anything, for example, about spectacular figures such as the actress Olga Chekhova or the Polish prince Radziwill. These and others like them, either real or mythical agents of the Soviet intelligence, densely populate the memoirs of former employees of the Soviet special services. However, Beria never mentions the same Chekhova, just as he never mentions in his diary the major radio games of the Soviet intelligence with the Abwehr during the war - operations "Monastyr", "Borodino",

etc. and so on.

Former subordinate and colleague of L.P. Beria, General Pavel Sudoplatov, in the preface to his book Intelligence and the Kremlin, published in 1996 by Gaia LLP, stated:

"Observing the military oath, I was silent as long as the Soviet Union existed. When the activities of Soviet intelligence and a number of aspects of the foreign policy of the USSR ceased to be secret after the well-known events of 1991 (This is P.Ya. Sudoplatov so delicately defines the bourgeois counter-revolution of Gorbachev-Yeltsin-CIA. - S.K.) and all what I faithfully served ceased to exist (Well, well. - S.K.), I could not and had no right (Is that how? - S.K.) to remain silent any longer. Unfortunately, I had no other choice but to publish my memoirs initially in the West, since domestic publishers intended to publish them only after consultation with (competent authorities ... "

But, sorry, but how else? After all, Sudoplatov and many other former Chekists over the past two decades have dumped so much information on the work of the Soviet special services that one can only wonder why they took their works to publishing houses - for very modest fees.

I think they would have received much more if they had first offered the annotations of their memoirs, and then the full manuscripts to one or another Western intelligence agency. They would have been torn off with arms and legs! Because it is very informative and valuable for the practical purposes of enemy

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secret services turned out to be the collective surrender of many secrets of the Soviet intelligence (and, let's not forget - also counterintelligence!) by its former leaders and employees.

They, you see, were silent, "observing the military oath" until 1991. It turns out they were repeating "I serve the Soviet Union!" not out of conviction, but out of duty. The traitors betrayed the Soviet Union, and now it was no longer necessary to serve him for Sudoplatov and others, keeping the secrets of the Soviet Union.

Oh well...

But to this day there are many people who served, today serve and will serve the SOVIET UNION! Past, present and future!

That Soviet Union, which Beria served faithfully all his life.

I spent an hour at Koba's with Sholokhov. Koba urgently called, said that there was an urgent conversation. It may have seemed to him, but it is necessary to investigate!. Urgently instruct Abakumov.

Then they were left alone, Koba asked how the Germans were. I say the data is conflicting. It seems they are digging in, but they seem to be preparing a blow. While we find out. Airplanes fly in, it has already become the norm.

He asks: "Do they fly far?" I say (So in the text. - S.K.): "Yes, not very much." He says, "Watch."

5 The essence of the conversation could not be established. On August 23, 1940, from 22.40 to 24.00, Stalin talked with Sholokhov in the presence of Molotov and, from 23.00, also Beria. At 0.10 Beria left, and Mikoyan entered the office. At 1.30 on August 24, Beria again went into Stalin's office, from where he left at 2.15 with Molotov and Mikoyan.

I am Viktor Semyonovich Abakumov (1908-1954), one of the heads of the state security agencies, Colonel General. From December 5, 1938 to February 25, 1941 - head of the UNKVD in the Rostov region. Subsequently - Deputy People's Commissar of the NKVD of the USSR, head of the Smersh Main Directorate of Defense of the USSR People's Commissariat of Defense, Minister of State Security of the USSR. On July 12, 1951 he was arrested, on December 19, 1954 he was sentenced to death by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR and shot on the same day.

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30/US 40

New territories are good. But it needs to be cleaned up. Now all the People's Commissariats have new troubles. Only some people have pleasant ones, but the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs does not have pleasant ones. If it's a chore, then a new x..ynya around the neck. We need to clean up the republics. There is experience here, but there is a lot of work. The good thing is that the Baltics are well developed intelligence.

We must firmly guard the new Frontier! Many violations and more serious ones. Not smuggling and not visiting, but intelligence. As always, a lot of fuss with the OUN. They work both themselves and for the Germans. It's hard, they know the local situation as well as we do, and even better.

14/1X-40

Koba entrusted a difficult task. You have to think hard. We know only Vyacheslav and Andrey. I think that this should be done. Andrey too. Koba hesitates, Vyacheslav dissuades him?

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev.

The meaning of this record could not be reliably deciphered. However, below I provide some accurate historical information, the analysis of which allows us to make reasonable assumptions about what was meant in the entry in the diary of L.P. Beria on September 14, 1940.

On September 10, 1940, Stalin did not receive anyone, but at the very beginning of the day - at ten minutes after midnight, he called three of them: at 0.10 Zhdanov appeared, at 0.15 - Beriia and 0.20 - Molotov. They were with Stalin until one in the morning, and then all day on September 11 Stalin had no reception.

Only on the evening of September 11, 1940, Stalin held a series of

1 In a short time, the Baltic border districts were formed, 28 border detachments,

2 See comment below.

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meetings in which Molotov, Zhdanov and Beria also took part. But these were ordinary current affairs: the construction of hydraulic structures, metallurgy, the problems of Transcaucasia, and so on.

On September 12, 1940, Stalin again did not receive anyone, and only at the very end of the day - at 23.35 - called Zhdanov, Molotov and Beria again, who stayed in the office for only 25 minutes, after which all three left Stalin exactly. 24.00.

On September 13, 1940, Stalin did not receive anyone. And on September 14 (the day on which Beria made an entry in his diary), Stalin first invited Zhdanov to himself (came at 19.50) and Molotov (came at 20.00). From 20.30 to 21.40, Bolshakov, the chairman of the Committee on Cinematography under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, was in the office, and at 22.10 Beria joined Stalin, Molotov and Zhdanov. After 50 minutes, at 23.00, Molotov, Zhdanov and Beria all left together.

On September 15, 1940, Stalin did not receive anyone in his office. Possibly, on that day (as well as on September 13) he was absent from the Kremlin at all. But already on September 16, 1940, Stalin again held a series of current meetings, including on the work of the People's Commissariat of the Aviation Industry, and life seemed to flow as usual.

However, on September 21, 1940, Stalin held only one meeting - from 18.55 to 20.00 he had Molotov, Beria and two deputies of Molotov for the NKID - Vyshinsky and Dekanozov (future USSR ambassador to Germany until June 22, 1941).

So, an analysis of this entire chronology suggests that Stalin then very seriously considered all the pros and cons of his possible meeting with the German Reichscanner Hitler and discussed this issue in an extremely narrow circle: his closest comrade-in-arms Molotov, a broad-minded ideologist Zhdanov and NKVD chief Beria as an inevitable member of the company.

It is possible that in those days when Stalin was not holding a reception in the Kremlin, he was reflecting on the problem in Kuntsevo. Possibly together with Zhdanov and Molotov. Beria Stalin into this narrow foreign policy "think tank", of course

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but, did not include him, considering him a powerful manager, but not a diplomat and ideologist.

It is authentically known that Hitler sought a meeting with Stalin. So, on March 28, 1940, that is, even before the May offensive of the Wehrmacht in the West, the Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop signed cipher telegram No. 543 to the German ambassador in Moscow, von Schulenburg, which, among other things, said:

"...I have not parted with the idea of Mr. Molotov's visit. On the contrary, I would like to do this in the near future... It goes without saying that the invitation is not limited to Molotov alone. If Stalin himself comes to Berlin, it will serve our own purposes even better, as well as our really close relations with Russia. The Führer in particular will not only be happy to welcome Stalin to Berlin, but will see to it that he is received in accordance with his position and importance, and the Führer will show him all the honors appropriate to the occasion.

So, Hitler was ready for a personal meeting with Stalin! But was Stalin ready? In the Ribbentrop cipher, this was stated as follows:

"As you know, an oral invitation to both Molotov and Stalin was made by me in Moscow and was accepted in principle by both. In what form these invitations should now be repeated, now decide for yourself ...

Express the invitation to Mr. Molotov more specifically, and make the invitation to Mr. Stalin on behalf of the Fuehrer in less definite terms... Of course, we must avoid Stalin's open refusal..."

On March 30, 1940, Schulenburg sent a response code number 599 to Berlin, where he reported:

"Personally, I am firmly convinced ... that Molotov, conscious of his duty, will visit Berlin as soon as the time and circumstances seem favorable to the Soviet government. After attentive

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studying all the factors known to me, I cannot, however, hide the fact that at present I consider the chances of accepting the invitation as negligible ... "

The Ambassador went on to say that in Germany's ongoing war with the West, the Soviet Union was determined to remain neutral and inclined to avoid anything that might bring it into conflict with the Western powers. Schulenburg warned Berlin:

"The Soviet government is probably afraid that a demonstration of the existing relations between the Soviet Union and Germany, such as the visit of Molotov or Stalin himself to Berlin, may carry the risk of breaking off diplomatic relations or even starting hostilities. with Western powers.

However, this was before the defeat of France. And in the fall of 1940, in the new situation, Stalin could seriously think about the possibility of a radical turn towards Germany. And also about whether it is worth fixing it with a personal visit to Berlin.

In any case, there is reason to believe that the above reconstruction of the events of mid-September 1940 is not so wrong.

Unfortunately, Stalin did not dare to make a radical turn, and on October 17, 1940, Berlin took the initiative. On this day, Schulenburg conveyed to Molotov an official invitation to come to Berlin on a visit.

On October 21, 1941, Stalin responded to Ribbentrop by agreeing to Molotov's visit.

15/1X-40 Amayak! transmits interesting reports from Berlin. Very helpful, I give them completely to Kobe and he

1 Kobulov Amayak Zakharovich (1906 - 26.02.1955), one of the leaders of the state security agencies, Beria's junior comrade-in-arms. In 1939 he was sent to Berlin as a resident of intelligence under the guise of the post of the 1st adviser to the embassy of the USSR. His diary reviews were very informative in terms of describing the atmosphere in Berlin. It is believed that he only misinformed the leadership of the USSR, not noticing the approaching war, but this is far from the case, and Kobulov's miscalculations as a resident were largely due to reasons beyond his control. In 1953, A. Kobulov, like his brother B. Kobulov, was arrested in the Beria case. Shot in 1955.

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also reads. Here is also a man from the new shift. Very grown up.

Sent a report on the conversation with Professor Niedermayer (Precisely: Oskar von Niedermayer. — S.K.)!. Very interesting. We know this professor well. An employee of General Seeckt lived with us for a long time. Asked about Radek and Hirschfeld? He is now professor of military affairs at the University of Berlin and colonel for special assignments under Keitel, Chief of Staff of the High Command. He says that he is a supporter of the Soviet-German rapprochement.

The most important.

Niedermeier boasted that before the war the Germans had reconnoitered all the targets in England and were bombing accurately, while the British did not know the location of important military facilities and 50% of the bombs fell on non-military

objects. Conclusion: they conduct such reconnaissance and we need to strengthen the operational security service for all objects accessible for bombing.

He believes that the future belongs to America - this is one part, Germany and the USSR - this is the second part. The time will come for their clash.

He warned us against the threat of the bombing of Baku by the British. He says that a dozen bombs will suffice. Well, we ourselves know this. But it must also be taken into account.

He says that National Socialism is an enemy of the bourgeoisie and a friend of the workers. And the burgher touches them a little.

Interesting.

? Niedermeier Oskar Baron von (1885–1948), a German intelligence officer and geopolitician, in 1924–1930 was one of those German military men who directly organized cooperation between the Reichswehr and the Red Army while in the USSR.

Girshfeld A.V. (1897-?), Consul General of the USSR to Königsberg (1935-1938) and Hamburg (1938), in 1938-1944. senior researcher at the Institute of History of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

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25 /1X-40

We are starting work on the Konosha-Kotlas railway to connect the Gorky and Severnaya railways. Must be built within a year. A lot of work, almost 400 km. I must tell Frenkel! to press hard on the introduction of a bonus system and enhanced nutrition for record-setters, honors students and drummers.

On the Ukrainian section of the border, it comes to direct clashes with gangs of nationalists. They go to Germany, from Germany. The leaders of the underground were ordered to cross over to Germany and follow to Berlin.

At night, increased movement of military echelons. They are whispering something. Did you talk to Tymoshenko?, he agrees that this cannot be a redeployment before the attack. This year is already late and they have few troops in Poland.

5/X-40

Koba confers with the military on plans for military development. It was smooth on paper. They are very fenced off, there is no good interaction. Spoke with Maslennikov and Sokolov." They report that on the ground, the border guards have interaction with the command of the border units. And already in the Districts, not so much. The military looks at the Border Troops as second class. And Finland did not prove it. The worst thing is that you can't break it and you can't prove it to Kobe. And fight together.

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev.

Lamentations L.P. Beria on the arrogant attitude of the high command of the Red Army towards the troops of the NKVD were justified. Before the war, the command of the Red Army was not considered

1 Head of the Main Directorate of Railway Construction of the NKVD of the USSR.

2 People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR.

3 Deputy People's Commissar of the NKVD of the USSR for the troops.

\* Head of the Main Directorate of the Border Troops of the NKVD of the USSR.

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The border troops of the NKVD were considered to be a serious military force, which must be taken into account in every possible way in the strategic plan for the development of the Armed Forces. I think that some psychological alienation of the command cadres of the two departments also played a role, especially considering that the command cadres of border guards were more formed within the border service, and not the service in the Red Army.

The arrogance of the army men did not attest them in the best way - in terms of effective combat training of troops, primarily single, the Red Army had a lot to learn from the troops of the NKVD. On the border, especially in the 30s, there was no peacetime, and therefore the combat training of the average Red Army soldier from the NKVD border troops was incomparably higher than that of the average Red Army soldier in the Red Army.

Already the first days of the war proved that only the border units of the NKVD along the entire line of the Soviet-German border showed almost absolute combat stability and played a strategic role during the border battle.

12/X-40

As expected, the Germans brought troops into Romania to protect the oil fields. A military dictatorship is established in Romania, but a weak one. Romanians always have a mess, I remember it well from 1917. For us, these are new tasks for reconnaissance and protection of the Border. Now there will be more provocations. It sucks.

> During the Soviet-Finnish war, the border troops of the NKVD were transferred by agreement to the operational subordination of the army command only within the border zone of hostilities. However, since the border guards, unlike the army men, proved themselves brilliantly, the command of the Red Army units, by hook or by crook, kept the border guards at their disposal even when advancing into the territory of Finland to a depth of 50 or more kilometers.

6 See comment below.

On September 4, 1941, the fascist dictatorship of General Ion Antonescu was actually established in Romania, while the power of King Mihai 1 was formally preserved.

And Beria was in Bessarabia in 1917 as a practical technician.

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18/X-40

The operational situation on the border is not becoming calmer. Only worse. There is a concentration of troops, overseas agents also report the transfer of troops to the eastern border. The transfer of agents of the German intelligence agencies is intensifying. In the border zone of Germany, Polish prisoners of war and Ukrainian nationalists.

Let's see what will happen next. But the fact that they are actively reconnaissance of the border strip and inland is a fact. Constantly pay attention to Koba. He says: "Look at both sides, do not allow provocations and do not give in." This is understandable, we have always been taught that. On the Border the best shots. Pride!

23/X-40

Vyacheslav will go to Hitler!. Koba decided so, but I think in vain. I had to go myself. Vyacheslav is not a figure. Koba sees like an eagle, all at once and high. And Vyacheslav as a professor. Knows a lot, but weak in actions. How will he manage there? But Koba decided so.

Something is wrong in the Defense People's Commissariats. There have been a number of major accidents and there is still serious sabotage. According to the People's Commissariat of Ammunition, products are rejected in packs? This year's plan was completed in 9 months less

1 See commentary on 14 September 1940 entry.

2 Only one digit. In 1939 and 1940, 171 million pieces of Shkass primers were rejected due to "undeveloped (?) technology" at factories No. 5 and 53 of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition.

At the 18th party conference (February 15-20, 1941), People's Commissar Ivan Pavlovich Sergeev (1897-1942) was warned that if he did not get the job done, he could be removed from the Central Committee and removed. Not for horse food. As a result, on March 3, 1941, Sergeev was removed and transferred to teaching at the Military Academy of the General Staff, and on May 30, 1941, he was arrested. On February 13, 1942, he was shot by the verdict of the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR. In 1955, the Khrushchevites rehabilitated one of those who in 1941 jeopardized the army's supply of ammunition.

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by more than 70 percent, but we need at least 75 percent. The People's Commissariat for Armaments is also a mess!

What, then rush? Avralyat, and then the products in marriage by the millions. What is this negligence? Maybe negligence, but more like sabotage. The war could have been already this year. What about fighting? Fucking.s!

Finishing the filtering of the Poles, soon we will present the results of Kobe?. General conclusion: from the Poles it is possible to form a separate military unit up to a division. The command staff can be selected, even the generals say that they consider the Germans enemies and will fight with us. And which of them are warriors. They won't fight for us.

ÿ The People's Commissar for Armaments was then Beria's future comrade-in-arms in the Atomic Project, B.L. Vannikov (1897-1962). It is very likely that Vannikov and Beria met during the Civil War in Baku or Tiflis. However, there seemed to be no particular warmth between them, although Beria appreciated Vannikova.

At the beginning of June 1941, Vannikov was also dismissed as having failed to do his job and arrested (later he admitted the justice of this measure), but already on July 25, 1941 he was released and initially appointed Deputy People's Commissar of Ammunition P.N. Goremykin, and from February 16, 1942 - People's Commissar.

Comparing the fates of Sergeev and Vannikov, one can understand that Stalin's repressive policy at the highest levels of government was by no means indiscriminate and, on the whole, adequate to the situation and the sins of the guilty.

November 22, 1940 in a message addressed to I.V. Stalin No. 4713 / B People's Commissar of the NKVD L.P. Beria reported on the results of his work with Polish and Czech prisoners of war. It is curious that the words "Germans", "for the fight against Germany", "Polish military unit", "Czech military units", etc. were typewritten by hand. The only surname of all the surnames mentioned in the text was entered by hand - the surname of the Czech Colonel Svoboda, who was then abroad. The last phrase of the message announced: "FREEDOM has been summoned by us from abroad."

That is, Stalin was already thinking about involving the Poles in joint military operations against Germany in the event of war. In reality, this resulted in the organization of Anders' army (see diary entries for 1942 and 1943). But what is interesting: if at a time when the USSR and Germany were not at war, almost all captured Poles, including generals, wanted to fight against Germany on the side of the USSR, then during the outbreak of the war, Anders's army formed by the Soviet Union preferred to go to Iran to the English. Only Colonel Berling, mentioned in

message L.P. Beria dated January 2, 1940, remained in the USSR and formed the 1st division of the Troops Polish.

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31/X-40

Established the Badge "Honored Worker of the NKVD". This will greatly help in the work. It's not a trifle, as some people think. Chekists happy?.

10/X1-40

Vyacheslav will go to Hitler?. Koba, Zhdanov and he confer. They sit near Koba. I wonder what instructions Koba gives. Zakordonnaya agentstura informs contradictory. Everything can be. If the Germans hesitate, then the data will be this way and that. Intelligence of the Border Troops gives more information about the war. Troops are piling up, that's for sure. The question is why they accumulate. There are parts that will come, stay and leave, it's like a vacation. But the majority settle down and settle down.

The question is why? This is now becoming the main issue. We have no right to miss. There is a lot of chaos in the army. So they don't learn. I give Koba reports from the Special Departments, Timoshenko looks askance. And what is mowed. My guys give verified information, they are not accustomed to lie.

In aviation, as there was a mess, it remained.

Special Departments report that there is talk that the quality of the aircraft is poor. How to say. Where x.evoe, and where not. Where there is technological discipline, there is order. You cannot give an elevated plan, so why boast before Comrade Stalin.

1 See entry dated July 17, 1940.

On October 231, 1940, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks approved the Regulations on the sign "Honored Worker of the NKVD". Characteristic for Beria was the inclusion in the "Regulations ..." of paragraph 4:

"4. Those awarded with the sign "Honored Worker of the NKVD" have the right to receive preferential housing in the houses of the NKVD.

To be precise, Beria's project further stated: "...and they pay for the living space they occupy in the houses of the NKVD at a 50% discount." However, Stalin deleted this part of paragraph 4 when he signed it.

ZS 12 to 14 November 1940 V.M. Molotov negotiated in Berlin with German Reich Chancellor Adolf Hitler and German Reich Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop.

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Need to figure it out. It's not so easy here, it smells of sabotage. Or criminal negligence.

24 /X]-40

Two years as I am People's Commissar. Worked, no shame. If there is war tomorrow, the NKVD will not let you down. I don't know about the army. There is a lot of gold on the sleeves, but what about the other - we'll see.

Vyacheslav brought nothing good from Berlin. Hitler did not seem to him, strange. He is not a fool at all, such successes do not happen to fools. It's our fools who are lucky, but they are not respected there.

The cases of sabotage are repeated. There are gunpowder factories, the People's Commissariat of Ammunition and the line of the right. The quantity is decreasing, but the quality is growing. Maybe next year



war, they need to scale up. And if the harm is large, it is easier to identify. Found large beetles. The guys work a lot.

Here you can't work with a fist, you need technical expertise. Nothing, they do it. It will be necessary to introduce the group to the Orders.

13/HP-40

Koba is engaged in aviation a lot, and I, too, through the People's Commissariat. There was a big breakthrough in the aviation industry. Tupolev and Mikhail Kaganovich caught the early warning. Now we are correcting, but time does not wait. One thing is good in the aviation industry, dealing with sabotage is good, almost none. We have the facts, but not as much as on ammunition and weapons.

I thought why is that? And he gave the guys a task. Now I understand. Most of the aviation cadres are new, already Soviet. Young, our Change. This is the flesh of the flesh of the Soviet Power. Why harm them, they themselves will bring pests to clean water.

And in the old industries, we have to use old specialists from the old army. Powder workers, artillerymen—there are even many old officers there. Who

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works, and who looks to the west. And it is easier to recruit them according to their moods and old connections. Like cleaned, but still not completely. And the time for war, they have to perform tasks, and just from evil harm. This is where we pinch them.

If you look at the work of my construction guys, you will be envious. Good deal. And if you read the interrogation protocols on pests, you yourself would have slapped me. If everyone worked as they should, how would we rise. Cadres decide everything, only where you get them for everything.

It sucks.

13/HP-40

It's winter here, it's cold. Would go home. It's warm there, the mountains. The air is different and the sun shines differently. So what to do. You can't replay life. Koba is Koba. There is no other like it. And it won't. So we will work in Moscow. We will go home on vacation. If yes, dut.

20/HP-40

We will develop helium production. The helium plant can be considered passed!. We will build soot plants there! Koba says soot is badly needed. Helium too. If there is a war, then the main thing will be soot! You have to press.

On all frontiers it is alarming. All along the German frontier, reports of new troops are everywhere. Maybe they are hiding from the British bombing, but it doesn't look like it. They begin to build concrete (So in the text. — S.K.) airfields. Starting from the new year, regular reports on the German border should be given to Kobe separately. Together with the Hungarian and Romanian.

On the southern border of the gang, well, this is a trifle. More smuggling, less politics.

1 See comment below.

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In DVK! as always, but it got worse. The border strip in Manchuria is populated by Japanese reservists. For the year almost 100 provocative actions. The number of Japanese troops against Primorye is up to 200,000 people. The barracks fund allows you to bring up to 17 infantry divisions (450,000).

White emigrants are becoming more active, the Japanese actively support them. They can hit hard. There are serious enemies, there are just fools. Stakhanov? reports that the "Union of Russian Musketeers named after Prince Nikita" is functioning in Harbin? It will be necessary to tell Mykyta\* for a laugh that in Harbin the belyaks have organized a union named after him.

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev.

Helium is a rare noble gas, indispensable in a number of technical fields, in particular, in the production of electronic equipment. Its importance can already be seen from the fact that the Decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of September 5, 1924 introduced a state monopoly on helium. At the same time, all foreign helium projects were considered secret even in the 1930s.

In 1926, industrial enterprises were opened in the USSR (as

, Far East region.

2 Stakhanov Nikolai Pavlovich (1901-1977), one of the leaders of the border troops, lieutenant general. In 1939-1942. Head of the Border Troops of the NKVD of the Primorsky District.

3 More precisely - "The Union of Musketeers named after Prince Nikita"

Khrushchev Nikita Sergeevich (1894-1971), since 1938 the 1st secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) of Ukraine, since March 22, 1939 - a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). Stalin called him Mykyta. As you can see, Beria also called him that, at least in his diary. Since the 1930s, he and Khrushchev had quite friendly relations. The enormous workload of the members of the Stalinist leadership was not conducive to the emergence and development of genuine friendship in the event that the members of the Politburo had not known each other for a long time (as, for example, Stalin and Molotov). However, as within any other business "team", in the Politburo someone was closer to someone, someone - further. As you know, Beria and Khrushchev mutually joked with each other in a friendly way, and the entry in the diary confirms this.

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later, during extensive gas exploration) reserves of helium-containing gases in the basin of the Ukhta River (Komi ASSR).

By October 1935, a site was selected for the construction of a helium plant on the right bank of the Izhma River, 1 km from the northern outskirts of the village of Krutoy, Ukhta District. The Izhma plant was supposed to operate on the basis of the Sedielskoye gas field, producing 50,000 cubic meters of gas per year.

A by-product of helium production was technical soot, also a product needed in the economy. More than 90% of the carbon black produced is consumed by the rubber and, above all, the tire industry, because the introduction of carbon black into rubber significantly increases the tear resistance and abrasion resistance. It is clear how much soot was needed in the war.

On October 9, 1938, the Economic Council under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR issued a resolution on the construction of the Izhemsk helium plant with the completion of construction and commissioning of the plant in 1940. Led the construction of Gazstroy Ukhtozhemlag of the NKVD of the USSR.

On December 20, 1940, the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the construction of carbon black plants in the Upper Izhma region was adopted.

23/HP-40

Koba held a meeting on oil. I gathered everyone, there were almost 50 people. He looked and said: "It's a pity, Gubkina! lacks". Yes, not enough (So in the text. - S.K.). From Koba gone, I'm all once again

collected from old memory, talked additionally. As regards oil, we will activate it along all lines. Exploration, production and processing.

Koba already told me, get ready, Lavrentiy, you will be an oil curator and we will add more. I said

Gubkin Ivan Mikhailovich (1871–1939), an outstanding geologist, founder of Soviet petroleum geology, academician (1929), chairman of the Council for the Study of the Productive Forces of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Member of the RCP(b) since 1921.

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"Thank you. If necessary, I will. I know oil well. He says that's why I load on you. And what? I'll pull! I will pull more.

25/HP-40

Signed the order for the Pechora camp. We will judge Bolyshakov and shoot the bastard to the motherfucking mother. The camp is not a holiday home. But you're a bastard dealing with people. There are so many of them dying, what to do, the work is hard, and they are criminals. But you are responsible for them. You are driving people into the coffin, you bastard, and you are disrupting the plan. Double offender.

I told Frenkel, go and deal with Gorbachev!

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev.

To this day, slanderous "historians" and unscrupulous journalists are trying to make L.P. Beria is a sadist, that is, a person with psychopathological inclinations to cruelty and torturing living beings. By the way, I note that Beria did not like hunting (he preferred fishing). Of course, not every hunter is prone to sadism, but a sadist cannot but love hunting, especially if he has every opportunity for this.

But this is by the way. Below I will briefly report that in November 1940, Beria received information about the difficult situation in the Pechora railway camp and on November 25 a commission was sent there to find out the reasons. She established criminal actions on the part of the head of Pechorlag Bolshakov, his deputy Goldman, the head of the control and planning department Kairevich and the head of the sanitary department Novosadova. All of them were arrested and put on trial.

On December 25, 1940, Beria signed the order of the NKVD No. 001606, which began like this:

See comment below.

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"As a result of the criminal attitude to the household arrangement and labor use of prisoners by the leadership of the Pechora railway camp, significant morbidity and mortality occur among the prisoners of the camp.

The head of the camp, Bolshakov, and the head of the operational-Chekist department of the camp, Yugov, did not promptly inform the NKVD of the USSR about the difficult situation in the camp and did not take the necessary measures to eliminate the situation that had arisen ... "

Mortality was really high - in 1940, 3664 died for 37,706 arrivals.  
person.

By order of Beria, a brigade was sent to Pechorlag for a period of two months under the leadership of the head of the Political Department of the Gulag, Captain M.E. Gorbachev. The brigade included the head of the Sanitary Department of the Gulag D.M. Loidin, Head of the Political Department of the GUZhDS of the NKVD of the USSR

Captain G.B.I.A. Golovanov and four investigators. Head of the Main Directorate for Railway Construction of the NKVD of the USSR N.A. Frenkel was recalling from construction site No. 107 to Pechorlag to take urgent measures.

Beria would not have been Beria if he had limited himself to general words in the order. It was specific: to immediately bring by all available vehicles a sufficient amount of food, clothing allowance, linen and medicines to the Kozhva-Sinya sections from Ust-Usa and to Abez from Adzva-Vom with immediate delivery to Pechorlag "150 tons of fresh meat, 15 tons butter, 15 wagonloads of sauerkraut, 30 tons of yeast and enough vegetables for sick prisoners."

The order prescribed: "Introduce enhanced nutritional standards for all weakened prisoners, allow an additional 2,500 thousand rubles to be spent for these purposes ..." It was ordered to deliver the necessary amount of medicines and medical equipment from Ukhtomizhelag and Sevzheldorlag to Pechorlag for three months per 10,000 people (with the number as of 1.10.40 25,486 people).

It was ordered to immediately deploy housing and medical and sanitary construction and ship 20 barracks for 4,000 people to Pechorlag within two decades.

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Beria's order was not, as someone might think, a work "for the public" - the order was, of course, top secret and concerned only those whom it concerned.

January 14, 1941 G.P. Bolshakov was arrested, on August 15, 1942 he was sentenced by the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR to VMN "for participation in an anti-Soviet organization and sabotage" and on September 12, 1942 he was shot.

The investigation went on for a long time, so the wording of the sentence "for participation in an anti-Soviet organization and sabotage" was hardly formal and, presumably, reflected the essence of the case.

This is how the "sadist" Beria acted.

It remains for me to inform you that the "innocent victim of Beria's arbitrariness" G.P. Bolshakov was posthumously rehabilitated by the "disaster" "humanists" on May 17, 1989.

21/HP-40

Received the latest data from zakordonnoy agency Milstein!. In the Warsaw area, the Germans are building five new airfields. Concrete paths for the removal of aircraft from the runway into the forest. Fuel is stored in underground gas tanks on a concrete base. Capacity 50,000 liters each. They do it thoroughly.

Two new military airfields near the Lithuanian border. At two stations, the number of tracks is expanded to 14 to create a base for armored trains. This must be brought under control. They can fight with armored trains only with us. They won't go across the English Channel.

On the railway line Sedlec - Plyaterovo development of stations. It also means for the rapid reception of TROOPS.

There are rumors in Poland that the Germans will create a Polish army with German officers in disguise.

It sucks. Happy New Year to you, Lawrence!

1 See note 1 to the entry of 17 July 1940

1941

3 /1-41

There was time, I read that I wrote "friend" in two years. There is a benefit. And you will speak out, and the time has come, read, remembered, saw what was wrong.

So I will continue to write. Let not every day, but when it works or you want.

We already had conversations with Koba, but now we will decide practically. The drug commissariat must be divided!. Koba asks: "Will Merkulov cope?"

I say yes. We arranged the matter, trusted the agents and residents, picked up the Intelligence apparatus and checked it. There have been great successes in the K-r (Counterrevolutionary. — S.K.) underground, and now careful developments are needed based on the available materials. People work well, they will cope. And I already have responsibilities up to my neck.

So we share the Commissariats.

This is good (So in the text. - S.K.) and will help me a lot. I'm more interested in getting into the National Economy, here we have high hopes for 1941. If not war.

There may be war. There are many violations of the air border in the Belorussian district alone, and it continues. There is a clear concentration of troops in the German border zone. New parts are coming and coming. Let's see how it will be in the spring, but hardly anything will change.

The Romanians are also preparing, they mobilized,

1 See entries of January 30 and February 3, 1941.

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there are violations of the air border by their aircraft. The border population of military age from Romania is running towards us. OK. Let him run.

From the border they report that the Germans are showing ostentatious politeness. Politeness is good. What is ostentatious is bad.

There will be more work this year. Only some? Either peaceful or military. I know one thing for sure, if there is no war by autumn, I will ask Koba for a vacation for at least a couple of weeks. It pulls home, I want to go through Tbilisi. Look at the mountains.

1/1-41

Prepared the Decree on Dalstroy. Over 400 awards! 10 people - Order of Lenin. Big deal. Gold was given 80,000 kilograms, and this year they should give 84,000 kilograms, and tin must reach 5,000 tons, then we will do well. Well done Tsaregradsky ?, I was not mistaken, I did a good job of geological exploration. In one year almost 19 new mines. And he discovered new ore deposits for tin. Looking for coal. Everything would be so.

On January 11, 1941, 414 employees of Dalstroy and the NKVD of the USSR were awarded for the successful implementation of production plans for Dalstroy, of which 10 were awarded the Order of Lenin, 48 were awarded the Order of the Red Banner of Labor, 62 were awarded the Order of the Badge of Honor, 94 were awarded the medal "For Labor Valour" and 200 - the medal "For Labor Distinction".

2 Tsaregradsky Valentin Aleksandrovich, geologist. At the age of thirty-three, from November 25, 1940, he was the head of the Geological Prospecting Directorate of Dalstroy of the NKVD of the USSR, later - Major General of the Engineering and Technical Service. On January 11, 1941 he was awarded the Order of Lenin, on January 17, 1943 - the Order of the Red Banner of Labor, on January 20, 1944 he was awarded the title of Hero

Socialist Labor. Stalin Prize in 1946 for the discovery and exploration of new gold deposits in the north-east of the USSR in 1943-1944.

3 Actually, in 1941, 3226 tons of tin were mined, in 1942 - 3500 tons. The plan for gold mining in 1941 was also underfulfilled, 75,770 kilograms of chemically pure gold were mined. The reason for the underperformance is quite obvious - the outbreak of war. If not for her, most likely, the plan of 1941 would not only have been fulfilled, but also exceeded.

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18/1-41

Yesterday I submitted to Koba and the Politburo a summary note on a survey of mobilization readiness on the railways. Koba even turned gray. Then it exploded. Screaming when will it end? I can't look after everyone.

Lazar blinked, made excuses, Voznesensky sat as if he was not touching him, but he was also touching.

I already told them, I said, don't prepare the examination yourself, Milshtein is examining me, he will bring everything to the point. And brought.

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev.

In my opinion, one survey of the mobilization readiness of the country's railways, undertaken by the NKVD at the direction of L.P. Beria, convincingly proves that someone, and Beria already at the beginning of 1941, not only fully expected the war already in 1941, and not only did not hide this conviction from Stalin. Beria clearly warned all his colleagues in the highest administration of the state about the need to prepare for a possible close war.

I would like to cite the note of the NKVD of the USSR to Stalin, Molotov and Kaganovich signed by People's Commissar Beria dated January 17, 1941 in full, but I will cite from it, unfortunately, as always extraction:

"According to the materials of the NKVD of the USSR, there are a number of serious abnormalities in the mobilization preparation of railway transport.

The order of the NKPS No. ss-70 / Ts1 on the preparation by the Military Mobilization Directorate by December 1, 1940 of the mobilization plan for the USSR railway transport was not fulfilled. Thus, at present, the NKPS does not have a mobilization plan for transportation ...

"There is still no proper agreement between the NKPS and the NPO on the issue of the plan for military transportation ...

At the insistence (!? - S.K.) of the NKPS, in June 1940, the General Staff of the Red Army submitted to the NKPS roughly approximate dimensions of loading, unloading and the dimensions of movement along

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sections of roads, on the basis of which the NKPS developed a temporary version of the mobplane ...

This temporary military transportation plan is unrealistic.

The transportation plan does not specify the rolling stock code, the loading dimensions exceed the unloading dimensions by 100,000 wagons (!! — S.K.), transportation along the Lithuanian, Latvian and Chisinau roads is not provided for!

On the Lvov, Kovel and Brest roads, it is planned to carry out 75% of loading into narrow gauge cars and 25% into broad gauge cars, while these roads are almost completely

changed to wide gauge.

So far, no centralized plan has been drawn up for the national economic transportation for the first month of the war. Allied People's Commissariats did not submit applications to the NKPS for goods to be transported in the first month of the WAR ... "

These were general introductory statements, but then followed a description of specific shortcomings and failures, for example:

".. The Minsk junction is underdeveloped: short and weak tracks and necks, not provided with water supply, therefore, the junction in the direction from Moscow can only pass 42 pairs of trains, while the hauls of this line provide the passage of 96 pairs of trains - DOV...

"Meanwhile, the 1,286 million rubles allotted by the Government for 1940 according to a special estimate of the People's Commissariat for Commissariat of Railways to increase the throughput capacity of hubs and hauls ... were spent only 726.7 million rubles (56.8%).

..At the construction site No. 56 in the western regions of Ukraine, not a single task of the Government and the People's Commissariat of Passengers for the commissioning of railway lines and individual hauls was fulfilled.

Skipkin, the head of construction, during 1940, ignoring the instructions of the People's Commissariat for Commissariat of Civil Engineering, scattered funds and thereby did not ensure the completion of the most decisive

1 That is, officials (or pests?) from the NKPS ignored the fact that new territories of the USSR appeared, and officials (or pests?) from the General Staff calmly swallowed it.

2 That is, officials (or pests?) from the NKPS also ignored the fact of re-equipment of the track facilities of railways in the new territories of the USSR, while officials (or pests?) from the General Staff calmly swallowed this.

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construction sites. Meanwhile, Skipkin repeatedly informed the NKPS about the successful progress of construction...

"In the mobilization stock of roads, instead of the 30,700 cars required by the plan, there are only 18,000.

The plan for arranging the stock of wagons along the roads is drawn up in such a way that the areas of concentration of empty cars do not coincide with the areas of mass military loading. As a result, in a number of points, in the first days of mobilization, military transportation will be in danger of disruption ...

"The norms of the mobilization reserve do not provide for the property necessary for the restoration of the depot facilities and power plants ...", etc.

The note was signed by the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. Beria and the head of the Main Transport Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR Milshtein.

Are additional comments needed here?

22/1-41

Filthy information is coming from Berlin. It is necessary to check, but it seems to be true. Goering is probing the Berlin Americans in order to come to an agreement with America and England. And at whose expense?

It is reported that Goering gave the order to organize flights over our territory at high altitude for photographing and accurate maps. It is necessary to check, but already now it is necessary to report to Kobe and Molotov!

They handed over a letter from Astakhov<sup>2</sup>. Write what he wants

1 This diary entry also clearly shows that L.P. Beria - in spite of the slander now erected against him - already at the beginning of 1941 was aware that there was a danger of a conflict with Germany in the current year and immediately informed Stalin about this. This position of Beria is convincingly confirmed by a large array of now declassified documents.

2 Very interesting evidence that the figure of the former charge d'affaires of the USSR in Germany in 1939, G.A. Astakhov (see commentary on the entry dated July 29, 1939) was in the sphere of attention of L.P. Beria and in 1941. Obviously, this refers to Astakhov's letter dated January 7, 1941, where Astakhov wrote:

"..I would like to write to Comrade Stalin - not for lamentations and polemics with the investigation, but to highlight some points

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write to Comrade Stalin on German affairs. Let him write. Looks like he got messed up. He holds on tight, but the evidence on him is also strong. Maybe framed. While he said let him write, and then we'll see what to do with it. We need to talk to Koba!.

29 1-41

Yesterday there was a conversation with Koba. We spoke strongly and frankly, in Georgian. Things turn out to be bad, and while Koba was talking, he even looked younger. What does your language mean. Youth is youth. In Russian, he rarely gets excited and argues little. Either he speaks calmly, or he said it like he cut it off. And yesterday he was arguing, arguing. How young?

30/1-41

Received the title of General Commissar of State Security of the USSR. Koba said that your predecessors let you down, the first two Genes

my diplomatic work (especially for the last period in Germany) with a copy to you. There are a number of points that need to be fixed, even regardless of the question about my case ... "

: The fate of G.A. Astakhov, despite his, most likely, innocence, turned out to be tragic. Already after the start of the war, on July 9, 1941, he was sentenced to 15 years in camps, and on February 14, 1942, he died in the Ust-Vymsk labor camp in the Komi ASSR. Perhaps the fact that the growing flow of cases in connection with the increasingly obvious threat of war by the summer of 1941, and then finally the round-the-clock loading of I.V. Stalin and L.P. Beria with the beginning of the war, did not allow them to return to the fate of Astakhov. He just might have slipped out of their memory. Only those who "think of themselves as a strategist, seeing the battle from the outside" (Shota Rustaveli) can condemn I.V. Stalin—Chairman of the State Defense Committee, and L.P. Beria, the most active member of the GKO.

2 The meaning of the record could not be deciphered. One thing can be said with certainty. An entry in the diary of L.P. Beria confirms that on January 28, 1941, the conversation in the Stalinist office between his master and two guests who appeared in the office at 23.30 and left at 0.10 on January 29, 1941 was in Georgian. The fact is that on January 28, Stalin received only two people. They were Beria and a certain Nikuridze (unidentified). Perhaps it was a guest from Georgia with objective information about the state of affairs there.

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real Commissars! I had to slap so you Lavrenty do not let us down.



I said, I won't let you down, because I'm giving State Security to Merkulov ?. He laughed and said you are cunning.

The draft Decree is ready, I present it to Comrade Stalin at the Politburo. Candidates for new People's Commissars? Almost all are ready too. Most will leave those who were in the NKVD or UNKVD. But I promoted someone. Meshik\* will go to Ukraine. Calm guy, reliable. Kobulich? I give Merkulich to the NKGB, Bogdan can handle it.

3/P-41

Presented to Koba the draft Decision of the Central Committee and the Decree on the division into two People's Commissariats. Today the project was approved, that's it! We are also withdrawing Special Departments to the military."

Now I'm the People's Commissar, you can say with abbreviated

1 Meaning G.G. Yagoda and N.I. Yezhov. 2 See entry dated February 3, 1941. 3 This refers to the people's commissars of the republican NKVD and the NKGB.

4 Pavel Yakovlevich Meshik, later one of L.P. Beria, including those involved in the Atomic Project, was shot on December 23, 1953 in connection with the "Beria case". In 1941, he worked as the head of the 1st department of the Main Economic Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR, and after the separation of the people's commissariats, he was appointed People's Commissar of the State Security Service of the Ukrainian SSR.

5 Kobulov Bogdan Zakharovich, employee of L.P. Beria still in the Caucasus, February 8, 1941 was approved by the Deputy People's Commissar of the State Security Service of the USSR V.N. Merkulov.

On February 63, 1941, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks approved the draft Decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the division of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR into two people's commissariats: the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR and the People's Commissariat of State Security of the USSR, as well as draft decrees of the USSR PVS on the appointment of L.P. Beria and People's Commissar of the NKGB of the USSR VN. Merkulov.

7 Almost simultaneously with the separation of the state security agencies from the NKVD into a separate NKGB, by the Decree of the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of February 8, 1941, the Special Department of the NKVD of the USSR was transferred to the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR and the People's Commissariat of the Navy of the USSR.

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states, but things have only increased!. The Deputy Presovrnarkom is strong. So Koba believes in me and appreciates me. It was getting there, that's understandable. But still nice. The responsibility is great and it will be necessary to work hard.

Let's see.

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev.

Since February 3, 1941, the state status of L.P. Beria has fundamentally increased. On the one hand, he remained the people's commissar of one of the most important people's commissariats, but at the same time he became one of Molotov's deputies for the Council of People's Commissars.

The division of the NKVD into the NKVD and the NKGB was a reasonable measure, since in the already distinctly pre-war period, one person could not – in a relatively normal, at any rate regime – cover such a huge amount of activity. Unless, of course, to work, and not to carry out, so to speak, general interference in the affairs of subordinates. But Beria could not work organically like that.

However, having freed himself from a significant part of his duties, Beria was immediately additionally "loaded" with new work in the national economy of the USSR. On February 3, he was also appointed Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR Molotov.

The first deputy of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR was at that time N.A. Voznesensky (1903-1950), at the same time - Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR.

Deputy Chairmen of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR at the time of L.P. Beria were also A.I. Mikoyan (1895-1978), A.Ya. Vyshinsky (1883-1954), A.N. Kosygin (1904-1980), V.A. Malyshev (1902-1957), M.G. Pervukhin (1904-1978), K.E. Voroshilov (1881-1969) and L.3. Mekhlis (1889-1953).

Simultaneously with L.P. Beria on February 3, 1941, M.Z. was appointed Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. Saburov (1900-1977).

1 February 3, 1941 L.P. Beria was appointed Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.

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Vyshinsky and Voroshilov were not connected with the economy and did not represent large independent figures, although Voroshilov was a member of the Politburo.

Kosygin, Malyshev, Pervukhin and Saburov were, in fact, pure business executives, and although their state competence was high, they were figures of a typically second rank, incapable of large-scale independent state activity, and even more so of reformation.

Mekhlis, despite the fact that Stalin appreciated him, was a figure, although not useless and not mediocre, but still specific. And also without a big flight of thought.

Anastas Mikoyan was a member of the top party and state leadership for a long time, but had no independent significance.

In the secret information of the State Planning Committee of the USSR presented to the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars on the preliminary results of the implementation of the plan for the development of the economy of the USSR for 1940, it was reported that a number of people's commissariats did not fulfill the planned tasks. Actually, the plan was fulfilled only by the people's commissariats of the aviation industry, armaments, the people's commissariats of the textile, light and food industries and the people's commissariat of procurement.

The People's Commissariat of the coal industry fulfilled the plan by 98%; oil industry - by 91; power plants — by 96; ferrous metallurgy - by 94; non-ferrous metallurgy - by 91, chemical industry - by 84, heavy engineering - by 99; medium machine building - by 95; general engineering - by 91; shipbuilding industry — by 89; ammunition - by 93; electrical industry - by 92; building materials industry - by 84; timber industry - by 84; paper and pulp industry - by 80; meat and dairy industry - by 91; fish industry — by 84%.

And so, from 1941, Beria began to oversee the work of the coal and oil industries, ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, as well as the chemical industry and power plants.

In addition, on March 10, 1941, Beria recommends Sta

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Lina and Molotov to appoint S.R. Milstein. Stalin replied as follows: "I propose to appoint Milstein as the first deputy at the ION (Acting People's Commissar. - S.K.) Saltykov, look for three or four months, allow Milstein to enter the matter during this time, and only after that raise the question about Milstein's drug addiction. I. Stalin.

Perhaps Milstein would have become a people's commissar, but after a little over three months the war began, and Beria returned the old tried and tested comrade-in-arms to the newly united NKVD.

As for the new pre-war appointment of L.P. Beria, the very fact that he was instructed to oversee the most important sectors of the economy that were in a "breakthrough" suggests that by 1941, Stalin was convinced of the high managerial potential of the new member of his personal "team".

Unlike many others, Beria did not disappoint him further and never let him down.

12/P-41

We have to strengthen the Romanian border. Provocations became more frequent. Germans are observed in the border zone, but only Romanians are shooting.

Across the German frontier, a new arrival of troops. So the concentration of troops continues. If they bring at least 200 divisions and the corresponding (So in the text. - S.K.) number of tank divisions, this can be considered a war. Or very close.

Publisher help.

From February 15 to 20, 1941, the 18th Conference of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was held in Moscow, which discussed the tasks of party organizations in the field of industry, transport and the plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR for 1941, as well as issues of "updating the central bodies of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks)". On the first issue, the report was made by N.A. Voznesensky.

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On the second question, at the Plenum of the Central Committee, by-elections to the Central Committee and the Central Auditing Commission were held. A new rather large group of military leaders was elected to the central bodies. In addition to the members of the Central Committee Marshals Budyonny, Voroshilov, Kulik, Timoshenko, People's Commissar of the Navy Kuznetsov, Generals Stern and Shchadenko, candidates for members of the Central Committee Konev, Meretskov, Shaposhnikov and others, generals G. TO. Zhukov, M.P. Kirponos, I.V. Tyulenev, Admiral I.S. Yumashev, and members of the Central Committee - General F.I. Golikov and Admirals V.F. Tributs and F.S. October.

On February 22, 1941, the VI session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was held.

25 11-41

Spoke with Mykyta!. I ask, how is Meshik? Says it works well. Everyone immediately liked that he knew the language. I say, he won't become a nationalist there? Laughs, says: "what is there is nothing" (Ukr. "what is not, that is not." - S.K.). I ask, according to Serov? do not regret? Presses. It can be seen that it was easier with Ivan. But Pavel is a strong man, he will carry out his line and will not succumb.

We talked with Koba about accidents in aviation. This is his main headache right now. How to give more planes and how to ruin them less. Leverage \* knocks on

and N.S. Khrushchev.

2 P.Ya. Meshik, from February 8, 1941, People's Commissar for State Security of the Ukrainian SSR.

3 I.A. Serov, until February 8, 1941, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, from February 8, 1941 - First Deputy People's Commissar of the USSR State Security Service V.N. Merkulov.

4Rychagov Pavel Vasilievich, Head of the Main Directorate

of the Air Force of the Red Army, from February 1941 also Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR.

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Shakhurina!, Shakhurin on Rychagova, but I know that the pilots had a mess and still have a mess.

And I don't see both of them rooting hard for the cause. Shakhurin works a lot, but the main thing for him is to report to Koba. Comrade Stalin is Comrade Stalin. But before you do it, report first.

And Rychagov seems to be without a king in his head. Your subordinates are fighting, and you are sitting your ass in Moscow. You are a pilot, now here, and in the evening already there. He sat down, flew, flew from the sky to his head for 1000 km. Arrived, figured it out, then flew on. And they respect vodka more than business. If I could fly, oh, how I would work. Koba does not allow flying by plane, but it would be convenient.

Did you talk to Ponomarenko?, he promises to help my border guards. He says it's a common thing, but the time is troubling.

It's also unclear. He himself says that the times are troubling, but at Koba he was more reassuring that our gunpowder is dry, Comrade Stalin.

Mykyta also blows the same tune. And reports from the border x..evye.

3/Sh-41

Look, look, look anyway. HF remained with Vsevolod. This is not the case, it must be returned to me. This business must be developed and pressed, Vsevolod will not succeed in this way. He has enough to worry about. And I need HF myself.

, Shakhurin Alexey Ivanovich, People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry of the USSR.

6 Ponomarenko Panteleimon Kondratievich (1902-1984), 1st Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Belarus.

2 When the NKVD was divided in February 1941 into two people's commissariats, the department of government HF communications initially remained in the NKGB (in the 4th department of operational equipment), but a month later, by a joint order of the NKVD / NKGB No. 00332 / 0066 dated March 26, 1941 year this department returned to the NKVD.

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9/Sh-41

Mykyta is still in Moscow. I don't understand. Does he have no business in Ukraine? There you need day and night, a huge economy. And the underground is the strongest there, they hurt hard. I told him so, we will still suffer with the OUN. We have cleared Ukraine of the open fifth column, but the underground is sitting. And the gangs go. And he is in Moscow. And everything is with Koba.

Gets to visit. I say, friend Nikita Sergeevich, I don't always see the house at night. We divide the People's Commissariat, we divide, we won't finish everything. Now I am not a people's commissar, but one and a half people's commissars. Two eyes on NAVD, one eye on NEGB. And also at the Council of People's Commissars. Soon your eyes will pop.

He says you have people, cadres decide everything. I say they decide if you are in charge of personnel.

I teased, I said: "And you, dear comrade, have escaped from the cadres, you are chilling in Moscow." He waved his hand. He says they will manage, I need to solve important questions with Comrade Stalin.

Well decide. And I have to share. It seems to be the case, to separate the GUGB. But in fact, a new structure is obtained here. There is no need to share chairs here, it is necessary to reorganize the whole work. In two years, we have seen what is good, what needs to be removed, what should be transferred where. But it works out better. And it will be easier for me!

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev

Very interesting and, above all, correct reasoning. And it is worth dwelling on it in more detail ...

The structural basis of a separate People's Commissariat of State Security of the USSR was primarily, of course, the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR. Its head V.N. Merkulov and became the People's Commissar of the NKGB. However, the division into two people's commissariats was by no means mechanical and required a lot of time from Beria.

1 See comment below.

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In fact, Beria and his assistants prepared for February 1941 and during the winter and spring of 1941 carried out a new reform of the NKVD. In the process of organizing two people's commissariats, it only developed and deepened.

If the first reform of Beria in 1939 was intended primarily to clear the Augean stables of the NKVD Yagoda-Yezhov, then the second reform of 1941 had the main goal of optimizing the activities of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs and the Soviet secret service. More than two years have passed since the beginning of Beria's reformist actions, the cadres were sorted out, selected and educated. Now it was possible to think about how to work even more efficiently.

The Department of Internal Affairs is a necessary element of the management of any society. Suffice it to recall such functions as the protection of public order, fire protection, registration of acts of civil status, etc.

The NKVD of the USSR also conducted a large national economic activity through its industrial departments.

The NKVD was left with the protection of the state border and reconnaissance of the adjacent border strip and a number of other important functions.

The UNKGB had a number of its own, purely specific, tasks, but some of its functions could not help intertwining with the functions of the NKVD. The new structure and procedure for the interaction of the two people's commissariats should have taken this into account as well.

Having divided the people's commissariats, Beria once again reorganized the NKVD.

So, on February 28, 1941, the order of the NKVD No. 00232 "On the organization of the First Special Department of the NKVD of the USSR" was issued. Numerous and diverse tasks of the new department (it had 15 departments) were defined in detail, accurately and comprehensively - Beria never had it otherwise. I will name just one: "Implementation of a centralized alphabetical and dactyloscopic registration of criminals arrested by the NKGB, NKVD, 3 departments of the NPO and the NKVMF, the prosecutor's office and the court, held in prisons, labor camps, near

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detention centers and other places of detention of the NKVD and the NKGB."

April 17, 1941 People's Commissar of the NKVD L.P. Beria approved the "Regulations on the Directorate of Operational Troops of the NKVD of the USSR." This was also an important moment.

By the way, in previous comments, I seem to have forgotten to emphasize that by order of the NKVD No. 001013 dated August 17, 1940, the Main Directorate for Political Propaganda of the NKVD Troops of the USSR was formed as part of the NKVD of the USSR, headed by divisional commissar P.N. Mironenko. IN

The NKVD model of Yagoda and the model of Yezhov did not pay much attention to this side of the matter, as well as to the optimization of the structure of the NKVD. It is understandable! Even if we do not take into account the talkative deeds and political intrigues and ambitions, it should be noted that the people of Yagoda and Yezhov, like themselves, were at best untalented dilettantes from the administration. And Beria and the cadres he brought up were brilliant, self-confident and tenacious, with a quick reaction, professional managers.

Returning to the new Directorate of Operational Troops of the NKVD of the USSR, formed two months before the start of the war, I will report the first two of its tasks, indicated by the letters from) to g), the first two:

"a) organization, management and control of service and combat training of troops;

6) directing the combat operations of the troops ... "

The falsifiers of history claim that Beria blocked any information about the impending war (later we will see that he did exactly the opposite, informing Stalin about the threat of war throughout the first half of 1941), but the first two tasks of the Directorate of Operational Troops of the NKVD of the USSR show that Beria just oriented the troops subordinate to him to a real close war, which the NKVD troops had to meet at a high organizational level and meet with dignity.

That's how they met her! And the Directorate of Operational Troops of the NKVD of the USSR, created by Beria before the war, greatly helped in the formation in the shortest possible time of those 15 full-blooded Chekist divisions of the NKVD, which played a strategic role in the summer and autumn of 1941.

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15 11-41

It seems that they have their own people, and everything is known, but a division is a division. Time took a lot. Now I deal with the Industrial People's Commissariats. Tevosyan! I know for a long time, with Lomako? and Sedinyms get acquainted. Now it is necessary to get acquainted with drug addicts as anew. People seem to know, Tevosyan is generally a figure. Sedin did not seem very good. And Lomako is an active guy. Chief specialist, higher education in the field, worked as the director of the Kolchuginsky plant. People's Commissar since July 1940, so he has not yet fully entered the course of the matter, nothing, he will pull it up.

Letkov\* is also a good guy and also a specialist. The responsible person.

I deal with the rest.

What's stopping us is the unfinished business. They seize on everything at once, and then they cannot build it in time and the bagpipes begin. This needs to end, I told everyone so. Accurate schedule! You can't say. I will help you with what I can and with what I cannot, but the responsibility is on you. You are an expert, you  
reply.

Sedin's deputy is a young guy, the funny name is Baibako. They told me they call me bastards  
linen

1 Tevosyan Ivan Fyodorovich (Tevadrosovich) (1901-1958), prominent statesman. In 1918-1920, at underground work in Baku, in 1919-1921. Secretary of the Baku City Party Committee. From May 1940 - People's Commissar (Minister) of Ferrous Metallurgy of the USSR, from June 1949 - Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

2 Pyotr Fadeevich Lomako (1904-1990), statesman, since July 9, 1940 People's Commissar of Nonferrous Metallurgy of the USSR.

5 Sedin Ivan Korneevich (1906-1972), from July 3, 1940 to November 30, 1944, People's Commissar for the Oil Industry of the USSR.

4 Letkov Andrey Ivanovich (1903-1942). Since April 17, 1940, People's Commissar of Power Plants of the USSR. In 1942, he died in the line of duty in an accident at a power plant.

5 Baibakov (Baybako) Nikolai Konstantinovich (1911–2008), statesman, since 1940 Deputy People's Commissar of the Oil Industry, since November 30, 1944 People's Commissar of the USSR Oil Industry. A native of the village of Sabunchi, Baku province. In 1932 he graduated from the Azerbaijan Industrial Institute, worked in Baku in the oil field.

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tyaev. But this guy is a hard worker. He studied in Baku, almost a countryman. And I'm from there. Thirty years old, and a guy with a perspective. It will work well, we will advance further.

19/Sh-41

This year we are starting to massively build heavy tanks. The People's Commissariat should allocate the labor force of the Gulag for the construction of capacities at the Kirov Plant. 3000 people. Koba set the task of producing 1,000 Klim Voroshilov (KV) tanks at the Kirov Plant by the end of the year. Good tank. I told Kobe that the Klim Voroshilov was a good tank, and if the Joseph Stalin tank were made, it would be even better. He looked and said: "Maybe we will do it again. But this is already for the offensive!".

22 1-41

I'm back in aviation. Aircraft and engines. It's better with motors. Aircraft designers had more sabotage, and almost all engine designers are reliable. Maybe that's why motors are better. But the accident rate is not just from poor quality. It's deeper here.

Spring, birthday is coming soon. Would you like to go home, see your mother?

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev.

What other people call a personal life, Beria did not have for a long time. The daily whirlwind of affairs and duties was so intense that there was no time left for myself. However, this was how almost all the major statesmen in Stalin's USSR lived then, starting with most

5 An interesting entry. In the second half of the war, the heavy tank "Joseph Stalin" ("IS-2"), which was used as a breakthrough tank, actually entered service with the Red Army.

2 See comment below.

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Stalin. Stalin loved his mother, but could not go to her funeral. Beria turned out differently - his mother could not come to his funeral.

We know little about the relationship between the adult Beria and his mother, but I was cut to the heart by a phrase from a note from the short-lived (from April to September 1953) Mirtskhulava Khrushchev, 1st Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, dated August 25, 1953:

".. Beria's mother - Beria Marta, a deeply religious woman, visits churches and prays for her son - an enemy of the people."

Beria's mother (1872–?), a pensioner, was evicted in July 1954 from Tbilisi, where she lived in a separate apartment, to the Gulripsh district of the Abkhaz ASSR. Beria in the Krasnoyarsk Territory, Sverdlovsk Region and Kazakhstan, about thirty of his

relatives, including the widow Nino, son Sergo, sister, cousins, nephews, etc.

30/Sh-41

I rarely go to Koba now. Call, ask a question, and then just call. When questions about the People's Commissariat, when about the Industrial People's Commissariats, and now we are doing a lot of aviators. Things are bad there. We are doing well in terms of the quantity of aircraft production, but the quality is not being ensured. And a lot of people are fighting.

A commission from NGOs worked in the Moscow District. Now Koba instructed Vsevolod and me to conduct another check. Said it was a week. Said a lot is clear, you check to control!.

9/TU-41 There was a big talk about the mess in aviation. Timoshenko wanted to cover up, but there is no you will smear.

1cm next post and comments.

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Drinking as it was and is, but they teach badly. There are defective planes, I do not argue. But you fly around them, check. And most importantly, teach people. Maybe the war is on the nose, but they have such a mess.

Rychagov was removed for the case!. And Pumpura? in general it is necessary to shoot.

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev.

On April 9, 1941, the Politburo adopted the Resolution "On accidents and catastrophes in the aviation of the Red Army." Today, "Advanced" "historians" explain the extremely high accident rate in the Red Army Air Force before the war solely by "forced production of aircraft". However, this is nonsense if only because even during the war the accident rate in the Air Force, although it was high, was not as high in percentage terms as before the war. But then the level of personnel in the aviation industry fell, and the production of aircraft was indeed forced to the limit and beyond the limit, and the training of pilots proceeded extremely rapidly.

No, the reasons for the trouble in the Air Force in the first half of 1941 were still different, starting with direct betrayal in the leadership of the Air Force.

Thus, in May 1941, Ivan Filimonovich Sakrier (1900-1941), deputy head of armaments and supplies of the Main Directorate of the Air Force of the Spacecraft, was arrested on charges of subversive and espionage work. In 1941, Beria shot him. Later, the Khrushchevites rehabilitated him, but Sacrier was indeed connected with German intelligence. And he occupied important

On April 19, 1941, the head of the Air Force of the spacecraft and the deputy people's commissar of defense of the USSR P.V. Rychagov (1911-1941) was removed from his posts "as undisciplined and failed to cope with the duties of the head of the Air Force." He was sent to study at the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Red Army, but after the start of the war he was arrested and later shot.

PI. Pumpur, Commander of the Air Force of the Moscow Military District, Lieutenant General.

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hundred in the Red Army - in the Main Artillery Directorate, in the Air Force Directorate!

On the other hand, vulgar negligence and irresponsibility flourished everywhere. At a meeting of the Politburo in April 1941, monstrous things were revealed. However, let



the reader judges for himself.

In March 1941, in the capital, Moscow, military district, under the noses of the future "innocent victims of the Stalinist-Beria terror" Generals Smushkevich and Rychagov, as well as another "victim" - the commander of the Air Force of the Moscow Military District, Lieutenant General Pumpur (all three former Heroes of the Soviet Union and all three were rehabilitated by the Khrushchevites), 23% of the pilots did not fly combat aircraft at all. In the units of the 24th air defense division, not a single exercise was conducted, not a single alert was announced with the departure of fighters. Gone months before the war!

The inspection of the People's Commissariat of Defense found that almost all units of the Air Force of the Moscow Military District were not combat-ready, the machine guns were not fired, the bomb racks were not adjusted, and combat readiness on alarms was not worked out. Due to low training, the number of dead pilots alone was in the tens.

Rychagov, Smushkevich, Sacrier and several other aviation generals were shot by decision of the Special Meeting on October 28, 1941. The investigation into the case of Pumpur lasted until February 1942, when, at the direction of Stalin, by decision of the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR, he was sentenced to death by firing squad.

In modern sources (and quite anti-Soviet and loyal to Rychagov), I came across deaf information that in June 1941, Rychagov, on behalf of Stalin, conducted a secret inspection of the Soviet-German border. If this is so, then this means that even before the war itself, Stalin fully trusted Rychagov politically and believed in his patriotism. Nevertheless, Rychagov was already arrested on June 24, 1941. But this already means that he deliberately misinformed Stalin about the situation on the border and was arrested as a direct traitor. It's sad, but, alas, it's not out of the question.

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The Air Force was also very developed drunkenness. There was no all-weather aviation then, and flying in adverse weather conditions is difficult and dangerous. Therefore, when the weather was non-flying, the pilots simply killed time on the ground, and they brightened up boredom with booze. And it became the norm. The same Chkalov, alas, abused alcohol. It was quite possible to organize ground training and engage the personnel — even the same drill training (I must say a disciplining element of army service). However, this is exactly what aviation commanders did carelessly or did not do at all. But, for example, in 1938 the Commander of the Air Force of the Belarusian Military District K.M. Gusev could have seated Air Force Inspector A.K. Serov, Hero of the Soviet Union and a friend of Gusev, and we will "buzz" to the point of insensibility.

At a meeting of the Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR on November 21, 1938, a member of the Military Council of the Belarusian Special Military District I.V. Rogov directly stated:

"..Drunkenness in the district is developed quite richly, it is especially developed in the Air Force. There are two aviation chiefs sitting here: Comrade Denisov, Hero of the Soviet Union, and Comrade Gusev. Comrade Denisov's brigade is notable for drunkenness in the district and, perhaps, can take first place... It was difficult for Comrade Gusev to fight against drunkenness, since he himself once showed a bad example, getting drunk with Colonel Serov "in smoke", what is called. This should not be, because if the commanders themselves start drinking, then what, one wonders, can be demanded from their subordinates.

This, of course, was not the case in all aviation formations and units, but the difficult situation in which the Soviet Air Force found itself in the first days of the war was largely on the conscience of a significant part of the highest aviation commanders. The same commander of the Air Force of the Western Special Military District, General Kopets, "prepared" for war so carelessly that if he had not shot himself with the outbreak of hostilities, he would have been deservedly put on trial together with the former commander of the ZapOVO Pavlov and, like Pavlov, shot.

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10/LU-41

The Germans occupy Yugoslavia and Greece!. And then their success. I am an outsider to external affairs, they don't even address correspondence from the NKID to me. But I also think. And now I can't think of anything. I don't understand.

We, with our pact with the Serbs, crap. Only signed, and Hitler went to Yugoslavia. Why Koba agreed to this pact is unclear. The Serbs look back at the British, the coup was staged by the British, but what do we have to do with it? It was possible to do something before the Germans dragged Yugoslavia into the tripartite pact. Then you could count on something. Why now? So you got fuchs ?, just the opposite. It is still unclear how this will end for us. The Germans evaluate our pact with the Yugoslavs in different ways, but Hitler got angry.

Why do we need this. We just didn't have enough war (So in the text. - S.K.). And that's how you can get there. I don't understand.

I have always followed Koba and will follow Koba. We are all smart guys in the Politburo, and Koba is a genius. How many people burned out because they thought that they themselves were smart, and Koba was a fool and was leading the wrong way. From here came oppositions, groups, conspiracies and all that parsley that manifested itself in Tukhachevsky, Zinoviev, Rykov, Bukharin and all the bastards. No, everyone has a thin gut, only Koba was always right. And when he makes a mistake, he will correct himself.

You can't go against Koba. The people believe him, they understand that Comrade Stalin always does the right thing. And if we do not understand and grumble, then it is worse for us. Time has passed, it is clear that Comrade Stalin is right. So it was and so it will be.

On April 15, 1941, the Soviet-Yugoslav Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression was signed. On April 6, 1941, Germany launched an invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece. On April 17, 1940, Yugoslavia capitulated, and on April 23, Greece.

Fuchs - in billiards, an accidentally, unexpectedly won ball. This is where the expression "win with fuchs" comes from.

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They didn't want industrialization, they didn't want collectivization, how much blood was shed, how much resistance there was. And how many howled: "Koba leads to death. Koba - mediocrity. Koba rested, but you need to be flexible.

And how did it end! For ten years another Country. And the economy is different, and people. Cadres decide everything. But frames had to be created. Created, nurtured. And Koba led and will lead. We will go on like this for another ten years, and no one will believe that twenty years ago people wore bast shoes and there was famine and strikes. This is if there is no war. War now can only be with the Germans, but why? We don't need a war. So why are we teasing them with this pact. All the same, they will beat the Serbs, but what about us?

I don't understand Cob. But you have to follow Koba! He will have the truth, and he will have it, even if there is a war. And there might be war. And along the line of Vsevolod? there is information, and along the line of Sokolov's intelligence<sup>3</sup>. It's not quiet on the border.

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev.

It must be said right away that acquaintance with the entry in the diary of L.P. Beria dated April 10, 1941 touched my "sore spot" - the topic of the Soviet-Yugoslav treaty of April 5, 1941. This step of Stalin is absolutely incomprehensible to me. For the only time in his political life, Stalin acted not only recklessly, but frankly stupid.

Beria's doubts became for me another confirmation that Beria was able to think politically quite independently. Another thing is that it is precisely because of this that Beria consciously, even

alone with himself, he did not even allow the thought that it was possible to pursue a line different from the Stalinist one, whatever they might be.

1 See comment below.

- People's Commissar of the State Security Service of the USSR Vsevolod Merkulov, who was in charge of foreign intelligence of the NKGB of the USSR from February 3, 1941.

3 Head of the Main Directorate of the Border Troops of the NKVD of the USSR.

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But this did not exclude, as we see, L.P.'s internal hesitations and doubts. Beria on the key - in my opinion - moment of Soviet-German relations before the war. The wrong assessment of this moment by Stalin and the stupid behavior of the USSR in relation to the problem of the Balkans, which followed from it, finally pushed Hitler to the decision to fight with Russia.

The point here is this. For Hitler, who was at war with England, who did not want to end the matter with peace, by 1941 the time factor had become vital. He understood that in another year or two, America would come to Europe again, like a quarter of a century ago, to defeat Germany and become the supreme judge and final master of Europe.

On the other hand, for Hitler, Romanian oil was vital - the only reliable source of supplies to Germany.

If England occupied the Balkans, she would be able to effectively bomb the Ploiesti oil fields.

Hitler could not allow this. This means that he could not allow the British to enter the Balkans. And the British were just aiming there. Here is some timeline...

In December 1939, the British offensive began in North Africa. On January 15, 1941, the British offensive began in East Africa; on January 22, the British occupied Tobruk. On March 7, 1941, the British began to land troops in Greece, and the island of Crete was occupied by British troops on November 1, 1939.

On September 27, 1939, Germany, Italy and Japan signed the Tripartite Pact. In the USSR, after the war, it was presented as directed against the USSR, although the Tripartite Pact was aimed at neutralizing the United States and countering England. That this pact was not of an anti-Russian character is best proved by the fact that in November 1940, Hitler, in a conversation with Molotov, suggested that we join the Tripartite Pact.

The inflexible policy of the USSR led to someone that the Tripartite Pact gradually began to acquire a not very friendly character towards the USSR due to the fact that after the failure of the Berlin negotiations of Molotov, the Tripartite Pact was joined on November 20-24, 1939

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Hungary, Romania and Slovakia. Especially the first two countries were more than cool towards the USSR.

On March 1, 1941, Bulgaria joined the Tripartite Pact, and German troops entered the territory of Bulgaria. And on March 25, 1941, under pressure from Germany, the Tripartite Pact was also signed in Vienna by Yugoslavia.

Almost immediately, on March 27, a British-inspired coup d'etat took place in Belgrade, and the pro-British government of Simovic came to power. Yugoslavia in fact

withdrew from the Tripartite Pact (although Yugoslav Foreign Minister Nincic said that the new government would recognize the Vienna Protocol). And England had the opportunity to secure a convenient platform for organizing raids on the Romanian oil fields.

Under these conditions, the conclusion of the Friendship Pact with Yugoslavia was, to put it mildly, inexpedient for the USSR. Even at the end of March 1941, the Yugoslav representatives in Moscow were given to understand that Moscow did not want to get involved in the Balkan problems, however, on April 5, Stalin signed an agreement with Yugoslavia through the hands of Molotov - the day before the Wehrmacht invaded Yugoslavia.

Why they did it, I can't understand. Moreover, even the title of the treaty was almost caricatured: "On friendship and non-aggression." What kind of mutual attack could we talk about? And friendship is good, in which they agree on non-aggression against each other.

I note that the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was one of the most staunch anti-Soviet states in Europe. Many White Guard emigrants settled in Yugoslavia, Yugoslavia was always ready to support the anti-Soviet position of the Anglo-French. In 1931, the article "Yugoslavia", published in the 65th volume of the first edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, stated:

"In relation to the USSR, Yugoslavia has always taken a clearly hostile position. The bulk of the remnants of the Wrangel army found shelter in Yugoslavia, where they were used to serve in the border guards. The Wrangel detachments go through military training all the time and

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any moment can be used to form a white army."

Yugoslavia was almost the last (and most likely the last, except for the Vatican) European state to establish official diplomatic relations with the USSR! They were mutually installed only on June 25, 1940 (the fortieth!) Year.

At the same time, as already mentioned, on March 27, 1941, a coup d'état inspired by British intelligence took place in Belgrade, with the aim of turning Yugoslavia away from a peaceful course in relations with Germany.

British troops were preparing to enter Yugoslavia, and this sealed the German invasion of Yugoslavia. Accordingly, the conclusion by the Soviet Union of the Pact with the politically bankrupt Yugoslavia on the eve of Germany's operation against Yugoslavia was an objectively stupid and unfriendly step towards Germany.

Hitler was stunned by this step of Stalin precisely by its obvious irrationality. But, as we see, Beria also could not understand Stalin here.

I can't understand him either. I regard the Yugoslav "fuchs in reverse" as one of Stalin's fatal mistakes, although very few in number. Actually, in foreign policy this was, perhaps, the second and last major mistake of Stalin during his entire leadership of the country (the first was the underestimation of the possibility of an exclusively peaceful development of Soviet-German relations after August 23, 1939).

Stalin had previously been active in part of Yugoslavia. According to some information, he made efforts to organize such a coup d'état in Yugoslavia, when army officers loyal to the new Russia would come to power there. Thus, secret emissaries from the NKVD intelligence were sent to Yugoslavia back in 1938. In 1941, one of the leaders of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army, Mikhail Abramovich Milshtein (1910-1992), apparently went there on a flock mission.

I emphasize that this Milstein should not be confused with Beri-

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Yevsk colleague Solomon Rafailovich Milshtein (1899-1955).

Mikhail Milshtein from military intelligence, an employee of the Intelligence Department since 1933, a native of the city of Achinsk in the Krasnoyarsk Territory, lived quietly until perestroika times, was considered (I don't know how deservedly) one of the aces of intelligence and since 1966 had the rank of lieutenant general .

Solomon Milshtein, a native of Vilna, worked in the Army Special Departments from May 1925, and from January 1927 he became the Secretary of the GPU of Georgia, that is, a subordinate of L.P. Beria. An intelligent worker was noticed by Beria, and when in 1931 Beria became the 1st secretary of the CP (b) of Georgia, he took Milstein to himself in the Central Committee, and in December 1938 he transferred him to the NKVD of the USSR. The long career of Beria's Milstein ended immediately after Lavrenty's arrest Pavlovich. On June 30, 1953, Solomon Milshtein was arrested, on October 30, 1954 he was sentenced to death and on January 14, 1955 he was shot.

However, the famous Soviet intelligence general Pavel Sudoplatov in his memoirs claims that the NKVD also took steps to organize a coup in Yugoslavia in March 1941. He writes: "On our part, Alakhverdov participated in this action." However, Sudoplatov's memoirs, although in many of their parts are authentic to reality, in many of their parts, to put it mildly, do not really correspond to it. As far as I know, the first edition of Sudoplatov's book (and even with the participation of his son, an economist, as well as a certain Gerald Schecter and his wife Leona) was published in 1994 in the USA and France. One can only guess what in this book belonged to the pen of Pavel Sudoplatov, what - Anatoly Sudoplatov, and what was the result of a "family contract" of foreign spouses (and, perhaps, some completely obscure "co-authors" of them).

Often, inaccuracies in Sudoplatov's "memoirs" are visible to the naked eye. In particular, bearing in mind the "Yugoslav" collisions of 1941, one can note the oddity that the most experienced Chekist, a living history of the NKVD, forgot that in March 1941 the NKGB had already separated from the NKVD, including the GUGB and its 1 -e (intelligence) directorate

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nie. That is, all external intelligence actions went through Merkulov, not Beria. Of course, they still worked in close contact, but Beria had enough of his own worries, including the Council of People's Commissars, where he became Molotov's deputy from February 3, 1941. And Merkulov sent his reports directly to Stalin and, presumably, received assignments directly from him, coordinating the actions of foreign intelligence with him, now the NKGB of the USSR

So I don't know if Merkulov's NKGB had anything to do with the coup in Belgrade on March 27 and what Milshtein from the Intelligence Agency did in the Balkans - an institution, in fact, permanently not very reliable (suffice it to recall that both the traitor Penkovsky and the traitor Rezun - "Suvorov").

Nor do I know to what extent our success in the cause of the pro-Soviet coup in Yugoslavia was even possible. I think that the chances for this were zero even in 1938, when, according to the same Sudoplatov, Stalin was thinking about such a coup (which, for a number of reasons, I do not really believe). Whether sustainable Russian or Soviet success in the Balkans was impossible because the Balkan Slavs have always looked at Russia as a free source of "cannon fodder" designed to shed Russian blood for them, and as a cash cow. But they looked at the West as a master with a stick and a carrot. This was characteristic even of the masses, let alone the propertied strata!

One way or another, some attempts in terms of a pro-Soviet coup could have been made in 1940, or at least until mid-March 1941 - before the official accession of Yugoslavia to the Tripartite Pact.

After March 25, 1941, the Balkans should have become politically taboo for the USSR. But here, Stalin (I can't imagine why?!) managed to get into the Balkan situation in the most deplorable way. I would pay dearly to know who pushed him to this? But, as we see, it was not L.P. Beria.

The intrigue is strengthened by the fact that, firstly, from March 28 to April 10, 1941, Beria did not appear in Stalin's office. Secondly, during this period, Stalin did not receive much at all: only on March 28, April 5, 8 and 9 (on April 7, Stalin had only Molotov from 19.35 to 20.05). Of course, Stalin can

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go from the fact that the coup in Yugoslavia distracted Hitler from the USSR. But after all, on March 27, the coup had already taken place and was carried out by the hands of the British. Hitler was already forced (not by Stalin, but by Churchill) to undertake an invasion of Yugoslavia and, at the same time, pro-British Greece. So why, one wonders, was it necessary to conclude a pact of April 5?

It seems that someone provoked Stalin very seriously then. So, I do not rule out that some nimble figures (perhaps from the same Intelligence Agency) directly misinformed Stalin about the role of the Soviet special services in organizing the coup on March 27th. Stalin could be convinced that the British, they say, were only a screen, but in fact we rule the "ball" in Belgrade. And if, they say, the USSR concludes a pact with Yugoslavia, then, firstly, this will firmly include Yugoslavia in the sphere of Soviet influence, and secondly, it will keep Hitler from occupying Yugoslavia.

But such an occupation was indirectly beneficial to the USSR, already because diverting the Wehrmacht to operations in the Balkans reduced the likelihood of a German strike on the USSR in 1941 or, at least, postponed its timing, which was important for us.

The Soviet-Yugoslav Pact did not enter into force because by the end of April 1941 Yugoslavia had ceased to exist. However, Hitler's already fragile faith in Stalin's good intentions towards the Reich was, alas, finally undermined.

And Hitler decided to strike at Russia already in 1941, while the situation in Germany was at least somehow favorable.

15 LU-41

Koba again collected for aviation. I have already reached the end, everything is there, Shakhurin!, Dementiev?, Yakovlev? And Zhigarev was sitting. With Koba Vyacheslav, George and Anastas.

- People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry of the USSR. 2 Deputy People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry of the USSR.

Z Aircraft designer and Deputy People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry of the USSR.

Head of the Air Force of the Red Army.

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And yesterday I had a conversation with Timoshenko and Zhukov and Zhigarev. The People's Commissariat was instructed to build new airfields, a necessary thing, but how to do it in time. We need to work on more than 200 airfields. Lots of questions!

16 /LU-41

Today introduced Sergei? Koba. Koba switched to Georgian, Sergey answered him, I also inserted a word. And Vyacheslav sits like a fool, pouted and pretends that it does not concern him. Seen Koba

decided to tease. Then he speaks in Russian: "What are we comrades forgot about Vyacheslav Mikhailovich. He doesn't understand Georgian. Excuse me Comrade Molotov, we got carried away".

Vyacheslav looked pretty evil?

20 /TU-41

The pact with the Japanese was signed and the Japanese border became calmer\*. There are provocations, but less. It's worse with the Germans. Violations of the Romanian border by German aircraft began. Shooting at the Germans is strictly prohibited. If they fly away from us, we protest. And if they fly from the Romanians, then to whom to file a protest. Sokolov asks how to be. I ordered

On March 24, 1941, the NKVD of the USSR was entrusted with the task of building airfields for the Red Army Air Force. By order of the NKVD No. 00328 dated March 27, 1941, the Main Directorate of Airfield Construction (GUAC) of the NKVD of the USSR was established in the NKVD.

2 Sergey Arsentievich Goglidze (1901-1953), one of the leaders of state security, associate of L.P. Beria, in the 30s - People's Commissar of the NKVD of the ZSFSR and People's Commissar of the NKVD of the GSSR. From November 14, 1938 to February 26, 1941 - Head of the UNKVD for the Leningrad Region. In the early 1950s, he was Deputy Minister of State Security of the USSR. In 1953 he was convicted and shot in the "case of Beria".

On April 316, 1941, from 11:00 pm to 11:25 pm, only Stalin, Molotov, Beria, and Goglidze were in Stalin's office.

April 728, 1941 Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR V.M. Molotov and Japanese Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka signed a neutrality pact between the USSR and Japan for a period of five years.

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Maslennikov to request the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. From there they explain that protests must be made to the Romanian border authorities. Do not fire on German planes.

And they are already openly conducting deep reconnaissance. A German aircraft with photographic equipment was landed near Rovno and photographed our territory to a depth of 200 km. Reported to Kobe.

All intelligence data of the GUPV for the fact that they can start a war as soon as the roads allow. This is somewhere in the second half of May, not earlier. According to Vsevolod and the military, it turns out the same way. But they are dull.

Koba says that one must be prepared and not provoke. I send him messages all the time! He asks: "What do you think, will they start in the spring?"

I'm saying, I won't say for sure yet, but maybe late in the spring or summer. They just finished with the Yugoslavs and are finishing off the Greeks and the British." In Greece, they still need time, then to put the troops in order and transfer them. Mid-May, not earlier.

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev.

To this day, there is a lot of involuntary confusion, and even more deliberate

lies.

The point here is this.

Throughout the first half of 1941, the top political leadership, that is, Stalin and Molotov, as well as the top military leadership, that is, People's Commissar for Defense Timoshenko and the Chief of the General Staff

Zhukov of the Red Army, regularly received intelligence reports through the Intelligence Department of the General Staff (chief of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Lieutenant General Golikov), through the NKGB

1 See comment below.

2 The German operation in Greece was completed by April 29, 1941. From 24 to 29 April, British troops were evacuated from Greece.

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(People's Commissar Merkulov) and along the line of intelligence of the border troops of the NKVD (People's Commissar Beria).

Today, much (although, alas, far, far from everything!) has been published. Without overloading the text, I will simply refer, as typical examples, to two documents.

On April 26, 1941, the head of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army, Lieutenant General Golikov, sent Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Timoshenko, Beria, Zhukov, Kuznetsov (Navy Naval Forces) and Zhdanov a special message from the General Staff No. 660448ss on the distribution of the German Armed Forces in theaters and fronts of hostilities as of April 25, 1941.

The number of German troops in the border zone of the USSR was determined by the Intelligence Agency at 95-100 divisions (without cavalry units). The accuracy of the note was, it should be noted, not the best, but please pay attention to the mailing list. The mailing list was quite established, and later statements, for example by Zhukov, that Golikov allegedly informed Stalin "bypassing" the People's Commissar for Defense and the General Staff are simply false.

It must be said that the Intelligence Agency continued to underestimate the number of German troops, however, he nevertheless caught the tendency to increase tension. So, on May 5, 1941, in a special message of the RU General Staff No. 66-477ss, Golikov noted that in two months the number of German divisions in the border zone against the USSR increased by 37 divisions, of which the number of tank divisions increased from 6 to 12, and in total from ru - The Mynian and Hungarian armies have 130 divisions. The mailing list is the same, except for Zhdanov and with the addition of Budyonny, Shaposhnikov and Kulik.

The second document illustrates the work of foreign intelligence of the NKGB of the USSR. On April 24, 1941, People's Commissar Merkulov sent a regular note No. 1253/M to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (b), the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR NPO and the NKVD of the USSR, that is, to Stalin, Molotov, Timoshenko with Zhukov and Beria, about plans to prepare Germany for war with the USSR. In particular, there it was reported that "plans for an anti-Soviet action have not been removed from the agenda", that "the aviation headquarters is carrying out preparatory work with the same intensity for an operation against the USSR, which expresses

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Xia in the detailed definition of the objects of bombardment in the general plan of operations ... "etc.

However, here, too, the information is presented in a hypothetical and not very specific way.

But the Note of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.P. Beria No. 1196/5 dated April 21, 1941 on the transfer of German troops to the Soviet border and violation of the airspace of the USSR, sent by I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov and Commissar of Defense S.K. Tymoshenko:

"From April 1 to April 19, 1941, the border detachments of the NKVD of the USSR on the Soviet-German border obtained the following data on the arrival of German troops at points adjacent to the state border in East Prussia and the General Government.

In the border zone of Klaipeda region:

Two infantry divisions arrived, an infantry regiment, a cavalry squadron, an artillery battalion, a tank battalion, and a company of scooters.



To Suwalki Lykk area:

Up to two mechanized divisions, four infantry and two cavalry regiments, tank and engineer battalions arrived.

To Myshinets-Ostrolenka area:

Up to four infantry and one artillery regiments arrived, a tank battalion and a motorcyclists

To the Ostrov-Mazowiecki-Malkina-Gurna area:

One infantry and one cavalry regiment arrived, up to two artillery battalions and a company of tanks.

To the area of Biala Podlaska:

One infantry regiment, two sapper battalions, a cavalry squadron, a company of scooters, and an artillery battery arrived.

To the Vlodaa-Otchovok area:

Up to three infantry, one cavalry and two artillery regiments arrived.

To the Holm area:

Up to three infantry, four artillery and one motorized regiments, a cavalry regiment and a sapper battalion arrived. Over five hundred vehicles are also concentrated there.

To the Hrubieszow area:

Up to four infantry, one artillery and one motorized regiments and a cavalry squadron arrived.

To the Tomasov area:

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The headquarters of the formation arrived, up to three infantry divisions and up to three hundred tanks,

To the Pshevorsk-Yaroslav area:

They arrived up to an infantry division, over an artillery regiment and up to two cavalry regiments.

<...>

The concentration of German troops near the border took place in small units, up to a battalion, a squadron. Batteries, and often at night.

In the same areas where the troops arrived, a large amount of ammunition, fuel and artificial anti-tank obstacles were delivered.

In April, work on the construction of fortifications intensified.

<...>

During the period from April 1 to April 19, German planes violated the state border 43 times, making reconnaissance flights over our territory to a depth of 200 km.

Most of the planes were fixed over the regions: Riga, Kretinga, Taurogen, Lomzha, Rava Russkaya, Przemysl, Rovno.

Application: scheme.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Beria

As you can see, everything here is precise, concrete, and a quite definite picture of the obvious preparation of the first strike emerges. Just as concretely and conclusively, Beria informed Stalin in the future. Moreover, the intelligence information of the NKVD border troops, in principle, could not contain elements of strategic disinformation, because it was "ant" intelligence, where the overall picture consisted of hundreds of separate private reports from mass informants on the other side of the cordon.

25 /TU-41

Koba approved Sergey! Commissioner for Moldova. This time without tricks, Vyacheslav, Vsevolod, Sergei and I sat talking.

1 April 25, 1941 S.A. Goglidze was appointed authorized by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR in the Moldavian SSR. See also entry dated April 16, 1941.

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29:/TU-41

Vyacheslav said that Koba had discussed with Tymoshenko and Zhukov the situation with combat readiness in the western districts. They wrote a note. You don't write a note, but go yourself and write a report on the inspection. I travel a little, so I have a well-established apparatus. Chekists gave accurate information from the field even under Yagoda. I'm telling Tymoshenko, you rely more on your Third Office!. Something rumbles. Specialists are not their own for them. Fools and mud..ki in addition! They think the Special Department is like gendarmes. Here x..y you.

A real special officer is a separate control over the state of combat readiness. First Assistant Command. And then they discuss, discuss, but what is going on in the troops still don't know x..I don't know. Strategists! Koba does not acquaint me with the documents of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. And I would like to. Believes that Lavrenty x..evy diplomat.

There is a concentration of troops on the border with the Germans. Sending notes to Kobe, but no calls yet. And from the Border Troops they are already directly writing that there may be a howl at2. Did the Germans expect our offensive in mid-April?.

1 The former Special Department of the NKVD of the USSR, when the NKVD was divided, was transferred to the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR and transformed into the Third Directorate of the NPO.

2 The report of the Ukrainian border district of April 20, 1941 stated:

"The data of the units of the border troops of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR in the period from April 10 to 20 clearly confirm the accelerated preparation of the theater of war, carried out by the command and authorities of Germany both in the border zone of Germany and on the territory of Hungary. The most characteristic facts are: the ongoing intensive engineering and sapper training - tracing and separating trenches, reconnaissance of rivers, increased observation of our territory by officers, .. photographing our side both from the adjacent territory and flying different types of aircraft for the purpose of aerial photography ...

"April 18 at st. Razvadov, three echelons of tanks, guns and aircraft were unloaded ... "etc.

3 The report of the Ukrainian border district of April 20, 1941 reported: "There were rumors that the Germans were expecting an offensive by the Soviet troops on April 10-15.." Most likely, this was due to Berlin's fears that the USSR had concluded a pact with Yugoslavia on

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Prepared an order for Pechorlag!. Potemkin will be the boss, let him work. He told everyone that this is an order for one construction, but wrap everything around your mustache. You can only complete the plan if people work well. And then they will work well when they are fed, shod and clothed. And mood matters too. So life also needs to be built.

5/U-41

Spoke with Zhdanov. Koba is busy with the military and aviators. Andrei says that Koba doubts that there will be a war. He says that the risk for Hitler is very big. I told Andrei that it might be so, but the information from the border is very bad, it's just that so many troops are not moved. Then they strengthen the wooden bridges with iron. For what? For disinformation? (So in the text. - S.K.) Bullshit! They are preparing hard. Zhdanov says that the military also believe that the German will be afraid. And your reports, he says, Comrade Stalin reads and shakes his head.

Herovo. We need to get a conversation going.

not an inevitable German strike against Yugoslavia in order to have a formal reason to break with Germany and strike at her. It is even more likely that this was the result of a direct provocation by Churchill and Roosevelt (see diary entry of December 11, 1941).

! Order of the NKVD No. 0220 dated April 30, 1940 summed up the results of the examination by the commission of the NKVD of the USSR of the Pechora camp of the NKVD, where by the end of autumn 1940 a difficult situation had developed and the death rate among prisoners had sharply increased (see entry dated December 25, 1940 and commentary to her). The style of the order - energetic and at the same time specific, proved that the people's commissar did not just sign, but actually prepared this order for the people's commissariat. Beria did not pose as a humanist, the essence of his order focused on "the unconditional completion of the construction of the railway line Tsechora - Vorkuta within the time period established by the Government - in December 1941." But Beria demanded to ensure the fulfillment of this task not at the expense of the whip, but at the expense of a high organization of work and life at the construction site.

The same order ordered the arrest and trial of the head of the General Supply Department of the Pechorlag Heidereikh and the former head of the 2nd department of the Pechorlag Kondrashin "for the disruption of work on the supply and household arrangements of prisoners."

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1/U-41

I was at Koba's, but things were current! And it should. I live like crucian carp in a frying pan?

Publisher help.

The day of May 9, 1941 in the official pre-war history is not particularly marked in any way. And it was, most likely, a remarkable day. Then Stalin accepted only two. Whom?

Here is an entry in the journal of visits to Stalin's office:

"T. Khrushchev 11 o'clock exit 18 o'clock. T. Beria 21:45

out. 21 h. 50 Last. came out at 9:50 p.m.

What did Stalin talk about that day, first alone with Khrushchev, calling him from Kyiv, and then almost four hours later, alone with Beria? There is no record of this in the diary. But why?

I will touch on this in more detail in the commentary to the entry of June 10, 1941.

15/U-41

Today we agreed at Koba that we urgently need to clear the Baltics and the border in general. There were only Vyacheslav, Georgy, Zhdanov and Vsevolod."

May 17 L.P. Beria from 15.45 to 21.00 took part in a meeting with Stalin together with Molotov, L. Kaganovich, Bulganin, Voznesensky, Mikoyan and Shakhurin (People's Commissar for the aviation industry).

Judging by the emotional structure of the notes of May 5 and 7, Beria was very disturbed by the lack of a sharp reaction from Stalin to information about the threat of an imminent war.

3 See comment below.

" This refers to Molotov, Malenkov, Merkulov and, as is clear and true, Zhdanov.

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Everything must be carefully prepared. The good thing is that Koba seems to have realized that everything can be expected soon. Even a big war.

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev.

On May 16, 1941, Commissar of the State Security Service of the USSR Merkulov submitted to the Central Committee a memorandum of the NKGB No. 1687/M, in which he forwarded for consideration a draft Resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the SNK of the USSR on the "cleansing" of the Baltic states. The project was presented to Stalin signed by Beria and Merkulov. The decision adopted on its basis read, in particular:

"1. Allow the NKGB and the NKVD of the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian SSRs to arrest with confiscation of property and send them to camps for a period of 5 to 8 years, and after serving their sentence in the camps, exile the following categories of persons to a settlement in remote areas of the Soviet Union for a period of 20 years :

a) active members of counter-revolutionary parties and members of anti-Soviet nationalist White Guard organizations (A total of 5,420 people were arrested in the three republics. - S.K.);

6) former guards, gendarmes, the leadership of former policemen and jailers, as well as ordinary policemen and jailers. on which there are compromising materials (In total, 1603 people were arrested in three republics. - S.K.);

c) former large landowners, manufacturers and high officials of the former state apparatus of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia (In total, 3236 people were arrested in the three republics. - S.K.);

d) former officers of the Polish, Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian and White armies, on which there are compromising materials (In total, 1576 people were arrested in the three republics. - S.K.);

e) a criminal element who continues to engage in criminal activity (In total, 2162 people were arrested in the three republics. - S.K.) "...

As you can see, paragraph 1 referred to an urgent "cleansing" of an obvious "FIFTH COLUMN". Point 2 the decree provided for the expulsion to

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20 years of family members who lived together or were dependents of the repressed.

It also provided for the exile of "persons who arrived from Germany in the order of repatriation, as well as Germans who signed up for repatriation to Germany and refused to leave, in respect of which there are materials about Ikhanti-Soviet activities and suspicious connections with foreign intelligence agencies (In total there were 56 people were arrested in three republics – S.K.)".

But I will quote point 3 in full with particular pleasure - it is very funny in the light of "democratic" "horror films":

"3. Permit the NEGB and the NKVD of the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian SSRs to administratively deport prostitutes to the northern regions of Kazakhstan for a period of 5 years, previously registered with the former police bodies of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and now continuing to engage in prostitution.

In parentheses, I will inform you that the merry girls were expelled in the amount of 760 people, as were expelled from the Baltic states and 2162 criminals (these three thousand "victims of Merkulov-Beria" "democrats", of course, also add today to the general "Baltic martyrology").

The resolution ordered to send to the Baltic States, to help local authorities, Commissar of State Security Comrade Merkulov and his deputy Comrade Serov, as well as Deputy Commissar of Internal Affairs. Abakumov.

For use in conducting operations and investigations, 208 cadets of the Higher School of the NKGB of the USSR were sent to the republics, by nationality - Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians.

On the border of Lithuania with Belarus, a barrier zone was temporarily established "for the period of preparation and conduct of the operation", with the allocation of up to 400 border guards for this purpose.

Initially, it was proposed to carry out the operation in the shortest possible time only in Lithuania, but in reality it had to be carried out in all three republics from June 14 to June 17, 1941.

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Its results were as follows:

017 | centuries

Latvia 9546 15 171

In total - 40 178 people.

Including three thousand whores and bandits.

At the same time, the repressed included not only Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians, but also citizens of other nationalities, including the White Guards who settled in the Baltic states, etc. I emphasize that not one of them was shot! The maximum measure is from 5 to 8 years in camps.

Before the war, an additional "mopping up" of the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus, as well as the border zone of Moldova, was also carried out.

18/U-41

Just from Koba. We talked very well! But this must be recorded separately!

Was he very indignant at the mess with the plane? 2. Lived up!

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev.

On June 10, 1941, People's Commissar for Defense Tymoshenko and Chief of the General Staff Zhukov issued Order No. 0035, which began like this:

t Extremely intriguing record. The fact is that on the night of May 18-19, Stalin summoned only one person to the Kremlin - L.P. Beria, and then there was no reception all day on May 19. Beria entered the office at fifteen minutes to two in the morning, and left no one knows when (the time of leaving was not indicated in the Journal of Visits, the case is not frequent). Beria was clearly agitated by the conversation, but in the strangest way, he no longer touched on the essence of this conversation with Stalin in his diary. I give a possible explanation for this in a comment to the entry of June 10, 1941.

2 Of course, this refers to the ugly story with the unhindered passage to Moscow of the non-scheduled Yu-52 aircraft flying from the western border. See comment below.

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"On May 15, 1941, the German Yu-52 non-scheduled aircraft was allowed to cross the state border without any hindrance and flew across Soviet territory via Bialystok, Minsk, Smolensk to Moscow. No measures were taken to stop its flight by the NVO authorities ...

<...>

"The Chief of Staff of the Air Force of the Space Agency, Major General of Aviation Volodin, and the Deputy Chief of the 1st Department of the Headquarters of the Air Force, Major General of Aviation Grendal, knowing that the Yu-52 aircraft arbitrarily flew over the border, not only did not take measures to detain him, but also assisted his flight to Moscow with permission to land at the Moscow airfield and instructing the air defense service to ensure the flight ... "

At that time, General Volodin was merely reprimanded, but on June 27, 1941, he was arrested, because the situation on June 10 and June 27 was as different as heaven and earth.

In October 1941, by decision of the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR, which received the right after the start of the war to sentence Volodin to capital punishment as an emergency measure, as well as Colonel General A.D. Loktionova and G.M. Stern, Lieutenant General of Aviation F.K. Arzhenukhin, I.I. Proskurov and P.V. Rychagov, twice Hero of the Soviet Union Ya.V. Smushkevich, divin-engineer I.F. Sacriera, Major General M.M. Kayukova, G.M. Savchenko and brig engineer S.O. Sklizkov was shot.

But Major General of Aviation Dmitry Davydovich Grendal, mentioned in Timoshenko's order, worked quietly and during the war as Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force for Intelligence, in 1943 he became Lieutenant General of Aviation. Although it would seem that someone could be repressed for a sweet soul - Dmitry Grendal, what kind of elder brother Vladimir, was from the nobility, and even of Swedish origin.

By the way, V.D. Grendal (1884-1940), a military theorist, colonel-general of artillery (1940), also, of course, let us down in terms of the questionnaire, having managed to graduate from the Mikhailovskaya Artillery Academy in tsarist times and rise to the rank of colonel. A participant in the 1st World War, he joined the Red Army in 1918, held important positions in the Soviet artillery, commanded an operational group of troops in the Finnish War, and died in November 1940 of lung cancer.

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26/U-41

The day before yesterday, Koba had a big meeting with the military. We were not invited, there was only Vyacheslav (V.M. Molotov. - S.K.).

Today I visited Koba together with Vsevolod! . Vsevolod raised the question of Sergeev's arrest before Koba? and Vannikov? We'll have to arrest and start an investigation. There is data, especially on Sergeev. Georgy (G.M. Malenkov. - S.K.) supports.

I don't understand how people fall apart. Sergeev is the son of a worker. You were raised, taught, work. And you become a bastard. This is a serious matter, it will have to wind and wind.

But Vannikov is sorry, he blabbed.

Then we talked about the general situation. Koba is nervous. It doesn't look like him, but he has nothing to hide before us. He told me and Vsevolod that only your subordinates know more than you\*. He looked at Ponomarenko and said: "But Panteleimon already has everything in sight."

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev.

So that the reader can judge for himself whether the former People's Commissar of Ammunition Sergeev was justly arrested, and then convicted and shot in 1942, I will quote a part of the Politburo Decree of November 11, 1940, based on the results of a joint check by the People's Commissar of the State Control of the USSR (People's Commissar L. Z. Mekhlis) and the People's Commissariat of the USSR NKVD

1 People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR V.N. Merkulov.

2 Ivan Pavlovich Sergeev (1897-1942), former People's Commissar for Ammunition of the USSR, dismissed on March 3, 1941 and transferred to teach at the Military Academy of the General Staff. May 30, 1941 arrested. See entry of October 23, 1940 and note 1 of the book.

3 See entry dated 23 October 1940 and note 1 to it.

On May 26, 1941, from 23.25, only Beria, Malenkov, Merkulov and the 1st Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Belarus N.K. remained in Stalin's office. Ponomarenko.

At 23.50 Merkulov left. The rest left Stalin at 0.15 on May 27.

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ammunition of the USSR. The check was very thorough and qualified, it was carried out by 55 employees of the NKGK and the NKVD under the leadership of the Chief Inspector of the NKGK Gafarov and the deputy head of the GEM NKVD Nasedkin.

When reading the full act on the results of the check, the hair stands on end. But even brief extracts give an idea of what was going on in the People's Commissariat of Ammunition of the USSR less than a year before the start of the war:

"..For 9 months of 1940, the National Design Bureau did not provide the Red Army and the Navy with 4.2 million ground artillery rounds, 3 million mines, 2 million aerial bombs and 205 thousand naval artillery rounds.

In 1940, the NKB was supposed to produce 5.7 million iron shells instead of brass artillery shells. Having not worked out the technological process, the NKB manufactured 1,117 thousand iron shells in 9 months, of which 963 thousand went into marriage ...

"The National Design Bureau conducts a huge correspondence, loading the apparatus ... For the 3rd quarter of this year, the National Design Bureau received daily from the factory (So in the text. - S.K.) and construction sites an average of 1400 letters and 880 were sent ...

"For a year and a half, the People's Commissariat removed 26 heads of enterprises and 18 chief engineers from work. Only at plant No. 78 during this time in shop No. 4 were replaced 5 bosses, 8

deputy chiefs and 14 department heads...

"In the absence of a sufficient number of engineers in the NKB system, during the 7 months of 1940, according to incomplete data, 1226 certified engineers were fired from the plant ...", etc.

Reading this, you do not believe that this could be. However, it would. As for the role and policy of People's Commissar for Ammunition Sergeev, it was said as follows:

"..Tov. Sergeev is poorly versed in people, does not know how to recognize them. He had great confidence in Inyashkin, the Deputy Commissar for Personnel (removed from work during the inspection of the NKB) ... Inyashkin, who was distinguished by idleness, drunkenness and self-supply, ruined the work of personnel ...

..Among the employees of the People's Commissariat there are 14 former officers of the tsarist army, 70 people from the nobility. pome

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31 were sued for various crimes, 17 were expelled from the CPSU(b), 28 had relatives abroad, 69 people whose relatives were repressed for anti-Soviet work, etc.

Many of these people have no place in the apparatus of the NKB. Meanwhile, in 1940, 171 members of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, 166 engineering and technical workers were removed from the central office as a result of downsizing. The reduction itself was completely entrusted to Inyashkin and the chiefs of the chiefs ... "

The situation in the People's Commissariat of Ammunition 7 months before the war was characterized by the words: "the collapse of the leadership", "malicious disruption of government tasks", "criminal negligence" and "deliberate sabotage". I warn the reader that these are not expressions from a joint note by People's Commissar of State Control Mekhlis and People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Beria on the situation in the NKB, but my own assessment, formed after reading their note.

However, even after that, People's Commissar Sergeev was politically trusted for some time, he was a delegate of the KhMII! party conference, February 22, 1941 Sergeev (for the last time) took part in a meeting with Stalin. But his subordinates, already arrested, gave such (alas, not "knocked out" of them) testimonies that it became clear that Sergeev was not just a hat, but a reborn, an enemy.

Therefore, Ivan Sergeev was shot in the same year 1942, in which Boris Vannikov received his first Gold Star of the Hero of Labor.

Vannikov turned out to be in 1940 at the post of people's commissar not a pest, but simply a talented slob who had ceased to control himself. As Beria wrote: he blabbed, which he himself later admitted on occasion. After a serious shake-up, Vannikov continued to work excellently during and after the war and died in 1962 as Colonel General of the Engineering and Technical Service and three times (!) Hero of Socialist Labor (1942, 1949, 1954).

1/1-41

The Germans are sending qualified agents with long-range radios to us. Exploration in the areas of Lviv, Drohobych oil fields, district

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Brody and Suwalki. One agent is a former officer of the Russian, British, French and former Polish armies, since 1940 a senior lieutenant of the German army. Reported to Kobe.



Prepared another summary for him. By all indications, they can strike before the end of June. In the extreme until mid-July, but hardly. It may already rain in July. So you have to survive June.

Commentary by Sergei Kremler

Ever since the Khrushchev era, some supposedly memorandum by L.P. has been walking through the pages of even reputable publications. Beria to I.V. Stalin, allegedly dated June 21, 1941, with the following content:

"I again insist (Beria allegedly writes to Stalin in similar terms! - S.K.) on the recall and punishment of our ambassador in Berlin, Dekanozov, who continues to bombard me with "disinformation" about an allegedly impending attack on THE USSR. He said that this "attack" would begin tomorrow. Major General V.I. Tupikov, military attache in Berlin. This stupid general claims that three Wehrmacht army groups will advance on Moscow, Leningrad and Kyiv... Golikov complains about Dekanozov and his lieutenant colonel Novobrantsev, who also lies that Hitler concentrated 170 divisions against us on our western border. But I and my people, Iosif Vissarionovich, firmly remember your wise plan: in 1941 Hitler will not attack us!"...

This, of course, is a clumsy fake, visible even to the eye, which is not armed with accurate historical knowledge. It has already been analyzed more than once, including by me in my book about Beria. But here it suffices to cite two authentic archival documents published already in the 1990s.

1 See comment below.

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On June 2, 1941, Beria sends Stalin note No. 1798/5, which says:

"Border detachments of the NKVD of the Byelorussian, Ukrainian and Moldavian SSR obtained the following information about the military activities of the Germans near the border with the USSR.

Two army groups concentrated in the areas of Tomasov and Lezhaysk. In these areas, the headquarters of two armies were identified: the headquarters of the 16th army in the town of Ulyanov .. and the headquarters of the army in the Usmierz manor ... the commander of which is General Reichenau (requires clarification).

On May 25 from Warsaw ... the transfer of troops of all branches was noted. The non-movement of troops occurs in mostly at night.

On May 17, a group of pilots arrived in Terespol, and one hundred aircraft were delivered to the airfield in Voskshenitsa (near Terespol).

<...>

Generals of the German army carry out reconnaissance near the border: on May 11, General Reichenau - in the area of the town of Ulguwek ..., on May 18 - a general with a group of officers - in the Belzhets region ..., on May 23, a general with a group of officers ... in the Radymno area .

Pontoons, canvas and inflatable boats are concentrated in many points near the border. The largest number of them was noted in the directions to Brest and Lvov.

<...>

In addition, information was received about the transfer of German troops from Budapest and Bucharest in the direction

borders with the USSR ... <...> Reason: telegraph reports from the districts. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Beria

Three days later, on June 5, Beria sent Stalin another note (No. 1868/6) on the same subject: "Border detachments of the NKVD of the Ukrainian and

the Dava SSR additionally (our No. 1798/B dated June 2 of this year) obtained the following data:

Along the Soviet-German border

May 20 in Biala Podlaska... the location of the headquarters of an infantry division, the 313th and 314th infantry regiments, the personal regiment of Marshal Goering and the headquarters of a tank formation are noted.

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In the Yanov-Podlyasky area, 33 km northwest of Brest, pontoons and parts for twenty wooden bridges are concentrated.

<...>

May 31 at st. Sanok arrived a trainload of tanks.

<...>

On May 20, up to a hundred aircraft took off from the Modlin airfield.

Along the Soviet-Hungarian border

In the town of Brustura ... there were two Hungarian infantry regiments and in the Khust area - German tank and motorized units.

Along the Soviet-Romanian border

<...>

During May 21-24, they proceeded from Bucharest to the Soviet-Romanian border: through st. Pashkans - 12 echelons of German infantry with tanks; through st. Craiova - two echelons with tanks; at st. Three echelons of infantry arrived at Dormenashti and at st. Borshchov two echelons with heavy tanks and vehicles.

Up to 250 German planes were noted at the airfield in the Buzeu area.

<...>

In Dorokhoi Uyezd, the gendarmerie and local authorities offered the population to set up a bomb shelter near each house within five days.

The General Staff of the Red Army has been informed.

Reason: telegraphic reports of districts.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Beria

As you can see, all of Beria's information just screamed - in real time! about the proximity of war. Moreover, Stalin understood that it was Beria's information that could not but be objective. Therefore, it was Beria's information that dispelled Stalin's hopes that war could be avoided in 1941.

The NKVD of Beria, even in the half-month remaining before the start of the war, sent Stalin the accumulating data as they were obtained by the agents of the border troops of the NKVD. As a result of this information and a number of his own probes, Stalin, a few days before the war, realized that the war

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starts from day to day. Therefore, no later than June 18, 1941, Stalin authorized the necessary preparations.

However, at the beginning of June 1941, Stalin still hesitated.

1/U1-41

I no longer have the strength to swear. Tymoshenko and Zhukov seem to support, but without pressure. Georgy (Obviously, Malenkov. - S.K.) is also the same, sluggishly. Molotov is more silent, evidently he thinks, let Koba decide. The rest are not advisers at all.

All data for the war. They evacuate the embassy without noise. Saboteurs whom we catch, who passes. It can be seen that it is no longer agents but militants who are crossing the cordon. This is no longer for reconnaissance, this is to undermine bridges and tear communications. Naum! I am also convinced that this is a war.

Koba is slowly leaning towards it too. We must all press together.

10/U1-41

There was a strong conversation. No fools. Koba listened, Georgy supported me. Invited (Stalin. - S.K.) from Vsevolod (Merkulov, People's Commissar of State Security. - S.K.) Bogdan (B. Kobulov, Deputy Merkulov. - S.K.). He confirmed everything in his line. Koba said, if so, go and see for yourself.

Food?.

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev.

Alas, today one can only guess - where the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and People's Commissar of the NKVD of the USSR Beria was going to go after a conversation with Stalin on June 10, 1941,

1 Without a doubt, this refers to Naum Isaakovich Eitingon (1899-1981), one of the brilliant leaders of intelligence and sabotage and terrorist work of the NKVD abroad. He led the operation to liquidate Trotsky, fought in Spain. In August 1953 he was arrested, sentenced to 12 years in prison, and released in 1964. Worked as an editor in

publishing house.

2 See comment below.

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And did he leave, and if he left, then what and where did he do, when and with what did he return to Moscow?

Neither the personal diary of L.P. Beria, there is nothing about this in the official Soviet historiography!

This is also why there is reason to believe that after the diary entry dated June 10, 1941, there are significant gaps in the text of the diary for the last two pre-war weeks and then for the first military year and a half, that is, for the second half of 1941 and 1942. .

In philology, a "lacuna" is an omitted, missing place in a text. And in the diary of L.P. Beria, it seems that there are quite a few such omitted places - in relation to a number of situationally very acute moments of the pre-war and first war periods.

Actually, the mysterious "Pavel Lavrentievich" warned me that there were gaps in the photocopy of the diary and, accordingly, in the electronic copy given to me. He meant, first of all, the omissions related to the fact that the people who made the photocopy of the diary did not work in comfortable conditions and missed something.

However, "Pavel Lavrentievich" himself suggested that the original diary also contained gaps, and possibly very extensive ones in places. Moreover, it was not Beria himself who deleted the entries from the diary, but someone later, during the period of archival special storage.

However, even here, according to "Pavel Lavrentievich", everything was not so simple. Either due to an oversight of those who cleaned up the diary, or due to the fact that the archivists did not give everything to some "censors" for viewing (it was possible to do this, because the notes were kept, I remind you, on separate sheets), some "criminal" records regarding Khrushchev and others have been preserved.

"Pavel Lavrentievich" at the same time specified: "I say (preserved) based on the assumption that some erasure of the diary, full or partial, did take place." This clarification, as I understood it, was quite characteristic of the style of "Pavel Lavrentievich": the utmost precision in expressions and the exclusion of ambiguous or incorrect interpretation of what he said.

I, analyzing the diary, came to the same conclusion that

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and Pavel Lavrentievich. Apparently, some kind of erasure of the diary was carried out by someone's hand. However, far from all the juicy historical details of both the military and post-war periods were removed from the diary. How this can be explained I can only speculate, especially given the fact that the records for 1943 and later are likely to be complete or nearly complete. Looking ahead, I note that only the periods from the end of 1952 to the death of Stalin and from the death of Stalin to the arrest of Beria raise doubts in this regard.

One way or another, the first clear gap is visible just for the period from June 10 to June 20, 1941.

Why I think so, I will explain a little later, but I will say right away that many alleged gaps, most likely, will not be able to be restored even after searching in the most secret special stores. It seems that a significant part of L.P. Beria for 1941-1942 was simply destroyed in the Khrushchev era. And you can guess why!

In the light of the truth of these records, many famous (which is a shame - deservedly famous, but ...) Soviet military leaders, and some party and state leaders, and, most importantly, personally "dear Nikita Sergeevich" must look very unsightly in the light of the truth of these records. with his public falsifications of the situation of the last pre-war and first war days of 1941

of the year.

Dain only in 1941, but also in the spring and summer of 1942, and - later, the times of Stalingrad.

These uncomfortable places have been removed!

But perhaps the extensive gaps in the records have a different explanation? Perhaps, during those periods for which there are no regular entries, Beria simply did not keep a diary?

Well, in the last days before the war, and even more so after it began, and then after its development, which was increasingly unsuccessful for the USSR, Beria really had no time for a diary.

In the first six months of the war, and even later, Beria simply did not have the opportunity to get enough sleep! In the conditions of confusion and the beginning of the evacuation, it was necessary to form the Reserve Front with the backbone of the newly created divisions of the NKVD, it was necessary to carry out this very evacuation

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and transfer the economy to a military footing, and besides, to lead the newly united NKVD, and in addition, to take part in the work of the State Defense Committee and the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, and in addition, to monitor the work of intelligence and turn daily in the head and soul of de a bunch of miscellaneous cases.

With all the spiritual desire to somehow speak out alone with the diary, Beria, of course, did not have a frequent opportunity for this. However, the presence, albeit few, of entries in the diary for the military half of 1941 and 1942, as well as the nature of these entries, suggest that even at that time L.P. Beria turned to the diary. And perhaps more often than you might think. Moreover, since 1943 the diary has become even more regular than before the war.

Further, the reader will see that the diary for the first year and a half of the war does not reflect many widely known decisive events and facts of that time, but there are clearly current, without spiritual revelations, records relating to matters and events of secondary importance.

But if so, if there was a dozen minutes for notes, so to speak, "passing", then could Beria - even in difficult times - not periodically write down something in his diary that was of the utmost importance both for him and for the country?

I don't think so!

However, there are no entries! Not about, say, the preparation of our offensive in 1942 in the Kharkov region, nor about the growing crisis in the Stalingrad region, nor about many other things! Even the summer and autumn entries of 1941 are extremely few and very random in content.

Further, in the course of events, I will also draw the reader's attention to the fact that the gaps in the diary coincide with very unclear moments of pre-war and military history.

And the first reason for doubt is just the entry dated June 10, 1941. And now more about this...

Firstly, as follows both from the text of the diary and from the entries in the journal of visits to Stalin's office, in April, May and early June 1941, Beria for some reason began to

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who often dropped out of the number of participants in Stalin's conferences.

Why is it suddenly like this?

I think this was due to the fact that it was Beria's information about the imminent war that turned out to be psychologically unpleasant for Stalin. And he, thinking and processing information, including from Beria, to make a decision, did not want to see Beria "live". The last time he went to Stalin on May 27, 1941, Beria did not appear with him until June 7, 1941!

Of course, they could see each other and certainly saw each other not only in the Stalinist office, but the main state work at the highest level was still carried out there. But - without Beria.

As far as I know, no one has undertaken a detailed analysis of the last two pre-war weeks on the basis of a study of the journal of visits to Stalin's office. Now I also can't deal with it to the fullest, because I act as a publisher and commentator on L.P.'s diary. Beria, but not as the author of his own book about the beginning of the war.

Nevertheless, we cannot but take into account some of the then chronology!

During the evening reception on June 3, 1941, Stalin talked alone with Khrushchev for 20 minutes. Then Timoshenko, Zhukov and Vatutin entered the office, and they spoke without witnesses (Khrushchev left shortly after the arrival of the military).

On June 6, 1941, at the end of the day, Stalin again retired for more than two hours (from 20.55 to 23.00) with the same trinity of military men.

And on June 7 at 20.45 Molotov, Beria, Malenkov and Bogdan Kobulov (NKGB) came to Stalin. After 15 minutes (!) Beria, Malenkov and Kobulov leave, but Molotov remains. Stalin receives Vyshinsky (NKID), Sedin (People's Commissar for the oil industry), Kuznetsov (NKVMF).

At 22.05 Beria and Malenkov reappear.

At 22.25, Timoshenko and Zhukov enter for 25 minutes, and a general conversation goes on for some time. Then Malenkov and Beria leave literally for five minutes (they are unlikely to go to the toilet), turning back, they stay with Molotov in Stalin's office and after the departure of the military, until 23.45 - until the end.

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On June 9, 1941, Stalin begins a reception with Timoshenko, Zhukov and Vatutin. Exactly one o'clock, from 16.00 to 17.00 the four of them are discussing something (Zhukov and Timoshenko come again later and from 18.00 to 23.35 they take part in a meeting with Stalin together with Voroshilov, Malenkov, Kulik and Voznesensky).

Stalin does not have Beria.

But already on June 10, 1941, Molotov and Mikoyan entered Stalin at 22.15, and almost immediately Beria and Malenkov. During the meeting, Kobulov is summoned for 30 minutes, and the discussion in a narrow circle ends at 23.00 (Shakhurin and L. Kaganovich join the conversation).

There are 12 days left before the start of the war. Perhaps Stalin does not yet believe in this, but the fact that the situation is critical is clear to him. And at this critical moment, from June 11 to June 20, 1941, the name of Beria suddenly disappears again from the journal of visits to Stalin's Kremlin office!

Why?

Could this be due to the fact that from June 11 to June 20, 1941, Beria, by agreement with Stalin (possibly, together with the People's Commissar of State Security Merkulov, who traveled to the Baltic states), conducted a personal inspection of the western border?

If this is so, then it is possible that Beria, not from Moscow, but right on the spot, organized that reconnaissance flight along the border of Colonel Zakharov, which should be included in school textbooks, but which even military historians are poorly aware of. I wrote about this flight in my books "Beria. The Best Manager of the 20th Century" and "10 Myths About 1941".

If this is so, then it becomes clear why Stalin, having not yet satisfied the request of Timoshenko and Zhukov to put the troops on alert on June 13, 1941, gave such a sanction no later than June 18, 1941! This fact is hushed up to this day, but there was such a sanction - today there is a lot of evidence for this!

And the information personally Beria, handed over to Stalin personally, on a real scale turned out to be decisive for Stalin to make such a decision!

Could the Khrushchevites leave traces in Beria's diary

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about this great contribution of Beria in the last days before the war to our future Victory?

Of course not!

Someone might say that it would have been easier to destroy the diary altogether - all of it! But this is where the subtleties begin. The complete absence of a diary gives more scope for a flight of fancy than a diary from which only a certain part of it has been removed and destroyed. Namely, the part that especially compromises the commander of ZAPOVO Pavlov, Timoshenko, Zhukov, Ponomarenko and others, but above all, "dear Nikita Sergeevich"!

After all, for some reason, Stalin summoned Khrushchev from Kyiv during the hot June days for an absolutely confidential conversation on June 16, 1941 — from 17.40 to 17.55.

From Kyiv, and only 15 minutes!

For what?

Is it not to ask: "Nikita! Lawrence reports that the war will begin any day! What did you weave for me on May 9?

After all, on May 9 (wow!) 1941, Stalin called Khrushchev from Kyiv in order to ask him about something for only 30 minutes in private - from 17.30 to 18.00.

Called from Kyiv, just for half an hour!

For what?

Apotom, not immediately after Khrushchev's departure, but after some lengthy deliberation, at 21.45 on May 9, 1941, Stalin summoned Beria for only 5 (five) minutes.

What were they talking about?

Isn't it because, here, they say, only you, Lavrenty, excite everyone! Like, war, war. And the rest, unlike you, do not twitch, and say: "No, Comrade Stalin, Hitler will not attack us this year" ... And Comrade Pavlov, and Comrade Khrushchev, and Comrade Ponomarenko ...

After all, Stalin and Beria talked about something very important on May 9, 1941? And they spoke alone...

And there is no entry about this conversation in Beria's diary!

Just as it does not contain a detailed record of a confidential conversation between Stalin and Beria, which took place on the night of May 18-19, 1941. Returning to the brief entry in the diary of May 18, the reader will see that Beria wanted to describe the night

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the conversation is more detailed, but there is no such entry in the diary (see also note 1 to the entry dated May 18, 1941). How to explain it? Perhaps Beria simply did not return to the conversation, or perhaps the recording was later withdrawn.

That is, it is possible that the gaps in Beria's diary should not even be counted from June 10, 1941, but from an earlier time - at least from May 9, 1941 ...

Or maybe even earlier?

Who knows!

By the way, the fact that Beria went on a personal inspection of the border from June 10, 1941 is indirectly confirmed by such, for example, a fact.

On June 12, 1941, the head of the border troops of the NKVD of the Moldavian and Ukrainian SSR Vasily Afanasyevich Khomenko was appointed deputy commander of the Kiev Special Military District of Kirponos for the protection of the rear (since June 22, 1941, Khomenko became the deputy commander of the Southwestern Front of Kirponos for the protection of the rear) . How can one explain such an unexpected transformation of a border chief into a military commander, if not by the fact that Beria, seeing the war was close, took care of the KGB security of the army in advance?

The appointment of Khomenko suggests that in the tenth of June 1941, Beria had already convinced Stalin of the need for some immediate measures in view of a possible imminent war.

Not without reason, after all, the head of the GUPV of the NKVD of the USSR, Grigory Grigoryevich Sokolov, was already on the western border by June 22, 1941, and immediately after the start of the war he was appointed deputy commander of the Western Front Pavlov for the protection of the rear (Sokolov had a particularly heavy burden) .

As for the very last days before the war, on June 18, 1941, from 20.00 to 0.30, Stalin conferred with Molotov (entrance at 20.00, exit at 0.30), Timoshenko and Zhukov (entry at 20.25, exit at 0.30), as well as Malenkov (entrance at 20.45, exit at 0.30).

Most likely, during this meeting, Stalin gave the order to bring the troops into combat readiness.

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Criminal negligence and outright betrayal did not allow to fulfill it in full. But it also played its positive role in the overall outcome of the war.

Thanks, first of all, to the vigilance and activity of Beria.

June 20, 1941 at 20.20 Beria again entered Stalin's office. And, starting from June 21, 1941, he rarely spent a day in this office - unless, of course, he was in Moscow at that time.

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Everything, now it will be as it will be. What you did, you did, what you didn't do, you can't do. I am confident in my Border Guards!. That's what Kobe said. If it starts, I'm afraid it will hit us hard.

And we'll see. Koba said they shouldn't fail. He also said: "And if we fail, there is nowhere to go. Anyway, this war will have to be won."

Where are we going. Have to.

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev.

On June 20, 1941, Beria again made a very brief entry in his diary, which is understandable. And time was running out, and there was nothing to write two days before the war - even in a diary, even in reports addressed to Stalin.

As Beria himself stated, what could be done was done. Now all that remained was to prepare and wait - would the Germans decide to go to war, or not?

On June 18, 1941, Stalin tried to send Molotov to Berlin for urgent consultations, but Hitler refused. This fact should also be known to every schoolchild, but it was previously hushed up by the academicians of the USSR Academy of Sciences and to this day the "academicians" of the "Russian" Academy of "Sciences" are hushing up.

Then, two days before the war, all that remained was to wait and...

1 See comment below.



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And, of course, timely issue appropriate orders to subordinates.

As it became clear two days later, the leadership of the NPO of the USSR and the General Staff of the Red Army, the high command of the Red Army and, above all, the commander of the Western Special Military District, General Pavlov, did not comply with Stalin's directives of June 18, 1941.

But the border guards of Beria met the war fully armed in the truest sense of the word - with weapons in their hands, in the trenches! They met her like this, firstly, because they had a direct order for increased combat readiness. And secondly, because their quoin was constantly cooked.

On June 20, 1941, the head of the border troops of the Belorussian border district, Bogdanov, gave the following order:

"In order to strengthen the protection of the border, I order:

1 Until June 30, 1941, scheduled classes with personnel should not be carried out.

2 The personnel who are at the training camp at the training outposts, immediately return to the linear outposts and continue not to call until further notice ...

4. Do not provide days off to personnel until 06/30/41.

5. At night (from 23:00 to 05:00) send out border detachments consisting of three people each. Use all light machine guns in night outfits, in the most important directions ...

7. The calculation of people for duty should be built in such a way that from 23.00 to 5.00 all people served at the border, with the exception of those returning from outfits by 23.00 and sentries.

8. Set up posts for ten days on separate, most vulnerable flank directions under the command of the assistant chief of the outpost...

11 Border detachments should be located no closer than 300 m from the border line.

Bogdanov"

Border general Ivan Aleksandrovich Bogdanov (1897-1942) would become a hero of the Great Patriotic War. He will carry out a difficult service in protecting the rear of the retreating troops, will become one of the organizers of the Reserve Front and the 39th Reserve Army...

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Then he will command the already combat 39th Army of the Kalinin Front, participating in the battle for Moscow.

In July 1942, while withdrawing army troops from encirclement, he would be mortally wounded, and on July 22, 1942 year ends.

By June 22, 1941, Bogdanov was the chief border guard of Belarus. But after all, the chief border guard of the USSR, the head of the Main Directorate of the Border Troops of the NKVD, Lieutenant General Grigory Grigoryevich Sokolov, on the night of June 21-22, 1941, was not in Moscow, but in Minsk in the box of the theater, as the commander of the ZapOVO General Pavlov, at the station 87th border detachment of the Belarussian border district.

Could the main border guard of the country be at the border without a direct order from Beria and without the sanction of Stalin? Of course not! Sokolov arrived in the border zone for KGB participation in a close war!

37-year-old General Grigory Sokolov, a natural border guard, having met the war on the border, soon became the head of the rear guard of the Western Front - a difficult position, given the failures of General Pavlov and Co.

Since October 1941, Sokolov was the chief of staff of the 26th Army, which took the brunt of Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group near Tula. At the end of 1941, Sokolov formed a new reserve 26th Army and went with it to the Volkhov Front.

This is what the shots of People's Commissar Beria looked like in historical reality, and not in the image of the figures of the "democratic" "Memorial".

It was they who prepared their subordinates for war and well prepared their knees. And the People's Commissar himself was the main "engine" of the reforms.

In confirmation, I will quote the book of retired Major General Sechkin "Border and War", published in 1993, that is, after the fall of Soviet power:

"In February 1939 (that is, after the arrival of L.P. Beria in the NKVD. - S.K.), a decision was adopted by the Council of People's Commissars, which was separated from the Main Directorate of the Border and Internal Troops as an independent Main Directorate of the Border Troops .

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The creation of a special body with clearly and precisely defined tasks and local district administrations had a favorable effect on the organizational strengthening of the border troops as special troops, designed to guard and protect the state border of the USSR ...

During 1938-1939. a complete reorganization of the units of the border troops was carried out; the headquarters of units and formations were reorganized according to a unified management scheme from top to bottom, intelligence agencies of units and formations of the border troops were also created according to a unified scheme (Identification here and below is mine. - S.K.); all departments of commandant's offices were reorganized in two main standard states (land and coastal), <...> the existing communications units were formed and reorganized, <...> the transport of units was motorized, <... > formed... 7 maritime schools, reorganized 7 service dog schools and

communication school.

<...>

The technical reconstruction of the troops, the re-equipment of the land border units with modern small arms, ... the development of border aviation, the introduction of engineering and technical means into the protection of the border made increased demands on ... the training of commanding officers and political staff.

<...>

By the beginning of 1941, command and engineering personnel for the border troops were being trained in 11 military educational institutions of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs."

I have already spoken about Beria's border reform in my comments to his diary for 1939, but I will say again that during 1939-1940 the personnel of the border troops increased by 50%, and at the beginning of 1941 "not preparing for war" Beria is also seeking an additional increase in their numbers, bringing it to the western border to 100 thousand people within five border military districts: Leningrad, Baltic Special, Western Special, Kiev Special and Odessa.

Beria's border troops, as well as their people's commissar himself, were ready for war and already in the first weeks of the war they played not a tactical (as they should have been), but, without exaggeration, a strategic role.

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But the leadership of the Red Army did not really prepare their subordinates for the war before the war, and with the outbreak of the war they let them down.

There were enough traitors and pests. So, with the outbreak of war, an acute shortage of rifles arose very quickly. And it arose only because almost the entire strategic stock of 7 (seven) million rifles was stockpiled before the war in the western districts.

Either a cretin or a conscious enemy could make such a decision, Stalin did not know about him, Beria did not have time to reveal this fact. But after all, neither Stalin nor Beria could get their hands on everything. The distribution of stockpiles of weapons was the prerogative of the People's Commissariat of Defense, its Main Directorates and the General Staff of the Red Army.

Is not it?

Another example... Chief of Staff of the KOVO Lieutenant General M.A. Purkaev reports on January 2, 1941 from Kiev to the General Staff:

"Mobilization] stock of ammunition in KOVO is extremely insignificant. It does not provide for the troops of the district even for the period of the first operation. <...> The main thing] A] artillery] Department [management] does not fulfill its plans. Instead of the 3684 cars planned for the second half of the year according to the directive of the People's Commissar of September 20, 1940 No. 371649, only 1355 cars were delivered to the district, and without the needs of the district in terms of types of ammunition.

etc.

The "clerk" generals from the General Staff, in the best clerical traditions, forward Purkaev's report to the GAU, and from there, in the best, again, clerical traditions, in February 1941, a reply comes:

"..The amount of ammunition supply to the district according to the plan for the 2nd half of the year [19140, based on directive G, was calculated only for partial satisfaction of the district's needs in [19]40.

<...>

Delivery plan completed by 34%"

etc. with a reassuring notice that, they say, during 1941 we will ship everything.

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Shipped!

And here is another deadly, but absolutely accurate fact! On June 22 (twenty-second!) 1941, the 6th mechanized corps in the ZapOVO had only a quarter of fuel refueling, and, after all, it must be the only one! Nevertheless, the entire available stock of fuel in the ZapOVO (commander General Pavlov) amounted to 22 (twenty-second!) June 1941 300 (three hundred!) tons. The rest of the fuel for the ZAPOVO, according to the plan of the General Staff, was in ... Maykop!

And here is what Marshals Timoshenko and Kulik reported to Stalin on June 19 (nineteenth!) 1941. During the inspection of small arms in the 175th 8th rifle regiments of the 1st motorized rifle division of the Moscow (under the nose of the People's Commissar, Chief of the General Staff and Chief of the GAU) Military District on June 17 and 18, 1941, out of a total of 196 stores inspected to PPD submachine guns, 60 magazines were found with broken and rusty springs. That is, 30% of the weapons were not combat-ready! Two days before the war! And it was a spot check!

What, Stalin and Beria were supposed to keep weapons in good working order and check them weekly, clean and lubricate them?

From the first day of the war, many fought like heroes. But traitors and slackers time and again nullified their heroic efforts. Nevertheless, the foundation for the victory of 1945 began to be laid from the very first day of the war.

June 22, 1941 - the first day of the Great

Patriotic War of 1941-1945.

Reference and commentary by Sergei Kremlev.

For one reason or another, but the entries in L.P. Beria for the military half of 1941 is not very much. However, in any case, there could not have been many of them - Beria's load was very large immediately after

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several directions. However, he did not completely abandon the diary. It seems that he has already developed the habit of addressing this "silent interlocutor" at least from time to time. But Beria could not constantly keep a diary. Therefore, I will try to somehow fill this gap with my references and comments.

The reader is already familiar with the term "lacuna". Let me remind you that a gap is a missed, missing place in the text. Alas, as regards the first days of the war, on the one hand, there are enough gaps in the description of them. On the other hand, nature does not tolerate emptiness, and these lacunae have been filled over the decades.

However, very often it is a lie.

Its highest level is Khrushchev's lie about Stalin at the 20th Congress. But here is an example of a lie, which is also at a very high level (meaning the status of a liar, not the quality of a lie). I mean the post-war lie of Anastas Mikoyan:

"On Saturday, June 21, 1941, in the evening, we, members of the Politburo, were at Stalin's apartment. We exchanged views... Stalin still thought that Hitler would not start a war...

"We parted at about three in the morning on June 22, 1941, and an hour later they woke me up: war!

Immediately, the members of the Politburo gathered at Stalin's ... "

And it's all a lie from start to finish!

On June 21, 1941 at 18.27 Stalin, being in his office in the Kremlin, invited Molotov to his place and then held a meeting until 23.00. In his office that evening were Molotov, Voroshilov, Voznesensky, Malenkov, Kuznetsov (Navy), Timoshenko, Zhukov, Budyonny, Mekhlis. At 22.20, everyone left Stalin except Molotov and Voroshilov. At 22.40 Beria joined them and at 23.00 Molotov, Voroshilov and Beria left Stalin, and he went to rest a little before a new hard day.

On June 21, 1941, Stalin did not have Mikoyan at all.

As for the "photo" of Stalin's first working war day, June 22, 1941, it is this:

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Molotov 5.45-12.05 Beria 5.45-9.20 Timoshenko 5.45-8.30 Mekhlis 5.45-8.30 Zhukov 5.45-8.30 Malenkov 7.30-9.20 Mikoyan 7.55-9.30 Kaganovich 8.00-9.35 Voroshilov 8.00-10 .15

Kuznetsov (Central Committee) 8.15-8.30 Dimitrov 8.40-10.40 Manuilsky 8.40-10.40 Kuznetsov 9.40-10.20 Mikoyan 9.50-10.30 Molotov 12.55-16.45 Voroshilov 11.40-12.05 Beria 11.30 — 12.00 Malenkov 11.30 — 12.00 Voroshilov 12.30 — 16.45 Mikoyan 12.30 — 14.30 Vyshinsky 13.05 - 15.25 Shaposhnikov 13.15 - 16.00 Timoshenko 14.00 - 16.00 Zhukov 14.00 - 16.00 Vatutin 14.00 - 16.00 Kuznetsov (Navy) 15.20 - 15.45 Kulik 15.30 - 16.00 Beria 16.25 - 16.45

Let us note that both on the last day of peace and on the first day of the war, the last person to leave Stalin's office was Beria. He reappeared in it on June 23 - exactly a day later, to the minute, and again - for twenty minutes.

The second military working day of Stalin began at 3.20. On this day, June 23, 1941, the Headquarters of the High Command of the Armed Forces of the USSR was formed, and on the same June 23, Beria became one of the permanent advisers to the Headquarters.

There were twelve of them in total: Marshal Kulik, generals Me

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Retskoy and Vatutin, Air Force Chief Zhigarev, Air Defense Chief Voronov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Voznesensky, Zhdanov, Malenkov, Mekhlis and Beria.

But here is how Mikoyan describes it:

"..On the second day of the war... they decided to form the Headquarters of the High Command... At the Headquarters, they created the institution of permanent advisers. They were: Vatutin, Voznesensky, Voronov, Zhdanov, Zhigarev, Mekhlis, Mikoyan, Shaposhnikov..."

As you can see, Mikoyan did not mention Malenkov, Kaganovich and Beria, politically incorrect for the Khrushchevites, as well as Marshal Kulik, among the advisers of the Headquarters.

Mikoyan assures that during the first days of the war, "Stalin was in a depressed state at a nearby dacha in Volynsky (near Kuntsevo)"... However, in reality, Stalin, taking only a break for sleep, worked for many hours in the Kremlin 22 to 28 June 1941.

Only on the night of June 28-29, having learned about the surrender of Minsk - on the seventh day of the war! - Stalin experienced a mental crisis and really went to the country.

That's when Beria took the initiative. Amazing, but true! Mikoyan turned out to be truthful in this most important moment of the first days of the war! And if he testified that it was Beria who raised the question of creating the State Defense Committee, to which all power in the country should be given, then it was, most likely, exactly so!

However, it is possible that this idea arose immediately from Molotov and Beria (see diary entry dated July 9, 1941). In any case, in a letter written in 1953 in a cell addressed to Malenkov, but addressed to all members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, Beria reminded Molotov:

"You remember very well when at the beginning of the war it was very bad and after our conversation with Comrade Stalin at his nearby dacha, you put the question point-blank in your office in the Council of Ministers that it was necessary to save the situation, it was necessary immediately organize a center that will lead the defense of our homeland, I then fully supported you and suggested that you immediately call on the owl

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comrade Malenkov... After that... we all went to comrade Stalin and convinced him [about] the immediate organization of the Committee for the Defense of the Country..."

As you can see, Beria played a paramount role in overcoming the most dangerous crisis in the leadership of the country, which arose a week after the start of the war.

On June 30, 1941, the GKO was formed as part of: I.V. Stalin (chairman), V.M. Molotov (Deputy Chairman), K.E. Voroshilov, G.M. Malenkov and L.P. Beria.

Mikoyan, by the way, at first misrepresenting the circumstances of the formation of the GKO composition, then wrote So:

".. Voznesensky asked to be in charge of the production of weapons and ammunition, which ... was accepted. The management of the production of tanks was entrusted to Molotov, and the aviation industry and aviation affairs in general were entrusted to Malenkov. For Beria, the protection of order within the country and the fight against desertion were left ... "

In fact, Beria almost immediately began to oversee the production of weapons and ammunition, and the production of tanks, and the aviation industry, and aviation in general, without neglecting, of course, the issues of maintaining order within the country, the fight against desertion and dozens of other big and small issues.

4/UP-41

Finally snatched a minute for "buddy". How I lived all this time only the Lord God and Koba know. And how I will live on, the Lord God and Koba also know. I do not know. It hasn't been two weeks, but it's been like two years. Even more how life has gone.

Cases immediately piled up so much that I was not even scared. The front has failed, the troops are fleeing, Minsk has been surrendered, but for me it's like in a movie. Didn't take it. It wasn't before. Thought I used to work a lot. Turns out I didn't know what a job was. And this is when at least shoot at you, and you have one hell, you need to have time to do it, and then how it will turn out. Just to do it.

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Now it will be easier, already used to it.

Just got back from Koba. Today the coffin with Ilyich was taken to Tyumen! I reported to Kobe that I had personally checked everything. Did Zbarsky go? and all his team. Zbarsky asks: "And how much is it?" I say, consider no less than a year. Looks like he didn't believe it. And I think not even a year. Less than two will not work.

Koba ordered Bagirov to be summoned," Charkviani? and Arutinovab. I added Auxentius." Today we talked to them. Koba said, you are responsible for the normal work of Baku not with your head, and not even with your party card, but with the good memory of people. Baku should work like clockwork. Turks and Persians should sit still. Do not succumb to any (So in the text. - S.K.) any provocations and do everything yourself carefully. And most importantly, Baku.

1 At the beginning of July 1941, in connection with the possible bombing of Moscow, it was decided to evacuate the body of V.I. Lenin from the Mausoleum to a safe place (Tyumen was chosen). B.I. Zbarsky (see note 2 to this diary entry), in a memorandum addressed to Beria, gave the appropriate explanations, and on July 4, 1941, at 19.00, a special squad, guarded by 5 officers and 15 soldiers, left the Kazan station for Tyumen. In the refrigerator car there was a coffin made of plane trees, the walls of which were impregnated with paraffin, and the sealing grooves were filled vaseline.

2 Zbarsky Boris Ilyich (1885-1954), biochemist, academician of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Hero of Socialist Labor (1945), laureate of the Stalin Prize (1944). Educated at Geneva and St. Petersburg Universities. Founder of the Biochemical Institute, head of work on embalming and preserving the body V.I. Lenin.

3 Only on March 25, 1945, a special train of 9 cars left Tyumen for Moscow and arrived in the capital three days later. September 16, 1945 Mausoleum of V.I. Lenin was reopened.

"Bagirov Mir Jafar Abbasovich (1896-1956), from 1933 to July 7, 1953 - First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Azerbaijan.

Y Charkviani Kandid Nestorovich (1907-1994), First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Georgia from 1938 to 1952.

b Arutinov Grigory Artemyevich (1900-1957), one of Beria's closest associates in Georgia, since 1934 secretary of the Tbilisi city party committee, in 1937-1953. First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP(b) of Armenia.

Trapava Avksenty Narikievich (1899-1955), one of Beria's closest associates in Georgia, from December 19, 1938, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Georgian SSR, from February 26, 1941, People's Commissar of the State Security Service of the Georgian SSR.

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In addition to separate groups, it is necessary to form a special sabotage unit. Canaris has a separate regiment, and we need to assemble a separate brigade! Guys athletes are asking. Should it be supported?

9/UP-41

I expected a mess, but I didn't expect such a mess. And there were traitors. And where did they end up! I'm spinning around. It's good that people are selected, otherwise it would be a complete pi..dets. Who is a hero, and who is stupid ... b, and who is a traitor. If I were there, I would shoot like a rabid dog. A dog is even better than what you take from it (So in the text. - S.K.). And the traitors... Georgy (G.K. Zhukov. — S.K.) says so from the front, it looks like there are traitors at the top. Not cleaned up!

Koba was already ready for the mess, but no one was ready for this. And even more so Koba. He said: "I believed in some, but others are pulling out." Well, he's hot. A lot of work as it should. And there are plenty of idiots.

It's good that no one doubts that we will win. Koba says: "There will be a holiday on our street (So in the text. - S.K.)."

Will! He won't be soon. This is now for two years, and then for three. Maybe more. I'm afraid we'll give a lot before we go to Berlin. And let's go! Koba says that now we will end the war in Berlin. We will!

And of course, I mean the reconnaissance and sabotage regiment of the Abwehr "Brandenburg-800".

% The idea of creating a special reconnaissance and sabotage military unit of the NKVD of the USSR, as they say, was in the air. It was expressed in his report by the future hero of the secret war, Dmitry Medvedev, Pavel Sudoplatov, Naum Eitingon and others thought about it. Thought about it, as we see, and Beria. At the beginning of July 1941, at the Dinamo stadium, selection began for the Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade of Special Purpose, later known as OMSBON. Thousands of future experienced scouts, partisan commanders, demolition workers, saboteurs, etc. passed through the OM-SBON training center.

3 Everything was just like that. Among other things, by order of the Headquarters of the High Command No. 00101 dated June 29, 1941, Beria was introduced to the Military Council of the Moscow Military District.

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The main thing for me is to give full-blooded divisions. Koba says your Border Guards are saving us. Everyone would fight like that. So come on, Lavrentiy, form the NKVD divisions from the Border Guards. Needed like air, more like air!.

Until I give, I will not sleep. The first days Koba kept us. Only his will. It's collapsing all around, Timoshenko doesn't know the situation, Georgy too, everyone is on his nerves, and Koba, as he was, is! Steel! And everyone is after him.

And after Minsk, his life was torn. He said, I can't take it anymore, I'm sorry. There was only me, Vyacheslav and Anastas.

He waved his hand and left. Said I'm going to bed. And you are here without me.

That's when it got scary. I look at them, they look at me. Vyacheslav says let's go to sleep too. Mornings are trickier in the evenings (So in the text. - S.K.), you need to get enough sleep.

In the afternoon he came to Vyacheslav, he says what to do? I say, it is necessary to bring power into one hand. Let's go to Comrade Stalin.

We've arrived. I have never seen Koba like this and never will again. It got scary again. Hands down, but you have to work.

I say to Vyacheslav: "You can't stop the war. Necessary

On June 129, 1941, signed by Timoshenko, Stalin and Zhukov, the order of the Headquarters of the High Command No. 00100 was issued on the formation of rifle and mechanized divisions from the personnel of the NKVD troops. Here is its full text:

"Proceed immediately to the formation of 15 divisions, of which 10 are rifle and 5 are motorized. For the formation of divisions, use part of the personnel of the commanding and rank and file of the border and internal troops of the NKVD.

Missing personnel to be covered from the reserve.

The formation of divisions is entrusted to the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Comrade. Beria L.P.

To the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army to provide the emerging divisions with human and material resources and weapons at the request of the NKVD.

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act. Kobe will get over it. We are tired, and he is even more tired." Gone.

Vyacheslav says the State Defense Council is needed. I say, that's enough, they consulted. You need to be strong. Is the committee okay? He says it's good. Then he says, let's call people, in the evening we will go to Kobe. Let him calm down, and there we will offer him. And you are still joking.

And in the evening Koba was already back to normal.

So they got out of the well..py. People matter. And for us and for Koba! Koba brought us together, Koba raised us. The Thunderstorm came, He held us for the first time. Then he gave some slack, and we supported him.

'Now everything, He will pull everything. And we are close. He said so: "Now we are working until the Victory!

That's what I tell my people, Comrade Stalin said, we'll rest after the Victory.

And who will rest earlier. You have to live until the Victory.

Parts are starting to arrive, it is necessary to put together in two or three days!. Koba said get ready now. Until they go into battle. We need to cover Moscow. But I see from the situation that some of them will have to be thrown near Smolensk. Already got there! How they stick! Nothing, they'll get drunk anyway!

Work Lavrenty!



Until Victory!

1 On the same day, June 29, 1941, Beria issued an order to the NKVD, which stated:

"1. The leadership of the formation is entrusted to my deputy lieutenant general comrade. Maslennikov.

2. When Comrade. Maslennikov to create an operational group of five people.

3. Start forming divisions immediately.

4. For the formation of these divisions, allocate 1000 people from the personnel of the NKVD troops. ordinary and junior commanding staff and 500 people each. command and command staff for each division. For the rest of the staff, apply to the General Staff of the Red Army for a call from the reserve of all categories of military personnel.

5. The concentration of personnel allocated from the NKVD troops to be completed by July 17 this year.

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We talked to Koba. The People's Commissariat must be restored unified. Everything must be taken in one hand! And to prepare special detachments for being sent to the rear. We have experience, we have people, we will succeed.

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev.

The divisions of the NKVD were formed primarily due to the best personnel of the border troops of the Georgian, Armenian, Azerbaijani, Kazakh, Central Asian, Turkmen and Trans-Baikal districts. In a matter of days (in 8-11 days), 3,000 commanders and 10,000 sergeants and privates arrived from distant border circles to the places of formation, in particular, to Yaroslavl.

In addition, already fired soldiers who had left the encirclement, from the personnel of the Leningrad, Baltic, Belorussian, Ukrainian and Moldavian border districts, were poured into the divisions. Total - more than 15 thousand combat core for 15 divisions.

Reliable personnel were also called up from the reserve in the NKVD division, if possible from former border guards.

Almost all command positions in the NKVD divisions were occupied by border guards. Graduates of the Kharkov Cavalry Border School became platoon commanders, students of the Higher Border School became battalion commanders.

The formation of six divisions of the first stage was ahead of schedule - in the zone of the former ZAPOVO, the current Western Front, a huge gap appeared, and Beria's cadres had to close it.

The oath was taken on the way to combat positions - this was dictated by the extremely difficult situation at the front.

All fifteen divisions of the NKVD went to where it was most difficult. Ten divisions (243, 244, 246, 247, 249, 250, 251, 252, 254 and 256th) - to the Western Front, five (265, 268,

ÿ By the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated July 20, 1941, "in connection with the transition from peacetime to military working conditions," the NKVD and the NKGB were again merged into a single People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs of the USSR under the leadership of L.P. Beria.

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262, 257 and 259th) - to the North-West. And these were not just unit numbers, and not even just full-fledged military formations. In July-August 1941, the border divisions of the NKVD became the backbone of our rebuff to the Wehrmacht. In 1941, they saved the situation in the same way as in 1942 in Stalingrad, it was saved by the airborne corps reorganized into guard divisions!

13/UP-41

Life can be said to be established. We sleep little, we work a lot. Maslennikov! and Sharapov? organize the 29th army. The German comes from the north, and this is a threat to Moscow. Kalinin of course. Maslennikov should cover Moscow from the north, in the direction of Staraya Russa and Bologoe.

Khomenko? will form the 30th army. Cover in the direction of Rzhev.

Sergei \* went to the front.

They say that chickens (So in the text. - S.K.) along the wasp

1 Ivan Ivanovich Maslennikov (1900-1954), Deputy People's Commissar of the NKVD for the troops, future commander of the North Caucasian Front and the 3rd Baltic Front, future Hero of the Soviet Union.

Sharapov Vladimir Maksimovich (1895-1972), one of the leaders of the state security agencies, lieutenant general (1944). Member of the First World War and the Civil War, since 1921 - in the troops of the Cheka. Beria's colleague at work in Georgia. On March 8, 1939, he was transferred to Moscow and appointed head of the Main Directorate of the escort troops of the NKVD of the USSR. Since June 1941 - in the Red Army in staff positions, a participant in a number of strategic operations in 1943-1945. In July 1941, by order of the Headquarters of the VK No. 06293, he was appointed chief of staff of the emerging 29th Army.

3 Khomenko Vasily Afanasyevich (1899-1943), military figure and one of the leaders of the NKVD border troops, from November 1940 head of the border troops of the NKVD of the Moldavian and Ukrainian SSR, from June 12, 1941 - deputy commander of the Kiev Special Military District for the protection of the rear, from June 22, 1941, deputy commander of the Southwestern Front for the protection of the rear, then commanded the 30th, 24th, 58th and 44th armies. Member of the Smolensk battle. Killed in 1943.

s Most likely, we are talking about Sergei Kruglov, Beria's deputy for the NKVD, who on July 5, 1941 was appointed a member of the Military Council of the Reserve, then the Western Front.

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They don't count, but already in the summer we can count who is boiled-fried chicken, who is wet chicken, and who is eagle. People appear in a day, and sometimes in an hour. You give him an order, and already you see, he will fail. Whom I immediately dismiss, whom I think is not, it is necessary to check. It happens and it justifies. Sometimes it doesn't. I send these to e..any mother. Out of sight. There is no time to mess around (So in the text. - S.K.).

Koba takes people away from me, but a replacement is still found. How not to remember, Koba firmly said "Cadres decide everything."

A hard life has gone, but how younger. We work quickly, and whoever cannot, we force him to. It can't, we still force it. If you fail, go away. The closer a person was to the point, the stronger one can lean on. And if it was closer to the papers, this one is just oversr..t.

In general, the situation is still bad. OK.

16/UP-41

How does it go! And shameful and envious. Under the threat of Leningrad, getting close to Kyiv and approached Smolensk. My divisions will go there.

Kirponos! fights well. And Pavlov? turned out to be a mu..a- KOM and a bastard.

The Reserve Front is being created. Georgiyz will be in command if it comes to battle. And it will come. Six armies, four of them take my eagles,

And Kirponos Mikhail Petrovich (1882 - 20.09.1941), colonel general, participant in the Soviet-Finnish war, Hero of the Soviet Union (23.1.1940), commander of the KOVO, and from June 19, 1941 - of the South-Western Front. Died while leaving the encirclement.

2 Former commander of the ZAPOVO and on June 19, 1941 - of the Western Front (arrested on July 4, 1941 in Dovsk, on October 16, 1941 after the investigation was shot).

e Zhukov Georgy Konstantinovich, member of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, commander of the Reserve, then the Leningrad, then the Western Front, etc.

\* On July 14, the Headquarters of the Higher Command issued order No. 00334 on the creation of a front of reserve armies at the line of Staraya Russa, Ostashkov, Bely, Istomino, Yelnya, Bryansk in order to prepare for a stubborn defense. The front was

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It's hard, but we'll win whatever happens. I wrote Kobe a submission for an amnesty to Tupolev and his people, for 30 people. They worked hard. And at such a time, people do not need to have (So in the text. - S.K.) the stigma of prisoners!. Fully redeemed and will work right when the enemy comes.

Yes, people die, but they go. The first groups went to the rear of the Germans. Young guys. I would kiss everyone, but when?

Publisher help.

From July 21 to August 21, 1941 L.P. Beria is not noted in the journal of visits to the Kremlin office of I.V. Stalin. On August 22, 1941, he appeared there for an hour and a half and disappeared again until September 6, 1941, so that later he could visit Stalin every day.

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev.

The fact that in such a tense period Beria, a GKO member, as well as Molotov and Malenkov, members of the GKO, is not

six armies were included (29th, 30th, 24th, 28th, 31st and 32nd), four of which were commanded by border guards: the 30th - the head of the troops of the Ukrainian border district, Major General V.A. Khomenko, who later died a heroic death; 31st - Chief of the troops of the Karelian-Finnish border district, Major General V.N. Dalmatov; 24th - Chief of the troops of the Baltic border district, Major General K.I. Rakutin. Beria's deputy, Lieutenant General Ivan Maslennikov, took over the 29th Army.

On July 16, 1941, Beria turned to Stalin with a proposal "to file a petition with the Government of the USSR for an amnesty with the removal of a criminal record of 30 people imprisoned by the Special Technical Bureau, who were directly involved in the creation of the 103-U aircraft ... It is about A.N. Tupolev and a group of specialists convicted in his case, who completed the development of a prototype of the Tu-2 bomber. By the way, although the prototype had a digital designation, in fact it should have been called "STO-3", that is, "Special Technical Department" (NKVD), the third design bureau.

Further, Beria proposed to enroll Tupolev and the others in the staff of the OTB already as ordinary civilian employees.

2 See comment below.

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appeared at Stalin's, is explained, of course, only by his almost round-the-clock loading.

At the same time, this proves that after overcoming the brief crisis of June 20-30, 1941, Stalin and his close "team" went about their own business. Moreover, almost independently. Stalin plunged into front-line affairs, entering the work of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (the fifth member of the GKO, Marshal Voroshilov, also left for the front). Molotov, Malenkov and Beria had their own "bushes" of problems, as did the rest of the members of the "narrow" Stalinist leadership.

This, by the way, proves that Stalin arranged things in such a way that, if necessary, his comrades-in-arms were fully capable of independent leadership and independent decisions. The last word, of course, remained with Stalin.

Despite the fact that the rest of Beria's colleagues were extremely busy, Beria immediately fell especially many cases, and it was more difficult for him than for anyone else from Stalin's close circle. Nobody, not even Stalin, backed up Beria in his diverse activities. But Beria every now and then had to insure his colleagues. In addition, all responsibility for the work of the former NKGB, returned to the NKVD under the hand of Beria, again fell on Beria.

From time immemorial, a "multi-station worker", Beria these days was loaded primarily in his now united People's Commissariat, but the tasks of the NKVD themselves branched out in a matter of days from the formation of military formations to be sent to the front (the task is actually NPO and the General Staff of the Red Army) and ensuring evacuation (actually the task of the Evacuation Council) to ensuring propaganda actions (which should be done by the corresponding department of the Central Committee).

So, it is known that on August 13, 1941, Beria reported to Stalin that in the Park of Culture and Recreation. Gorky prepared an exhibition of downed German aircraft, captured equipment, etc. and that the exhibition is ready to open on 14 August.

Even earlier, on August 8, Beria, in his special message, suggested that Stalin begin the creation of task forces

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to be thrown into the German rear for reconnaissance and sabotage purposes.

Stalin approved this proposal, and on August 10, 1941, Beria instructed Serov, Sudoplatov, and Apollonov, deputy head of the GUPV of the NKVD of the USSR, to begin work. However, by that time, the preparation of the OMSBON, the Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade for Special Purposes of the NKVD, was already in full swing.

On the twentieth of July 1941, L.P. Beria, very likely, also went to the places where the NKVD divisions were formed (for example, to Yaroslavl) for a personal inspection. The creation of these divisions was the most important task, because only the border troops showed absolute combat stability in the first days of the war. Army formations fought in different ways, depending primarily on who commanded what.

Most likely, Beria also visited the area of the Stroitel station near Moscow, where future scouts and saboteurs, OMSBON fighters, trained.

8/USh-41

I live not for days, but for weeks. That's how everyone lives. I have never lived like this and never thought that it was possible to live like this. It turns out you can.

Khomenko! and Maslennikov operate near Smolensk. Timoshenko? happy with them. George? Same. Georgy says that his old friend Rokossovsky is fighting heroically there (That's right, "Rokossovsky." -

1 See entry for 13 July 1941 and notes 1 and 3 thereto.

During the Battle of Smolensk, "to defeat the enemy's Smolensk grouping" task forces of Maslennikov, Khomenko, Kalinin, Kachalov and Rokossovsky were formed. In early August 1941, they (except for the Kachalov group) conducted fairly successful military operations.

2 Timoshenko Semyon Konstantinovich (1895-1970), military commander, Marshal of the Soviet Union (05/07/1940), from May 7, 1940 to July 19, 1941, People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, from July 1, 1941, Commander-in-Chief of the Western Direction.

e Zhukov Georgy Konstantinovich (1896-1974), military commander, Marshal of the Soviet Union, from June 23, 1941, a member of the Headquarters of the Civil Code (VGK), in July 1941, commander of the Reserve Front.

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S.K.)!. Pole, I ask. Says yes. I say, I remember his case. Steadfastly stood that he was not guilty and proved.

George says he'll prove it if he doesn't die. Let's see.

10/UPI-41

Moscow is being bombed, but little is breaking through to the city. During the first raid, 400 people were badly injured. There was little damage, and we can consider that we have coped with it. He won't destroy Moscow, isn't London for you?

What to take into account. German drops leaflets. Koba respected. He says: "Not badly written, and the hand is visible to our bastards. You won't immediately understand whether a Trotskyist wrote or a fascist." He says he needs to figure it out.

We did not clean it up, it is now clear. We must take into account.

Now something else. The Germans write that the Bolsheviks are gathering a brigade of thugs at the Dynamo stadium to carry out secret missions. Turns out someone

1 Rokossovsky Konstantin Konstantinovich (1896-1968), a brilliant military leader, Marshal of the Soviet Union, commander of the 16th Army since August 10, 1941. Arrested on a false denunciation, in March 1940 he was released and reinstated in rank and position.

: The first air raid on Moscow was carried out on the night of July 21-22, 1941. By that moment, in the Moscow air defense zone, which, by the way, was armed with domestic radars, there were 585 aircraft: the new MiG-3, LaGG-3, Yak-1, as well as 200 I-16 and 45 I-153. Moscow's air defense consisted of 1044 anti-aircraft guns (almost all of them were 85-mm guns equipped with modern fire control devices). London was covered by 452 guns of large, medium and small caliber.

3 In fact, students, the best workers of Moscow enterprises, were sent to OMSBON. At that time, the color of Soviet sports also gathered in OSMSBON. Boxers Nikolai Korolev (he became the adjutant of the famous Dmitry Medvedev) and Sergei Shcherbakov, speed skater Anatoly Kapchinsky, weightlifter Nikolai Shatov, rower Alexander Dolgushin, discus throwers Leonid

Mitropolsky and Ali Isaev, cyclist Viktor Zaipold, gymnast Sergei Korzhuev, gymnast Sergei Kulakov, wrestler Grigory Pylnov, skier Lyubov Kulakova, Dynamo Minsk football team, runners-stayers Znamensky brothers...

After the war, competitions were held in the Soviet Union in memory of the dead outstanding athletes: the prestigious All-Union Athletics Memorial named after the Znamensky brothers, competitions for prizes named after A. Kapchinsky. The anti-Soviet "Rossiyaniya" does not need the memory of these heroes, Beria's OMSBON fighters.

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they sit in Moscow and inform. They even know that it is not a regiment or division, but a brigade. So they know something else. We need to lather Pavel's neck! and Orlov. Let's find out the source of the information. Or one of their young recruits is chatting, so we must immediately weed out here. It will be late there. Or information comes from agents. Then you have to catch, there is a clue.

23/USh-41

Koba swears at commanders. He says that they couldn't advance, and they don't know how to retreat. Losing troops. Says Tyulenev? zasr..nets lost two armies, as the boys do not lose regiments.

I have the same crap. There is an evacuation advice, and my guys are embroidering the traffic jams." My guys are looking for a shortage. Damn...s, we've been fighting for two months, and they glued their asses. I gave them Victor there, but I still have to pull. He's there as a communications delegate. What's wrong, comrade Beria, help.

- Sudoplatov Pavel Anatolyevich, since July 5, 1941, the head of the Special Group under the People's Commissar, created to conduct reconnaissance, diversions and terrorist acts behind enemy lines.

2 Orlov Mikhail Fedorovich, colonel, commander of OMSBON.

3 Tyulenev Ivan Vladimirovich (1892-1978), army general (1940), from June 25 to August 30, 1941 commander of the Southern Front. From March 1942, commander of the Transcaucasian military district (front).

\* On July 16, 1941, by the Decree of the GKL No. 173, the Evacuation Council was created, headed by the Chairman of the Council of Nationalities of the USSR Armed Forces N.M. Shvernik and Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR A.N. Kosygin and M.G. Pervukhin as deputy chairmen. The members of the Council were A.I. Mikoyan, NKPS L.M. Kaganovich (replaced by his deputy B.N. Arutyunov), Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR M.3. Saburov (with his replacement G.P. Kosyachenko) and from the NKVD - Viktor Abakumov.

Undoubtedly, the Council performed a huge amount of work on the evacuation of industry, in which great merit, for example, A.N. Kosygin and M.G. Pervukhin. However, the Council did not have a local apparatus, and its leaders were unable to form an effective institution of their representatives in the shortest possible time. Therefore, in reality, the functions of such commissioners now and then had to be performed, in combination with many other cases, by the apparatus of the NKVD of People's Commissar L.P. Beria. Sometimes the people's commissar personally searched for especially important evacuated equipment.

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They sent a detachment of Medvedev to the front!. No time, but spent personally. Before that, there were small groups, a lot was lost. And here comes 33 people. I think Medvedev can handle it. Strong man, control will not release. He will operate in the Bryansk region and will try to get to Belarus.

I ask why you have such a number in the detachment. What, Pushkin remembered? He smiles, says exactly that, Comrade General Commissar. The number is known. I said so to the guys, at Pushkin 33 heroes came out of the waves, and we will enter the forests and let the Fritz tremble.

And he picked up a good name for the detachment, "Mitya." Mentally, but weighs.

He said to them: "Comrades, go and return alive. And who does not return, we will not forget. Let's not forget everyone. Before the Victory and after the Victory?

Spent, did not resist. During these two months, Mr. vna had seen and read so much that he wanted to see clean people. Maybe they go to death, but as a holiday. Fight for the Motherland  
happiness is considered.

Ah, life! Mud..ki is right there, heroes are right there. And here things are, you don't know where to run, what to grab onto. I take care of everything.

Publisher help.

From August 23 to September 6, 1941 L.P. Beria is not noted in the journal of visits to the Kremlin office of I.V. Stalin.

1 Dmitry Nikolayevich Medvedev (1898–1954), in 1941 — captain of the State Security Service (equivalent to an army lieutenant colonel), then Major of the State Security Service, Hero of the Soviet Union, holder of four orders of Lenin and the Order of the Red Banner, commander of the partisan special detachments of the NKVD "Mitya" (1941 - 1942) and "Winners" (1942-1943).

" Detachment Dm. Medvedev "Mitya" crossed the front line on September 7, 1941. This was the first special detachment of many sent to the deep rear of the Germans. Before Medvedev's detachment, small troupes went there.

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24 /USH-41

I saw George! Blackened, but well done. He said that my eagles near Smolensk fought for five. And Ivan, and Vasily?. And Kachalov, he said, let us down, turned out to be a bastard. I tell him, you have not seen Georgy bastards. I have so many of them right now in front of my eyes, and there are still more on the table.

He immediately jumped up, saying, just exactly, you look carefully at your diocese. I think that Fritz has someone in Moscow, they know the situation very well. Sometimes they beat you so that you look around, maybe Guderian is standing behind him and reading a map.

The situation is difficult, but Georgy believes that the main thing is that we have already exhausted him. He says not to the end, but the arrogance was brought down. That Fritz Lane is like at a parade, and now he has already sniffed, than mother Russian land smells.

Okay, he (I mean obviously G.K. Zhukov, and not the Germans. - S.K.) has his own affairs, I have mine.

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev.

The circumstances of the Smolensk battle have not been fully studied so far, and this is hardly accidental. Even the role of such major figures as Timoshenko and Zhukov is not objectively covered. This is all the more true in terms of the role and meaning of the actions of the commanders of all five operational army groups formed during the battle of Smolensk.

I cannot dwell on the Battle of Smolensk in detail and will touch on this topic only to the extent that it is useful for a better understanding of L.P.'s diary. Beria, give the environment in which he had to work during the war.

GK. Zhukov, then commander of the Reserve Front.

2 This refers to the commanders of army groups, border generals of the NKVD I.I. Maslennikov and V.A. Khomenko.

3 See comment below.

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In the high-profile, so to speak, history of the Great Patriotic War, the name of the commander of only one "Smolensk" operational group remained - Major General Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovsky. The commander of the army group, Army Commander-30, Lieutenant General Vasily Afanasyevich Khomenko, although he died later in battle, in the eyes of the Khrushchevites was "tainted" by the fact that he was a member of the "team" of Beria's combat comrades-in-arms. Lieutenant General Ivan Ivanovich Maslennikov, Army Commander-29 and Beria's deputy, is out of the question at all. A year after the arrest of Beria, Maslennikov, in anticipation of the inevitable arrest, had to shoot himself in order to defend his officer's honor. After that, his name was deleted from the history of the war.

There remain two group commanders - Lieutenant General Commander-28 Kachalov and Commander-25 Kalinin. And it doesn't hurt to take a closer look.

In his "Memoirs and Reflections" sample of the 70s, Marshal Zhukov wrote this:

"Against the army group of V.Ya. Kachalov, consisting of three divisions... the enemy abandoned a group of 9 divisions...

"Group of V.Ya. Kachalova found herself in a difficult situation, not many managed to retreat and join their own. In these battles, the commander of the group, General V.Ya., died a hero's death. Kachalov.

Well, it seems to be quite a worthy battle epitaph. But here's the problem! If we turn to the report of the Commander of the Reserve Front, General of the Army G.K. Zhukov to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin No. 2402 of August 19, 1941, then we read the following:

"...I believe that the enemy knows very well the entire system of our defense, the entire operational-strategic grouping of our forces, and knows our immediate capabilities.

Apparently, among our big workers, who are in close contact with the general situation, the enemy has his own people. Apparently, Kachalov and Ponedelin play a criminal role in this case. According to the story of the participants in the battles of the Kachalov group, Kachalov, as soon as they appeared

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small groups of the enemy, got into the T-34 tank and left in an unknown direction. Everything points to the fact that Kachalov deliberately went over to the side of the Germans. In the T-34 tank, in which Kachalov left, he forbade even his personal adjutant to sit down ... "

What does it mean? And like this...

On August 16, 1941 (as we can see, this was even before Zhukov's information to Stalin, that is, independently of it), the order of the Supreme Command Headquarters No. 270 was issued, read in all companies, squadrons, batteries, squadrons, teams and headquarters .

Here is the beginning:

"Not only friends recognize, but our enemies are also forced to admit that in our war of liberation against the Nazi invaders, units of the Red Army, their vast majority, their commanders and commissars behave impeccably, courageously, and sometimes downright heroically. ..."

Further, in Stalin's order, as examples of military prowess, the names of the deputy commander of the troops of the Western Front, Lieutenant General Boldin, were cited (Former commander of the Western Front, Pavlov, and chief of staff of the front, Klimovskikh, had already been shot, and Boldin fought excellently until the end of the war. - S.K.), Commissar of the 8th Mechanized Corps of the Brigadier Commissar



Popel, Commander of the 406th Rifle Regiment Novikov, Commander of the 3rd Army, Lieutenant General Kuznetsov, and Commissar of the 2nd Rank Biryukov, a member of the Military Council of the Army.

But then the order spoke of the "shameful facts of surrender to the enemy." And the first name was given to the commander of the 28th Army, Lieutenant General Kachalov, who "showed cowardice, ... preferred to surrender, preferred to desert to the enemy ...".

However, on December 23, 1953, the Special Presence of the Supreme Court of the USSR recognized that the accusations against Kachalov were false. The fact of his death in battle was officially established and all charges dropped.

Here a reader familiar with the biography of L.P. Beria, maybe

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say, "Wait, wait! What a coincidence! After all, December 23, 1953 is ... "

Yes, December 23, 1953 is the date of the official execution of L.P. Beria and the actual execution of his six associates. And for some reason, the official rehabilitation of General Kachalov fell on that day, which...

What is the rehabilitation in 1953 of the second former commander of one of the five "Smolensk" operational groups, Lieutenant General Kalinin (about him a little later).

Strange! 12 years have passed since the death of Kachalov, 8 of them since the end of the war. And suddenly, only in December 1953, and even on the day of the "execution of the Berievshchina," the truth was revealed? It, of course it might.

Maybe not!

Kachalov died on August 4, 1941. And on August 3, 1941, at 20.30, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, by directive No. 00679 signed by Shaposhnikov, prescribed "Kachalov's group consisting of the 145th and 149th divisions, the 104th tank division and all units of the reinforcement of the group (Selection is mine. - S .K.) ... transfer from the troops of the Western Front to the Reserve Front.

At the same time, on July 29, 1941, the Headquarters, by directive No. 00579 signed by Zhukov, ordered the commander of the 28th Army (that is, the same Kachalov) "...30.07. to accept into the army the 52nd Cavalry Division (Cavalry Division. - S.K.) ... and the 21st Cavalry Division (Mountain Cavalry Division. - S.K.) ... ".

Upon concentration in the initial areas no later than August 2, 1941, these divisions were instructed "to use the enemy grouping operating against the group of comrade. Kachalova ... ".

That is, on August 3, 1941, Kachalov had at his disposal not only three divisions, which Zhukov recalled in 1970, but also reinforcement units, plus two fresh cavalry divisions, designed to operate against the rear of the opposing German group.

Of course, it is easy to be a strategist, seeing the battle from the side, and even at a distance of seventy years. But still, taking into account the foregoing, the appearance of General Kachalov, completely exhausted and placed by the environment in a hopeless situation by August 4, 1941, is somehow not outlined.

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Kachalov, apparently, really died, and did not surrender (by the way, already in 1945 the fact of the absence of his capture could be established absolutely exactly), but it is by no means excluded that he died, nevertheless moving towards the Germans. And those, foolishly, and gouged at the "thirty-four" rushing towards them ... You never know what she has in mind!

Vladimir Yakovlevich Kachalov (1890-1941), who was born in the village of Gorodishche in the Penza province, did not come from the peasantry, I guess. From 1911 to 1912 he served in the army (obviously as a volunteer). After the outbreak of the First World War, he graduated from the ensign school and fought on the Romanian front, rising to the position of commander of an infantry regiment. Since 1918, in the Red Army, during the Civil War, he rose to the position of chief of staff of the 2nd Cavalry Army. From April 1938 - commander of the North Caucasian, and from June 1940 - the Arkhangelsk military districts. Since the beginning of the war - the commander of the 28th Army of the Western Front.

For me personally, he is a figure not clarified. And as for L.P. Berry - I don't know.

Now - about the fifth commander of the army group, commander-25, the same age as Kachalov, Stepan Andrianovich Kalinin (1890-1975). Born in the village of Pankratovka, Yegoryevsky district, Moscow province, he also, as I guess, did not come from peasants. In 1912 he entered the army, in 1917 he graduated from the Pskov school of ensigns, in the Red Army - since 1918. Kalinin's service in the Red Army was no less successful than that of Kachalov, and in 1938 Kalinin also commanded the military district - Siberian, and with the outbreak of war he began to command the 25th Army of the Western Front.

From August 1941, Kalinin was the assistant commander of the troops of the Western Front, from November 1941, the commander of the Volga, and from March 1944, the Kharkov military districts. However, in June 1944 he was removed from his post and arrested.

Why all of a sudden? During the war, there were 145 evacuated military schools in the Volga Military District,

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it was a forge of army personnel, and Kalinin seemed to be honestly training them. And here is the arrest, investigation, in 1951 deprivation of military rank and 25 years in labor camps.

Av 1953 - rehabilitation with the removal of a criminal record and in 1954 - transfer to the reserve. It is also a dark, unexplained fate.

I do not rule out that Kachalov and Kalinin had an agreement in 1941, which was discovered only in 1944.

After all, one of the first tasks of the People's Commissar of the NKVD of the USSR and a member of the State Defense Committee L.P. Beria (he, however, had a dozen such "firsts") had the task of identifying how true the very responsible statement of Army General G.K. Zhukov, made by him on August 19, 1941 in a report to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin.

I remind you that Zhukov said then:

"...I believe that the enemy knows very well the entire system of our defense, the entire operational-strategic grouping of our forces, and knows our immediate capabilities.

Apparently, among our big workers, who are in close contact with the general situation, the enemy has his own people. Apparently, Kachalov and Ponedelin are playing a criminal role in this case..."

But Zhukov had the right only to express suspicions. And it was Beria who had to establish whether they were justified!

At the end of the comment, a little additional information. Order No. 270 dated August 16, 1941 and Zhukov's report to Stalin dated August 19, 1941 also mention Lieutenant General Ponedelin, former commander of the 12th Army, who surrendered as a prisoner, and in order No. 270 also the commander of the 13th Rifle Corps Major General Kirillov.

Both really surrendered in brand new general's tunics, but without awards (and Ponedelin, for example, had the Order of Lenin and two Red Banners). Both behaved in captivity with little dignity, and after the war, in 1945,

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unlike many other captured Soviet generals, they did not go through the filtration at the Lubyanka and after a long investigation in 1950 were shot. The Khrushchevites rehabilitated them, but they did rehabilitate many, and those who were not rehabilitated by them were rehabilitated by the Gorbachevites.

And here's another example. On September 4, 1941, in the presence of Shaposhnikov, in a conversation over a direct wire with the commander of the Leningrad Front, Voroshilov and Zhdanov, Stalin said: "Your chief of staff does not inspire confidence in us both militarily and politically. Find a replacement for him today and send him to our disposal ... "

This is about Lieutenant General Markian Mikhailovich Popov (1902-1969), who, unsuccessfully commanding the Northern (Leningrad since August 23, 1941) front, "rolled back" it to the outskirts of Leningrad. Popov had two weaknesses: alcohol and women (a classic recruitment kit, by the way), and they dealt with him for three months. On December 18, 1941, Popov received the 61st Army and participated in the offensive phase of the Moscow Battle, then he commanded the fronts, but even taking into account the military leadership talent that manifested itself during the war, he did not rise above the rank of Army General (August 26, 1943) , daitogo was deprived in 1944. He ended the war as chief of staff of the 2nd Baltic Front.

But the return of Popov to the ranks in 1941 is also Beria's business. As, perhaps, Popov's recall to Moscow. But such were the duties of the People's Commissar of the NKVD: if you don't check, don't trust.

25/USh-41

He finally convinced Koba that troops should be sent to Iran immediately. We can get major sabotage in Baku. Koba gave the order. Tomorrow we start input. The border with Iran is additionally covered. It would be necessary to strengthen with Turkey, but there is nothing.

Koba said no negotiations with these assholes..

tsami, forward without talking!. If they start shooting, suppress by force of arms. I support. This operation must be carried out tick for tick and quickly. We know where the main bases of saboteurs are, so we will liquidate quickly, my guys are already in place. Now Fritz x..y without oil, not Baku.

The British are also sending troops?.

6/1X-41

Something is not right with us. Leningrad is under fire, Kyiv is under threat, near Smolensk it sucks. It turns out well near Yelnya, but that's how to say it. In Ukraine, he is still pressing. Tough war. Mykyta pissed himself up to his ears, now he promises that they will die and Kyiv will not be surrendered. Fool. Don't give up Kyiv, and live. So spoiled, so spoiled.

Koba had the English. Crips \* (Correctly "Cripps." - S.K.). They promise to help. While we help

1 Soviet troops were brought into northern Iran in accordance with Article 6 of the Soviet Iranian treaty of February 26, 1921, which declared canceled its treaties with tsarist Russia that infringe on the sovereignty of Iran. However, the RSFSR reserved the right to send troops to the territory of Iran if "...there are attempts from third countries...to turn the territory of Persia into a base for military actions against Russia." And this is exactly what happened: the Germans, who feel at ease in Iran, were already preparing actions to destroy the Baku oil fields, oil storages, refineries, oil pipelines, etc.

On August 226, 1941, British paratroopers occupied the oil fields of Southern Iran.

3 Although the exact meaning of this entry about Khrushchev (it is no doubt about him) is not clear, it can be assumed that Beria was referring to some assurances from Khrushchev in May 1941 that the Germans were not going to fight. The presence of this, as well as several more deadly for Khrushchev entries in the diary of L.P., Beria does not undermine my hypothesis about the presence of gaps in this diary. I remind the reader that, according to "Pavel Lavrentievich", the original was a separate sheet, so some records could be archived by Khrushchev's "censors".

\* Cripps Richard Stafford (1889-1952), British Ambassador to the USSR in 1940-1942.

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to themselves. Shitty with rifles. Some stupid ... b brought millions of rifles almost to the border! Maybe a traitor, one x..y. Search is useless. Rifles must be made.

I don't understand. Ordinary people work like heroes. They report to me that they don't leave the shops for days. And there is a result. And here sits a big bump and tells you that this can not be done. No, Comrade Beria, we cannot give 5,000 rifles a day. Snot you finger fucking .. naya. I ask you how you are going to do it, I do not ask you whether you can or cannot. If necessary, I will help. But you do it. No, you can't Comrade Beria, this period is unrealistic.

I understand that it is not real. And you make it real. You are a Bolshevik, you have been trusted. You have all the rights given, act. We do not need six months, but immediately.

Then it turns out that it is possible. You find people, they will do it. They will make you 10 thousand, you organize them, figure it out. There is always a reserve. Intelligent guy Kirpichnikov!. Here is the change. I would take it straight to me. But smart people are also needed by others.

10/1X-41

At the front, where. And we have the usual mess, but we work. The main thing is to move the industry to the interior of the country and get things going. What has been built must be completed quickly. Where we expand the old, and where we build a new one out of nothing. Need to be done before winter?

I don't think the front will settle yet. We fight where it's good, and where not in piz..u. And he has not run out of steam yet, there is a lot of strength. We prepared the Mozhaisk line of defense, and pulled my divisions apart. If so, what to cover?

Pl. Kirpichnikov, one of the deputy chairmen of the State Planning Committee of the USSR.

On September 211, 1941, the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR "On the Construction of Industrial Enterprises in Wartime Conditions" was adopted.

Koba decided to replace Klim with George!. Georgy showed himself well, and Koba said that Klim would be useful in negotiations with the British? He says that he is our chief master in this case, and will wipe Molotov's nose?

27 /1X-41

To have a rest now in the mountains I would drop everything and fly, if I could. It is forbidden. I now have the most working places tongue, ears and ass. Lawrence is there, Lawrence is here. Comrade Beria must, Comrade Beria immediately.

How much will this wheel be like a squirrel's? The squirrel runs, runs, gets tired - rests. And I have no rest, spinning and spinning. I see again, it's good that I picked up people in the People's Commissariat. They work well.

On September 11, 1941 at 19.10 Stalin sent a directive to Voroshilov, Commander of the Leningrad Front, and Zhukov, Commander of the Reserve Front, to replace Voroshilov with Zhukov and to appoint Lieutenant General Khozin, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Leningrad Front.

2 In Moscow, by the end of September 1941, an Anglo-American delegation was expected to arrive at a conference of representatives of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain, assembled on the initiative of US President F.D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister W. Churchill.

3 This is an interesting fact! It is believed that Voroshilov was replaced by Zhukov solely on the basis, so to speak, of Voroshilov's "professional unsuitability". However, as we can see, the explanation was somewhat different... Voroshilov really did not fit the role of commander of a great war, but in Leningrad he commanded not so badly, although not more than that. On the other hand, Voroshilov, with his experience in negotiations, his official visit to England as the People's Commissar for Defense of the USSR, and his undoubted charm, was needed by Stalin in Moscow as a member of the Soviet delegation at the upcoming negotiations. Time was required to prepare for the negotiations, and there was not much time left before the arrival of the Anglo-Saxons (on September 28, 1941, the delegations of the USA and England were already in Moscow).

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30/1X-41

Vyacheslav confers with the guests!. Koba too. My diplomacy is simple. Give it all. I need to help. But give, in the Lord God, a mother and an immaculate conception!

For Koba, the main thing from me now is Airplanes. And Tanks. And mortars. More Rifles and Machine Guns. Give people too. Vannikov? Well done. It happens with a fool, but it pulls well. If tightened, everything works well. It's bad that the war pulls someone up, whom it babbles. And there is like a g..vna bag, you can't take anything. Even with a bullet.

Kyiv is gone. And here is a miss..I Mykyt. The man has a lot of pressure and he seemed to know the business. And how the Thunderstorm came, prosr ... I. Command now from Kharkov. No matter how they and Kharkov didn't miss.. Ali"".

The front is none of my business. But you can't tell your head. Think. So far, there is no direct movement to Moscow. Fritz occupies Ukraine and presses in the north. What if they go to Moscow again? There is data. Of course, he needs to occupy Ukraine and Donbass. But he immediately turned to Moscow. Where will he go next? There is no faith in foreign intelligence here. I told Kobe so, he understood. They can vilely

1 From September 29 to October 1, 1941, an allied conference of the USA, Great Britain and the USSR was held in Moscow. A protocol on mutual military deliveries was signed. The US delegation was headed by the Special Representative of the US President in the rank of Ambassador Averell William Harriman (1891-1985), in 1943-1946. US Ambassador to the USSR. The British delegation was headed by Lord Beaverbrook, Minister of War Supplies. On October 1, 1941, Stalin and Molotov gave a reception in honor of the guests.

2 Vannikov Boris Lvovich (1897-1962), in 1941 Deputy People's Commissar of Ammunition of the USSR, before that People's Commissar of Armaments of the USSR. At the beginning of June 1941, Vannikov was dismissed as having failed to do his job and arrested, but already on July 25, 1941 he was released and was initially appointed Deputy People's Commissar of Ammunition P.N. Goremykin, and from February 16, 1942 - People's Commissar.

See also entries dated 23 October 1940 and 26 May 1941.

3 Kyiv was surrendered on September 19, 1941.

On October 43, 1941, Soviet troops left Orel, on October 6 - Bryansk, on October 25 - Kharkov. On October 17, 1941, the Kalinin Front was created, since there was a threat of an attack on Moscow not only from the west, but also from the north-west.

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rely on disinformation. Here you need to spread your brains around the situation. And how to spread. One division stands rooted to the spot (So in the text. - S.K.), the other army is running. Koba swears, says x..evo while we are at war.

And if he goes to Moscow?! Will he be able to reach Moscow? We can't do without Moscow, that's all. How much we give one weapon.

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev.

Operation Typhoon, according to Hitler's plan, was supposed not only to complete the 1941 campaign, but also to completely defeat the Red Army and give Moscow to the Fuhrer. To this end, Army Group Center was reinforced to the maximum, including the 4th Tank Group and the Aviation Corps from Army Group North, two tank and two motorized divisions from Army Group South, and two tank formations from the reserve of the Main command of the Ground Forces.

In general, 64% of all German mobile formations operating on the Soviet-German front were concentrated in the Army Group Center, and it had superiority over the troops of the three Soviet fronts in manpower 1.4 times, in artillery - at 1.8; vtanks - in 1.7; in airplanes — 2 times.

The Western Front was commanded by Colonel General I.S. Konev, Reserve - Marshal S.M. Budyonny, Bryansky - Lieutenant General A.I. Eremenko.

The tasks of the Headquarters were contradictory. On the one hand, Stalin directed the troops to the defense, on the other hand, to the offensive. Actually, it was not so contradictory! The best defense is an attack, and a successful attack in the face of a possible enemy offensive is ensured only from the positions of a well-fortified defense. However, both the command and the troops

' Just in those days when Beria was thinking about where the spearhead of the Wehrmacht's autumn offensive would be directed, the Germans were finishing preparations for Operation Typhoon, an attack on Moscow.

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the importance of the moment was not imbued. The German attack was unexpected.

The German offensive began on September 30 in the Bryansk Front, and the general offensive began on October 2. The Battle of Moscow began, in the first phase of which the Germans approached Moscow, and in the second phase the front stabilized near Moscow. From December 5 to January 7, a powerful counteroffensive of the Soviet troops continued, and this offensive impulse lasted until the end of April 1942, after which the Soviet-German front temporarily stabilized.

5/X-41

The position is rubbish again. Koba summoned George from Leningrad!. George has grown a lot in these months. Koba appreciates it. Sometimes rude, but he knows his business. Now this is the main thing.

Fritz even surprises me. When will he breathe? A great force has been gathered. Hit hard first. And again such blow. They know how to fight, bastards.

If we can stand it, consider we are in Berlin, the question is when. Will we survive? And where are we going. We will endure. And we'll punch them in the face.

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev.

Zhukov's call to Moscow was timely. Already in the first week of the German offensive on Moscow, a virtual disaster again occurred at the front, and primarily because of the lethargy of the command at the front-army level. Part of the armies of the Western, Reserve and Bryansk fronts in the area of Vyazma and Bryansk was surrounded. The way to Moscow was open. Stalin, as a sin, fell ill.

Knowing the history of the war and the real advantages and disadvantages of the entire galaxy of Soviet commanders of the Stalinist military school (and such a school brilliantly formed and strengthened during the war years), we can say that, apart from Zhukov

On October 15, 1941, Stalin called the commander of the Leningrad Front, G.K. Zhukov to Moscow to "consult on the necessary measures."

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then the situation could be pulled out only by Rokossovsky, who knew how to fight without a mat, but with the brilliance and faith of people. But then Rokossovsky was just beginning to enter Stalin's field of vision, and Zhukov was already in sight. Therefore, Zhukov's tough actions near Moscow in October 1941 generally provide him with a grateful memory of posterity.

On October 10, 1941, at 17:00, the Supreme Command Headquarters directive No. 002844 was issued to unite the Western and Reserve fronts into the Western one with the appointment of Zhukov as commander, and the former commander of the Western Front, Konev, as his deputy. Members of the Military Council of the front were N.A. Bulganin (then deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR), I.S. Khokhlov (Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR) and Deputy People's Commissar of the NKVD S.N. Kruglov.

Two days before that, on October 8, Stalin decided to prepare to undermine up to a thousand Moscow enterprises. Taking into account the real development of events, this fact testifies to the fact that at the beginning of the second week of October 1941, Stalin again experienced a severe crisis, and although he did not give up, he to some extent lost his spirit.

You can understand it. Stalin was already sure that the fronts would withstand the new German attack, that the hardest part was over. And suddenly it turned out that the military leaders and their troops had failed the country for the second time.

Nevertheless, the most correct decision would be to immediately turn Moscow into a fortress and conduct street battles. In the autumn of 1942, the hopes for a German victory finally burned out in the flames of Stalingrad, and Moscow could have become an even tougher nut to crack for the Germans in 1941.

And the actual state of affairs was not hopeless, which the coming weeks confirmed: already two months after the start of the German offensive, our victorious counter-offensive near Moscow began.

One way or another, the crisis of spirit was overcome by Stalin in two or three days. Zhukov's confidence in the ability to defend Moscow also played a role, which he assured Stalin of not only as a Bolshevik, but also as a professional.

The crisis of command and troops at the front in its most acute phase (complete confusion) was also considered

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these days have been overcome. A serious reversal of the situation began in our favor.

The severity of the moment is well conveyed by two directives of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command to the Military Council of the Western Front of October 27, 1941, separated by only two (!) hours.

At 14.50 directive No. 004149 was issued:

"The headquarters learned that you surrendered to the enemy troops in the amount of one infantry regiment of art. Volokolamsk. The Stavka considers this a shame for the Western Front. The Headquarters orders you to defeat the enemy at st. Volokolamsk from the air and ground units, mobilize all forces and clear st. Volokolamsk from enemy units. The headquarters is waiting for your reports on the release of art. Volokolamsk. STALIN! VASILEVSKY".

On May 17, Directive No. 0041562 was issued:

"In order to cancel order No. 004149, the Headquarters temporarily removes the task of immediately dealing with Art. Volokolamsk and categorically demands a strong defense of the eastern bank of the river. Lama in order to keep the city of Volokolamsk at all costs.

STALIN VASILEVSKY"

Volokolamsk was then surrendered, however, the front line stabilized somewhat east of the city before the start of our December counteroffensive. And on December 20, 1941, Volokolamsk was liberated.

In Khrushchev's times, even some marshals (of Khrushchev's production) had the audacity to assert that at the time of the first failures, all documents of the Headquarters allegedly went under the signature of only Shaposhnikov, and Stalin began to put his signature only after successes began to appear in a continuous strip.

I draw the reader's attention to the numbers of directives: 004149 and 004156. In two hours, the Headquarters, despite the difficult situation near Moscow, prepared, in addition to these two directives, six more. After all, the war did not wait, and the struggle went on along the entire front from the Arctic to the Crimea.

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It must be said that the information of the army command about the state of affairs was not always objective and accurate. Therefore, the NKVD organs and the Special Departments of the NKVD fell under the obligation to accurately inform Stalin. That is why he sometimes knew the situation better than the commanders of fronts and armies. Of course, this was useful for the cause, but this did not increase the love of the army command for Beria.

6/X-41

They have already reported for sure that Mikheev died in battle !. Died for sure. I know Mikheev, he wouldn't let him get in alive. Or just died, or shot himself, or held someone with a strict order to shoot if anything. He was a good guy. Only we gave him a Commissar to work and work for him, but war is war. I had high hopes for this guy. Victor? smart guy, but he needs control. And Mikheev was a solid guy, with a strong core. It's a pity. We're losing people. Eternal glory to him.

1 Mikheev Anatoly Nikolaevich (1911 - 23.09.1941), commissar of the State Security Service of the 3rd rank (19.7.1941), son of a railway watchman in the Arkhangelsk region, In September 1928 he entered the Red Army. He graduated from the Leningrad Military Engineering School (1931) and 4 courses of the Military Engineering Academy. V.V. Kuibyshev (1939). Member of the CPSU (b) since 1932. After joining the NKVD, Beria was sent by party recruitment to the NKVD bodies. From February 1939 he was the head of the Special Department of the Orel Military District, from September 1939 he was the head of the Special Department of the Kyiv Special Military District. In 1940-1941. head of the 4th department of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR (Special departments). Since February 1941, after the separation from the NKVD of a separate People's Commissariat of State Security, military counterintelligence was not included in the NKGB, but was transferred to the structure of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR as the 3rd Directorate of the NPO under the leadership of A. N. Mikheev. After the unification of the NKVD and the NKGB on July 20, 1941 and the return of the Special Departments to the NKVD of the USSR, Mikheev was appointed



Department of the NKVD of the South-Western Front and died in battle when leaving the encirclement (according to some reports, he shot himself).

2 Most likely, this refers to Beria's deputy Viktor Semyonovich Abakumov (1908-1954), then head of the Department of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR, then head of the Smersh Main Directorate of the NPO of the USSR and Minister of State Security of the USSR.

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13/X-41

There was a big conversation. Again he proved to Kobe that blowing up the city and leaving is not the point! We won't really blow it up, because we already have experience, when we move back, it's a mess. A recent example is Kalinin. Khomenko? called me, they fled the city shamefully?. And you are running from Moscow." And we need to organize our defense more strongly in case of street fights. Even if they enter Moscow, they will not leave. We know every hatch here, at night you can go into the rear and you can go around. Did you sit down with Shiryaev? and tankers. If the tanks retreat, you can use them as firing points. You can fight in the city. Moreover, we will not let them in here. They won't enter.

A mess like never before. If you look at what is hands down. You have to think what will happen. And when you think what will happen, x..y rises. Whatever one may say, but we have one thing left. Since he has reached Moscow, we must reach Berlin.

On October 8, 1941, the GKO Decree was adopted on the organization of a group of five headed by Deputy People's Commissar of the NKVD Serov "to hold special events for the enterprises of the city". This meant preparations for the liquidation of 1,119 enterprises in Moscow, of which 412 enterprises were of defense significance or partially worked for defense.

< Commander of the 30th Army, Major General of the Border Troops of the NKVD.

5 Operational command and control group of the 30th Army led by Commander V.A. Khomenko, arriving at 10.00 on October 13, 1941 in Kalinin (now Tver) to relocate the army headquarters, found there a really ugly picture not of evacuation, but of disorderly flight. More than a thousand policemen and NKVD officers also fled on the orders of the deputy. Chief of the UNKVD Shifrin and Chief of Police Zaitsev. The secretaries of the regional committee, including the 1st secretary Boytsov, the chairman of the regional executive committee and the head of the UNKVD for the Kalinin region, Major GB Tokarev, remained, however, in Kalinin, but they did not control the situation and began to act only after the decisive measures of Khomenko.

\* During the six months of the war, approximately 2,200,000 people were evacuated from Moscow in an organized manner and fled. At the same time, on January 8, 1942, 2,370,000 people lived in the city.

5 Shiryaev SI. (1907-?), major general, head of the department of fortified areas of the General Staff of the Red Army. On October 8 and 13, 1941, he took part in meetings with Stalin, at which Beria was also present.

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It sucks, what do you say. Koba lost his head again for a moment. I did not believe that we would hold Moscow. Ordered to prepare the liquidation of industry. I said let's do it, Comrade Stalin, but that's not the point. You have to STOP.

He says I know what I need. What if they don't? I say we must immediately strengthen Moscow. Here any house is like a fortified area. He looked at us with George! (Meaning G.M. Malenkov. - S.K.), he says, the thought is sensible. Shuruyte. Then he added: "Zhukov also assures us that we will not surrender Moscow."

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev.

October 13, 1941 from 13.15 Stalin had Molotov, Beria and Malenkov (from 13.20).

From 13.30 to 13.40 they heard the leaders of the Main Armored Directorate of the Red Army Fedorenko and Mishulin (the latter, commanding a tank division, distinguished himself in the August battles and was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union).

At 3:15 p.m., Chief of the General Staff Shaposhnikov appeared at Stalin, and from 3:25 p.m. to 4:30 p.m. a meeting was held, to which S.I. Shiryayev and the head of the Main Military Engineering Directorate of the Red Army L.Z. Kotlyar.

Shaposhnikov left at 16.30 with Kotlyar and Shiryayev. Twenty minutes later Molotov also left. Beria and Malenkov still remained with Stalin - until 17.00.

Most likely, then, in the last 10 minutes, the conversation took place, which is mentioned in the diary entry dated October 13, 1941.

1/X-41

But you x..y, not Moscow. The parade was held and will be held in a year! And in ten! And after a hundred! And we'll hold a Parade in Burley!

! See comment below.

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How the dirt was washed away. Koba is Genius! Another would think it's not time. And he said, it must be done. And they did it!

And the meeting was held?

'Just from Koba. Were there only Vyacheslav, Georgy and me? He said, comrades, we did not think a year ago that we would celebrate the October Anniversary in this way. But the main thing is that we celebrated it and will continue to celebrate it. And this scoundrel Hitler may mark the tenth anniversary of his Reich\* and celebrate, but he will not see the fifteenth anniversary! Then he looked at us, said, what fifteenth? What are we, for a year we can not manage?

Maybe we can manage. Three for sure!

Commentary by Sergei Kremlev.

Thick exclamation points in the entry for the 7th (actually, already for the 8th) November 1941 are quite understandable. The military parade of the troops of the Moscow garrison on November 7, 1941 on Red Square in honor of the 24th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution gave the country more than hope. He gave confidence in the future Victory. And the historical essence of this Parade turned out to be so great that even the bastard "Rossiania" is trying to hold "parades" in honor of this Parade, shamefacedly "forgetting" what event that Parade was held in honor of.

From the podium of the Mausoleum V.I. Lenin, the Chairman of the State Defense Committee and People's Commissar of Defense Stalin addressed the troops. It was then said to them:

"The war you are waging is a war of liberation, a just war. Let the courageous image of our great ancestors inspire you in this war -

1 See comment below. 2 See comment below.

From 0.10 to 0.40 on the night of November 7-8, 1941, in addition to his master, only Molotov, Malenkov and Beria were in Stalin's Kremlin office.

- Most likely, Stalin had in mind the countdown from 1933, when the Nazis came to power.

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Alexander Nevsky and Dimitri Donskoy, Kuzma Mivin and Dimitri Pozharsky, Alexander Suvorov and Mikhail Kutuzov! May the victorious banner of the great Lenin overshadow you!

The day before, on November 6, 1941, at the Mayakovskaya metro station (perhaps the most original station of the Moscow Metro), a solemn meeting of the Moscow Council of Workers' Deputies with party and public organizations of Moscow was held on the occasion of the 24th anniversary of the Great October Socialist revolution. The report was made by Stalin. At its beginning, he said: "... The period of peaceful construction is over. The period of the liberation war with the German invaders - MI ... "

The last words of the report were, perhaps, the most famous Stalinist words of the war:

"Our cause is just, the enemy will be defeated, victory will be ours!"

10/X1-41

X..evo x..evo, but we are working. And we beat the German, and we ourselves study, and success has been outlined. And people moved out. Bastards and dolbo ... bov much less. The war immediately showed. We thought about where to get people. And here they are, our people. Koba says we ourselves did not notice how the change was brought up. The old people asked .. ali, and the young pull, God forbid!

Parshin works well!. Tkachenko? well done too. The case was firmly set, there is a result. Koba says, say thank you, well done. Mortars to the front

ÿ Parshin Petr Ivanovich (1899-1970), statesman, since February 1939 People's Commissar of General Mechanical Engineering of the USSR. In November 1941, the people's commissariat was transformed into the people's commissariat for mortar weapons. Until the end of the state activity of L.P. Beria, Parshin was one of those who actively worked with Beria, including in the Atomic Project.

Khrushchev in 1957 sent this most experienced worker to retire.

2 Tkachenko I.M. (1910-1955), head of the 7th special department of the NKVD for KGB maintenance of the production of mortars. See also the entry about him dated June 12, 1947.

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they do a great job. No matter how many (So in the text. — S.K.) give, everything is not enough. He said I'll definitely pass it on. And I will add from myself! Airplanes are well made in Tbilisi. I told them that everything should only go beyond the plan. People in the cold Airplanes are made, and you have grapes. So work like animals, otherwise I'll come after the Victory, it will be bad.

Commentator help.

From November 16 to November 30, 1941 L.P. Beria is not noted in the journal of visits to the Kremlin office of I.V. Stalin. He appeared in it only on the night of December 1 at 0.50, when Stalin had only Molotov, Malenkov and Marshal Kulik. Kulik left after 40 minutes, and after 20 minutes Mekhlis was summoned to Stalin for 20 minutes. From 2.10 to 3.00 Stalin, Molotov. Malenkov and Beria were alone. There was something to talk about in a narrow circle.

From December 2 to December 24, 1941 L.P. Beria was again not noted in the journal of visits to the Kremlin office of I.V. Stalin. It can be assumed that during this period Beria worked in several directions at once. Perhaps he held a series of meetings at Moscow defense enterprises. Perhaps he periodically left Moscow to inspect the troops, clarify

the real state of affairs through the Special Departments of the NKVD, as well as to organize the actions of various units of the OMSBON in the course of our offensive that had begun, etc. but reported to Stalin face to face at the Kuntsevo dacha,

From December 25, 1941 until his departure on the 20th of August 1942 to the Caucasus as a member of the State Defense Committee and

1 In 1941, the production of mortars increased by almost four and a half times compared to 1940 - from 38,000 to 165,000!

2 From the end of 1941 to September 1948, the serial plant in Tbilisi produced the LaGG-3 fighters, and then the Yak-3.

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Representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command L.P. Beria took part in all - with the rarest exception - meetings with I.V. Stalin in his office.

25/ŷ1-41

Koba is busy with the front. I am also a front, more factories. The evacuated factories are already starting to work somewhere. While it is necessary to click on those that are. A prisoner from the 7th Infantry Division testified that the division was commanded by a chief lieutenant (senior lieutenant). Ordered blood from the nose to check. Checked. There was a fact. Told Kobe, he hears snoring contented. He says, yeah, and they got locked up. Don't worry, more will come soon!

11/HP-41

Are all pieces in the game now?. Roosevelt is war. Churchill (So in the text. - S.K.) is also a war. To, has it been going, has it been clear since August?. They are afraid that they will be left alone, and somehow distract Hitler from us. They need us. Accurate information just arrived from London. In April, through channels in America, Churchill planted misinformation on Hitler that Stalin wanted to attack Germany. To know this at least in May. Now it is clear why the Serbs were so intrusive towards us with their

1 At this time, preparations for the December counter-offensive of the Soviet troops near Moscow were already being completed.

On December 7, 1941, Japan attacked the possessions of the USA and the British Empire in the Pacific Ocean (Pearl Harbor, Hong Kong, Malaya, the Philippines, Guam, Wake, etc.). On December 8, 1941, Japan declared war on the United States and England, and on December 11, 1941, Germany and Italy declared war on the United States.

US President Roosevelt was well aware of Japan's plans to strike at Pearl Harbor, but deliberately put his fleet under attack in order to stir up isolationist public opinion in the US. Since the Second World War, like the First, was conceived in the interests of the United States, Roosevelt needed an excuse to directly involve the United States in military operations.

In the first half of August 1941, Roosevelt and Churchill met in the Atlantic Ocean. On August 14, 1941, the so-called Atlantic Charter was signed, saturated with hypocrisy, but directed against Germany.

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pact. It was not they who needed it, but Churchill. He gave us the same. The English can. In March there was misinformation, in June there was truth. It seems to be warning, like we need to say thank you. Bl..di! But now they will throw something at us from a weapon. From the black sheep. Okay, to hell with them, we'll see. So far, we are not advancing very much, but things are going on!

14/HP-41

Koba is building relations with the Poles?. In my opinion, they will be of use as from a goat of milk, a rotten people. His business. It sucks that I have a new concern to deal with this army of Anders? Today Pavel\* put a piece of paper on the table, Koba will have to be told that this is how my guys work. These mud..ki did not have time to scratch their tongues, but do we know what they were talking about ?. I always

On December 15, 1941, our counteroffensive began near Moscow.

On July 30, 1941, after the start of the Great Patriotic War, the government of the USSR and the London government in exile restored Soviet-Polish diplomatic relations. In November, the head of the London "government" and "commander-in-chief" of the "armed forces" of the "Polish Republic", General Sikorsky, appeared in the USSR. On December 1, he was received by Kalinin, and on December 3-4, 1941, talks were held in Moscow between Stalin and Molotov with Sikorsky and the Polish ambassador to the USSR Kot.

3 By agreement with Sikorsky, the formation of the Polish army from among Polish prisoners of war and other Polish citizens who were on Soviet territory began in the Soviet Union. On August 6, 1941, General Vladislav Anders was appointed commander of the army. By March 1, 1942, there were 3,090 officers, 16,202 sub-officers and 40,708 soldiers in the army, totaling about 60,000 people.

4 Without a doubt, we are talking about Pavel Mikhailovich Fitin (1907-1971), one of the leaders of Soviet intelligence. At the end of 1941, he served as head of the 1st (Intelligence) Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR.

5 Taking into account the date of the recording, most likely, this refers to Fitin's special message to Stalin, Molotov and Beria dated December 14, 1941, which cited the full content of the telegrams of the British Ambassador to the USSR Cripps to London dated December 6, 1941. Their text was received through the London agents of the NKVD. Cripps recounted his Moscow conversations with Sikorsky in detail, not even suspecting that by doing so he was providing the Soviet leadership with the most valuable information about the true mood of the London Poles. I will give only one

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I thought that you won't achieve much with the British (So in the text. - S.K.), and this Crips (That's right, "Cripps." - S.K.) is still that ferret. Sikorsky is just a bastard. And what to do, Koba ordered all the Poles to quickly collect and transfer to Anders. Thinks they will fight. X..y they will fight for the Russians. They did not fight for Poland.

Okay, without them there is a lot to do. What is said, let's do it. And then let him look. He'll get a zilch from Eden! I know the English better than anyone. Seen enough.

21/HP-41

Celebrated Koba's birthday. For the first time ever I saw him cheerful. Got a little drunk. It's good to live when we advance?, Tired for this month like a dog, worse than a dog. Dangled, dangled, and strength increased.

He even spread straws to Shakhurin. It turns out because of (So in the text. - S.K.) a trifle, things can become. Some kind of tubes, and you won't see the light through it, and without it there is no Airplane. Shakhurin rushed, Comrade Beria, help me out. George also asks, help, we can not find

well, the phrase of Cripps: "The General (Sikorsky. - S.K.) said under especially great secrecy that, on the basis of everything he had heard, he was absolutely sure of Stalin's deep distrust of the British government." I also note that in this completely confidential conversation there were absolutely no "Katyn", so to speak, motives.

, Beria looked into the water. On December 16-17, 1941, the "mission of Eden", the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Churchill's office, was in Moscow. The result was virtually zero. On November 21, 1941, Churchill assured Stalin in his letter that Eden was authorized to resolve any issue, including sending British troops to the south of the Soviet-German front. (First of all, we needed aviation). At first, the British meant only 10 air squadrons, but in the end they were not sent either, explaining the refusal by the fact that on December 8 Japan declared war on England, which was an empty excuse.

On November 29, 1941, Rostov-on-Don, surrendered on November 21, was liberated. On December 5, 1941, a successful counter-offensive of the Soviet troops near Moscow began. Solnechnogorsk was liberated on December 12, Klin on December 15, Kalinin on December 16, and Volokolamsk on December 20. On December 24, 1941, the Bryansk Front was restored by decision of the Supreme Command Headquarters.

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equipment lost. Found my guys, my phone was also hot, but found!.

Georgy said that he had seen Mykyta? He said that Koba invited Mykyta to the meetings, but he didn't invite him to the dacha. Can't forgive Kyiv. I haven't seen Mykyta yet.

Fuck it.. he is.

24 /HP-41

Dealing with old rubble. In October, materials were sent from London on work in the field of atomic energy. The conversations have been going on for a long time, but here it seems something is closer to the point. Allegedly serious work is already underway. It is reported that the force of the explosion will be enormously greater than that of conventional explosives. What does it mean in the greatest. Ten times? A hundred times? Or maybe a thousand times? It's not clear, let me clarify. I won't report anything to Kobe for now. Until then, and we need to figure it out 3. Maybe a lie. Let's see.

Tomorrow at Koba's, the question of the prisoners and the encircled must be raised. It's already in order. How to be? Clearly, we need filtration camps. And then? I think it is necessary after filtering to immediately transfer them to the formation. Let them redeem in battle. Special Department

1 Without a doubt, we are talking about N.S. Khrushchev, and Georgy is G.M. Malenkov.

2 I found an explanation of the meaning of this entry in the memoirs of the former People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry Shakhurin. The production of aircraft (which Stalin paid even more importance to than the production of tanks, because tank production was less technologically capacious) was suddenly threatened due to the lack of a special profile tube of small diameter for cooling radiators of aircraft engines, the so-called straw. As you can see, L.P. helped to eliminate this "bottleneck". Beria, whose apparatus was often involved in the operational search for equipment lost during the evacuation.

3 This is the first mention in the diary of L.P. Beria on intelligence information on foreign nuclear work. One of the first reports of Soviet intelligence on this topic fell on the People's Commissar's desk on October 10, 1941, when the Wehrmacht tank units were rushing towards Moscow.

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Ilamas of former prisoners to take note. Fights as it should, deregister. It crawls again, then you have to look!

26/HP-41

I met with Mykyta. I told him everything. I say, why did you make a fool of me in front of Comrade Stalin in May. "Comrade Stalin, they won't dare. Comrade Stalin, Lavrenty you

provokes." And what did you do?

It is gloomy, there is no smile. It's obvious that he's worried. He says, still you, Lavrenty. Comrade Stalin doesn't want to see it anyway. Hanging out like g..no in the hole without doing anything.

It became a pity for him. I say, okay, whoever remembers the old is out of sight. We, Mykyt, will fight together for a long time. Do not be offended, he said from the heart.

He cheered up, he says, I'll prove it. Everyone can make a mistake. Everyone was wrong. I say all but not all. Now just wave your hands. Now we have to work until the Victory.

' Most likely, the considerations that formed the basis of the GKO Decree No. GOKO-1069ss of December 27, 1941 are set forth here. It ordered the creation of NPO collection and transit points and four NKVD filtration camps "in order to identify among the former Red Army soldiers who were captured and surrounded by the enemy, traitors to the motherland, spies and deserters." The resolution entrusted NPOs with providing the organized camps of the NKVD with "premises, barracks equipment, bedding, food, heating, necessary uniforms and sanitation" (p. 6).

The most significant was paragraph 5: "Persons in respect of whom, after checking them by the Special Departments, no compromising materials are found, the heads of the camps should be transferred to the corresponding military commissariats - according to territoriality." In other words, even in the initial period of the war, a former prisoner of war did not automatically become an outcast.

2 This record was definitely hidden from the eyes of Khrushchev's censors. To do this, as I guess, was all the easier because Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites were primarily interested in the period before the war. Indeed, today there is reason to believe that Stalin's main disinformers regarding the intentions of the Germans for the summer of 1941 were, first of all, the commander of the Western Special Military District, General Pavlov, and then Khrushchev and, possibly, the 1st Secretary of the Central Committee CP(b) of Belarus Ponomarenko. The first one may have been connected with the Tukhachevsky conspiracy, and the last two simply looked into Stalin's mouth.

#### Publisher's Afterword

On this, the diaries of L.P. Beria for 1938-1941 actually ends (the last entry of 1941 will be made public a little later). And I just have to say a few words...

I must admit that, while working on preparing the diaries for publication, I turned over if not mountains, then certainly a couple of hills of documents, reference books, encyclopedias, memoirs, "memoirs", etc. Indeed, to begin with, it was necessary to at least minimally verify the authenticity of the diaries, and for this it was necessary to compare the dates and a number of circumstances that were by no means always well known. In addition, it was necessary to explain, and even decipher the meaning of many entries, etc.

Despite the fact that I have a good idea of the era of Stalin, its driving forces and motives, the heroes of that era and its traitors, much has been revealed to me in a new way, and some of what was previously seen in a foggy historical haze has acquired clear appearance.

I hope the reader will be able to say the same after reading the text of L.P. Beria and my comments on them.

The turbulent pre-war years, failures and victories of 1941 passed before us in their reflection in the diary of the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, member

at GKO L.P. Beria. And ahead of him and the whole country were another three and a half war years. This period is also reflected by L.P. Beria in his diary entries, and the reader will soon be able to

get to know them, because "Pavel Lavrentievich" gave me diaries for the war and post-war years. Preparations for their publication are nearing completion.

So, I hope, the dear reader is waiting, like me in due time, for new discoveries.

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Beria Lavrenty Pavlovich

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THE MAIN HISTORICAL SENSATION OF THE XXI CENTURY! Publication of the personal diary of L.P. Beria,  
which was supposed to be destroyed on the orders of Khrushchev, but, in full accordance with  
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more than half a century lay in the secret archives - and only

now that the muddy wave of "perestroika"

exposing, vilifying

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and anti-Soviet hysteria, handed over for publication to Sergei Kremlev, author of the best



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